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- ABSTRACT 
HUMAN REASONING! LOGICAL AND NONLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS. BY PAUL POLLARD 
This t h e s i s i s concerned w i t h subjects* responses t o 
psyc h o l o g i c a l 'reasoning* tasks. T h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f 
responses t o such tasks can be broadly categorised i n t o l o g i c a l 
e xplanations, t h a t assume t h a t s u b j e c t s perform an a n a l y s i s on the 
s t r u c t u r e o f the problem and n o n l o ^ i c a l explanations, t h a t e x p l a i n 
responses as determined by some, l o g i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t , f e a t u r e o f 
the problem. I n p a r t 1» data from r e l e v a n t reasoning s t u d i e s are 
reviewed w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference t o i d e n t i f y i n g separate e f f e c t s 
o f l o g i c a l and n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . I t i s concluded t h a t both 
f a c t o r s appear t o play a r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g responses. 
I n p a r t 2, seven experiments are presented i n f i v e chapters. 
The f i r s t chapter r e p o r t s experiments which o f f e r e d subjects the 
op p o r t u n i t y o f a f f i r m i n g or denying a set o f v a l i d or i n v a l i d 
inferences from a c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e * The r e l a t i v e I n f l u e n c e o f 
l o g i c a l and n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s was considered'.^and the r e s u l t s r e l a t e d 
t o comparable f i n d i n g s discussed i n y a r t 1. )The remaining chapters 
r e p o r t experiments on the e f f e c t o f p.erceived'J t r u t h s t a t u s o f a 
c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e on ' s e l e c t i o n task*\responses. Truth s t a t u s was 
manipulated both e x p e r i m e n t a l l y , by usb -of p r o b a b i l i t y l e a r n i n g 
tasks, and by use of r e l e v a n t thematic m a t e r i a l . L o g i c a l and non-
l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f r e s u l t s were t e s t e d i n l a t e r experiments 
and cin a s s o c i a t i o n theory developed t o e x p l a i n the main e f f e c t s . 
I n the general d i s c u s s i o n , the a s s o c i a t i o n theory i s 
discussai as a s p e c i a l case of the * a v a i l a b i l i t y ' theory o f IVersky " 
and Kahneman (1973). This general theory i s ap p l i e d to vairious 
e f f e c t s o f t r u t h s t a t u s and t o other n o n l o g i c a l responses. I t i s 
post u l a t e d t h a t such responses may be acquired because they have 
some u t i l i t y i n * r e a l l i f e * and t h i s hypothesis i s extended t o 
other types o f p r e f e r r e d responses. F i n a l l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between ' l o g i c a l ' and *n o n l o g i c a l ' f a c t o r s i s reassessed and i t 
i s concluded t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n may be a r t i f i c i a l , as p r a c t i c a l l y 
a l l p r e f e r r e d responses may be a f u n c t i o n o f simple cues t h a t the 
subj e c t has learned t o a t t e n d t o . 
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INTRODUCTION 
This t h e s i s i s concerned w i t h subjects' responses t o 
' l o g i c a l problems*. That i s , problems whose s t r u c t u r e may be 
analysed i n terms o f fo r m a l l o g i c . On the basis o f such a n a l y s i s , 
the subjects* response may be categorised ( w i t h c e r t a i n exceptions) 
as e i t h e r v a l i d or i n v a l i d . As w i l l be seen, subjects f r e q u e n t l y 
f a i l t o make the l o g i c a l l y v a l i d response and thus, from the stand-
p o i n t o f l o g i c , s u b j e c t s may be sai d t o make e r r o r s . 
Evans (1972a) has analysed explanations of these 
e r r o r s i n t o three main types, as f o l l o w s : 
1) L o g i c a l explanations assume t h a t the subject has 
m i s i n t e r p r e t e d the problem i n some way and t h a t he has 
'reasoned' i n accordance w i t h f ormal l o g i c on the basis 
of t h i s m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The response i s thus seen 
as the ' r i g h t * answer t o the 'wrong' question. 
2) I l l o g i c a l explanations assume t h a t the subject has 
employed an i n v a l i d ' s t r a t e g y ' . Such ' s t r a t e g i e s ' are 
o f t e n held t o be v a l i d i n a ' n a t u r a l ' , r e a l l i f e , , l o g i c . 
The subject i s thus seen as 'reasoning' l o g i c a l l y i n 
accordance w i t h an a l t e r n a t i v e system. A s l i g h t l y 
d i f f e r e n t form o f * i l l o g i c a l ' e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t the 
subject's ( i n v a l i d ) response i s due t o a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
e r r o r t h a t occurs d u r i n g ( v a l i d ) a n a l y s i s o f the 
s t r u c t u r e o f the problem, 
3) Nonlogical explanations assume t h a t the response i s a 
r e s u l t a n t o f a l o g i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t i n f l u e n c e , 
u n r e l a t e d t o the s t r u c t u r e o f the problem. The subject 
i s thus not seen as perfoming any l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s on 
the problem 
I t w i l l be noted t h a t the f i r s t two a l t e r n a t i v e s both 
assume t h a t the su b j e c t attends t o , and performs an a n a l y s i s upon, 
the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f the problem, whereas the t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e 
does not. The f i r s t two a l t e r n a t i v e s may thus be 'collapsed', 
producing a basic dichotomy between ' l o g i c a l ' and ' n o n l o g i c a l ' 
explanations ( i n f a c t , Evans also adopts a s i m i l a r dichotomy). This 
dichotomy may be extended t o l o g i c a l l y v a l i d responses as, c l e a r l y , 
the subject may maJce a v a l i d response because he has c o r r e c t l y 
analysed the l o g i c a l s t m c t u r e o f the problem, or simply because some 
no n l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e f o r t u i t o u s l y leads t o the l o g i c a l l y c o r r e c t 
answer, 
Reference w i l l f r e q u e n t l y "be made t o l o g i c a l and 
n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . As d e f i n e d here, a l o g i c a l ( o r n o n l o g i c a l ) f a c t o r 
i s t h a t mediator of responses t h a t i s p o s i t e d by a l o g i c a l ( o r non-
l o g i c a l ) e x p l a n a t i o n . The r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f l o g i c a l and n o n l o g i c a l 
explanations, i n general, may thus be i n v e s t i g a t e d by e v a l u a t i n g the 
evidence f o r the e f f e c t o f var i o u s s p e c i f i c l o g i c a l and n o n l o g i c a l 
f a c t o r s . Such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s c a r r i e d out i n the h i s t o r i c a l 
review. As w i l l be seen, although i n c e r t a i n cases there i s 
reasonably c l e a r - c u t evidence f o r the i n f l u e n c e o f both l o g i c a l and 
n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , i n other cases there are competing l o g i c a l and 
n o n l o g i c a l explanations o f the same data. This 'competition' i s a 
theme t h a t continues i n t o the experimental s e c t i o n and i s a c e n t r a l 
t o p i c o f chapter 5» I n the general d i s c u s s i o n , however, l o g i c a l and 
n o n l o g i c a l e f f e c t s are considered separately and a t h e o r e t i c a l 
p o s i t i o n i s developed t l ^ suggests t h a t these f a c t o r s may have a sim-
i l a r source and t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between them i s f a r from c l e a r -
cut. 
PART 1 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 
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This review deals w i t h experiments which have presented 
subjects w i t h problems t h a t can be analysed i n terms o f f o r m a l l o g i c . 
Such tasks are t y p i c a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as 'reasoning tasks*. I n t h i s 
context, •formal l o g i c ' r e f e r s t o systems o f l o g i c t h a t may be traced 
back t o c l a s s i c a l philosophers, notably A r i s t o t l e , Before considering 
these problems i n more d e t a i l , a b r i e f e x planation o f the sub j e c t 
matter o f formal l o g i c i s i n order. 
Formal l o g i c i s concerned w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n s , A prop-
o s i t i o n has been de f i n e d as "anything which can be said t o be t r u e 
or f a l s e " (Cohen & Nagel. 193^) and, t o be s t a t e d , must be contained 
w i t h i n a sentence. Sentences and p r o p o s i t i o n s should not be confused, 
however, as d i f f e r e n t sentences may contain the same p r o p o s i t i o n ( f o r 
instance, 'David i s smaller than G o l i a t h ' and 'Goliath i s l a r g e r than 
David') and the same sentence may be used t o convey d i f f e r e n t 
p r o p o s i t i o n s ( f o r instance, the sentence 'my p a r t y should govern the 
country', u t t e r e d by persons having d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s ) . 
There are three basic 'laws' o f l o g i c t h a t apply t o 
p r o p o s i t i o n s : ' i f a p r o p o s i t i o n i s t r u e , i t i s t r u e ' (the p r i n c i p l e 
o f i d e n t i t y ) , 'a p r o p o s i t i o n cajinot be both t r u e and f a l s e ' (the 
p r i n c i p l e o f n o n c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) and ' a l l p r o p o s i t i o n s are e i t h e r t r u e 
or f a l s e ' (the p r i n c i p l e o f excluded middlfe). However, i t need not 
be known whether a p r o p o s i t i o n i s tr u e or f a l s e . The t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y o f a p r o p o s i t i o n may be the sub j e c t o f disagreement or may 
be only a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n the f u t u r e and i t may never be possible 
t o a s c e r t a i n the t r u t h or f a l s i t y o f c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n f a c t 
the concept o f absolute t r u t h or f a l s i t y i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o many 
p r o p o s i t i o n s . For instance, psychology and other s t a t i s t i c a l l y based 
branches o f science view t r u t h as a p r o b a b i l i s t i c , r a t h e r than absolute 
concept. However, whether a p r o p o s i t i o n i s t r u e or f a l s e i s not a 
question w i t h which the l o g i c i a n concerns him s e l f . The l o g i c i a n i s 
s o l e l y concerned w i t h sets o f p r o p o s i t i o n s stmictured i n the form o f 
l o g i c a l arguments, s p e c i f i c a l l y , w i t h whether such arguments are 
v a l i d or i n v a l i d . 
Copi (1972) d e f i n e s a l o g i c a l argument as "any group 
of p r o p o s i t i o n s o f which one i s claimed t o f o l l o w from the others, 
which are regarded as p r o v i d i n g grounds f o r the t r u t h of t h a t one". 
The p r o p o s i t i o n claimed t o f o l l o w from the others i s termed the 
conclusion and the other p r o p o s i t i o n s are termed premisses. Such 
arguments are v a l i d i f , and only i f , i t i s impossible f o r the premisses 
t o be t r u e and the conclusion f a l s e . The l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f an 
argument i s thus not nece s s a r i l y dependent on the a c t u a l t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y o f i t s components. I n the extreme cases, i t i s possible f o r 
a v a l i d argument t o be e n t i r e l y composed o f f a l s e p r o p o s i t i o n s , and 
f o r an i n v a l i d argument t o be e n t i r e l y composed of t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
Of p a r t i c u l a r importance i s t h a t the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y of an argument 
i s not dependent on the t r u t h or f a l s i t y o f i t s conclusion. 
The experiments r e p o r t e d i n t h i s review have 
i n v e s t i g a t e d the ex t e n t t o which human reasoning responses are i n 
accordance w i t h those responses i n d i c a t e d by l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . I n 
c l a s s i c a l terminology, chapter 1 concerns c a t e g o r i c a l syllogisms 
whereas much o f - chapter 2 i s concerned w i t h h y p o t h e t i c a l and 
d i s j u n c t i v e s y l l o g i s m s . However, c l a s s i c a l w r i t e r s concentrated 
almost e x c l u s i v e l y on c a t e g o r i c a l syllogisms and other forms have 
provided the basis f o r the ' p r e p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s ' developed by more 
recent l o g i c i a n s . Accordingly, the terms ' h y p o t h e t i c a l s y l l o g i s m ' 
and ' d i s j u n c t i v e s y l l o g i s m * are not used i n the t e x t and c a t e g o r i c a l 
syllogisms are r e f e r r e d t o simply as 'syllogisms'. 
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Although none of the experimental work reported i n 
l a t e r chapters i s d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h syllogisms, research on 
syllogisms i s included i n t h i s review. There are two reasons f o r 
t h i s . F i r s t l y the i n i t i a t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l research on syllogisms 
predates research i n other areas of reasoning and thus provides an 
h i s t o r i c a l p e r s pective. Secondly, i t w i l l be seen t h a t the issues 
r a i s e d by research on syllogisms are comparable t o those r a i s e d by 
reseatrch on the p r e p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s and t h a t any theory o f 
reasoning must attempt t o e x p l a i n data from both o f these areas. 
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SECTION 1.1 THE FORMAL LOGIC OF SYLLOGISMS; MOOD 
Syllogisms in v o l v e p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t a f f i r m or deny 
t h a t one class i s included i n another. The f o l l o w i n g are 
examples o f such p r o p o s i t i o n s : 
A l l cats are animals 
A l l cats are good pets 
These p r o p o s i t i o n s l i n k the clas s o f 'cats' w i t h the clas s 
of 'animals' and the class o f 'things t h a t are good pets'. They 
are both a f f i r m a t i v e and ' u n i v e r s a l ' ( t h a t i s , they apply t o the 
whole class o f c a t s ) and are termed 'A' p r o p o s i t i o n s . The negative 
L u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n , ' a l l cats are not good pets' 
( t r a d i t i o n a l l y expressed as 'no cat i s a good p e t ' ) i s termed an 
'E' p r o p o s i t i o n . I t i s also possible t o co n s t r u c t ('particular') 
p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t do not ne c e s s a r i l y apply t o the whole class; f o r 
instance: 'some cats are good pets' ( ' I ' type p r o p o s i t i o n s ) and 
'some cats are not good pets' ('0' type p r o p o s i t i o n s ) . Using A and 
B t o stand f o r any two classes, the f o u r types o f p r o p o s i t i o n are 
l i s t e d below: 
A l l A are B 
No A are B 
Some A are B 
Some A are not B 
( u n i v e r s a l , a f f i r m a t i v e ) 
( u n i v e r s a l , negative) 
( p a r t i c u l a r , a f f i r m a t i v e ) 
( p a r t i c u l a r , negative) 
The formal meaning o f 'some' i s 'at l e a s t some' and 
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thus the p r o p o s i t i o n 'some A are B' allows the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t 
' a l l A are B'. For t h i s reason, an I p r o p o s i t i o n does not imply 
an 0 p r o p o s i t i o n and vice versa. I t i s also worth n o t i n g t h a t , 
although 'no A are B' i m p l i e s t h a t 'no B are A' and 'some A axe B' 
i m p l i e s 'some B are A*, ' a l l A are B' does not imply t h a t ' a l l B 
are A' and 'some A are not B* does not imply t h a t 'some B are not 
A*. Put simply, i t i s v a l i d t o 'convert' E and I p r o p o s i t i o n s but 
i n v a l i d t o convert A and 0 p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
A s y l l o g i s m i s a deductive argument c o n t a i n i n g three 
p r o p o s i t i o n s o f the type discussed above. There are two premisses, 
having only three terms between them ( i . e . there i s a common middle 
term) and a conclusion having the two terms other than the middle 
term. For instance, the f o l l o w i n g i s a ( v a l i d ) s y l l o g i s m ; 
A l l a r t i s t s are p e r f e c t i o n i s t s 
A l l a r t i s t s are c r e a t i v e (people) 
• < Some c r e a t i v e people are p e r f e c t i o n i s t s 
The premisses have three terms ( ' a r t i s t e , ' p e r f e c t i o n i s t s * 
and ' c r e a t i v e people'); one o f these ( ' a r t i s t s ' ) i s a middle term 
and the other two are i d e n t i c a l t o the terms of the conclusion. 
The premiss c o n t a i n i n g the predicate (second term) o f the conclusion 
i s r e f e r r e d t o as the major premiss and the premiss c o n t a i n i n g the 
subject ( f i r s t term) o f the conclusion i s r e f e r r e d t o as the minor 
premiss. 
Each o f the three component p r o p o s i t i o n s may be any one 
of the f o u r types (A, E, I or O) and there are thus 6^ d i s t i n c t 
types o f syllogisms. These axe r e f e r r e d t o as moods. A simple 
way t o give the mood o f a syl l o g i s m i s t o express i t i n the form 
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o f three l e t t e r s , f o r instance, AIE, which d e f i n e s the mood o f the 
major premiss, the minor premiss and the conclusion, r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
S i m i l a r l y , the mood o f a premiss p a i r may be expressed i n the form 
o f two l e t t e r s . 
The conclusion o f a syl l o g i s m may be e i t h e r ( l o g i c a l l y ) 
v a l i d or i n v a l i d and there are a v a r i e t y o f formal r u l e s f o r 
determining whether a given conclusion i s v a l i d . However, the 
general r u l e i s t h a t a conclusion i s l o g i c a l l y v a l i d i f , and only 
i f , the conclusion must be t r u e i f both o f the premisses are t r u e . 
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SECTION 1 .2 EXIERIMENTS ON THE EFFECT OF *MOOD' 
Most psychological experiments on syllogisms have asked 
subjects t o evaluate a b s t r a c t syllogisms. That i s , l e t t e r s are 
used as the terms o f the c o n s t i t u e n t p r o p o s i t i o n s t o reduce e x t r a -
neous i n f l u e n c e s on the task. A l l experiments reported i n t h i s and 
the f o l l o w i n g sections have u t i l i s e d a b s t r a c t syllogisms unless 
otherwise s t a t e d . 
The f i r s t experiments o f t h i s type were performed by 
Woodworth & S e l l s ( 1935) and S e l l s ( 1 9 3 ^ ) . Subjects were asked t o 
describe given conclusions as e i t h e r 'absolutely t r u e * , "probably 
t r u e " (these being scored as agreement), 'indeterminate' or 'abso-
l u t e l y f a l s e ' (these l a t t e r being scored as disagreement). C l e a r l y 
the l o g i c a l l y c o r r e c t response would be t o agree w i t h v a l i d , and 
disagree w i t h i n v a l i d , syllogisms. 
The authors looked a t the percentage o f agreement w i t h 
the conclusions of i n v a l i d syllogisms. Some syllogisms were c o r r e c t l y 
evaluated ( i . e . disagreed w i t h ) by almost a l l the subjects. However, 
other syllogisms y i e l d e d up t o 80% i n c o r r e c t agreement. The type 
of conclusion i n c o r r e c t l y agreed w i t h v a r i e d g r e a t l y between 
syllogisms but was r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e , across su b j e c t s , on i n d i v i d u a l 
syllogisms. Thus, f o r each s y l l o g i s m , there appeared t o be a s p e c i f i c 
conclusion t h a t l e d subjects i n t o e r r o r . 
This p a t t e r n was explained i n terms o f an 'atmosphere 
e f f e c t ' : the drawing o f conclusions on the b a s i s o f the 'global 
impression' o f the premisses. This theory holds t h a t subjects w i l l 
agree w i t h a conclusion i f i t accords w i t h the 'atmosphere* o f the 
premisses. A f f i r m a t i v e (A or l ) premisses produce an ' a f f i r m a t i v e ' 
atmosphere', negative (E or O) premisses produce a 'negative atmos-
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phere', u n i v e r s a l (A or E ) premisses produce a ' u n i v e r s a l atmosphere* 
and p a r t i c u l a r ( l or O) premisses produce a ' p a r t i c u l a r atmosphere'. 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , p a r t i c u l a r and negative atmospheres were held t o be 
dominant so t h a t , i n combination, a u n i v e r s a l and a p a x t i c u l a r 
premiss tend t o produce a p a r t i c u l a r atmosphere and an cLffirraative 
and negative premisV tend t o produce a negative atmosphere. 
This theory was held t o account f o r almost a l l the data 
obtained. However, S e l l s noted t h a t p a r t i c u l a r conclusions were 
o f t e n agreed w i t h when both premisses were u n i v e r s a l . Accordingly, 
a f u r t h e r p r i n c i p l e , termed 'caution' was added. This was defined 
as a tendency t o p r e f e r 'weak' t o 'strong* conclusions. 
These explanations view subjects' reasoning responses 
as being determined by f a c t o r s other than l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . The 
c o r r e c t r e j e c t i o n o f some o f the i n v a l i d s y l l o g i s m s i s seem as 
p r i m a r i l y f o r t u i t o u s : subjects r e j e c t i n g the conclusion because 
i t d i d not accord w i t h the atmosphere of the premisses not because 
i t was i n v a l i d . The f a i l u r e o f subjects t o r e j e c t i n v a l i d conclus-
ions t h a t d i d accord w i t h atmosphere c l e a r l y lends s t r o n g support 
t o t h i s viewpoint. This agreement w i t h a conclusion on the basis 
of i t s 'atmosphere' may be r e f e r r e d t o as a response b i a s . More 
g e n e r a l l y , f o r the purposes of t h i s t h e s i s , a response bias i s 
d e f i n e d as 'a tendency t o adopt, or not adopt, a p a r t i c u l a r response 
a l t e r n a t i v e dependent upon i t s having, or not having, some l o g i c a l l y 
i r r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e ' . 
This view of subjects as being e s s e n t i a l l y incapable o f 
reasoning l o g i c a l l y on s y l l o g i s t i c tasks remained unchallenged f o r 
over two decades, u n t i l Chapman & Chapman ( 1959 ) put forward a 
fundamentally d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n . They pointed out t h a t , i f 
subjects were s e l f c o n s i s t e n t , the acceptance of a u n i v e r s a l conclus-
i o n would a u t o m a t i c a l l y lead them t o accept a p a r t i c u l a r conclusion 
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( t o the same p a i r o f premisses) presented i n a d i f f e r e n t p a r t o f 
the t ask. I t i s , however, c o n s i s t e n t t o accept a p a r t i c u l a r 
conclusion w i t h o u t accepting the u n i v e r s a l and thus acceptance o f 
( i n v a l i d ) p a r t i c u l a r conclusions would be expected t o be the most 
frequent type o f e r r o r . Observed preference f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
conclusions was thus argued t o be a f u n c t i o n o f the Woodworth & 
S e l l s methodology. 
Chapman & Chapman presented subjects w i t h p a i r s o f premisses 
and o f f e r e d them f i v e a l t e r n a t i v e conclusions;- one conclusion i n 
each o f the four- moods and a *none o f these* a l t e r n a t i v e . Subjects 
were asked t o choose one a l t e r n a t i v e only and thus could not a f f i r m 
both a u n i v e r s a l and a p a r t i c u l a r conclusion t o the same p a i r o f 
premisses. 
This design has been used by almost a l l subsequent experiments 
and w i l l henceforth be r e f e r r e d t o as the standard design. Subjects 
are e f f e c t i v e l y being asked t o co n s t r u c t one of f o u r possible syllogisms 
Premiss p a i r s t o which a t l e a s t one o f the given conclusions can be 
added t o form a v a l i d s y l l o g i s m are r e f e r r e d t o as determinate. I f 
no v a l i d s y l l o g i s m i s possible ( i . e . i f the c o r r e c t answer i s 'none 
of t h e s e ' ) , the premiss p a i r i s indeterminate. (A convention has 
a r i s e n i n the l i t e r a t u r e whereby premiss p a i r s alone are r e f e r r e d t o 
as sy l l o g i s m s , t h i s convention w i l l not be used, however, as i t can 
lead t o confusion.) 
Chapman & Chapman presented subjects w i t h 42 indetenninate 
premiss p a i r s . The p r i n c i p l e of caution was not confirmed. When 
both premisses were u n i v e r s a l s , s e l e c t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r conclusions 
was very i n f r e q u e n t . The p r e d i c t i o n s o f atmosphere theory were 
predominantly confirmed. The dominance o f p a r t i c u l a r atmosphere, 
however, was not always evident when one or more premiss was negative. 
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I n f a c t , f o r IE premiss p a i r s , the p r e f e r r e d conclusion was a 
u n i v e r s a l negative. The authors would thus seem to be c o r r e c t i n 
arguing t h a t the p r e v i o u s l y observed bias towards p a r t i c u l a r conclus-
ions was a f u n c t i o n of the design. 
The r e s u l t s of t h i s study were i n t e r p r e t e d as i n v a l i d a t i n g 
the atmosphere theory, the authors remaJ-king t h a t "since the atmos-
phere p r e d i c t i o n s are not s u b s t a n t i a t e d , we must look f o r other 
p r i n c i p l e s o f expla n a t i o n " . They o f f e r two main suggestions. F i r s t l y 
they proposed t h a t subjects i n t e r p r e t the premisses t o mean t h a t the 
converse i s tr u e (an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t i s l o g i c a l l y i n v a l i d f o r A 
and 0 p r o p o s i t i o n s ) and, secondly, t h a t subjects' responses are 
mediated by ' p r o b a b i l i s t i c i n f erence'. 
For a l l premiss p a i r s t h a t include an A premiss, the type 
of ( i n v a l i d ) conclusion p r e f e r r e d i s i n accordance w i t h both atmos-
phere theory and the conversion hypothesis. However, the conversion 
hypothesis cannot e x p l a i n the p r e f e r r e d conclusions f o r the remaining 
premiss p a i r s . To e x p l a i n these. Chapman & Chapman suggested t h a t 
subjects believe t h a t t h i n g s t h a t share a common property are r e l a t e d 
and t h a t t h i n g s t h a t l ack a common property are not r e l a t e d 
( • p r o b a b i l i s t i c i n f e r e n c e ' ) . For instance, i n the case of an 10 
premiss p a i r i n the second f i g u r e ('some A are B', 'some C are not B'), 
the subject reasons t h a t some A and some C do not share the common 
q u a l i t y o f B and, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t some C are not A. To support t h e i r 
ideas. Chapman & Chapman r e f e r r e d t o the way i n which subjects reason 
i n r e a l l i f e s i t u a t i o n s . To support the conversion hypothesis, they 
suggested t h a t t h e i r subjects' p r i o r experience of A p r o p o s i t i o n s was 
p r i m a r i l y obtained from mathematics courses i n which 'are' means 'are 
equal t o * and, i n support o f ' p r o b a b i l i s t i c i n f e r e n c e ' , they argued 
t h a t subjects tend t o accept probable conclusions r a t h e r than reason 
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i n an e n t i r e l y . d e d u c t i v e way. 
There are vari o u s c r i t i c i s m s t h a t may be l e v e l l e d a t 
' p r o b a b i l i s t i c i n f e r e n c e * . The authors remark t h a t they can only 
o f f e r ' i n t u i t i v e evidence' f o r t h e i r explanations, but i t i s f a r from 
' i n t u i t i v e l y evident' how the explanation f i t s some o f the data. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the authors give few exajnples, but not even a l l the 
examples chosen are s e l f evident. For instance, f o r two E premisses 
('no A are B'. 'no C are B')' the conclusion 'no C are A' i s held t o be 
a r e s u l t o f p r o b a b i l i s t i c inference as the middle term, B i s not 
shared. However, t h i s can hard l y be an example of subjects' ( r e a l 
l i f e ) tendency t o accept probable conclusions, as the l a c k o f q u a l i t y 
B i n both A and C increases ( a l b e i t m a r g i n a l l y ) the p r o b a b i l i t y o f 
t h e i r being r e l a t e d . I n f a c t , they both share the common q u a l i t y of 
non-B. 
The u n c l a r i t y o f the e x p o s i t i o n of p r o b a b i l i s t i c inference 
has been noted by most authors i n the area. The conversion hypothesis, 
however, has proved very popular. I t should be noted t h a t i t presents 
an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t view ( t o atmosphere t h e o r y ) o f subjects' 
reasoning a b i l i t i e s . Subjects are viewed as capable o f v a l i d reason-
i n g w i t h i n the framework of an a l t e r n a t i v e ' r e a l - l i f e ' l o g i c i n which 
A and 0 p r o p o s i t i o n s are defined as c o n v e r t i b l e . 
Many workers i n the f i e l d have endeavoured t o determine 
whether c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e r r o r s are best explained by the conversion 
or atmosphere hypothesis. 
Begg & Denny ( I 9 6 9 ) considered the question t o be e m p i r i c a l 
r a t h e r than t h e o r e t i c a l and focussed upon the discrepancies between 
the Chapman & Chapman data and those o f S e l l s . I n essence, there are 
two main d i f f e r e n c e s : 
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1) Chapman & Chapman found l i t t l e evidence o f a dominance 
of p a r t i c u l a r atmosphere when the argument contained an 
E premiss. 
2) Chapman & Chapman found no evidence f o r the 'caution* 
hypothesis ( t h a t there i s some b i a s towards p a r t i c u l a r 
conclusions, even when both premises are u n i v e r s a l ) . 
Begg & Denny reported r e s u l t s t h a t agreed w i t h the S e l l s 
data i n the case of ( 1 ) above and w i t h the Chapman & Chapmaji data i n 
the case of ( 2 ) . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Begg & Denny f a i l e d t o note the 
Chapman & Chapmaji argument t h a t the apparent preference f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
conclusions i s a f u n c t i o n o f a l l o w i n g subjects t o a f f i r m more than 
one conclusion t o the same premiss p a i r , Begg & Denny allowed subjects 
t o a f f i r m more than one'-conclusion and thus the d i f f e r e n c e s between 
t h e i r data and those o f Chapman & Chapmaji were wholly c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
the l a t t e r ' s arguments. 
S i m i l a r l y , t h a t Begg & Denny d i d not observe an e f f e c t o f 
* caution* does not c o n s t i t u t e a f a i l u r e t o r e p l i c a t e the S e l l s data. 
Begg & Denny asked subjects t o choose one or more conclusions t o a 
premiss p a i r , whereas S e l l s presented subjects w i t h separate syllogisms 
I t may w e l l be t h a t p a r t i c u l a r conclusions t o u n i v e r s a l premiss p a i r s 
are only a f f i r m e d when there i s no a l t e r n a t i v e . 
Both Simpson & Johnson ( I 9 6 6 ) and D i c k s t e i n (1975) 
attempted t o s p e c i f i c a l l y t r a i n one group of subjects against atmos-
phere, and one group of subjects against conversion, e r r o r s . However 
these r e s u l t s lend l i t t l e c l a r i t y t o the issue as Simpson & Johnson 
reported an e f f e c t o f *anti-atmosphere t r a i n i n g * , whereas D i c k s t e i n 
r e p o r t e d no e f f e c t o f * anti-atmosphere t r a i n i n g ' but d i d r e p o r t an 
e f f e c t o f 'anti-conversion t r a i n i n g ' 
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There ar e , i n f a c t , good grounds f o r the argument t h a t 
* t r a i n i n g ' experijnents cannot resolve the issue. F i r s t l y , the f a c t 
t h a t 'anti-atmosphere' or 'anti-conversion' i n s t r u c t i o n s reduced 
e r r o r s could only suggest t h a t those f a c t o r s u s u a l l y mediate t y p i c a l 
responses. Secondly, the e f f e c t o f i n s t r u c t i o n s w i l l be dependent 
upon the exact nature of the wording. For instance, D i c k s t e i n ( 1975) 
appears t o have given a more s t r o n g l y worded warning against 
'atmosphere', than against 'conversion' e r r o r s . T h i r d l y , i n the 
Simpson & Johnson experiment, there was some i n d i c a t i o n t h a t a warning 
o f any k i n d produced a tendency t o avoid a l l f o u r p r e p o s i t i o n a l 
conclusions and u n d e r l i n e 'none o f these'. The c o n t r o l group, who 
received no warning, made more mistakes on the indeterminate premiss 
p a i r s but made l e s s mistakes on the determinate ' f i l l e r ' items. Thus 
a warning may reduce e r r o r s on indeterminate premiss p a i r s simply by 
c r e a t i n g a response bias against p r e p o s i t i o n a l conclusions. 
Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a (1971) pointed out t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n s 
may be 'modified' t o make t h e i r meaning c l e a r . For instance, the 
f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n makes one s p e c i f i c meaning of an A premiss c l e a r : 
Ml ' A l l A are B, but some B are not A' 
Under the conversion hypothesis, subjects are held t o 
i n t e r p r e t the usual A form ( ' a l l A are B') to mean the f o l l o w i n g : 
M2 ' A l l A are B and a l l B are A' 
Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a presented subjects w i t h a set o f premiss 
p a i r s i n t r a d i t i o n a l form (T) and a set o f 'modified' premiss p a i r s (M) 
i n which A premisses were sometimes given i n the form o f Ml and 
•22-
sometimes i n the form o f M2, They argued t h a t , i f subjects u s u a l l y 
' i l l i c i t l y convert' premisses, then data from ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' premiss 
p a i r s c o n t a i n i n g A premisses should be s i m i l a r to data from 'modified' 
premiss p a i r s c o n t a i n i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n s of the M2 form. 
Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a reported t h a t the above r e s u l t was indeed 
obtained and thus concluded t h a t "the subject t r e a t s the T s y l l o g i s m " 
( s i c ) " as i f i t were the corresponding M s y l l o g i s m , which we take 
as d i r e c t evidence f o r p r e m i s s - m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " . Their study thus 
appears t o provide good evidence f o r the conversion hypothesis. 
However, there axe two very good reasons f o r considering 
t h e i r conclusion t o be i n v a l i d . F i r s t l y , i n c e r t a i n cases where 
Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a r e p o r t t h a t T data i s s i m i l a r to t h a t from 
modified premiss p a i r s using the M2 m o d i f i c a t i o n of A premisses, they 
d i d not use a modified v e r s i o n o f the samejiremiss p a i r using the Ml 
m 6 d i f i c a t i o n of A premisses. Thus, i n these cases, there was no 
' c o n t r o l ' . S i m i l a r l y , they use only one m o d i f i c a t i o n o f I premisses 
and argue t h a t d a t a from premiss p a i r s i n c l u d i n g these i s s i m i l a r t o 
data from ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' premiss p a i r s . Again, there was no ' c o n t r o l ' 
t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t other m o d i f i c a t i o n s would not also produce data 
s i m i l a r t o the T data. 
Secondly, i n those cases where t r a d i t i o n a l premiss p a i r s 
c o n t a i n i n g A premisses axe compared w i t h modified premiss p a i r s u s i n g 
both the Ml and M2 m o d i f i c a t i o n s , Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a r e p o r t t h a t the 
T data was s i m i l a r t o t h a t from modified premiss p a i r s using the M2 
m o d i f i c a t i o n , but neglect t o mention t h a t the T data were e q u a l l y 
s i m i l a r t o those from modified premiss p a i r s using the Ml m o d i f i c a t i o n . 
C l e a r l y , t h a t the T data axe s i m i l a r t o the M2 d a t a i s no evidence 
f o r conversion i f they are also s i m i l a r t o the Ml data. I n only two 
cases ( t h e i r comparison 3 and ? and comparison k and 8 ) were d i f f e r -
ences observed between Ml and M2 m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f the same premiss 
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p a i r . I n one o f these, the M2 m o d i f i c a t i o n d i d produce greater 
s i m i l a r i t y t o the T data and 'Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a p o i n t t h i s out i n 
t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n . However, i n the other case, the Ml m o d i f i c a t i o n 
produced g r e a t e r s i m i l a r i t y t o the T data. 
Thus, i n most cases where the Ml and M2 m o d i f i c a t i o n s were 
pro p e r l y compared, there was no d i f f e r e n c e between them and, i n the 
remaining tv;o cases, one d i f f e r e n c e was i n . f a v o u r o f the conversion 
hypothesis and one d i f f e r e n c e was against i t . 
R e v l i s (1975a) used a standard design t o present subjects, 
w i t h a wide range of premiss p a i r s , h a l f o f them determinate, i n an 
attempt e m p i r i c a l l y t o compare the atmosphere and conversion 
hypotheses. He developed two i n f o r m a t i o n processing models based on 
the two t h e o r i e s and concluded t h a t r e s u l t s y i e l d e d more support f o r 
the atmosphere theory. The atmosphere model accounted f o r 8 8 . 9 ^ o f 
responses on indeterminate, and 85-2^ on the determinate, premiss p a i r s , 
whereas the conversion model accounted f o r only 6,Q% and 8,k% o f 
these responses r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
However, R e v l i s i n t e r p r e t e d conversion as r e f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f a premiss as i t s converse. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n leads t o some 
p e c u l i a r p r e d i c t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n premiss p a i r s . For instance, consider 
the f o l l o w i n g indeterminate AA premiss p a i r : 
( 1 ) A l l A are B 
A l l C are B 
R e v l i s ' s conversion model assumes t h a t the subject 
r e f o r m u l a t e s t h i s as the f o l l o w i n g premiss p a i r : 
(2a) A l l B are A 
A l l B are C 
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From the above premiss p a i r , the conclusion 'some C are A* 
i s v a l i d and thus the R e v l i s conversion model p r e d i c t s an I conclusion 
However, t h i s i s very d i f f e r e n t from Chapman & Chapman's theory o f 
conversion. According t o the l a t t e r , premiss p a i r ( 1 ) i s reformulated 
as: 
( 2 b ) A i s equ i v a l e n t t o B 
C i s equivalent t o B 
From ( 2b ) i t i s deducible t h a t A i s equi v a l e n t t o C, and 
hence t h a t ' a l l A are C, This conclusion accords w i t h atmosphere 
theory and i s t y p i c a l l y observed. Thus much o f the data which c o n t t a -
d i c t e d the R e v l i s conversion model d i d not c o n t r a d i c t the Chapman & 
Chapman hypothesis. The R e v l i s model presumes t h a t premisses are 
converted and a c o n s i s t e n t conclusion looked f o r . I f no conclusion 
i s found, the subject i s held t o 'unconvert' the premisses ( i . e . r e t u r n 
them t o t h e i r o r i g i n a l form) and again search f o r a co n s i s t e n t 
conclusion. C l e a r l y , t h i s model does n o t f i t the data, although i t 
produces the same p r e d i c t i o n s as the Chapman Sc Chapman hypothesis f o r 
most premiss p a i r s . 
R e v l i s (1975b) presents an i n f o r m a t i o n processing model o f 
s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as the conversion 
model o f R e v l i s (1975a) w i t h the atmosphere model added. The R e v l i s 
(1975a) conversion model had three s e q u e n t i a l stages: search f o r a 
conclusion t o the converted premisses, then ( i f none found) a search 
f o r a conclusion t o the o r i g i n a l premisses and, f i n a l l y , ( i f s t i l l 
no conclusion i s found) a guess. R e v l i s (1975b) replaces the guessing 
stage w i t h a d e c i s i o n stsige based on atmosphere. 
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The R e v l i s (1975b) model thus incorporates the idea t h a t 
the subject uses only the converse o f premisses on the f i r s t pass. 
I t was demonstrated above (premiss p a i r s ( 1 ) , ( 2 a ) and ( 2 b ) ) t h a t t h i s 
model produces p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t d i f f e r both from those made by the 
Chapman & Chapman hypothesis and from the observed data. There i s 
no question t h a t the a n a l y s i s given here m i s i n t e r p r e t s R e v l i s , as 
R e v l i s (1975b) a c t u a l l y shows premiss p a i r s ( 1 ) and ( 2 a ) as an example 
of h i s theory (page 1 0 8 ) . This i s a somewhat p e c u l i a r t h i n g f o r 
R e v l i s t o do as any reader w i t h some knowledge o f the l i t e r a t u r e would 
know t h a t the p r e d i c t i o n i s not e m p i r i c a l l y confirmed. 
More p e c u l i a r , however, i s the f a c t t h a t R e v l i s ( l 9 7 5 h ) 
uses the data o f R e v l i s (1975a) t o support h i s model. These data 
show the conversion model t o be hopelessly inadequate. How, then, 
can these data be used t o support what i s (up to pass 3 ) "the same 
conversion model? R e v l i s (1975"^) achieves t h i s by c o n f i n i n g h i s 
a n a l y s i s t o e r r o r r a t e s but he does not say what type o f e r r o r s . 
Where h i s model p r e d i c t s erroneous responses he quotes high observed 
e r r o r r a t e s as supporting h i s model and thus t a c i t l y i m p l i e s t h a t these 
e r r o r s axe i n accordance w i t h h i s p r e d i c t i o n s . ( R e v l i s , 1975a-, gives 
e r r o r r a t e s and percentage o f d e c i s i o n s c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d ; the 
poor p r e d i c t i v e accuracj o f the model being evident from the l a t t e r 
but not from the former.) 
I t i s also worthy o f note t h a t reference t o R e v l i s ( 1975a) 
r e v e a l s t h a t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f premiss p a i r s as 'sames' (those 
t h a t lead t o - the same conclusion whether or not converted) and 
' d i f f e r e n t s ' (those t h a t lead t o a d i f f e r e n t conclusion when converted) 
i s somewhat i d i o s y n c r a t i c but conveniently enables c e r t a i n other 
p r e d i c t i o n s o f h i s model t o be v a l i d a t e d . However, as the R e v l i s 
conversion model does not f i t data from s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning t a s k s , 
f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i s not waxranted. 
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D i c k s t e i n (1978a) argues i n favour o f the Chapman & Chapman 
conversion hypothesis but also extends t h i s p o s i t i o n t o e x p l a i n data 
from those premiss p a i r s t h a t cannot be accounted f o r e n t i r e l y tjy 
the theory of conversion. This explanation i s i n three p a r t s as 
f o l l o w s : 
1) EE, EO, OE and 00 premiss p a i r s a l l i n d i c a t e t h a t the middle 
term i s not r e l a t e d t o e i t h e r term of the conclusion. The 
subject assumes t h a t , i f the terms o f the conclusion axe 
not r e l a t e d through the middle term, then they axe not 
r e l a t e d . This leads t o acceptance of E or 0 conclusions, 
2) I I premiss p a i r s lead t o i n v a l i d I conclusions because the 
subject assumes t h a t the 'some' r e f e r r e d t o i n each premiss 
i s the same 'some'. Thus, given 'some A axe B*, 'some B 
axe C, the subject assumes t h a t some o f the B t h a t are 
A are the same B as are C. This explanation extends t o 10 
and 01 premiss p a i r s although, f o r these, a conversion 
operation i s in v o l v e d , l e a d i n g t o an i n v a l i d 0 conclusion, 
3) IE premiss p a i r s are explained s i m i l a r l y t o the f i r s t 
category w i t h the a d d i t i o n o f a conversion o p e r a t i o n . 
His a n a l y s i s o f data obtained from D i c k s t e i n (1978b) 
provides some support f o r the cohesiveness o f these categories. 
Percentage c o r r e c t responses were 7 3 . 9 . 7 2 . 7 , 7 2 . 7 and 7 7 . 3 f o r the 
f o u r premiss p a i r s i n category 1 as compared w i t h 5 0 . 0 , 55 .7 and 5 8 , 0 
f o r the three premiss p a i r s i n category 2 , D i c k s t e i n argues t h a t the 
category 2 e r r o r i s more pervasive since " i t corresponds t o general 
language usage i n which the same term i n two successive sentences 
almost always r e f e r s t o the same r e f e r e n t " , 
- 2 7 -
Percentage c o r r e c t responses t o IE premiss- p a i r s wats 37•5» 
D i c k s t e i n argues t h a t t h i s i s the most d i f f i c u l t as two e r r o r s 
(assumption of n o n r e l a t i o n due t o n o n r e l a t i o n w i t h middle term and 
conversion) are i n v o l v e d . However, t h i s i s somewhat spurious as one 
could e q u a l l y w e l l argue t h a t 01 and 10 premiss p a i r s i n v o l v e two e r r o r s 
Given t h a t the conversion step i s not counted as an a d d i t i o n a l e r r o r 
on these two, t h e r e i s no apparent reason ( o t h e r thatn t h a t i t v o u l d 
not f i t the data) t h a t IE premiss p a i r s should not have been included 
i n category 1. IE premiss p a i r s appear t o pose problems f o r a l l 
t h e o r i e s , even f o r atmosphere th e o i y as there are two (E and O) 
e r r o r s t h a t are f r e q u e n t l y observed. 
The median c o r r e l a t i o n ( o f v a l i d responses) between 
d i f f e r e n t premiss p a i r s was 0.648, f o r those i n category 1, and O .768, 
f o r those i n category 2. However, the median c o r r e l a t i o n between 
premiss p a i r s i n x;ategory 1 and premiss p a i r s i n category 2 was only 
0 .166 , The t o t a l c o r r e c t responses on category 1 premiss p a i r s y i e l d e d 
a c o r r e l a t i o n o f only 0,157 w i t h the t o t a l c o r r e c t responses on 
category 2 premiss p a i r s . Thus a subject who was i n c o r r e c t on one 
premiss p a i r was more l i k e l y t o have also been i n c o r r e c t on another 
premiss p a i r w i t h i n the same category but not more l i k e l y (than other 
s u b j e c t s ) t o have al s o been i n c o r r e c t on premiss p a i r s i n the other 
category. This appears t o lend s t r o n g support t o the hypothesis t h a t 
a d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d f o r each category". This does not, 
however, nec e s s a r i l y imply t h a t D i c k s t e i n ' s explanations are c o r r e c t , 
although i t should be noted t h a t n e i t h e r p r o b a b i l i s t i c inference n o r 
atmosphere theory would p r e d i c t d i f f e r e n t e r r o r frequencies. 
D i c k s t e i n ' s work provides an elaborate and complex explan-
a t i o n o f s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning t h a t depends on, a t l e a s t , the f o l l o w i n g 
three f a c t o r s , other than l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y : 
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1) Conversion of A and 0 premisses. 
2) The assumption t h a t , i f both terms of the conclusion are 
not r e l a t e d t o the middle term, then they are not r e l a t e d 
to each other, 
3) The assumption t h a t the 'some' i n one premiss r e f e r s t o the 
sajne 'some' as does the other premiss. 
The complexity i s increased by D i c k s t e i n ' s f u r t h e r suggestion 
t h a t acceptance of 'probable conclusions', and a bias against the 
'none of the above' a l t e r n a t i v e ( f i r s t proposed by R e v l i s , 1 9 7 5 a ) , 
may also play some r o l e i n determining responses. 
Of the work considered i n t h i s s e c t i o n , D i c k s t e i n ' s 
p o s i t i o n represents the most v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o atmosphere theory, 
as i t explains a t l e a s t most of the t y p i c a l atmosphere responses. 
Although c e r t a i n o f h i s arguments are s i m i l a r t o those o f Chapman & 
Chapman, regarding both conversion and p r o b a b i l i s t i c i n f e r e n c e , he 
e x p l a i n s these i n more d e t a i l . However, although D i c k s t e i n ' s 
arguments are p l a u s i b l e , there i s no r e a l evidence t h a t subjects do 
behave i n the manner t h a t he suggests. The v a r i e t y o f the explanations 
are an inherent weakness of h i s p o s i t i o n and an explanation i n terms 
o f atmosphere must be seen as being f a r more parsimonious. 
However, before concluding t h i s s e c t i o n , i t should be noted 
t h a t atmosphere theory cannot e x p l a i n a l l the data. The f o l l o w i n g 
two f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f a conclusion plays 
a t l e a s t some r o l e i n mediating responses: 
1) Several workers (e.g. Ceraso & P r o v i t e r a , 1971i Roberge, 
1970, R e v l i s 1975a) have r e p o r t e d t h a t atmosphere e f f e c t s 
are most apparent on those determinate premiss p a i r s whose 
l o g i c a l l y v a l i d conclusion accords w i t h atmosphere. 
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2) Certain indeterminate premiss p a i r s ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , those 
r e f e r r e d t o as category 1 and category 2 by D i c k s t e i n , 
1978a) y i e l d h i g h frequencies o f v a l i d conclusions. That 
i s , s ubjects i n d i c a t e t h a t *none o f the above' (conclusions) 
f o l l o w s from the premisses. Such conclusions, which w i l l 
h enceforth be r e f e r r e d t o as n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l conclusions, 
c l e a r l y cannot accord w i t h atmosphere. 
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SECTION 1.3 THEMATIC CONTENT: THE EFFECT OF TRUTH STATUS 
Janis & Frick (19^3) point out that i t i s a "widely-held 
b e l i e f that people are l i k e l y to be s a t i s f i e d with unsound arguments 
i f they accept the conclusion to which the arguments lead, and 
conversely, that they are l i k e l y to be unduly c r i t i c a l of sound 
arguments i f they r e j e c t the conclusion". This "widely-held b e l i e f " 
has generated much research i n the s y l l o g i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e , although 
unfortunately, design errors appear to have occurred i n some of the 
e a r l i e r studies. 
Janis & Frick presented subjects with (whole) syllogisms 
to evaluate as * v a l i d ' or ' i n v a l i d ' , and subsequently presented them 
with an 'attitude t e s t ' comprised of the conclusions to the syllogisms. 
On the at t i t u d e t e s t , subjects were asked whether they cLgreed or 
disagreed with each statement. Analysis of the errors i n evaluating 
the syllogisms showed that s i g n i f i c a n t l y more errors occurred when 
subjects had to accept a conclusion they disagreed with, and least 
errors occurred when subjects had to r e j e c t a conclusion they disagreed 
with. These r e s u l t s support the "widely-held b e l i e f " quoted above 
i n that they suggest that the ' t r u t h status* of a conclusion mediates 
evaluation of i t s l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . However, Janis & Frick appear 
to have used Chi-squared tests to analyse data comprised of more 
than one response per subject and the thematic syllogisms used were, 
i n some cases, very obscure. 
Lefford (19^6) presented subjects with 20 syllogisms of a 
"socia l l y controversial nature, which may tend to excite an emotional 
reaction i n the subject" and 20 syllogisms of "a neutral nature and 
not intended to excite any par t i c u l a r emotional reaction". Subjects 
were asked to rate the conclusions as v a l i d or i n v a l i d and then to 
go back through the test i n d i c a t i n g whether they believed the 
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conclusions to be 'true* or 'false*. Subjects made more errors on 
'emotional* syllogisms and there was a relationship between judged 
v a l i d i t y and agreement f o r both types of content. Lefford argued 
that, whereas attitudes affected 'emotional syllogisms', previous 
knowledge affected 'neutral syllogisms*. In f a c t , both may be 
regarded as 'prior b e l i e f , as there i s l i t t l e operational difference 
between b e l i e f acquired from fact or prejudice. However, the data 
were not f u l l y reported, the analyses were atypical and subjects may 
well have been influenced by t h e i r p r i o r v a l i d i t y judgements when 
indicating t h e i r b e l i e f s . Subjects should at least have been given 
a separate sheet on which to indicate b e l i e f so that they could not 
see t h e i r o r i g i n a l evaluations of v a l i d i t y . 
One of the most widely quoted studies on b e l i e f e f f e c t s , 
and possibly the most badly designed, i s that by Morgan & Morton ( 1 9 ^ ) 
In t h e i r main experiment, they presented subjects with 15 thematic 
premiss pairs and 15 abstract premiss pairs of the same structure. 
Comparisons showed differences i n responses f o r 1^ of the pairs. They 
claimed that these differences could be explained i n terms of a bias 
towards conclusions i n which the subjects believed and concluded from 
t h e i r results that, although responses to abstract syllogisms are 
primarily determined by atmosphere, responses to thematic syllogisms 
axe primarily determined by personal convictions. They stated that 
"a person i s l i k e l y to accept a conclusion which expresses his 
convictions with l i t t l e regard f o r the correctness of the inferences 
involved". 
None of the * biases' observed i n the thematic materials were 
predicted and thus t h e i r post hoc explanations of why subjects preferred 
p a r t i c u l a r conclusions must be rigorously scrutinised. Such 
investigation reveals that few of t h e i r explanations are self-evident. 
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even when considered i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l context. 
Henle & Michaal (195^) presented subjects with ten of the 
pairs used by Morgan & Morton, followed by an a t t i t u d e questionnaire 
comprised of a l l four possible conclusions to each of the ten thematic 
premiss pairs. Some wording of the thematic problems was changed to 
make them of current i n t e r e s t . Although results were reported as 
"agreeing well" with those of Morgan & Morton, preferred conclusions 
on the reasoning task did not usually match preferred statements on 
the a t t i t u d e questionnaire. Further, Henle & Michael point out that 
the very f a c t that t h e i r data conformed to that of Morgsrn & Morton's 
presents problems f o r the l a t t e r ' s position, as the changes made 
would be expected to produce d i f f e r e n t attitudes. For instance, on 
one problem, Henle & Michael changed the wording from 'India' to 'Rus-
sia' and point out that " i t would be rash to assume that the a t t i t u d e 
of our subjects toward the people of Russia was the same as the 
a t t i t u d e of the subjects of the previous investigation to the people 
of India". 
Henle & Michael performed a fur t h e r experiment using ten 
thematic premiss pairs concerning Russia or Communism, -matched with 
abstract premiss pairs having the same structure. Subjects were 
subsequently asked to indicate t h e i r a t t i t u d e toward Russia. 'Anti-
Russian* and 'neutral' groups were compared and s i g n i f i c a n t differences 
found on only one problem, r e l a t i n g to atheism. 'Anti-Russian* 
subjects were less l i k e l y to evaluate 'no atheists are found-in Russia' 
as v a l i d and more l i k e l y to evaluate 'some Russians are atheists' 
as v a l i d . 
Given the shortcomings i n e a r l i e r studies, and the data of 
Henle & Michael, i t would appear that the e f f e c t of t r u t h status i s 
weaker than was o r i g i n a l l y thought. However, there are a variety of 
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experiments that do provide reasonable support f o r the e f f e c t , although 
the size of the e f f e c t , r e l a t i v e to that of atmosphere, i s open to 
question. 
For instance, Gordon (1953) used premiss pairs whose 
conclusions involved statements about Russia, embedded i n a selection 
of 'neutral' items. Subjects were subsequently presented with an 
att i t u d e questionnaire comprised of the conclusions to the Russian 
problems. 11 of the 28 subjects were i d e n t i f i e d as making non-
atmosphere errors consistently favourable or unfavourable towaxds 
Russia and, i n ten of these cases, the bias was the same as that 
indicated by the at t i t u d e quest ionnaire. However, Gordon reports 
that most errors were i n accordance with atmosphere, although there 
were more non-atmosphere errors on the 'Russian' problems. 
The i n i t i a l study reported by Morgan & Morton involved 
abstract problems, matched with thematic problems which a l l used the 
same three terms ('insults', as subject, 'unpleasant', as predicate, 
and 'troubles' as the middle term). This experiment essentially 
showed that the nature of the differences between response p r o f i l e s 
from the abstract and thematic content varied according to the structure 
of the problem. However, reanalysis of t h e i r data, to produce a 
comparison across a l l problems^, reveals that the thematic group showed 
a strong bias to r e j e c t the statement 'no i n s u l t s are unpleasant*. 
Analysis "by sign test reveals a highly s i g n i f i c a n t indication of a 
difference between abstract and thematic problems i n the case of *E' 
responses (p < 0.001) but no s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n the case of A, 
I , 0 or 'none' responses. There i s some, nonsignificant, indication 
that subjects made more l o g i c a l l y v a l i d responses on thematic problems, 
but t h i s cannot be advanced as an explanation of the differences i n 
E responses. 
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The above r e s u l t makes certain of the Fra.se (1966a, 1968a;) 
findings somewhat surprising. He used conclusions that were measured 
as to compatibility, i n terms of subjects* responses to a semantic 
d i f f e r e n t i a l t e s t . Thus a conclusion such as *no i n s u l t s are 
unpleasant' would presumably have high incompatibility. However, Frase 
reports very small, but s i g n i f i c a n t , e f f e c t s , such that compatibility 
f a c i l i t a t e d correct responses and argues that, as three-quarters of 
his syllogisms were i n v a l i d , t h i s must imply that compatible conclusions 
were more often ( c o r r e c t l y ) rejected. Thus, according to Frase, i n v a l i d 
incompatible conclusions, such as *no i n s u l t s are unpleasant', are 
more l i k e l y to be accepted than i n v a l i d compatible conclusions. The 
Frase results aire, i n f a c t , apparently contrary to a l l the other 
reported effects of t r u t h status. However, i n the absence of support 
fo r his position, the results may be overlooked f o r two reasons: 
1) The eff e c t s are marginal and not e n t i r e l y consistent across 
the two studies, and i t i s debatable whether 'compatibility* 
i s i n a l l cases correlated with t r u t h status. I t i s possible 
to pair two terms, both having a high positi-^e or negative 
•affective *tone*, and produce a meaningless statement, 
2) Frase does not separately analyse v a l i d and i n v a l i d 
syllogisms. I t i s thus merely an assumption that i n v a l i d 
'compatible' conclusions are more often rejected than i n v a l i d 
'incompatible* conclusions. 
Thouless (1959) did f a i l to f i n d any s i g n i f i c a n t indication 
of an ef f e c t of b e l i e f i n a group of student subjects, although he 
obtained such an ef f e c t on a group of adult subjects. He reported 
that some subjects had apparently guessed the intention of the task. 
However, Thouless's method was to ask subjects whether they agreed 
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or disa^eed with the conclusions before asking them to indicate 
whether they believed them to be v a l i d l y derived. This may well 'alert* 
test-sophisticated subjects. 
In f a c t , the procedure of asking subjects to evaluate 
given conclusions, both on the basis of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y and t r u t h 
status, within a short period of time, may cause d i s t o r t i o n of r e s u l t s , 
whatever the order i n which the subject i s asked to perform these 
two tasks. Kaufman & Goldstein (19^7) avoided t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by 
using syllogisms with conclusions that a d i f f e r e n t sample had rated 
f o r agreement or dissigreement. They selected conclusions that showed 
80%, or above, agreement or disagreement (referred to as *positive 
a f f e c t * . PA, and 'negative a f f e c t ' , NA, respectively) and formulated 
a selection of items that were "presumably neutral" ( N ) . 
They observed strong effects of t r u t h status, although these 
effects were complex and d i f f i c u l t to i n t e r p r e t . Essentially, they 
observed three important findings: 
1) Although subjects rejected less v a l i d , and accepted more 
i n v a l i d , conclusions to PA than NA arguments ( i n accordance 
with the e f f e c t of t r u t h status), a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t was 
only observed f o r acceptance of i n v a l i d arguments. This 
r e s u l t may well explain why Henle & Michael only observed an 
e f f e c t on one of the ten syllogisms used i n t h e i r second ex-
periment. Six of these syllogisms were v a l i d and i t appears, 
from the Kaufman & Goldstein data, that a strong e f f e c t of 
t r u t h status i s only observed on acceptance of i n v a l i d arguments 
2) There was also l i t t l e e f f e c t of t r u t h status on evaluation 
of syllogisms having universal conclusions. Thus the only 
large difference observed between responses to PA and NA 
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syllogisms was on the acceptance of i n v a l i d p a r t i c u l a r 
conclusions (68% to 369S), However, i t should be noted that 
they only studied affirmative conclusions and that the 
i n i t i a l Morgan & Morton (19^3) experiment suggests that a 
strong e f f e c t may be obtained on negative universals. 
3) More errors were observed on neutral items than on either 
type of affective item. This was primarily due to a f a r 
greater tendency to accept i n v a l i d universal conclusions to 
'neutral' items (kSfo f o r N, as against 15% f o r PA and 8% 
f o r NA). In f a c t , across a l l syllogisms, subjects accepted 
less p a r t i c u l a r than universal conclusions to 'neutral' items, 
but accepted more p a r t i c u l a r than universal conclusions to 
'affective' items, (This in t e r a c t i o n was s i g n i f i c a n t ) . 
These l a s t r e s u l t s could be related to the Frase (1966b) 
findings that there i s a relationship between quantification and b e l i e f , 
such that subjects show a greater tendency to indicate b e l i e f i n quanti-
f i e d than i n nonquantified statements. Thus, both PA and NA 'affective' 
items may have been more 'believable' when quantified, whereas 'neutral' 
items, not r e l a t i n g to b e l i e f , would possibly not be expected to be 
affected i n t h i s way by qu a n t i f i c a t i o n . However, i t i s unclear 
whether the data can be explained i n these terms as, unfortunately, 
Kaufman & Goldstein do not give examples of the type of content used 
and give l i t t l e i ndication of the nature of the 'neutral' items. 
Another well-designed experiment, that uncovered new 
information as to the e f f e c t of t r u t h status, was that by Feather (1964) 
He presented subjects with syllogisms concerning r e l i g i o n ( h a l f with 
favourable, and h a l f with unfavourable conclusions) randomly embedded 
i n a selection of 'neutral syllogisms'. A r e l i g i o u s a t t i t u d e t e s t was 
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administered one week l a t e r , together with a test of 'intolerance of 
ambiguity' developed by Budner ( I 9 6 2 ) . Separate analyses were carried 
out f o r subjects c l a s s i f i e d as 'proreligious' and (a much smaller 
number of) subjects c l a s s i f i e d as 'a n t i - r e l i g i o u s ' . 
For the proreligious group, s i g n i f i c a n t l y more (reasoning) 
errors were i n the proreligious d i r e c t i o n , ^^i^ther, the extent of t h i s 
bias was s i g n i f i c a n t l y correlated with both the strength of p r o r e l i g -
ious a t t i t u d e and intolerance of ambiguity, and inversely correlated 
with the number of ( l o g i c a l l y ) correct evaluations on the 'neutral* 
syllogisms. 
The errors of the a n t i - r e l i g i o u s group, however, showed no 
evidence of bias. This was possibly due to the fin d i n g that a n t i -
r e l i g i o u s subjects had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower intolerance of ambiguity, 
and made s i g n i f i c a n t l y less errors on the neutral syllogisms, than 
proreligious subjects. 
In general, the re s u l t s of Feather (1964) clearly demonstrate 
that t r u t h status i s a source of bias, but suggest that s u s c e p t i b i l i t y 
to t h i s bias i s a function of strength of at t i t u d e and of certain 
personality factors. However, the more able a subject i s correctly 
to evaluate (*neutral') syllogisms, the less susceptible he i s to the 
bias. 
Revlin & L e i r e r (I978) have attacked the view that reasoning 
responses may be influenced by personal bias. They suggest that 
t y p i c a l results concerning * b e l i e f may be explained i n terms of 
'conversion blocking*. Their theory i s best explained with reference 
to the following (inventec^ syllogism which i s i n v a l i d : 
A l l honest people are good 
A l l r e l i g i o u s people are good 
• . A l l honest people are r e l i g i o u s 
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I f t r u t h status affected evaluation of t h i s syllogism, then 
proreligious subjects would be expected to accept the conclusion more 
often than non-religious subjects. Revlin & Leirer would explain such 
a response, not as due to the subjects' b e l i e f that r e l i g i o u s people 
are honest, but due to his conversion of the premiss ' a l l r e l i g i o u s 
people are good*. The point i s that a proreligious subject may have 
a greater *set equivalent* perception of *good* people and 'religious* 
people. To the nonreligious subject, i t w i l l be more readily 
apparent that not a l l 'good' people are r e l i g i o u s , and thus his con-
version w i l l be blocked. That i s , according to Revlin & Leirer. his 
experience w i l l indicate that the conversion i s i n v a l i d and he w i l l 
2 
thus be less l i k e l y to accept the i n v a l i d conclusion. 
This theory was tested i n t h e i r f i r s t experiment by use of 
'neutral* premiss pairs, that did not relate to 'real l i f e ' knowledge, 
but which led to conclusions that did rela t e to 'real l i f e ' knowledge. 
According to t h e i r theory, there thus should be no e f f e c t of t r u t h 
status of conclusion, as there should be no d i f f e r e n t i a l (premiss) 
conversion. For instance, i n one such problem, the two premisses 
expressed a relationship between an unnajned committee (the middle term) 
and 'women' and 'U.S. senators'. Subjects would thus have 'real l i f e * 
knowledge r e l a t i n g to the relationship between the terms of the 
conclusion ('women' and 'U.S. senators'), but no knowledge about the 
relationship between either of these terms and the middle term. I n 
some cases the l o g i c a l l y v a l i d conclusion agreed with the 'true' ( r e a l 
l i f e ) conclusion, and i n others i t did not. 
Although observing an effe c t of t r u t h status, the authors 
report that i t was very marginal. However, t h i s can hardly be taken 
as contradicting e a r l i e r studies f o r a variety of reasons. F i r s t l y , 
the Kaufman & Goldstein r e s u l t s suggest that a strong effect i s only 
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observed on i n v a l i d syllogisms and stronger effects thus may"^  be ex-
pected on indeterminate premiss pairs, which Revlin & Lelrer did not 
use.. Secondly, on those arguments f o r which Revlin & Leir.er claim 
that the v a l i d answer c o n f l i c t s with the 'true* answer, t h i s i s not 
e n t i r e l y the case. For instance, although ' i t i s true that 'no Arabian 
sheiks are U.S. senators', the ' c o n f l i c t i n g * l o g i c a l l y v a l i d answer 
'some Arabian sheiks are not U.S. senators* i s also true. Thus 
subjects are not necessarily accepting v a l i d conclusions that they do 
not believe. Thirdly, i t appears that Revlin & Leirer did not control 
f o r the ef f e c t of atmosphere. As the l o g i c a l l y v a l i d conclusions 
accorded with atmosphere, and as Gordon (1953) has s p e c i f i c a l l y reported 
t r u t h status to be weaker than atmosphere bias, i t i s not at a l l 
surprising that the e f f e c t of t r u t h status was "quite l i m i t e d " . 
F i n a l l y , i t i s worth noting that reported 'accuracy' (Table 3) was 
83^ when 'belief* accorded with l o g i c , and 6?^ when i t conflicted with 
l o g i c . Given the above points, the size of the e f f e c t i s reasonably 
compatible with that observed i n other studies. 
However, i t should be noted that Revlin & Leir.er employed 
an excellent control f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l 'conversion blocking' by using 
premisses that did not relat e to 'real l i f e * knowledge. In f a c t , 
conversion i t s e l f was controlled f o r , as only E and I premisses were 
used. Conversion of E or I premisses does not a f f e c t the logic of 
the argument. Thus on the basis of the above argument, that the 
size of the t r u t h status e f f e c t observed i s compatible with other 
studies, t h e i r experiment appears to indicate that the 'conversion 
blocking* explanation i s wholely unfounded. 
In t h e i r second experiment, Revlin & Leirer used premiss 
pairs that were claimed to have "real world t r u t h values (of a s o r t ) " , 
and conclusions that did not. Subjects were also presented with a 
^ 0 -
questionnaire that investigated t h e i r knowledge of the relationships 
between various terms used i n the premisses. For instance, f o r the 
premiss " a l l blacks i n Neuberg are welfare recipients", subjects were 
asked on the questionnaire to assess the percentage of blacks who are 
welfare recipients and the percentage of welfare recipients who are 
black, Revlin & Leirer argued that, the higher these percentages are 
thought to be, the more l i k e l y i t i s that the premiss, " a l l blacks 
i n Neuberg are welfare recipients", w i l l be converted. 
On the basis 6f the questionnaire responses, the authors 
predicted conversion errors on the s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning task and 
reported a reasonable degree of confirmation of these predictions. 
The data were;.not f u l l y reported, but i t appears that subjects made 
more errors consistent with the conversion hypothesis, i f they 
reported high 'set equivalent* percentages on the questionnaire. 
Unfortunately, the authors present t h i s r e s u l t as a demonstration that 
t r u t h status bias i s , "at least to a considerable degree", a resultant 
of d i f f e r e n t i a l premiss encoding", an in t e r p r e t a t i o n that was seen 
to be unlikely on the basis of the r e s u l t s of t h e i r f i r s t experiment. 
Clearly, i f certain responses on abstract problems are a 
resultant of premiss conversion, then i t may well be that such conversion 
may be blocked on thematic problems using premisses such as ' a l l rabbits 
are animals', as subjects know that not a l l animals are rabbits. 
Thus t h i s may well play some role i n mediating observed differences be-
tween data from thematic and abstract problems. For instance, Morgan 
& Morton (19^4) report a variety of differences, which Henle & Michael 
(1956) have pointed out cannot a l l be due to the ef f e c t of t r u t h 
status.of conclusion. I t i s quite possible that some of these d i f f -
erences were due to an ef f e c t of the 'real l i f e ' t r u t h status of the 
premisses. 
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However, i t would be very d i f f i c u l t to explain how 
'conversion blocking' could explain a l l the results of 't r u t h status' 
experiments, p a r t i c u l a r l y those that have compared one thematic problem 
with another. I n f a c t , there i s d i r e c t evidence from Revlin & Lei^er's 
f i r s t experiment that 'conversion blocking' cannot explain a l l the 
data and t h e i r study appears to indicate that there may be separate 
effects of t r u t h status on both premisses and conclusion. 
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SECTION 1.4 THE FORMAL LOGIC OF SYLLOGISMS: FIGURE 
There are four possible ways i n which the subject (S) and 
predicate (P) terms of the conclusion and the middle term (M) may 
be arranged i n the two premisses. These are referred to as figures 
of the syllogism and are shown i n Table 1.1. 
TABLE 1.1 
The Four Possible Arrangements (Figures) of the Subject (s), 
Predicate (P) and Middle Term (M). 
FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 
MAJOR PREMISS 
MINOR PREMISS 
M-P 
S-M 
P-M 
S-M 
M-P 
M-S 
P-M 
M-S 
CONCLUSION S-P S-P S-P S-P 
I t i s t r a d i t i o n a l to write the major premiss f i r s t , but 
the premiss pairs are l o g i c a l l y interchangeable. Thus the following 
argument i s also i n the f i r s t figure: 
S-M 
M-P 
. . S-P 
Due to t h i s interchangeability of premisses, i t should be 
noted that four further figures cannot be obtained by reversing the 
conclusions. I f the conclusion of a figure 2 syllogism i s reversed 
i t simply becomes a ( d i f f e r e n t ) figure 2 syllogism with interchanged 
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premisses. The same applies to figure 3- ^ "the conclusion of a 
figure 1 syllogism i s reversed then i t becomes a figure 4 syllogism 
with interchanged premisses. Similarly, figure 4 syllogisms transpose 
into figure 1. 
This reveals an important relationship between figure 1 
and figure 4: they are i d e n t i c a l as f a r as premiss pairs are concerned. 
Premiss pairs alone can define a syllogism as figure 2 or as figure 3, 
but can only define a syllogism as either figure 1 or figure 4, In 
t h i s l a t t e r case, the figure of the syllogism i s defined by hhe 
d i r e c t i o n of i t s conclusion. For instance, consider the following 
premiss pair: 
A l l A are B 
No B are C 
This may become either a figure^ 1 or a figure 4 syllogism 
dependent upon the conclusion. Consider f i r s t the ( v a l i d ) conclusion: 
No A axe C 
This produces a figure 1 syllogism (with reordered premisses). 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , consider the (equally v a l i d ) conclusion: 
No C are A 
This produces a figure 4 syllogism. There are thus four 
possible structures f o r syllogisms but only three possible structures 
f o r premiss pairs. I n f a c t , A r i s t o t l e recognised only three syllogisms, 
making no d i s t i n c t i o n between figure 1 and figure 4, 
I t w i l l be noted that the 'standard' design of presenting 
subjects with four alternative prepositional conclusions, a l l i n a 
given d i r e c t i o n , defines the figure of the syllogism f o r figures 1 
ajid 4. In t h i s context, then, premiss pairs may be said to be i n any 
one of the four figures. However, i f no d i r e c t i o n of conclusion i s 
, disregarding proniss order, 
specified, then no d i s t i n c t i o n may be made between figure 1 and figure 4 
and premiss pairs can be said to be i n one of only three figures. 
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SECTION 1.5 EXHIRIMENTS ON THE EFFECT OF 'FIGURE' 
Frase (1968b) was the f i r s t worker to consider s p e c i f i c a l l y 
the e f f e c t of figure on s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning. His idea was that 
subjects solve syllogisms by setting up- associations between the terms 
and then assessing the strength of association i n the conclusion. 
The building of associations i s comparable, he argued, to the processes 
involved i n paired associate learning. 
Frase was primarily concerned with those premiss pairs that 
may become figure 1 or figure ^ syllogisms dependent on d i r e c t i o n of 
conclusion. Henceforth, these w i l l be referred to as figure l / 4 
premiss pairs. Given that premiss order i s l o g i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t , these 
premiss pairs are a l l i n the following form: 
A-B (minor premiss for figure 1, major premiss f o r figure ^) 
B-C (major premiss f o r figure 1, minor premiss f o r figure 4 ) 
Frase suggested that t h i s may lead to an associated chain 
(A-B-C) and that, i f the given d i r e c t i o n of conclusion specifies a 
figure 1 syllogism (A-C). i t i s i n accordance with t h i s chain, but. 
i f the given d i r e c t i o n of conclusion specifies a figure 4 syllogism 
(C-A), the subject must evaluate a 'backwards' chain. He reported 
two experiments, presenting subjects with whole syllogisms, which 
together y i e l d reasonable evidence that subjects make less errors -when 
offered an A-C conclusion to figure l / 4 premiss pairs, than when 
offered a C-A conclusion. Roberge (1971a) also reports data showing 
that most errors are observed on figure 1/4 premiss pairs for which 
the given conclusions specify a figure 4 syllogism. 
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Pezzoli & Frase (I968) worked with figure 2 and figure 3 
syllogisms. The Frase position i s that figure 2 i s comparable to 
a stimulus equivalence paradigm i n paired associate learning, i n that 
the same (middle) term i s paired to subject and predicate of conclusion 
Figure 3 i s comparable to a response equivalent paradigm, i n that 
two d i f f e r e n t terms (subject and predicate) are paired to one stimulus 
term (the middle term), Pezzoli & Frase argued th a t , as Figure 3 
requires d i f f e r e n t responses to be associated to the same stimulus, 
i t can produce interference and hence more reasoning errors, whereas 
figure 2 syllogisms should f a c i l i t a t e reasoning. Further, they 
argued that the stronger the association between the premiss terms, 
the stronger w i l l be the interference e f f e c t on figure 3 syllogisms 
and thus the more apparent these differences should become. 
In one condition of t h e i r experiment, r e a l i s t i c terms were 
used such th a t , although the terms of the conclusion were not assoc-
iated, there was a high association between each of these terms and 
the middle term. This condition led to considerably more figure 3 
than figure 2 errors. The fi n d i n g supports t h e i r theory that 
associations w i l l increase interference on figure 3 syllogisms and 
they concluded that "the present study has shown that mediated 
associations play a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n deductive reasoning". 
However, differences between figure 2 and figure 3 need to be invest-
igated i n a wider context as t h i s study used only f i v e syllogisms, 
a l l having I conclusions. • 
I t should be noted that Pezzoli & Frase argued that 
differences between figure 2 and figure 3 should be increased by the 
presence of associations but that Pezzoli & Frase, and Roberge ( I 9 7 l a ) , 
found no difference between figure 2 and figure 3 when abstract 
content was used. Thus, although the Pezzoli & Frase study shows that 
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the presence of association may affect reasoning behaviour, the 
resu l t s do not necessarily imply that abstract syllogisms are 
solved by an associational process. 
However, although the position regarding figure 2 and 
figure 3 i s unclear, i t does appear that figure 1 yields less 
errors than figure U. The best explanation of t h i s appears to 
be Frase's theory that subjects prefer *farwaxds* conclusions, 
Dickstein (1978b) argues that, i f subjects do prefer 
'forwards' conclusions, then figure 4 w i l l lead them to conclusions 
that are the reverse of those given and he suggests that subjects 
convert these to match them to the given alternatives. Clearly, 
i f the conclusion i s v a l i d i n both directions, t h i s conversion 
w i l l y i e l d the correct answer. Where the conclusions d i f f e r , 
more errors would be expected on figure k than figure 1. 
To test t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i t i s preferable primarily 
to consider only those (nine) premiss pairs that are 
consistent i n the above respect across a l l four figures. 
Dickstein reports two experiments that employed a standard design 
to present subjects with a l l premiss pairs i n a l l four figures. 
Although there was a highly s i g n i f i c a n t figure e f f e c t o v e r a l l , 
specific support was obtained f o r Dickstein's theory. 
Two main findings are of primary importance: 
-47-
1) A s i g n i f i c a n t figure e f f e c t (such that figure k yielded most, 
• and figure 1 least errors) was observed f o r EI premiss pairs. 
There i s a v a l i d conclusion f o r each of these but no 
v a l i d reverse conclusion. Most (invaJ.id) 'no conclusion* 
responses were observed on figure 4. A similar s i g n i f i c a n t 
figure e f f e c t (although figure 4 did not produce the most 
errors) was observed f o r IE premiss pairs. There i s no 
v a l i d conclusion f o r each of these but there i s a v a l i d 
reverse conclusion. Most ( v a l i d ) *no conclusion' responses 
were observed on figure 1. 
2) No figure e f f e c t was observed on EE, EO, OE. 00, I I , 10 and 
01 premiss pairs which, i n a l l four figures, y i e l d no 
v a l i d conclusion i n either d i r e c t i o n . 
These r e s u l t s lend strong support to the view that f i g u r e 1 
i s least prone to error r e s u l t i n g from i n v a l i d conversion of r eversed , 
conclusions. Dickstein reports further corroboration of t h i s view-
point based on certain premiss pairs i n some figures only. He points 
out that conversion of conclusions i s an extension of Chapman & 
Chapman's theories. Essentially, Dickstein argues that the subject 
i s "assuming a symme t r i c a l r e l a t i o n between the classes represented 
by the terms". This assumption of symmetry thus applies to both 
premisses and conclusion. Dickstein's suggestion that subjects may 
convert conclusions i s , of course, additional to those explanations 
given f o r Dickstein (1978a) (see section 1.2). 
The d e f i n i t i v e experiment on figure was performed by 
Johnson-Laird & Steedman (1978). Other workers have noted that 
figure 4 produced more errors than figure 1 and have presumed that 
t h i s was due to a preference f o r 'forward processing'. Johnson-Laird 
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& Steedman presented subjects with premiss pairs only and allowed 
them to write t h e i r own conclusions. Subjects constructed more 
•forwarxis' than 'backwards* conclusions f o r figure \/h premiss pairs, 
except i n the case of one of the two premiss pairs that allow only 
backwards conclusions. In cases where conclusions may be stated i n 
either order, t h i s bias was overwhelming and v a l i d deductions 
compatible with the bias were made on over 80^ of occasions, whereas 
v a l i d deductions incompatible with the bias were made on only 20^ of 
occasions. 
The authors report no bias f o r figu r e 3 or indeterminate 
figure 2 premiss pairs. However, f o r determinate figure 2 premiss 
pairs which allow only one v a l i d conclusion, subjects made s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
less errors when the subject of the conclusion appeared i n the second 
premiss (67.5^. as opposed to 30^, correct). There was also an e f f e c t 
of premiss order on figure 1/4 premiss pairs such that order (a) 
produced less errors than order (b): 
(a) A-B (b) B-C 
B-C A-B 
This represents further confirmation f o r the idea of 'forward 
chain processing' as (a) clearly f a c i l i t a t e s t h i s . Further, the 
above difference only applied to determinate premiss pairs. F a c i l i t -
ation of the construction of a chain can only f a c i l i t a t e v a l i d 
responses when a v a l i d conclusion can be derived. 
The authors present a theory of s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning 
processes (a preliminstry account of which i s given by Johnson-Laird. 
1975) that i s based, i n part, on t h i s preference f o r forward processing, 
Essentially, subjects are held to formulate a representation of the 
premisses by imagining one class and 'tagging' i t with (or without) 
the a t t r i b u t e represented by the other class as follows: 
A l l A axe B Some A axe B Some A axe not B No A axe B 
a a a (a) a a (a) a a 
i i i i 1 ^ 1 1 
b b (b) b (b) b b b b b 
denotes a connection and J- denotes that two terms 
axe known not to be connected. An absence of either symbol denotes 
an indeterminate connection. Brackets indicate that there may be a 
further instance of the class. Thus, f o r the I premiss, the 
representation denotes that there may be some As that axe not Bs and 
(or) some Bs that axe not As. 
When premisses axe combined, the next premiss i s 
added on to the f i r s t representation. Two sorts or error axe held 
to arise at t h i s stage, as the theory postulates a bias towards 
forming connections. Examples of these axe shown below: 
(1) Some A axe C, Some B axe C (2) No A are B, No B axe C 
a (a) a a 
i 1 I 
b (b) b b 
i i 1 
c (c) c c 
The above w i l l lead to an i n v a l i d I conclusion at ( l ) , 
due to the middle term, B, having been assumed to be common to both 
premisses. Although (2) i s a correct representation, i t may lead to 
error due to the subject noting that there i s a 1 symbol i n a l l 
paths between A and C. Once these i n v a l i d conclusions axe derived, 
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the theory holds that the subject puts them to a sequence of tests 
that manipulate the representation. Successful subjects, f o r instance, 
w i l l a l t e r ( l ) to: 
a (a ) 
; 
b (b) 
i 
c (c) 
There i s now no l i n e l i n k i n g A and C 
(although the brackets show that a l i n k i s possible) and the premiss 
pair w i l l be correctly judged to be indeterminate, ( l ) and (2) above 
are examples of Dickstein's category 2 and category 1 premiss pairs 
respectively. However, i t should be noted that the Johnson-Laird & 
Steedman data do not show a d i f f e r e n t i a l error rate between category 
1 and category 2 premiss pairs, error rates being low i n both cases. 
The most appealing aspect of the Johnson-Laird & 
Steedman model i s i t s u t i l i s a t i o n of forward processing. Consider 
the representation of the following AA premiss pairs: 
Figure 1/4 Fl gure 2 Figure 
a a a a a a (a) 
i i J. ; T t 
(b) b b (b) (b) b b 
i i I t r 
c c c (c) c c c c c (c) 
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Connections between A and C are more d i f f i c u l t to derive 
from figures 2 and 3 as the A-B and B-C connections axe i n opposite 
directions. The authors point out that t h i s i s consistent with t h e i r 
f i n d i n g that there were less errors on indeterminate figure 2 and 3 
premiss pairs. The readily available connection i n figure l / ^ increases 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of making an i n v a l i d propositional conclusion on 
indeterminate premiss pairs. More important, however, i s the d i r e c t i o n 
of the connection i n figure 1/4. I t i s not surprising that A-C 
conclusions axe constructed, and that'error rates axe high, i n cases 
where the only v a l i d conclusion goes from C to A, against the d i r e c t i o n 
of both arrows. The forward processing findings are thus central to 
the theory of how the premisses axe represented. 
Although Johnson-Laird & Steedman's model i s present-
ed as an alternative to atmosphere theory, i t i s of interest to note 
that the preferred propositional errors were i n accordance with 
atmosphere i n almost a l l cases. Of more interest are the e f f e c t s of 
atmosphere on determinate premiss pairs. There are two such effects 
as follows; 
l ) A l l determinate figure 1/4 premiss pairs that y i e l d 
'forwards* conclusions y i e l d conclusions i n accordance 
with atmosphere, and frequencies of v a l i d conclusions 
were very high on these problems (81% and 88% one week 
l a t e r ) . However, determinate figure 1/4 premiss pairs 
that y i e l d only 'backwards* conclusions do not always 
y i e l d conclusions i n accordance with atmosphere. In 
the case of these premiss pairs, the percentage of 
l o g i c a l l y v a l i d conclusions was higher when the 
conclusion accorded with atmosphere, than when i t did 
not {20% to 3%, and 33% to 8% one week l a t e r ) . 
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2) For figure 3 premiss pairs, the percentage of l o g i c a l l y 
v a l i d solutions was f a r greater when the v a l i d con-
clusion accorded with atmosphere than when i t did not 
(63^ to 23^ and 82% to ^5%, when the same subjects were 
tested one week later).'^ 
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SECTION 1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Much of the research on syllogisms has focussed on 
the question of whether atmosphere bias i s , or i s not, a satisfactory 
explanation,of the data. I t should be noted that the data of Chapman 
& Chapman (1959) vfere not inconsistent with the atmosphere predictions, 
except i n one respect: the presence of an E premiss reducing the 
dominance of par t i c u l a r atmosphere. However, t h e i r (a l t e r n a t i v e ) 
conversion hypothesis has proved very popular, although none of the 
experiments discussed i n section 1.2 has produced re s u l t s indicating 
that i t i s a better explanation. 
A subsidiary f i n d i n g of Revlis (1975a) suggests that 
both conversion and atmosphere explanations may be applicable. He 
reported that subjects made more errors on indeterminate premiss 
pairs that become determinate when premisses are converted than on 
indeterminate premiss pairs that cannot be made determinate by 
conversion. Thus, more atmosphere responses are observed when the 
response accords with the conversion hypothesis. As error rates 
increase when both atmosphere and conversion may be said to be oper-
ating , t h i s suggests that both factors may influence the data. 
Similar to the above i s the f i n d i n g that atmosphere 
responses are most frequent when they accord with a l o g i c a l l y v a l i d 
conclusion (to a determinate premiss p a i r ) , which c l e a r l y suggests 
that l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i s a further factor that may be said to mediate 
responses. Further support f o r t h i s i s provided by the fact that 
v a l i d nonpropositional conclusions are frequently observed on certain 
premiss pairs. However, although an increase i n atmosphere responses, 
when they are v a l i d , a t t e s t s to an ef f e c t of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y on 
responses, i t does not indicate that a l l such responses are determined 
by v a l i d i t y . I n f a c t , subjects frequently f a i l to draw the v a l i d 
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conclusion when i t does not accord with atmosphere, which suggests 
that atmosphere i s . at least, an equally important determinant. 
I t i s i m p l i c i t i n the conversion hypothesis that the 
subject makes a l o g i c a l l y v a l i d inference, given the misinterpretation 
of one or more premisses as implying t h e i r converse. Just two d i s t i n c t 
factors ( l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y and atmosphere) may thus be i d e n t i f i e d as 
mediating responses, one r e l a t i n g to the structure of the problem and 
the other a response bias. These may be referred to as ' l o g i c a l ' and 
'nonlogical' factors respectively, a f t e r Evans (1972a). I t w i l l be 
noted from the above that response frequencies are highest when both 
factors favour the response. 
A further 'nonlogical' factor i s the ef f e c t of the 
t r u t h status of an argument's conclusion. Although some of the e a r l i e r 
work on t h i s i s open to c r i t i c i s m , certain of the l a t e r studies, i n 
part i c u l a r those of Kaufman & Goldstein (19^7) and Feather ( I96A) , 
appear to be well designed. The res u l t s of the Revlin & Leirer 
experiments suggest that use of thematic content may affect both the 
l o g i c a l and nonlogical factors that influence responses on abstract 
tasks. A new nonlogical factor ( t r u t h status of conclusion) may come 
into operation and, i f the subject attends to the structure of the 
problem, his responses may well be influenced by 'real l i f e * knowledge 
or b e l i e f that relates to the premisses. 
The idea that responses to s y l l o g i s t i c tasks are p a r t l y 
mediated by nonlogical factors has been recently challenged by Dickstein 
(1978a, 1978b) and also by Johnson-Laird & Steedman (1978). Dickstein 
(1978a) discusses a va r i e t y of apparently unrelated factors that may 
mediate responses but, unlike Johnson-Laird & Steedman, he does not 
present these within the context of a cohesive theory. I n terms of 
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parsimony, the m u l t i p l i c i t y of these factors i s an inherent weakness 
of his position and he f a i l s to demonstrate that they provide a 
better explanation than that provided by the more parsimonious 
atmosphere theory. 
The Johnson-Laird & Steedman (1978) model explains 
the data i n a similar way to Dickstein. For instance, the model 
accounts f o r possible errors r e s u l t i n g from conversion or a preference 
f o r 'forwards' processing and f o r errors a r i s i n g from the use of 
p a r t i c u l a r or negative premisses. However, the authors bring a 
cohesiveness to these explanations by attempting to show that they 
are a l l a function of the way i n which the subject represents the 
premisses. The foundation of t h i s model i s centred upon the observed 
preference f o r 'forwards' conclusions, which appears to have been 
well validated. However, there i s no d i r e c t evidence that subjects 
attempt to solve s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning problems i n the way that 
Johnson-Laird & Steedman suggest. 
They attack 'atmosphere' theory on the grounds that 
i t cannot explain preferred d i r e c t i o n of conclusion. However, t h i s 
i s an attack upon the extreme position that atmosphere i s the only 
determinant of responses. Atmosphere theory only makes predictions 
about mood but other factors may influence other features of the 
conclusion. 
On indeterminate premiss pairtS, the preferred 
prepositional errors observed by Johnson-Laird & Steedman were 
generally i n accordance with atmosphere and thus t h e i r explanations 
of these can only be seen as an alternative to atmosphere theory. 
In the case of determinate premiss pairs, however, i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to envisage the model being able to provide an alternative explanation 
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to that of atmosphere. Thus, although i t i s possible that f u r t h e r 
development of the Johnson-Laird & Steedman model may provide a 
viable alternative point of view, there i s no good reason at present 
to abandon the view that responses axe determined by a combination 
of l o g i c a l and nonlogical factors. However, the Johnson-Laird & 
Steedman data do suggest that certain designs may increase the r e l a t i v e 
e f f e c t of l o g i c a l factors. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. This comparison may be derived from Table 1 of Morgan & Morton. 
However, the reader should note that i t i s apparent, from t h e i r 
discussion and. p a r t i c u l a r l y , from Table 2 and Table J, that the 
designations *S' and 'C i n Table 1 are i n the wrong order i n a l l 
cases except that of problem 1. 
2. I t should be noted that Revlin & Leirer make no attempt to show, 
fo r instance, by content analysis of various studies, that conversion 
blocking can explain t r u t h status effects on individual problems used 
by other experimenters. 
3. I t i s , of course, accepted that determinate premiss pairs are 
not s t r i c t l y comparable with v a l i d syllogisms, as the former o f f e r 
subjects one v a l i d and three i n v a l i d conclusions 
4. Eased on analysis of. the data given i n the Appendix of the 
paper. Only two such analyses of the e f f e c t of atmosphere on 
determinate premiss pairs can be made, as a l l determinate figure 2 
premiss pairs y i e l d v a l i d conclusions i n accordance with atmosphere. 
5. Six of the nine determinate figure 3 premiss pairs y i e l d a con-
clusion i n accordance with atmosphere. 
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SECTION 2.1 LOGICAL CONSTAJ^ TS WITHIN THE PROFOSITIONAL CALCULUS 
The prepositional calculus i s concerned with r e l a t i o n -
ships between propositions. A proposition has been defined as 
"anything which can be said to be true or f a l s e " (Cohen & Nagel. 193^) 
For any two propositions, (P and Q ) , there are thus four possible 
combinations of t r u t h or f a l s i t y as shown below: 
I -9 
T T 
T F 
F T 
F F 
These may be referred to as the TT, TF, FT and FF 
t r u t h table cases. 
There axe four basic l o g i c a l constants used to connect 
propositions and these may be defined i n terms of t h e i r t r u t h tables. 
That i s , tables that define t h e i r t r u t h or f a l s i t y i n each of the 
four t r u t h table cases. The d e f i n i t i o n of the four basic connectives 
i s shown i n Table 2 .1 . 
The • r e l a t i o n , known as conjunction, i s r e l a t i v e l y 
simple and expresses the assertion that both P and Q are true. 
The O r e l a t i o n i s true unless P i s true and Q false 
(the TF case) and i s referred to as expressing material implication. 
The V r e l a t i o n i s true unless both P and Q are false 
(the FF case) and may be referred to as inclusive disjunction. I n 
common parlance, exclusive dis.junction i s often used, which does not 
have a special symbol. This r e l a t i o n i s false not only when both P 
and Q are f a l s e , but also when both P and Q are true. Thus exclusive 
disjunction demands that one component be true and that the other 
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component be false. 
The = r e l a t i o n i s referred to as expressing material 
equivalence and i s true i f either both or neither component i s true. 
I t i s l o g i c a l l y equivalent to the assertion: (P Q) • ( Q P). 
Table 2.1 
Truth Table Definitions of Four Logical Connectives Used to Connect 
Two Propositions P and Q 
TRUTH TABU: CASE FORMS OF CONNECTION 
P g P ' Q • P O Q P V Q P = Q 
T T 
T F 
F T 
F F 
T T T T 
F F T F 
F T T F 
F T F T 
The constituent propositions (P and Q) , of the above 
re l a t i o n s , may refer to classes of events that occur on more than one 
occasion. I n such cases, one f a l s i f y i n g case i s s u f f i c i e n t to prove 
the r e l a t i o n false (however many v e r i f y i n g cases have been observed). 
Thus, f o r instance. P Q i s only true i f there are no TF instances. 
The f a l s i t y of a proposition, P, may be referred to as P which, 
i n set terminology, may be interpreted as 'anything that i s not P'. 
Similarly, the f a l s i t y of Q may be expressed as Q. Only expressions 
l i n k i n g P and Q have so fax been considered, but P and Q may also be 
involved i n a combination. There are thus four possible implication 
relationships, and four possible (inc l u s i v e ) disjunctive relationships, 
each with i t s own t r u t h table, A convenient way to re f e r to these i s 
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as AA, AN, NA, or NN (implication or disjunctive) rules, which denotes 
the affirmation or negation of each component. The t r u t h tables f o r 
a l l these rules are shown i n Table 2.2, which i s drawn i n such a way 
as to show the connection between implication and inclusive disjunction, 
For each material implication rule i n the f i r s t column, there i s an 
inclusive disjunction rule i n the l a s t column that has the same t r u t h 
table. 
Table 2.2 
The Truth Tables f o r a l l Four Possible ^ and V Relations 
MATERIAL 
IMPLICATION 
RUIES P Q 
TRUTH 
P Q 
TABIDS 
P Q P Q 
INCLUSIVE 
DISJUNCTION 
RUIES 
T T T F F T F F 
P 3 Q (AA) T F T T P v Q (NA) 
P => Q (AN) F T T T P V Q (NN) 
P => Q (NA) T T T F P V Q (AA) 
P => Q (NN) T T F T P V Q (AN) 
Similar tables may be constructed f o r material 
equivalence and exclusive disjunction rules, which are also l o g i c a l l y 
connected. 
I t i s important to note that the middle columns of 
Table 2.2 refer to the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of P. and Q, I f , however, the 
cases are made to apply to the actual propositions contained i n the 
r u l e , so that, f o r instance, the TT case of P o Q i s PQ, then a l l 
four rules w i l l have the same standard t r u t h table ( i . e . that given 
f o r the AA r u l e ) . This l a t t e r notation has certain advantages and w i l l 
be adopted henceforth. 
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The C5 and v constants are fundamental to the 
prepositional calculus and could be argued to be fundajnental to the 
construction of l o g i c a l arguments i n r e a l l i f e . However, i f subjects 
use of these constants i s to be investigated, a way must be found to 
express them verbally. 
The best tr a n s l a t i o n of the inclusive disjunction re-
l a t i o n i s probably 'either P or Q', The phrase 'or both* possibly 
needs to be added to make the meaning wholly clear and to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
inclusive from exclusive disjunction, which may be expressed as 'either 
P or Q but not both* (corresponding to an = r e l a t i o n ) . Strawson (1952), 
although pointing out that 'or' i s not an exact translation of v i n 
a l l cases, concludes that 'or' i s the best available t r a n s l a t i o n . 
However, the translation of o i s more d i f f i c u l t . A 
word used by logicians i s 'entails', where 'P e n t a i l s Q' i s defined 
as 'P and not Q i s inconsistent' (Strawson). This word would appear 
to be the solution to the problem of t r a n s l a t i n g ^ , Unfortunately, 
'entails i s an infrequently used word i n ordinary discourse and 
cannot be used i n a "natural' way to express implication, except i n 
a few cases. The closest, frequently used, natural equivalent of P Q 
that embodies the concept of entailment, i s ' i f P then Q'. Such 
stat^entsiare known as conditionals, the f i r s t component (P) being 
referred to as the antecedent and the second component (Q) as the 
consequent. 
There are, however, various other p o s s i b i l i t i e s , f o r 
instance: 'never P without Q';•'whenever P, then Q'; 'Q i f P'; the 
universal , ' a l l P are Q'; or even the d i s j u n c t i v e , 'either not P or 
Q'. A l l these forms may be used to express implication and are thus 
l o g i c a l l y equivalent but i t would be naive to assume that they axe 
necessarily psychologically equivalent. 
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Further, Strawson points out that the t r u t h of P O Q 
may be established i n cases which would not constitute v e r i f i c a t i o n 
of a conditional. The f a l s i t y of P i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r the t r u t h of 
P :3 Q, whereas conditionals make statements about Q, contingent upon 
the occurence of P, and are not usually considered v e r i f i e d when P 
f a i l s to occur. Kneale & Kneale (I962) point out that persons are 
not generally considered to have kept (conditional) promises, or 
obeyed conditional orders, when the conditions f o r those promises or 
orders have not been f u l f i l l e d , 
Strawson also points out that counterfactual conditionals 
do not correspond to P z:> Q statements. Counterfactuals a l l have 
antecedents that are known to be false and thus, i f they were the same 
as implication, would a l l be necessarily true. For instance, the 
counterfactual statements, * i f H i t l e r had had the atomic bomb, he 
would have won the war' and * i f H i t l e r had had the atomic bomb, he 
would ( s t i l l ) have l o s t the wax*, would both be necessarily true, as 
H i t l e r was not i n possession of such a weapon. Strawson argues that 
such statements cannot be taken as always true i n r e a l l i f e , otherwise 
there would be no point i n making them. Lewis (1973) argues that 
counterfactual conditionals cannot be described i n terms of implication 
, i f so, 
as l o g i c a l l y v a l i d arguments may be constructed that have true 
premisses but false conclusions. 
However, i t i s not the case that conditionals have only 
recently been considered (and rejected) as possible translations of 
implication. Kneale & Kneale report a history of debate on conditionals 
i n t h e i r own r i g h t o r i g i n a t i n g i n a n t i q u i t y . Much of t h i s debate 
concerns whether a conditional implies implication. Kneale & Kneale 
conclude that a conditional i s best described by assigning i t no t r u t h 
value when the antecedent i s false. This i s referred to as defective 
implication and yields the following t r u t h table f o r the statement 
' i f P then Q'. 
T T T 
T F F 
F T ? 
F F ? 
Similar tables can be constructed f o r the three other 
possible conditional rules. I t can be seen that the f i r s t two entries 
are as f o r P z> Q, Kneale & Kneale explain that the ? (they use ..) 
does not mean that the conditional i s something other than either 
true or f a l s e , but simply that i t i s inapplicable. This also appears 
to hamdle the problem of counterfactuals as they become neither true 
nor false. I t i s c l e a r l y impossible to actually v e r i f y or f a l s i f y 
a counterfactual and thus the FT or FF ca® represented by the r e a l 
state of a f f a i r s i s inapplicable to evaluating i t . 
This defective t r u t h table can also be applied to 
other forms that use ' i f , such as i f P' and to the universal. These 
forms, then, cannot be taken as an exact t r a n s l a t i o n of P ^ Q, 
although there axe certain features i n common. Strawson concludes 
that the best expression of implication i s *not both P and not Q\ 
However, t h i s i s somewhat too s i m p l i s t i c f o r psychological purposes. 
The expression of P o Q would be 'not both P and Q' . This does not 
appear to convey any impression of entailinent, A reasonable 
expression of implication may be disjunction but ' i f P then Q' 
appears to be psychologically d i f f e r e n t to 'either not P or Q' and 
the l a t t e r form, again, does not seem to convey much impression of 
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entailment. In any case, the disjunction cannot be used to express 
implication i f i t i s desired to investigate both disjunction and 
implication. 
Thus the conditional (or similEir forms) appears to be 
the best choice f o r the psychologist who wishes to study entailment. 
The conditional has a long history of association with implication 
and thus i s perhaps a better choice than other, similar, forms. I t 
should be remembered, however, that t h i s does not represent a study 
of P Q. 
There are inferences that may be drawn from the 
conditional ' i f P then Q' that p a r a l l e l inferences which may be drawn 
from P ^  Q, Two v a l i d inferences are modus ponens (MP) and modus 
tol l e n s (MT). The MP inference i n f e r s 'Q* , given 'P', and the MT 
inference i n f e r s 'not P*, given 'not Q', I t can be seen that these 
inferences depend upon the fact that 'P' and 'not Q* cannot occur 
together i f the conditional i s true. 
Two i n v a l i d inferences axe the affirmation of the 
consequent (AC) and the denial of the antecedent (DA), The AC 
inference i n f e r s 'P', given *Q*, and the DA inference i n f e r s *not Q', 
given 'not P'. These inferences are i n v a l i d because a conditional 
( i f i n accord with implication) only states that Q must be true i f 
P i s true; i t does not state that Q cannot also be true when P i s 
false. These inferences would be v a l i d i f the rule expressed 
equivalence (they are v a l i d f o r P = Q), Clearly, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
' i f P then Q' as also meaning * i f Q then P' i s a form on conversion 
and, f o r t h i s reason, the conversion hypothesis i s frequently stated, 
i n the prepositional l i t e r a t u r e as the hypothesis that subjects inter^ 
pret a conditional rule as implying material equivalence. In f a c t , 
conditionals aresometimes used i n r e a l l i f e to express an equivalence 
relationship, 
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As, with the addition of negatives, there are four 
possible conditional r u l e s , i t i s not always the case that, f o r 
instance. MP i n f e r s 'Q* from 'P', Given the (NN) conditional ' i f not 
P then not Q* , MP i n f e r s 'not Q' from 'not P'. and MT infers P from Q. 
A convenient standard notation i s to refer to the true or false case 
of the antecedent (TA or FA) and to the true or false case of the 
consequent (TC or FC). Thus, TA and TC are P and Q f o r the AA r u l e , 
but 'not P' and 'not Q' f o r the NN r u l e . This allows the following 
standard expressions of the four inferences, which apply to a l l rules: 
MP ( v a l i d ) TA /. TC 
MT ( v a l i d ) FC /, FA 
AC ( i n v a l i d ) TC /, .TA 
DA ( i n v a l i d ) FA /. FC 
Inferences may also be drawn from disjunctive rules. 
Given that one component i s false, i t i s v a l i d to i n f e r that the 
other i s true. However, given that one component i s true, i t i s not 
v a l i d to i n f e r that the other i s false (unless exclusive disjunction 
i s specified). There are thus two v a l i d , and two i n v a l i d inferences 
that are the equivalent to those that may be inferred from the 
corresponding conditional. 
F i n a l l y , a note on the difference between 'not P' and 
'P' i s i n order. These w i l l be used to stand f o r e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t 
negation respectively. Thus, given the proposition (P) 'the number 
i s a ?', the conclusion (or denial) 'the number i s not ?' w i l l be 
expressed as 'not P', However, i f there were a choice of conclusion 
between '?' and ' 6 ' , t h i s would be expressed as 'P' and 'P* (because 
' 6 ' i s 'something which i s not 7 ' ) -
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SECTION 2,2 TRUTH TABLE EXICTIMENTS 
The idea that subjects may i n t e r p r e t conditionals i n 
terms of defective implication was f i r s t introduced i n t o the 
psychological l i t e r a t u r e by Wason ( I966) . I t was Johnson-Laird & 
Tagart ( I969) , however, who f i r s t attempted to establish which type 
of t r u t h table was psychologically appropriate f o r the various ways 
in which implication may be expressed. They studied the four a l t e r -
native forms shown below: 
(1) I f P then Q 
(2) There i s never P without there being Q 
(3) There i s n ' t P i f there i s n ' t Q 
(k) Either there i s n ' t P or there i s Q 
I t can be seen that ( l ) , (2) and (k) are a l l possible 
translations of P o Q, ( l ) being the conditional, and (4) the 
disjunctive form. Although the conditional at (3) could be taken as 
a translation of P Q, i t i s best described as a translation of 
Q O P (which has the same t r u t h table as P Q). Thus i t d i f f e r s 
i n two ways from the conditional at ( l ) ; f i r s t l y , i t contains 
negatives, and secondly the order of terms i s reversed as the ante-
cedent i s the second term. 
The rules expressed relationships between l e t t e r s and 
numbers that appeared on the l e f t and r i g h t hand sides of cards having 
a l i n e drawn down the centre (e.g. ' i f there i s an A on the l e f t , then 
there i s a 7 on the r i g h t ' ) . Each subject had to classify a 
p a r t i c u l a r set of cards as to whether each card proved the r u l e true, 
proved the rule false or was irrelevant to the r u l e . The sets 
included instances of TT, TF, FT and FF cases (e.g. f o r the above 
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r u l e , A7, A6, B? and C6, respectively) so that subjects evaluated 
each t r u t h table case. The P and Q terms were f a l s i f i e d i n three 
d i f f e r e n t ways; either by a d i f f e r e n t l e t t e r (or number), a geometric 
shape, or a blank. There were no reported response differences between 
these three methods. 
Data were reported i n terms of derived t r u t h tables 
f o r each subject. However, they were not f u l l y reported as a 
'miscellaneous* category was used which included a l l t r u t h tables that 
occurred no more than twice throughout the experiment. On some rules 
t h i s category accounted f o r a large proportion of the data. 
As expected, most subjects (19 out of 24) were 
c l a s s i f i e d as i n t e r p r e t i n g r u l e ( l ) as defective implication. There 
was only one (material) implication, and four miscellaneous, c l a s s i f i c -
ations. The same tendency, although weaker, was observed on ru l e ( 2 ) . 
14 subjects were c l a s s i f i e d as in t e r p r e t i n g i t as defective implication 
and only three were c l a s s i f i e d as giving an implication i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Rule ( 3 ) I however produced a wide range of responses. Only f i v e sub-
jects were c l a s s i f i e d as int e r p r e t i n g i t as defective implication 
(of Q o p) and no other c l a s s i f i c a t i o n occurred more thaji twice. 
This re s u l t reveals a drawback of the method used. Each subject 
evaluated 16 s t i m u l i f o r each rule and thus repeated measures were 
used. The subject's t r u t h table was derived (presumably) from his 
most frequent evaluations. I f a l l the data had been analysed, i t 
i s possible that a greater consistency across subjects may have 
become apparent. 
Two important points emerge from these res u l t s . 
F i r s t l y , (AA) conditional statements are most frequently interpreted 
as defective implication. I t i s of int e r e s t to note that there was 
no ^cpparent tendency to i n t e r p r e t the conditional as implying 
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equivalence ( i . e , they were not converted). Secondly, the i n t e r p r e t -
ation of P O Q i s dependent upon i t s l i n g u i s t i c expression. I n t e r -
pretations were less consistent f o r the nonconditional rule ( 2 ) , 
The reversed, negated conditional was apparently too complex f o r 
most subjects. The root of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s unclear, however, as 
i t may be the reversal or the presence of negatives (or both). I t 
i s unfortunate that the study did not investigate rules of the form 
'there i s a Q i f there i s a P* (reversed) and ' i f there i s not a P, 
then there i s not a Q' (negated). 
The disjunctive rule (4) was evaluated very d i f f e r e n t l y 
from the conditional rule ( l ) . Responses were more varied and 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n times were (on average) more than twice as long. 
However, there were less 'irrelevsint' responses and eight of the 
subjects were c l a s s i f i e d as i n t e r p r e t i n g i t as implication. Four 
subjects responded as though the disjunctive was true when the f i r s t 
(negated) part was true and false otherwise, thus appearing to ignore 
the second hal f of the rule and no other t r u t h table was ascribed to 
more than two subjects. Thus one very clear f i n d i n g of t h i s study i s 
that, although P :D Q i s l o g i c a l l y equivalent to P v Q, the AA 
conditional i s not psychologically equivalent to the NA disjunctive. 
The investigation of conditional rules was extended 
by Evans (1972b) to include a l l four conditional rules formed by 
systematic negation of antecedent and consequent, Evans points out 
that t h i s procedure e n t a i l s that "overall the e f f e c t of instances 
matching (affirming) or mismatching (negating) values named i n the 
rules should cancel out". This i s demonstrated i n Table 2.3, 
I t can be seen from Table 2,3 that each of the four 
matching cases ( i , e , PQ, PQ, PQ and PQ) appears exactly once as each 
of the four t r u t h table cases. 
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Table 2.3 
Table Demonstrating How Use of Four Rules Controls f o r Matching 
• TT " TF --• FT ' • FF 
CONDITIONAL CASE CASE CASE CASE 
IF P THEN Q (AA) PQ PQ PQ PQ 
W P THEN NOT Q (AN) PQ PQ PQ PQ 
IF NOT P THEN Q (NA) PQ PQ PQ PQ 
IF NOT P THEN NOT Q (NN) PQ PQ PQ PQ 
The subjects were not offerred an 'irrelevant' 
category but were presented with an array of P, P, Q and Q instances 
and asked to construct true and false instances of given (abstract) 
conditional rules. They were asked to give further instances u n t i l 
they said there were no more. Iixelevance was thus simply denoted 
by a f a i l u r e to construct a par t i c u l a r case as either Verifying or 
f a l s i f y i n g . Table 2.4 shows the frequency of selection of the four 
t r u t h table cases siimmed across the four rules. 
'Kible 2 A 
Frequency of Construction of the Four Truth Table Cases Summed 
Across the Four Rules (data obtained from Evans, 1972b, Table 3) 
N=96 (24 subjects x 4 rules) 
TRUTH.TABIE VERIFICATION FALSIFICATION NOT CONSTRUCTOD 
CASE 
TT 95 0 1 
TF 3 77 16 
FT 13 33 50 
FF 32 22 ^2 
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As can be seen, there was a strong bias to construct 
TT to v e r i f y and TF to f a l s i f y . Treatment of FT and FF was more 
variable but across the four rules i t was more common to ignore these 
two cases than to construct them as either true or false instances. 
An int e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g emerges i f t h i s data i s analysed, 
not by t r u t h table case, but by actual values selected, summed across 
the four rules. This i s done i n Table 2 .5, which shows Evans* use 
of negated conditionals to be an effe c t i v e technique, as i t disambiguates 
these values and t r u t h table case. 
Table 2.5 
Frequency of Selections Summed Across the Four Rules (Data from Evans, 
1972b, Table 3) N=^ 96 (ZU- subjects x k rules) 
VERIFICATION FALSIFICATION NOT CONSTRUCTED 
PQ . 33 50 13 
PQ 39 32 25 
PQ 38 26 32 
PQ 33 24 39 
I t can be seen that f a l s i f i < i a t i o n , but' not v e r i f i c a t i o n , 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s show a trend down the table. In p a r t i c u l a r , PQ was 
constructed f a r more frequently than either PQ, PQ or PQ. This e f f e c t 
i s even more noticeable when i n i t i a l constructions are looked at. 
PQ was constructed as a f a l s i f y i n g instance 46 times as opposed to 
21 (PQ), 13 (PQ) and 13 (PQ). Evans refers to t h i s tendency to prefer 
t o construct those values mentioned i n the r u l e as 'matching bias'. 
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Evans (1975) reports data that replicated the above 
study using an evaluation task, i n which subjects were presented with 
instances of t r u t h table cases and asked whether they were true or 
false cases of (or ir r e l e v a n t to) the rul e . He extended the invest-
igation to rules of the form 'P only i f Q' (referred to as 01 condit-
ionals), which have the same t r u t h table as the usual ' i f . . . t h e n ' 
( I T ) conditional but a somewhat d i f f e r e n t form. The evaluations of 
the four t r u t h table cases, summed across the four rules, are shown 
i n Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 
Evaluations of the Four Truth Table Cases Summed across the Four Rules 
(Data from Evans, 1975. Table 1) N=96 (Zh- subjects X 4 rule 
IF, , ,THEN ONLY IF 
TRUE FALSE IRRE LEVANT TRUE FALSE IRREIEVANT 
TT 85 5 6 79 2 15 
TF 9 78 9 11 56 29 
FT 18 28 50 12 55 29 
FF 29 11 55 ^2 15 38 
As can be seen by comparison with Table 2 .^ , data f o r the 
IT rule are comparable to those obtained from the construction task. 
S t r i k i n g differences may be observed, however, between the IT and 01 
data. F i r s t l y , the tendency to evaluate FF as a v e r i f y i n g instance 
i s more noticeable on the 01 r u l e , 'true' being the modal response 
to FF. More noticeable i s that there i s no difference on the 01 
rules between responses to TF and FT, which both show a strong bias 
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towards 'false* evaluations. 
The s i m i l a r i t y between TF and FT responses, together 
with the increased bias towards evaluating FF as a true* case, suggest 
that subjects may int e r p r e t the 01 rule as implying equivalence. 
However, i t i s also noticeable that the amount of* 'irrelevant* 
responses summed across both TF and FT i s approximately the same fo r 
the two rules (59 and 58). I t could thus be that, on the 01 r u l e , 
some subjects evaluated FT as false and TF as irr e l e v a n t . This would 
suggest a conversion to * i f TC then TA' treated as defective implication 
The ef f e c t of matching on the IT rule was somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t from that observed i n the data of Evans ( l972b) . I t was 
very noticeable, i n that data, that matching only affected f a l s i f i c a t i o n 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and that i t s primary e f f e c t was to produce a high 
construction frequency f o r the double matching case. On the Evans 
(1975) data, matching appeared to have some ef f e c t on 'true' as well 
as 'false' evaluations, and i t s primary e f f e c t appeared to be to 
increase 'irrelevant* evaluations of the double mismatching case. 
The Evans (1972b) suggestion that matching affects * irrelevant' 
responses appears to be the best explanation of the evaluation task 
data. Matching bias had an equally strong e f f e c t on responses to the 
01 r u l e . This i s of par t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t , as i t shows that the bias 
extends to a d i f f e r e n t formulation of the r u l e . 
Evans & Newstead (1977) also investigated subjects* 
evaluations of IT and 01 rules. A strong matching e f f e c t on ' i r r e l -
evant* responses was observed and, again, the ef f e c t was most notice-
able on PQ. The mean number of 'irrelevant' evaluations (per 16 
subjects) was 7.88 f o r PQ as opposed to 3.75 (PQ). 2.75 (PQ) and 
1.95 (PQ). I t seems possible that the ef f e c t of matching i s q u a l i t -
a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t between construction and evaluation paradigms, 
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primarily leading to the construction of double matches, and the 
evaluation of double mismatches as ir r e l e v a n t . 
Evans & Newstead investigated the apparent conversion 
of 01 rules noted i n the data of Evans (1975) but concluded that 
such conversion i s only a minor tendency. I f 01 rules are converted 
then FT becomes TF, and vice versa. The 01 data were compared with 
the IT data to see whether a better match was obtained with, or 
without, the assumption of conversion of 01 rules and a better f i t 
was obtained without t h i s assumption. 
Truth table experiments have indicated that the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ^ r e l a t i o n i s highly dependent on the way i t 
i s expressed. For any par t i c u l a r expression, responses are very 
varied and often no consistent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , across subjects, can 
be determined. Conditionals appear to be often interpreted as implying 
defective implication, although data from the FT and FF cases suggest 
that they may al so be occasionally interpreted as implying equivalence. 
There appears to be some tendency on 01 conditionals to also convert 
them to ' i f TC then TA' and interpr e t the converted form as implying 
defective implication. Some subjects on conditional tasks, and many 
subjects on disjunctive tasks, y i e l d inconsistent or unclassifiable 
t r u t h tables. 
Smedslund (1970) has pointed out that there i s a 
'circular r e l a t i o n between understanding and logic' as i t i s only 
possible to f i n d out whether the subject has reasoned l o g i c a l l y i f 
his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s assumed, but his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may only be 
inferred by assuming that he has reasoned l o g i c a l l y . Although 
Smedslund was r e f e r r i n g to theories of reasoning i n general, the point 
i s well made with reference to t r u t h table experiments. The only way 
i n which t r u t h tables may be inferred i s on the assumption that sub-
jects reason correctly on the basis of t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The 
existence of matching response bias i s one indication that t h i s i s 
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an i n v a l i d assumption. 
The a b i l i t y of t r u t h table tasks to determine 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n i s thus debatable. They have served, however, to 
demonstrate that d i f f e r e n t response p r o f i l e s are obtained from 
d i f f e r e n t forms of ( l o g i c a l l y equivalent) rules. Clearly, d i f f e r e n t 
responses must be expected to tasks using d i s j u n c t i v e , conditional 
or 01 conditional rules. 
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SECTION 2.3 CONDITIONAL INFERENCE TASKS 
SECTION 2,3.1 ABSTRACT CONDITIONAL INFERENCE TASKS 
In general, inference tasks present subjects with a 
major premiss (a conditional or disjunctive r u l e ) and a minor premiss 
(the affirmation or denial of one component of the r u l e ) , and require 
them to draw (or evaluate) a conclusion about the affirmation or 
denial of the other component. 
As was described i n section 2.1, the following four 
inferences can be drawn from a conditional r u l e : 
MP: TA TC 
MT: FC /. FA 
AC: TC /. TA 
DA: FA FC 
Whatever the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , MP and MT are v a l i d as 
they depend on the r e s t r i c t i o n that TA and FC may not both be true. 
However, AC and DA are i n v a l i d unless the rule i s interpreted as 
implying equivalence. Some work.in t h i s f i e l d has been directed at 
i n f e r r i n g underlying t r u t h tables and thus determining the i n t e r -
pretation of the conditional: i f subjects make a large quantity of 
AC and DA inferences, they are presumed to have interpreted the 
conditional as implying equivalence and, i f they make few such i n f e r -
ences, they are presumed to have interpreted the conditional as 
implying implication. This approach has two drawbacks. F i r s t l y 
many subjects behave inconsistently and are not easily c l a s s i f i e d , 
•77-
and secondly i t suffers from the Smedslund (1970) objection of 
c i r c u l a r i t y . I t i s preferable to consider actual frequencies of the 
AC and DA inferences, rather than c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of subjects on the 
basis of t h e i r presumed in t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Taplin & Staudenmayer (1973) presented subjects with 
sets of three statements, i n which the antecedent and consequent of 
conditionals referred to l e t t e r s of tte alphabet, such as the 
following: 
I f there i s a Z. then there i s an H (major premiss) 
There i s a Z (minor premiss) 
There i s an H (conclusion) 
Subjects were asked to mark each conclusion true or 
false and a l l four inferences were evaluated as 'true' i n most cases. 
In t h e i r second experiment, Taplin & Staudenmayer offerred subjects 
a choice of three possible conclusions: 'always true', 'sometimes 
but not always true' and 'never true', (For ha l f the subjects the 
word 'false* was used i n place of 'true* but t h i s had no effe c t on 
responses.) There was a marked reduction i n the frequency of 
'always true' responses to AC and DA conclusions (no specific data 
are given), and subjects took advantage of the 'sometimes but not 
always' categories. 
Taplin & Staudenmayer suggest that one reason f o r the 
high frequency of acceptance of AC and DA conclusions i n the f i r s t 
experiment i s that subjects misinterpreted the response categories. 
However, i t i s the authors themselves who appear to have done t h i s . 
They state that, " i n lo g i c " , conclusions that follow from premisses 
are true and that "any other conclusion i s false", and appear t o 
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confuse *true* and 'false' with 'valid' and ' i n v a l i d * . In f a c t , 
given two true premisses, v a l i d conclusions are true but in v a l i d 
conclusions may be either true or false. Forced to make a choice, 
subjects i n the f i r s t experiment presumably believed that AC and DA 
conclusions were more l i k e l y to be true than false. Overall, the 
results of t h i s study thus appear to suggest that mos t subjects 
believe that AC and DA conclusions (from true premisses) are 
probably, but not necessarily, true. 
-Evans (1972c) noted that, f o r the AA r u l e , some 
inferences involve negative conclusions and others involve affirmative 
conclusions, and that t h i s difference may well a f f e c t r e l a t i v e 
frequencies of acceptance of these inferences. Accordingly, he used 
a l l four conditional rules and thus the extent to which each i n f e r -
ence produced affirmative or negative conclusions was balanced across 
the four rules. For instance, MT produces a negative conclusion on 
AA and AN rules, but an affirmative conclusion on NA and NN rules. 
Evans studies only MT and AC and thus a l l conclusions involved the 
antecedent of the r u l e . For each problem, subjects were presented 
with three alternative conclusions: *P', 'not P' and 'indeterminate'. 
Each subject had the opportunity of constructing each inference twice. 
The percentage frequency with which each inference was made, f o r 
each of the four rules, i s shown i n Table 2 .? . (Percentages are 
based on two responses from each of 16 subjects). 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y more MT inferences, and less AC i n f e r -
ences, were made on rules having affirmative antecedents and thus, 
fo r both inferences, subjects affirmed s i g n i f i c a n t l y more negative 
conclusions. I t i s thus possible to in t e r p r e t these data as suggesting 
a response bias that produces a preference f o r negative conclusions. 
However, there are two alternative p o s s i b i l i t i e s worth considering: 
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1) NA and NN rules may be confusing and thus y i e l d more errors 
I f AC i s considered i n v a l i d , then confusion would thus 
y i e l d more AC and less MT responses. 
2) NA and NN rules may be more frequently interpreted as 
implying equivalence. This would explain the greater 
frequency of AC responses, ( i t should be noted, however, 
that t h i s explanation does not account f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l 
frequencies of MT responses.) 
Table 2.7 
The Percentage Frequency of MT and AC inferences i n Exp. 1, Evans, 1972c 
(Data from Table 2, Evans, 1972c) 
MT AC 
IF P THEN Q * 91 32 
IF P THEN NOT Q 75 35 
IF NOT P THEN Q 38 61 
IF NOT P THEN NOT Q kl 55 
*The data f o r the AA rule are s l i g h t l y suspect as the subjects were 
given pretests with feedback f o r both inferences on t h i s r u l e , 
Evans (1977a) studied a l l four inferences, on a l l four 
rules, using an evaluation task. Subjects were asked to indicate 
(*yes* or 'no') whether the conclusion followed from the given 
premisses. A l l subjects affirmed the MP inference on a l l four rules, 
but s i g n i f i c a n t differences between the rules were observed f o r the 
other three inferences. The Evans (1972c) results were replicated 
i n that s i g n i f i c a n t l y more MT inferences, and less AC inferences, 
were affirmed on rules having affirmative antecedents. Furthermore, 
•80-
more DA inferences were affirmed on rules having affirmative 
consequents. 
This l a t t e r r e s u l t i s of particular importance 
because, again, i t suggests a bias towards negative conclusions. 
Both of the above alternative explanations would predict that more 
DA responses would be observed on rules having negative antecedents. 
Thus, as the observed DA data do not accord with these alternative 
explanations, the best available explanation i s that subjects are, 
i n f a c t , biased towards negative conclusions. This w i l l be referred 
to henceforth as 'conclusion bias'. However, although i t appears that 
a nonlogical factor influences responses, there i s also clear evidence 
of the influence of a l o g i c a l factor, as a l l subjects affirmed MP on 
a l l four rules. 
Evans (1977a) also investigated the 01 forms of 
conditional rule and found no s i g n i f i c a n t evidence of the bias. 
However, subjects did af f i r m more negative than affirmative conclusions 
on a l l four rules (which r e s u l t i s , i n i t s e l f , close to significance) 
and a rank correlation, performed across the c e l l s of the Evans data 
(rule form by inference), yielded a s i g n i f i c a n t correlation of O.76 
between the two rules. This suggests that the data from the two rule 
forms 'move' i n the same way and there i s thus good reason to believe 
that the bias did have a (weaker) e f f e c t on the 01 responses. The 
data from the 01 rules suggested that some subjects were converting 
them to ' i f TC then TA' ( i n accordance with the findings of Evans. 
1975» and Evans & Newstead, 1977). 
Roberge (1971b) ran a comparatively large sajnple 
(110 subjects), presenting them with a l l four inferences to be 
evaluated on a l l four conditional rules. Subjects were asked to respond 
'yes', 'no' or 'maybe'. The problem with t h i s study i s that Roberge 
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does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between inference type and thus some of h i s 
findings are impossible to interpret. For instance, he reports that 
there i s no difference i n error rates between subjects' evaluation 
of affirmative and negative conclusions. However, t h i s does not 
necessarily mean that one type of conclusion was not affirmed more 
often than another, as agreement with a conclusion may or may not 
be an error, depending on the inference type. I f subjects had 
accepted a l l negative conclusions and rejected a l l affirmative 
conclusions, then the error r a t e s would have been i d e n t i c a l . 
Roberge analysed the data in terms of mean errors per 
ru l e , on the assumption of an implication interpretation ( i . e . AC and 
DA were scored as e r r o r s ) . Least errors were made on AN rule s and 
most errors were made on NA ru l e s , with the error rate on AA r u l e s 
about the same as that on NN r u l e s . This o v e r a l l pattern does 
coincide with the data of Evans (1977a) but no more precise comparisons 
can be drawn, as Roberge does not give separate data for each inference, 
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SECTION 2,3.2 THEMATIC CONDITIONAL INFERENCE TASKS 
Taplin (1971) used thematic rules to investigate a l l 
four main inferences plus the i n v a l i d inference: TA FC. Subjects 
evaluated each inference 12 times and thus 60 problems ( a l l based on 
affirmative conditional rules) were used. As i n the Evans (19773-) 
study, subjects were asked whether a given conclusion necessarily 
followed from the premisses. The i n v a l i d inference, TA FC, was 
rejected on 9W of occasions and MP was affirmed on 91^ of occasions. 
However, the error rates are surprisingly high, p a r t i c u l a r l y as 
Evans (1977a) reported 100^ correct MP responses on an abstract task 
complicated by the presence of negatives, MT was affirmed on only 
6jfo of occasions which again reveals a higher error rate than that 
reported f o r the AA rule by Evans (1972b and 1977a). As Taplin*s 
subjects were presented with 60 problems, the error rate could 
possibly be explained by boredom (or other factors) r e s u l t i n g from 
the length of the task. However, Taplin & Staudenmayer (1973) 
presented subjects with 96 (abstract) problems but s t i l l obtained 
frequencies of 99% 0^) and 87% (MT) i n experiment 1. 
The position i s unclear as the Taplin & Staudenmayer 
methodology may have increased the frequency of a l l inferences i n 
experiment 1 and, unfortunately they do not report the raw data from 
experiment 2, However, as they stand, these data suggest that use 
of thematic rules appears to have a small i n h i b i t o r y e f f e c t on the 
affirma t i o n of v a l i d (MP and MT) inferences. Further support f o r t h i s 
view i s provided by the data of Roberge (1978) who compared use of 
thematic and abstract content on a within subject design. Although 
Roberge reports no analysis of the e f f e c t of content on conditional 
rules only, his data do show higher frequencies of MT affirmation on 
-83-
abstract than on thematic problems (70^ to 6l% on the AA rule and 
67% to 58% across a l l four r u l e s ) . 
Taplin's data show that AC was affirmed on 57%i and 
DA on 6\% of occasions. However, when thematic rules are used, the 
frequencies of these inferences would be expected to be related to 
the content of the rules. For instance, subjects might be expected 
to make more AC and DA inferences on the r u l e * i f the number i s even 
then i t i s d i v i s i b l e by two* than on the r u l e * i f i t i s a r a b b i t then 
i t i s an animal', 
Unfortunately, although i t i s possible to construct 
statements that c l e a r l y imply equivalence or implication, many 
thematic statements, although not s t r i c t l y implying equivalence, may 
suggest that the AC stnd DA inferences are very l i k e l y . For instance, 
Geis & Zwicky (1971) have suggested that conditional promises and 
threats, ' i n v i t e ' the (DA) inference that, i f the conditional 
behaviour i s not performed, then the promised reward, or threatened 
punishment, w i l l not be forthcoming. Fillenbaum (1975» 1976) has 
provided experimental support f o r t h i s view. Most subjects conclude 
that, f o r instance, the 'real l i f e ' utterance of the statement ' i f 
you mow the lawn I w i l l give you f i v e d o l l a r s ' implies that no money 
w i l l be paid i f the lawn i s not mown. 
I t i s not necessarily the case, however, that such 
•invited inferences' denote a consistent equivalence i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
As Kneale & Kneale (1962) point out, promises are not usually 
considered v e r i f i e d i f the condition on which the promise was made 
i s not f u l f i l l e d . Thus a person t o l d ' i f you mow the lawn I w i l l give 
you f i v e d o l l a r s ' may accept the inference that i f he doesn't mow the 
lawn he w i l l not receive f i v e d o l l a r s ; but, i f he does not mow the 
lawn (and does not receive f i v e d o l l a r s ) he may not accept t h i s as 
v e r i f i c a t i o n that he would have received f i v e d o l l a r s i f he had 
mown the lawn. That i s , his ' inference task'responses rpay appear to 
indicate an equivalence i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , whereas his 'truth table' 
responses may appear to indicate a defective implication i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
The argument against assumption of int e r p r e t a t i o n on the basis of 
responses thus holds at least as well f o r thematic rules as f o r 
abstract rules. This point should be borne i n mind during the 
following discussion of the e f f e c t of content on frequencies of AC 
and DA affir m a t i o n . 
Taplin reports that the 60 conditional rules used 
"contained a mixture of instances where the two propositions, P and 
Q, were causally related and where the connection between the 
propositions was either a r b i t r a r y or ambiguous". However, the 
relationship expressed by the conditional was reported to have no 
e f f e c t on responses, each inference being affirmed with approximately 
equal frequency on each problem. The data of Staudenmayer (1975)? 
however, although not f u l l y reported, appear to suggest that more 
AC and DA inferences are drawn from abstract rules of the form 'P 
causes Q' than from abstract rules of the form ' i f P then Q*. ( i t 
i s not clear whether the same r e s u l t applied to thematic r u l e s ) . 
A useful idea introduced by Staudenmayer i s that 
acceptance of AC and DA may be related to the perceived necessity 
of the antecedent. TA may be defined as necessary i f there are no 
alternatives to TA that lead to TC. I t appears from Staudenmayer's 
data that statements such as ' i f the switch i s turned on then the 
l i g h t w i l l go on' led to more AC and DA inferences than statements 
such as ' i f I turn on the switch then the l i g h t w i l l go on'. 
Staudenmayer argues that the antecedent of the second statement i s 
not necessary as i t i s possible f o r somebody else to turn the l i g h t on. 
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A more sophisticated form of the above d i s t i n c t i o n 
would be to view necessity as a dimension. That i s , the more a l t e r -
natives to TA that lead to TC, the l e s s necessary TA may be said to 
be. Bucci (1978), using affirmative universal statements, compared 
performance on statements drawn from either end of t h i s dimension. 
'Broad predicate* items (e.g. ' a l l football players are strong', 
'every cat has whiskers') were such that many a l t e r n a t i v e s to TA 
led to TC. For instance, strength i s not peculiar to football 
players and various species have whiskers, 'Narrow predicate' items 
(e.g. 'every dog can bark', ' a l l oak trees have acorns') were such that 
there were either no al t e r n a t i v e s or only a few al t e r n a t i v e s . There 
are only a few species, other than dogs, than can bark and there are 
no trees, other than oaks, that have acorns. Adult subjects affirmed 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more AC and DA inferences on 'narrow predicate' items 
than on 'broad predicate* items. 
The problem with the Staudenmayer and Bucci findings 
i s that they do not necessarily reveal anything about human reasoning. 
The necessity of TA i s c l e a r l y d i r e c t l y related to the likelihood of 
the AC and DA inferences. I f a problem i s constructed such that the 
subject's experience leads him to assume that TA i s not necessary 
for TC, then that same experience w i l l also t e l l him that the AG and 
DA inferences are not necessarily true. For instance, for the cond-
i t i o n a l ' a l l football players axe strong', i t i s clear that the 
inference ' a l l strong people are foot b a l l players' i s not true. Thus 
no reasoning i s required as subjects may d i r e c t l y evaluate the truth 
of the conclusion, Bucci himself believed that subjects were 
assessing the p l a u s i b i l i t y , rather than v a l i d i t y , of conclusions to 
thematic problems. 
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Rips & Marcus (1977) suggest . 
a way in which prior b e l i e f s may have a more subtle e f f e c t on 
responses. Their main experimental work follows up a truth table 
experiment by Legrenzi ( 1 9 7 0 ) . Legrenzi showed subjects a machine 
in which a b a l l could r o l l down one of only two channels. When the 
b a l l reached the end of the channel, a red or green l i g h t came on, 
and Legrenzi used conditionals such ' i f the b a l l r o l l s r ight, the 
red l i g h t comes on*. A high number of FT - f a l s e and FF - true 
responses were observed and he argued that the binary condition had 
led to a higher than usual tendency to assume that the conditional 
implied equivalence. 
Rips & Marcus extended the design to include two 
further types of material; cards with l e t t e r s and numbers on them 
and a set of pictures of f i s h that varied in colour and markings. 
Their data were not f u l l y reported but, even when a l l three problems 
were m*»ue binary, they appeax to have obtained more FT - f a l s e 
and FF - true evaluations, and more AC and DA inference affirmation, 
on problems involving the machine context. As t h i s difference could 
not have been due to the binary nature of the task, i t must have been 
due to a factor more s p e c i f i c to the machine context i t s e l f . Rips 
& Marcus argue that i t i s the relationship that the subject 
presupposes between the antecedent and consequent that defines the 
interpretation of a conditional r u l e . 
In a further experiment, subjects were told that 
each of three antecedent values was associated with one (only) of three 
consequent values (the authors r e f e r to t h i s as c o r r e l a t i o n ) . Two 
third s of subjects' responses were consistent with an equivalence : 
interpretation and there was no difference between the three contexts. 
Rips & Marcus claim that t h i s finding explains e a r l i e r r e s u l t s as i t 
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appears to demonstrate that the one-to-one relationship i s usually 
more often assumed f o r the machine context. They conclude that 
conditionals are more l i k e l y to be interpreted as implying equivalence 
i f "subjects believe a p r i o r i that a simple correlation exists between 
the dimensions". 
This i s somewhat vacuous, however, as to t e l l subjects 
that the dimensions are correlated on a one-to-one basis i s also to 
t e l l them that the conditional rules imply equivalence. Similarly, 
b e l i e f i n such a correlation i s b e l i e f that an equivalence r e l a t i o n 
exists. Thus Rips & Marcus appear to be arguing that subjects are 
more l i k e l y to i n t e r p r e t a rule as implying equivalence i f they 
believe a p r i o r i that an equivalence r e l a t i o n e x i s t s ! The c r u c i a l 
question, which Rips & Marcus f a i l to answer, i s why subjects appear 
to have a greater tendency to assume an equivalence r e l a t i o n i n the 
machine context. 
One possible explanation i s that subjects assumed a 
causal r e l a t i o n between the b a l l and the l i g h t . Rips & Marcus 
believed that subjects did assume a causal r e l a t i o n , but argued that 
t h i s did not a f f e c t interpretation,^ Their conclusion i s based on 
the f a c t that the machine context did not y i e l d more responses 
consistent with an equivalence i n t e r p r e t a t i o n when subjects were t o l d 
that the antecedent and consequent values were not correlated. 
However, there are two reasons f o r r e j e c t i n g t h i s argument. F i r s t l y . 
Rips & Marcus assume that the instructions about non-correlation 
did not a f f e c t subjects' b e l i e f i n a causal connection. This i s 
clearly debatable. They overlook the f a c t that although correlation 
does not imply causality, causality does imply correlation. Secondly, 
when analysing subjects' response^ to bncorrelated' problems using the 
machine context, they ignore over half of t h e i r data. Thus the 
f i n d i n g that the machine context yields more responses consistent 
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with an equivalence i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (when subjects are not t o l d that 
the dimensions are, or are not, correlated) may be due to perceived 
causality. The Staudenmayer (1975) r e s u l t s suggest that, when a causal 
r e l a t i o n i s made e x p l i c i t , more AC and DA inferences are affirmed on 
abstract rules. Although Taplin (1971) reports no difference i n 
response p r o f i l e s between rules expressing a causal r e l a t i o n and rules 
expressing an a r b i t r a r y r e l a t i o n , i t i s possible that statements that 
Taplin viewed as having causally related propositions were not 
perceived i n t h i s way by the subjects. The example quoted i s " i f 
food i s constantly supplied to them, then the very f i e r c e s t creatures 
l i v e peaceably together". I t i s plausible that such statements do 
not relat e to the subjects' experience and axe thus treated as 
ar b i t r a r y , but that subjects' experience ( f o r instance, of electronic 
games) does relate to ba l l s (apparently) turning l i g h t s on. 
The quantitative model proposed by Rips & Marcus i s 
of some int e r e s t but they give no proper explanation of how the f i t 
to the data i s achieved. This f i t i s surprisingly good, which i s 
perhaps, at least p a r t l y , a resultant of- f i t t i n g the model to only 
part of the data. An int e r e s t i n g suggestion contained within the 
model (stage l ) i s that subjects f i r s t look f o r a match between the 
minor premiss and the antecedent of the major premiss. I f a match i s 
found, subjects w i l l accept the (MP) inference i f the consequent matches 
the conclusion and r e j e c t the inference i f i t does not. This suggest-
ion explains the lower error rate generally observed on these inferences. 
However, the model cannot explain most data from other experiments 
as i t gives no account of the circumstances under which the error" 
parameters w i l l vary, i s only applied to AA conditionals and takes no 
account of conclusion bias. 
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SECTION 2 A DISJUNCTIVE INFERENCE TASKS 
SECTION 2AA DIFFERENTIAL ERROR RATES 
Roberge (197^) compared performance on a l l four 
conditional rules with a l l four disjunctive rules. He studied 
frequencies of affirmation of those inferences that are i n v a l i d , 
given a material implication i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ru l e . Over a l l 
four rules and inference types, the frequency of acceptance of i n v a l i d 
inferences was approximately the same f o r both types of expression. 
I t would thus apparently be an oversimplification to suggest that 
one form of rule i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y more d i f f i c u l t than the other. 
However, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n between the form ( i . e . AA, 
AN, NA or NN) and type ( i . e . conditional or disju n c t i v e ) of r u l e . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y more inferences were affirmed on NA, than on any other 
form of conditional rules; and s i g n i f i c a n t l y less inferences were 
affirmed on AA, than on any other form of disjunctive rules, ( i n t h i s 
and l a t e r Roberge studies, subjects could respond *yes', 'no' or 
'maybe'). 
These findings reveal a s t r i k i n g difference between 
the NA conditional and the l o g i c a l l y equivalent AA disjunction and, 
i n general, lend further support to the Johnson-Laird & Tagart (19^9) 
f i n d i n g that l o g i c a l equivalence does not necessarily lead to 
psychological equivalence. Unfortunately, Roberge (197^) pooled data 
from more than one inference and thus f u r t h e r analysis of the type 
of error involved i s not possible. 
Roberge (1976a) studied one v a l i d disjunctive inference 
only; the affirmation of the second component of a disjunctive r u l e 
given the denial of the f i r s t component, and compared performance on 
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a l l four inclusive r u l e s (e.g. 'Either A or B or both') with 
performance on a l l four exclusive r u l e s (e,g, 'Either A or B but not 
both'). For inclusive disjunction, s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s errors were 
again observed on AA r u l e s . For exclusive disjunction, there were 
fa r more errors on AN and NA r u l e s than on both AA and NN r u l e s . The 
average error frequency on NN r u l e s was only s l i g h t l y greater than 
on AA r u l e s . Thus the presence of negatives per se does not always 
produce a high error frequency i n disjunctive reasoning. S i g n i f i c a n t l y 
l e s s errors were observed on exclusive r u l e s and t h i s r e s u l t was 
e n t i r e l y due to the reduced error frequency on AA and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
NN r u l e s . Roberge suggests that the 'but not both' instruction 
"appears to reduce the confusion" of "homogeneous" major premisses. 
However, these findings may be due to a tendency to ignore negatives 
and t r e a t a l l d i s j u n c t i v e r u l e s as i f they were AA. This hypothesis 
provides a simple explanation of the very low error frequencies 
observed on the AA r u l e , and i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y well equipped to deal 
with the reduction of NN errors on exclusive r u l e s . I f an NN 
exclusive rule i s treated as i f i t were an AA exclusive r u l e , t h i s 
w i l l not r e s u l t i n error as the two r u l e s are l o g i c a l l y equivalent. 
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SECTION 2.4,2 THE DENIAL OF A NEGATIVE! AN ILLUSORY PROBLEM? 
The two premiss pairs shown below both y i e l d the 
v a l i d conclusion "John i s i n t e l l i g e n t " . 
Problem A 
1) E i t h e r John i s i n t e l l i g e n t 
or he i s r i c h 
2) John i s not r i c h 
Problem B 
1) E i t h e r John i s i n t e l l i g e n t 
or he i s not r i c h 
2) John i s r i c h 
Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l (1972) predicted that the 
v a l i d conclusion would more /frequently be derived from problem A 
than from problem B. Subjects were presented with premiss pairs such 
as those shown above and asked "to determine what followed from them 
in virtue of logic alone". Results confirmed the prediction, subjects 
making more errors on problems such as B above. Mean response times 
were also higher on these problems. These r e s u l t s were interpreted 
as showing "that i t i s easy to grasp that a negative denies an 
affi2rmative, but exceedingly d i f f i c u l t to grasp that an affirmative 
denies a negative". 
Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l argue that "the proper function 
of affiirmatives i s to make assertions, and of negatives to make 
denials" (a similar argument has been advanced by Wason, I 9 6 5 ) . 
Thus, in problem A above, the negative i s f u l f i l l i n g i t s proper 
function and causes l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . In f a c t , Johnson-Laird & 
T r i d g e l l found that e x p l i c i t negation of an affirmative appeared to 
cause l e s s d i f f i c u l t y than an i m p l i c i t negation such as 'John i s poor'. 
In problem B. however, a negative component of the disjunctive rule 
i s denied by an affirmative and t h i s i s held to cause problems, 
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because the affirmative and negative are not f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r natural 
functions. 
This hypothesis has been u t i l i s e d by Roberge ( 1976a , 
1976b, 1978) to explain several aspects of h i s data and there i s 
thus apparently considerable empirical support for the view that 
denial of a negative i s a determinant of error. Such error may 
potentially occur in the following two ways; 
1) Subjects may have d i f f i c u l t y in in f e r r i n g a conclusion 
from an affirmative minor premiss that denies a 
negative component. ^ 
2) Subjects may have d i f f i c u l t y in evaluating (or i n f e r r i n g ) 
an affirmative conclusion that denies a negative component 
These two p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be considered in order. 
Roberge (1976a) studied arguments involving the affirmation of the 
second component, given denial of the f i r s t component, of the r u l e , 
and Roberge (1978) studied arguments involving the affirmation of 
the f i r s t component, given denial of the second. In both cases he 
reports that, in accordance with the data of Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l , 
more errors were made when an (affirmative) minor premiss denied a 
negative component. 
However, t h i s r e s u l t may simply be due to the very 
low error frequency observed on AA r u l e s , as the reported finding 
does not hold up for comparisons not involving the AA r u l e . There 
was l i t t l e difference in error frequencies between ( i n c l u s i v e ) AN 
and NN r u l e s in the experiment of Roberge ( 1 9 7 6 a ) , or between NA and. 
NN r u l e s in the experiment of Roberge ( 1 9 7 8 ) . Both of these compar-
isons compare an argument in which the minor premiss denies an 
affirmative component with an argument in Twhibh the minor premiss 
denies a negative component. Further, for these comparisons, the 
•93-
reported difference i s reversed on exclusive r u l e s . For instance, 
in the experiment of Roberge (1978) error r a t e s were 58^ for NA, and 
33^ for NN, (exclusive) r u l e s . Thus there i s no r e a l evidence in 
the data of Roberge (1976a , 1978) that more errors occur when a 
negative component i s denied by the minor premiss. This argument 
c l e a r l y also applies to the r e s u l t s of Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l , as 
these authors only used AA and AN disjunctive r u l e s . In f a c t , an 
explanation of the r e s u l t s of Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l , as due to the 
low error rate t y p i c a l l y observed on AA disjunctive r u l e s , has been 
proposed by Evans ( 1 9 7 2 a ) , 
Roberge (1976b) used exclusive disjunction r u l e s to 
study two types of v a l i d inference: 
1) Principle 1 arguments involved the denial of one 
component, given the affirmation of the other, 
2) P r i n c i p l e 2 arguments involved the affirmation of one 
component, given the denial of the other. (The saine 
form of inference as that studied by Roberge, 1976a, 1978) 
Roberge reports that more errors were observed on 
principle 2 than on principle 1 arguments and argues that, as pri n c i p l e 
2 arguments involve minor premisses that deny a component, t h i s 
represents further evidence that more errors are observed when the 
minor premiss denies a negative. However, the greater error 
frequency on principle 2 arguments was at l e a s t as noticeable on the 
AA rule as on the other r u l e s . The d i f f e r e n t i a l error frequency between 
principle 1 and principle 2 arguments thus cannot be explained as 
due to d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g when the minor premiss denies (only) a 
negative component of the r u l e , and some other explanation must be 
sought.'^ 
Thus, on the basis of the above, there i s no evidence 
t h a t the d e n i a l of a negative i n the minor premiss i s a determinant 
of e r r o r . The argument t h a t d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s from inferences whose 
conclusions deny a negative component i s proposed by Roberge (1976b) . 
He r e p o r t s two f i n d i n g s in^support of t h i s p o i n t o f view; 
1) For p r i n c i p l e 1 arguments, most e r r o r s occurred due 
to a f a i l u r e t o accept a f f i r m a t i v e conclusions t h a t 
v a l i d l y denied a negative. That i s , most e r r o r s 
were made on a f f i r m a t i v e conclusions when the v a l i d 
response was 'yes*. 
2) For p r i n c i p l e 2 arguments, the most prevalent e r r o r 
was f a i l u r e t o deny a f f i r m a t i v e conclusions t h a t 
i n v a l i d l y denied a negative. That i s , most e r r o r s 
were made on a f f i r m a t i v e conclusions when the v a l i d 
response was *no*. 
However, these two f i n d i n g s are again based on a 
comparison across the f o u r r u l e s and may be the r e s u l t a n t of low 
e r r o r r a t e s on the AA r u l e . I t i s possible t h a t no v a l i d a n a l y s i s 
can p r o p e r l y be made but, as Roberge used arguments t h a t a f f i r m e d 
both f i r s t and second components-of the r u l e , both the NA and AN 
r u l e s y i e l d both v a l i d and i n v a l i d a f f i r m a t i v e and negative conclusions, 
f o r each p r i n c i p l e o f argument. A comparison f o r these r u l e s i s thus 
of some i n t e r e s t and i s shown i n Tkble 2 . 8 . (Data from AN and NA 
r u l e s i s 'pooled* as there were only n e g l i g i b l e d i f f e r e n c e s between 
thesa) 
The two c r u c i a l frequencies axe denoted by an a s t e r i s k . 
As may be seen from Table 2 . 8 , f o r p r i n c i p l e 2 arguments, i t i s not 
the case t h a t more e r r o r s occurred on arguments demanding a *no* 
e v a l u a t i o n o f a f f i r m a t i v e conclusions ( t h a t denied negative components). 
E r r o r r a t e s were the same f o r both a f f i r m a t i v e and negative conclusions 
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f o r which the v a l i d response was *no'. 
Table 2 .8 
Average Percentage E r r o r Frequencies on AN and NA (Exclusive) Dis.lunctive 
Rules, Compared by P o l a r i t y o f Given Conclusion and V a l i d Response. 
(Data obtained from Roberge, 1976b, Table 2) 
VALID RESPONSE 
POLARITY OF CONCLUSION PRINCIPLE YES NO 
AFFIRMATIVE PRINCIPLE 1 68* 4? 
PRINCIPLE 2 60 60* 
NEGATIVE PRINCrPIE 1 51 -^1 
PRINCIPLE 2 5^ 60 
Thus, f o r p r i n c i p l e 2 , there i s no evidence t h a t 
conclusions t h a t deny a negative axe a determinant of e r r o r on NA 
and AN r u l e s , and no way t o t e s t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y on AA and NN r u l e s . 
For p r i n c i p l e 1 , the highest e r r o r r a t e (68%) i n 
t a b l e 2.8 was observed on e v a l u a t i o n o f ( v a l i d ) conclusions t h a t 
denied a negative component. Subjects made more e r r o r s on a f f i r m a t i v e 
conclusions t h a t denied a negative than on those t h a t d i d not and 
t h i s c l e a r l y could be taken as (the o n l y ) evidence t h a t d e n i a l o f 
negatives causes e r r o r . However, the f o l l o w i n g two observations sug-
gest t h a t t h i s may be a premature i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : 
a) I n v a l i d conclusions y i e l d e d l ess e r r o r s on p r i n c i p l e 
1 arguments i n the case o f both a f f i r m a t i v e and 
negative conclusions. 
96-
b) Considering v a l i d conclusions sepaxately ( i . e . the 
*yes' column o f Table 2.8), there i s c l e a r l y a 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t f u t u r e experimentation would f a i l t o 
produce any s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n e r r o r r a t e s 
between p r i n c i p l e 1 and p r i n c i p l e 2 arguments. 
I t i s thus possible t h a t the high e r r o r r a t e , on acc-
eptance o f p r i n c i p l e 1 conclusions t h a t deny negatives, i s a r e s u l t a n t 
o f other f a c t o r s . I n conclusion, then, the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s may be 
made: 
1) There i s no evidence t h a t a f f i r m a t i v e minor premisses 
t h a t deny negatives are a determinant o f e r r o r , 
2) There i s no evidence t h a t p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a f f i r m a t i v e 
conclusions t h a t deny negative components leads t o 
e r r o r on p r i n c i p l e 1 arguments. 
3) There i s some i n d i c a t i o n t h a t p r e s e n t a t i o n of a f f i r m -
a t i v e conclusions t h a t deny negative components may 
lead t o e r r o r on p r i n c i p l e 2 arguments, although t h i s 
r e s u l t may po s s i b l y be a r e s u l t a n t o f other f a c t o r s . 
4 ) Given t h a t the only support i s t h a t mentioned a t ( 3 ) 
above, i t i s a reasonable conclusion t h a t , a t l e a s t 
a t present, the hypothesis t h a t d e n i a l of negatives 
i s a determinant o f e r r o r i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y supported 
by the data t o be accepted. 
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SECTION 2.4,3 THEMATIC DISJUNCTIVE INFERENCE TASKS 
Roberge (197?) compared thematic AA r u l e s such as those 
used by Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l w i t h a b s t r a c t AA r u l e s . The r u l e s 
s p e c i f i e d i n c l u s i v e d i s j u n c t i o n (by the a d d i t i o n o f *or both*) and 
subjects were asked t o evaluate conclusions t o both v a l i d p r i n c i p l e 2 
and i n v a l i d p r i n c i p l e 1 arguments. The l a t t e r axe i n v a l i d f o r 
i n c l u s i v e d i s j u n c t i o n as n o t h i n g may be i n f e r r e d from the a f f i r m a t i o n 
o f one component. As usual f o r AA r u l e s , e r r o r r a t e s were f a i r l y low 
(about 20^) and there was no d i f f e r e n c e between the ab s t r a c t and 
thematic problems. 
However. Roberge also included ' c o n t r a d i c t o r y ' thematic 
r u l e s i n which the components were s e m a n t i c a l l y incompatible (e.g, 
'either John i s i n t e l l i g e n t or he i s s t u p i d ' ) . For the v a l i d p r i n c i p l e 
2 inferences, s i g n i f i c a n t l y fewer e r r o r s were observed on the 
'co n t r a d i c t o r y * r u l e s , than on other thematic or a b s t r a c t r u l e s . For 
instsmce, given 'John i s not i n t e l l i g e n t ' , subjects made few e r r o r s 
i n a f f i n n i n g 'John i s s t u p i d ' . However, on p r i n c i p l e 1 inferences 
more e r r o r s were observed on the ' c o n t r a d i c t o r y ' r u l e s , s u b j ects 
tending t o respond i n accordance w i t h an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f exclusive 
d i s j u n c t i o n . These responses can ha r d l y be regarded as e r r o r s , however, 
as subjects must have found i t somewhat strange t o be presented w i t h 
problems such as the f o l l o w i n g : 
"Suppose you know t h a t : 
E i t h e r the car i s o l d or i t i s new ( o r both) 
The car i s o l d 
Then would t h i s be t r u e : 
The car i s not new" 
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S5% of subjects cLgreed w i t h such conclusions and 
50^ denied conclusions such as 'the car i s new* to the same premiss 
p a i r , whereas the l o g i c a l l y v a l i d ('maybe') response was made on only 
38% and o f occasions, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Given the question 'would 
t h i s be t r u e ' , i t i s perhaps s i a r p r i s i n g t h a t there were so many 
'maybe' responses. Although a somewhat extreme example, these r e s u l t s 
c l e a r l y demonstrate t h a t the content o f thematic r u l e s i s of cruciaJ. 
importance. The major premiss i n d i c a t e d i n c l u s i o n s y n t a c t i c a l l y but 
excl u s i o n semantically and both i n d i c a t i o n s appear t o have a f f e c t e d 
subjects' responses. However, many subjects may simply have 
evaluated the conclusion on the basis of the minor premiss alone 
and thus i t i s perhaps debatable whether these were t r u l y d i s j u n c t i v e 
reasoning problems. 
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SECTION 2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The f i n d i n g s o f Evans (1972b, 1975) t h a t 'matching 
bias* a f f e c t s responses on t r u t h t a b l e tasks has two important 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t l y , i t demonstrates the e f f e c t o f a-'nonlogical' 
bias on a p r e p o s i t i o n a l t a s k , t h a t p a r a l l e l s the f i n d i n g o f non-
l o g i c a l bias on s y l l o g i s t i c tasks, discussed i n Chapter 1 . Secondly, 
the existence o f a response bias complicates the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f 
psychol o g i c a l t r u t h t a b l e s . As Evans p o i n t s out, " i t i s p o s s i b l e , o f 
course-, t h a t some d i f f e r e n c e i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n between the r u l e s 
may be r e f l e c t e d i n the t r u t h t a b l e s e l i c i t e d " . However, no 
exp l a n a t i o n based s o l e l y on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n could adequately cope w i t h 
the d i f f e r e n t frequencies o f TF c o n s t r u c t i o n observed and there i s 
thus good reason t o be l i e v e t h a t matching bias has, a t l e a s t , some 
e f f e c t on responses. I t i s almost impossible t o determine, however, 
t o what e x t e n t d i f f e r e n c e s between the r u l e s are .a f u n c t i o n o f 
matching and t o what e x t e n t , i f any, they are a f u n c t i o n o f i n t e r p r e t -
a t i o n . 
However, although s p e c i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of 
i n d i v i d u a l r u l e s cannot be i n f e r r e d , c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n may be 
der i v e d from an a n a l y s i s across a l l f o u r r u l e s . Such an a n a l y s i s 
c o n t r o l s f o r matching bias and reve a l s t h a t there i s a very s t r o n g 
tendency ( v a l i d l y ) t o evaluate the TT case as v e r i f y i n g and the TF 
case as f a l s i f y i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , there appears t o be a r e s i d u a l 
tendency t o evaluate FT as f a l s i f y i n g and FF as v e r i f y i n g . This 
l a t t e r tendency i s more noticeable on 01 r u l e s . 
Thus t r u t h t a b l e responses appear t o be mediated by 
a combination o f l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y ( p o s s i b l y sometimes determined by 
'conversion') and a n o n l b g i c a l b i a s , i n the sajne way as was argued 
t o be the case i n s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning. The same p o s i t i o n a p p l i e s 
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t o a b s t r a c t c o n d i t i o n a l inference tasks, which appear t o be mediated 
by l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , a t l e a s t i n the case o f the MP inference, but 
also by a n o n l o g i c a l bias i n favour o f negative conclusions. 
Both matching and conclusion bias may be compared t o 
atmosphere bias i n some respects. R e v l i s (1975a-) argued t h a t 
atmosphere bias was s i m i l a r t o matching b i a s , i n t h a t both produced 
conclusions t h a t matched 'features* o f the premisses. Conclusion 
bias may also be l i k e n e d t o the dominance o f negative atmosphere and 
thus i t would appear t h a t n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s may be producing 
c o n s i s t e n t e f f e c t s across paradigms. 
When considering the e f f e c t o f thematic content on 
c o n d i t i o n a l inferences, i t i s best t o consider separately the e f f e c t s 
on those inferences t h a t are, assuming i m p l i c a t i o n , v-alid and i n v a l i d . 
There i s some suggestion i n the data t h a t thematic content may have 
some i n h i b i t o r y e f f e c t on the drawing o f v a l i d (MP and MT) inferences 
although no s t u d i e s have reported s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between 
a b s t r a c t and thematic content f o r these inferences and thus, c l e a r l y , 
the e f f e c t o f thematic content awaits f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
However, i t i s evident t h a t thematic content has no general f a c i l i t -
a t o r y e f f e c t on the drawing o f v a l i d i nferences. 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the e f f e c t o f thematic content 
on AC and DA inferences i s very d i f f i c u l t as, the more the major 
premiss encourages conversion, the more *true* the AC conclusion 
w i l l appear. The v a l i d i t y o f the inference i s thus confused w i t h 
the t r u t h s t a t u s o f the conclusion. As Bucci (1978) suggests, i t 
i s l i k e l y t h a t subjects evaluate thematic inferences such as * a l l ' . 
strong people axe f o o t b a l l players* on the basis o f p l a u s i b i l i t y 
r a t h e r than v a l i d i t y . 
The w e l l v a l i d a t e d f i n d i n g o f d i s j u n c t i v e inference 
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tasks i s t h a t a very low percentage o f e r r o r s i s observed on AA 
r u l e s and a high percentage o f e r r o r s are observed on a l l r u l e s 
c o n t a i n i n g negatives, w i t h the exception o f exclusive NN r u l e s . 
There i s also a^  n o ticeable d i f f e r e n c e between c o n d i t i o n a l and 
d i s j u n c t i v e inference tasks i n t h a t , on the former, subjects who 
f a i l t o accept MT, AC, or DA u s u a l l y evaluate them as 'indeterminate', 
whereas, on d i s j u n c t i v e tasks, subjects f r e q u e n t l y deny v a l i d 
inferences and a f f i r m i n v a l i d inferences. 
There appears t o be a tendency f o r subjects t o t r e a t 
a l l problems as i f they are reasoning w i t h AA r u l e s , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the data o f Wason & Johnson-Laird (1969a) 
as well'as w i t h the data o f the Roberge experiments. I n ' r e a l l i f e ' , 
conversation, negated d i s j u n c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those o f the NA and 
AN forms are ra^^ely, i f ever, used and subjects are presumably 
depending on the r u l e s o f inference they have acquired f o r the 
AA form. 
The use o f thematic content by Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l (1972) 
and Roberge (1977) appears t o have produced response p r o f i l e s 
comparable t o those obtained from a b s t r a c t content, except i n the 
case o f Roberge's ' c o n t r a d i c t o r y ' content. For both c o n d i t i o n a l 
and d i s j u n c t i v e thematic tasks, the c r u c i a l f a c t o r appears t o be 
whether a c l e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the terms i s expressed. For 
instance i n the 'machine cont e x t ' , s t u d i e d by Rips & Marcus ( 1 9 ? 7 ) » 
the b a l l s ' movement appears t o be the reason f o r the l i g h t and, f o r 
t^e ' c o n t r a d i c t o r y ' items o f Roberge (1977) . there i s a c l e a r l y 
( s e m a n t i c a l l y ) expressed d i s j u n c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between terms such 
as ' i n t e l l i g e n t * and ' s t u p i d ' . I f such a r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not 
perceived, i t appears l i k e l y t h a t r u l e s w i t h thematic terms w i l l be 
responded t o as though the terms were a b s t r a c t . 
•102-
However, although use o f thematic terms may a f f e c t 
responses, there i s no reason t o believe t h a t such an e f f e c t i s due 
t o the terms having c l a r i f i e d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the r u l e . Many 
subjects f a i l t o draw, or agree w i t h , the MT infere n c e , which i s 
v a l i d on any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a c o n d i t i o n a l ; and Roberge's work 
y i e l d e d high e r r o r r a t e s on d i s j u n c t i v e r u l e s , f o r which the i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n was made cl e a r t o the subject by the use o f 'or both' or 
'but not both'. There i s thus no reason t o believe t h a t ' i n t e r p r e t -
a t i o n ' can be f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e d . The semantic e f f e c t o f thematic 
m a t e r i a l s appears t o be, not t o c l a r i f y the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f 
the problem, but to c l a r i f y the t r u t h s t a t u s of the conclusion. The 
r e s u l t s o f Roberge (197?) demonstrate t h a t , when t r u t h s t a t u s accords 
w i t h v a l i d i t y , then thematic content may appear t o f a c i l i t a t e 
l o g i c a l behaviour but t h a t , when t r u t h s t a t u s c o n f l i c t s w i t h v a l i d i t y , 
f a r more ' e r r o r s ' w i l l be observed. I r r e s p e c t i v e o f co n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f v a l i d i t y , subjects w i l l conclude ( f o r instance) t h a t i t i s not the 
case t h a t ' a l l s t r o n g people are f o o t b a l l p l a y e r s ' . t h a t i t i s very 
l i k e l y t h a t b a l l s i n machines w i l l t u r n l i g h t s on and t h a t o l d cars 
are not new cars. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. One p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the i n s t r u c t i o n *but not both* stresses 
the i n v a l i d i t y o f the conj u n c t i o n and t h a t such statements are 
u s u a l l y made i n ' r e a l l i f e ' t o demonstrate t h a t one o f the components 
cannot be the case. Denial of a component ( p r i n c i p l e 1) would thus 
be a more * n a t u r a l ' conclusion. 
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SECTION 3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE TASK 
The paradigm developed by Wason ( I 966 ) i s v a r i o u s l y 
r e f e r r e d t o as 'the Wason s e l e c t i o n task', t h e s e l e c t i o n task* and 
'the f o u r card problem*. I t w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o here as *the s e l e c t i o n 
task'. The simplest way t o e x p l a i n the task i s t o give an example. 
Suppose a subject i s shown a pack o f cards a l l having a l e t t e r on 
one side and a number on the other. The experimenter then takes f o u r 
such cards and l a y s them on the t a b l e i n f r o n t o f the subject t o 
produce an arr a y such as t h a t shown belows 
A D 7 3 
The subject i s then shown a t y p e w r i t t e n c o n d i t i o n a l 
r u l e t h a t s p e c i f i e s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a p a r t i c u l a r l e t t e r and 
a p a r t i c u l a r number. For instance, the r u l e might'be * i f the l e t t e r 
i s an A, then the number i s a 7 ' . The subject i s t o l d t h a t the r u l e 
i s o nly supposed t o apply t o the f o u r cards on the t a b l e and i s 
asked which cards i t would be necessary t o t u r n over i n order t o 
f i n d out whether the r u l e i s t r u e or f a l s e . The f o u r cards are always 
chosen so as t o present subjects w i t h one instance each of TA, FA, 
TC and FC and thus the task e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v e s e v a l u a t i o n o f these 
f o u r cases. 
The only combination t h a t f a l s i f i e s a c o n d i t i o n a l 
r u l e i s TA and FC, and thus the l o g i c a l l y cctrrect response i s t o 
s e l e c t those cards t h a t may p o t e n t i a l l y y i e l d t h i s combination ( i . e . 
TA and FC). For instance, f o r the above example, the r u l e i s f a l s e 
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i f the A does not have a 7 on the back or i f the 3 has an A on the 
back, otherwise i t i s t r u e . I t i s i r r e l e v a n t what i s on the back o f 
the D cLnd the 7-
I f a c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e i s t r u e , then the two v a l i d 
i n ferences, HP and MT, must hold. The s o l u t i o n t o the s e l e c t i o n task 
can thus be seen as t e s t i n g these two inferences. Selection o f TA 
t e s t s MP (which i n f e r s t h a t TC i s on the other side) and s e l e c t i o n 
o f FC t e s t s MT (which i n f e r s t h a t FA i s on the other s i d e ) . 
However, i f the r u l e i s i n t e r p r e t e d as imp l y i n g equivalence, then the 
AC and DA inferences (which may be t e s t e d by s e l e c t i n g TC and FA, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) are also v a l i d and thus the l o g i c a l l y c o r r e c t s o l u t i o n 
i s t o s e l e c t a l l f o u r cards. 
A l l experiments r e p o r t e d h e r e a f t e r have used AA 
c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e s only, unless otherwise s t a t e d . T y p i c a l r e s u l t s 
from such s t u d i e s are t h a t most subjects s e l e c t TA but t h a t many also 
s e l e c t ( i n v a l i d l y ) TC, and t h a t FA and FC are both i n f r e q u e n t l y 
selected. Thus, i n f a i l i n g t o s e l e c t FC, subjects behave as though 
they do not possess the MT inference. Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) 
r e p o r t the f o l l o w i n g frequencies of i n i t i a l s e l e c t i o n s from f o u r 
experiments: 
TA and TC 59 subjects 
TA only ^2 subjects 
TA. TC and FC 9 subjects 
TA and FC 5 subjects 
A l l other combinations 13 subjects 
128 
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SECTION 3.2 EARLY WORK AND THE 'THERAPY' EXPERIMENTS 
Wason (1968a) suggested t h a t c o n d i t i o n a l s are u s u a l l y 
only used i n r e a l l i f e i f they are t r u e , and thus t h a t subjects 
perform the task w i t h the assumption t h a t the r u l e i s t r u e . I f the 
subject has a d e f e c t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n a l , 
then the only t r u e case w i l l be the j o i n t occuirence o f TA and TC, 
and thus subjects' responses may be aimed a t r e v e a l i n g t h i s v e r i f y i n g 
case.. To d i r e c t the su b j e c t s ' a t t e n t i o n towards the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
f a l s i t y , V/ason showed subjects f o u r cards p r i o r t o a s e l e c t i o n task 
and asked them t o p i c k out the one card t h a t f a l s i f i e d , and the one 
card t h a t v e r i f i e d the r u l e . However, although subjects were able 
t o do t h i s , the procedure had no e f f e c t (as compared w i t h a c o n t r o l 
group) on subsequent responses. 
Vfason & Johnson-Laird (1970) pointed i.out t h a t one 
possible explanation of f a i l u r e t o s e l e c t FC, and i n v a l i d s e l e c t i o n 
of TC, i s t h a t the r e f e r e n t s 'one side o f the card' (which r e f e r s t o 
the antecedent) and 'the other side o f the card' (which r e f e r s t o the 
consequent) may cause confusion. S p e c i f i c a l l y subjects may confuse 
'the other side o f the card' w i t h the side t h a t i s face down. They 
used c o n d i t i o n a l s whose antecedent and consequent r e f e r r e d t o the 
centres and borders o f the cards and presented subjects w i t h the 
f o u r a l t e r n a t i v e s by masking r e l e v a n t p a r t s . However, although the 
s t i m u l i were a l l on the same side o f the card, subjects performed no 
d i f f e r e n t l y t o a c o n t r o l group who were presented w i t h the usual form 
o f the s e l e c t i o n task, 
Wason (1969a) adopted two m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o the task. 
F i r s t l y , b i n a r y s t i m u l i ( r ed or blue c i r c l e s or t r i a n g l e s ) were used. 
•108-
Secondly, he suggested t h a t the c o n d i t i o n a l form "has the possible 
undesirable connotation t h a t there i s a temporal, or even a causal, 
r e l a t i o n between antecedent and consequent". He avoided any such 
i m p l i e d c a u s a l i t y by use o f r u l e s such as the f o l l o w i n g : 
"Every card which has "a red t r i a n g l e on one side 
has a blue c i r c l e on the o t h e r " 
T y p i c a l r e s u l t s were obtained and thus presumably 
n e i t h e r the b i n a r y nature o f the task, nor the l i n g u i s t i c form 
(which i s a type o f u n i v e r s a l ) , had any s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t . Wason 
introduced three stages o f 'therapy*, subsequent t o i n i t i a l s e l e c t i o n s 
aimed a t d i r e c t i n g the subject's a t t e n t i o n towards f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f 
the r u l e , and thereby r a i s i n g the frequency of FC s e l e c t i o n s and 
reducing the frequency o f TC s e l e c t i o n s . The three stages o f the 
procedure were as f o l l o w s : 
1) F i r s t l y , the subjects (who were not allowed a c t u a l l y 
t o t u r n over t h e i r i n i t i a l s e l e c t i o n s ) were asked what 
might be on the other side o f TA. I f necessary, they 
were t o l d t h a t FC may be on the o t h e r side and thus 
t h a t the statement p o s s i b l y might be f a l s e . Subjects 
were given the o p p o r t u n i t y o f r e v i s i n g t h e i r 
s e l e c t i o n s a f t e r t h i s , and l a t e r , stages. 
2) I f a ' c o r r e c t * r e v i s e d s e l e c t i o n was not obtained, 
subjects were prompted t o conclude t h a t , i f a TA 
instance were on the other side o f the FC card, then 
t h i s would again f a l s i f y the statement (and t o r e a l i s e 
t h a t i t was possible f o r t h i s t o o c c u r ) . 
3) I f the FC card was s t i l l not s e l e c t e d , the experimenter 
e v e n t u a l l y turned t h i s card over, r e v e a l i n g a TA 
instance on the other side. The subject was then asked 
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whether he s t i l l b e lieved the statemant t o be t r u e 
and, a f t e r the FC card had been turned back over, was 
sigain i n v i t e d t o r e v i s e h i s previous s e l e c t i o n s . 
A f t e r these *therapies', some subjects s t i l l f a i l e d 
t o make the combination o f s e l e c t i o n s r e q u i r e d by the experimenter 
( i . e . TA and FC). These subjects were e x p l i c i t l y informed t h a t 
t h e i r s e l e c t i o n s were wrong and once again i n v i t e d t o change them. 
Of the 32 s u b j e c t s , only two i n i t i a l l y selected FC and t h i s was 
pr o g r e s s i v e l y r a i s e d t o 10 ( a f t e r stage 1), 16 ( a f t e r stage 2) and 
30 ( a f t e r stage 3) . A f t e r the f i n a l d e c i s i o n stage, 28 subjects 
selected FC. Se l e c t i o n o f TC was ha r d l y a f f e c t e d , although i t was 
selected s l i g h t l y more o f t e n i n the middle o f the experiment, s e l e c t i o n 
frequencies being 15 i n i t i a l l y , 20, 20 and 21 a f t e r the three 'therapy* 
stages, and 1^  a f t e r the f i n a l d e c i s i o n staige. The procedure was 
presumed t o f a c i l i t a t e ' i n s i g h t * , t h a t . i s , some c o g n i t i v e s t a t e i n 
which the sub j e c t reasoned i n accordance w i t h formal l o g i c . However 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may w e l l be unwarranted. The evident bias o f the 
experimenter towards f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n general, and the FC card i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , may be s u f f i c i e n t t o e x p l a i n changes i n subjects* 
responses. A v e r b a l reinforcement e x p l a n a t i o n would account f o r 
the f a c t t h a t only FC s e l e c t i o n s were a f f e c t e d whereas, i f the 
subject i s assumed t o have acquired some general s t a t e o f i n s i g h t , 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n why TC s e l e c t i o n s were unaffected. 
Wason & Golding (197^) used statements about cards 
t h a t were d i v i d e d i n t o two v e r t i c a l s e ctions. The top se c t i o n e i t h e r 
d i d , or d i d not, co n t a i n a l e t t e r and the bottom s e c t i o n e i t h e r d i d 
or d i d not, co n t a i n a number. Rules r e f e r r e d ( n o n s p e c i f i c a l l y ) t o 
* numbers' and ' l e t t e r s * , and thus FA and FC were represented by the 
absence o f a stimulus r a t h e r than by a d i f f e r e n t s t i m u l u s t o t h a t 
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mentioned in the r u l e . The following formulations of the relationship 
were used; 
1) Whenever there i s a number below the l i n e there i s 
a l e t t e r above the l i n e . 
2) There i s a l e t t e r above the l i n e whenever there i s 
a number below the l i n e . 
3) There i s a l e t t e r above each number, 
A l e t t e r i s above each number, 
5) Above each number i s a l e t t e r . 
None of these al t e r n a t i v e s appeared to produce 
responses s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those usually obtained or to 
each other. There was a s l i g h t suggestion i n the data that statements 
in which the consequent appears f i r s t ( 2 , 3 and 4 ) may be s l i g h t l y 
e a s i e r . This experiment also used 'therapy' but i t was found that, 
a f t e r responses had been changed by 'therapy* on one task, responses 
on a subsequent task were no dif f e r e n t to those-usually obtained. 
Clearly, FG on a subsequent task, although a d i f f e r e n t card, i s 
conceptually the same. A verbal reinforcement explanation of 'therapy' 
r e f e r s only to the selection of a s p e c i f i c card. An insight 
explanation, however, presumes that the subject gains a conceptual 
understanding of the l o g i c a l relevance of the FC card and such an 
understanding would be expected to transfer to a subsequent task. 
However, the r e s u l t s of Smalley (197^) do suggest that 
some understanding of the problem can be induced. Subjects were 
group tested and the four caxds (red and blue c i r c l e s and t r i a n g l e s ) 
were placed on a chalk r a i l at the front of the room. The task 
booklet explained the selection task and asked subjects to give 
t h e i r solution and then asked them to give (written) reasons for 
t h e i r selections. Subjects were subsequently given the opportunity 
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of r e v i s i n g these selections. They were then asked to consider each 
card at a time. Subjects were told ( i n the booklet) what the two 
possible figures on the other side of the card could be and asked 
i n each instance whether the statement would be true or f a l s e . 
Following consideration of each card, they were again asked for 
th e i r selections (and reasons for change i f they had changed). In 
the f i n a l phase, the experimenter turned each card over, one at a 
time. When they were turned over, TA revealed a TC instance on the 
back but FG revealed a TA ( f a l s i f y i n g ) instance. After each card 
had been turned over, subjects were asked what conclusion they would 
draw about the truth or f a l s i t y of the statement and (af t e r the cards 
were turned back over) were a^ain asked to indicate t h e i r present 
choice of cards together with reasons for change. 
This procedure had l i t t l e e f f e c t on TC selections but 
produced a large increase i n the frequency of FC selection.(although 
not so marked as that observed by Wason, 1969a-) After the f i n a l 
stage, 61% of the subjects selected FC. These r e s u l t s do suggest 
that the 'therapy' induces the subject to r e a l i s e the relevance of 
searching for f a l s i f y i n g cases. Thus, although verbal encouragement 
from the experimenter may be necessary to induce very high 
frequencies of FC selection, many subjects, given s u f f i c i e n t 'cues', 
are apparently able to learn 'for themselves' to se l e c t FC. 
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SECTION 3.3 INFORMATION PROCESSING MODELS 
Johnson-Laird & Wason (1970) proposed an information 
processing model to explain subjects' responses on the selection task. 
This b a s i c a l l y assumes three cognitive s t a t e s through which subjects 
progress during therapy. The three states are defined as follows: 
1) 'No insi g h t ' - subjects focus only on those cards 
mentioned in the ru l e . Subjects who interpret the 
rule as implying implication focus only upon the TA 
card whereas subjects who interpret the rule as implying 
i t s converse focus on both TA and TC. These cards 
are selected as they may v e r i f y the ru l e . 
2) ' P a r t i a l insight' - the subject r e a l i s e s two things; 
that a l l cards should be considered and that cards 
should also be selected i f they may f a l s i f y the ru l e . 
Subjects thus s e l e c t TA. TC and FC, 
3) 'Complete insight' - subjects s e l e c t only those cards 
(TA and FC) that may f a l s i f y the ru l e . 
Subjects, although usually i n i t i a l l y i n a 'no insight* 
state, may s t a r t i n any of the three states but, i f they are not in 
a state of 'complete insight', they w i l l progress towards t h i s state 
during therapy. Goodwin & Wason (1972) asked t h e i r subjects to give 
reasons for t h e i r s e l e c t i o n s and claimed that" these protocols 
represented supportive evidence for the model. Subjects who chose 
TA and TC only, explained TA selection i n terms of v e r i f i c a t i o n , 
whereas subjects who included FC i n thei r selections tended to explain 
both FC and TA selections in terms of f a l s i f i c a t i o n . 
However, several c r i t i c i s m s have been levelled at the 
model. For instance, i t does not make i t c l e a r why a subject who 
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interprets the r u l e as implying iinplication w i l l s e l e c t TC, because 
i t may v e r i f y , when he i s i n a * p a r t i a l insight* state but f a i l to 
do so when he i s i n a *no insight' state. Also, although state 1 
presumes that some subjects interpret the rule as implying i t s , 
converse, the second two states apparently presume that no subjects 
interpret the rule i n t h i s way (as, i f the rule implies i t s converse, 
a l l four cards are potential f a l s i f i e r s ) , Smalley (197^) accordingly 
proposed an alternative model that, although retaining the three 
insight stages, attempted to take account of various possible i n t e r -
pretations of the problem. The main differences were as follows; 
a) Subjects who interpret the rule as implying implication 
are held to s e l e c t both TA and TC in state 1 unless 
they do not appreciate the r e v e r s i b i l i t y of the 
stimulus cards ( i . e . that TA, with TC or FC, on the 
back i s the same as T C o r FC, with TA on the back). 
I f they do not appreciate t h i s r e v e r s i b i l i t y , they 
w i l l s e l e c t TA only i n a l l three states, 
b) Subjects who interpret the r u l e as implying i t s 
converse axe held to s e l e c t a l l four cards i n states 
2 and 3- However, i f they do not appreciate the 
r e v e r s i b i l i t y of the cards, they w i l l s e l e c t only TA 
and TC i n a l l three s t a t e s . 
Smalley appears to argue that perception of reversib-
i l i t y , unlike 'insight*, cannot be induced by 'therapy*. However, t h i s 
i s somewhat peculiar, as i t implies that subjects who select TA 
only (implication interpretation with no perception of r e v e r s i b i l i t y ) 
w i l l not change t h e i r selections during 'therapy', whereas the 
r e s u l t s of Wason (1969a) , which Smalley r e f e r s to, c l e a r l y indicate 
that they do. Smalley reports that the protocols gathered in h i s 
experiment (described e a r l i e r ) lend support to h i s model. That i s , 
subjects tended to reveal interpretations of the rule and states of 
insight ( i . e . bias towards v e r i f i c a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n ) consistent 
with h i s interpretation of t h e i r selections. 
A fundamental c r i t i c i s m of both the Johnson-Laird & 
Wason and Smalley models concerns the use of the term 'insight'. 
' P a r t i a l insight' i s defined as a set towards both v e r i f i c a t i o n and 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n which, i n the Johnson-Laird & Wason model i s i t s e l f 
defined uniquely as the selection of TA, TC and FC. Similarly, t h i s 
model defines 'complete insight' as selection of TA and FC, As 
Evans (1977b) has pointed out, the state of 'insight' i s deduced from 
the behaviour and thus simply describes the selections. The l a b e l 
i s c i r c u l a r , as subjects are held to have selected TA and FC because 
they are in a state of 'complete insight', but the only 'evidence' 
for their being in a state of 'complete insight' i s thei r selection 
of TA and FC, Similarly, i n the Smalley model, both state of insi g h t 
and interpretation are inferred from, and held to be deterainants of 
the selections. I t should be noted that supportive protocol 
evidence does not break t h i s c i r c u l a r i t y as, i n t h i s case, 'insight* 
i s inferred from, and held to be the determinant of, protocol 
evidence of a f a l s i f i c a t i o n bias. Thus, i f introspective data were 
acceptable, protocol data may be taken as (non-circular) evidence 
of a v e r i f i c a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n bias, but neither selections nor 
protocols may be taken as evidence of 'insight'. The contention that 
subjects are i n a state of 'insight' when they give the l o g i c a l l y 
correct answer i s thus non-falsifiable and, i n terms of modern 
philosophy of science (e.g. Popper, 1 9 5 9 )i must be held to be outside 
the province of experimental psychology. 
Bree (1973) proposed a model that replaced the three 
insight states with three strategies that r e f e r to neither insight 
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nor a v e r i f i c a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n bias. The three strategies (as 
stated by Bree & coppens, I976), are -shown below: 
A Selection of "an object i f the v i s i b l e symbol requires 
the presence of a pa r t i c u l a r hidden symbol" (se l e c t i o n 
of TA only, or TA and TC i f the converse i s assumed 
to hold), . 
B Selection of "any object which could have a symbol 
(hidden or v i s i b l e ) requiring the presence of any 
other p a r t i c u l a r symbol" (se l e c t i o n of TA, TC and FC, 
or a l l four cards i f the converse i s assumed). 
C Selection "as in A, Then se l e c t any object which 
could have a hidden symbol that would necessitate 
the presence of a symbol other than the symbol already 
v i s i b l e " ( s e l e c t i o n of TA and FC or a l l four cards i f 
the converse i s assumed). 
This model assumes that subjects do not interpret the 
conditional as implying the MT inference ( i , e . FC i s not taken to 
'require* FA), Moshman (1978) points out that the model may be 
taken as making the MT inference "a matter of strategy rather than 
of interpretation", 
Bree & Coppens (1976, 1978) presented subjects with 
both a truth table task and a selection task. Subjects' interpretation 
of the conditional was inferred from the truth table data and there 
was s i g n i f i c a n t evidence of a relationship between inferred equival-
ence interpretations and 'TA and TC* selections on the selection 
task. A l l 11 subjects who were judged to have interpreted the 
conditional as implying i t s converse selected TA and TC, These 
subjects were thus a l l assumed to be adopting strategy A, However, 
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the nine subjects judged to have interpreted the rule as implying 
implication gave a variety of selection task responses (although 
only two selected TA and TC). This implies some interaction not 
accounted for by the model, between interpretation and strategy adopted 
The Bree model does not appear to be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
useful as the d e f i n i t i o n of the three strategies i s no l e s s c i r c u l a r 
than the d e f i n i t i o n of the three insight states i n the Johnson-Laird 
& Wason model. Also, as Bree & Coppens point out, i t i s no better 
at explaining the data and, unlike the Johnson-Laird & Wason model 
i s incapable of predicting any selections i n those cases where the 
subjects' interpretation cannot be inferred. 
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SECTION 3 .^ MATCHING BIAS; AN EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOUR 
The studies discussed so far have shown that the most 
frequent i n i t i a l selection i s TA and TC and most workers, other 
than Bree, have explained t h i s as a v e r i f i c a t i o n bias, an interpret-
ation that i s supported by subjects' own explanations. However, a l l 
these studies used only the AA conditional and thus TA and TC are 
confused with P and Q, the values mentioned i n the r u l e . There was 
thus a p o s s i b i l i t y that selections could be explained in terms of the 
matching bias observed, on a truth table task, by Evans (1972b), The 
c r u c i a l experiment was performed by Evans & Lynch (1973) . They 
presented subjects with four selection tasks, using a l l four forms 
of conditional r u l e . The data showed four s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t s , a l l 
of which would be expected i f subjects were displaying a tendency to 
match thei r selections to the values named i n the r u l e : 
1) More TA cases were selected on r u l e s having 
affirmative antecedents. 
2) More FA cases were selected on r u l e s having 
negative antecedents. 
3) More TC cases were selected on r u l e s having 
affirmative consequents, 
^) More FC cases were selected on r u l e s having 
negative consequents. 
Over a l l four r u l e s , subjects selected f a r more TA 
than FA, and thus there i s a clear tendency to s e l e c t TA, independent 
of matching bias. This:.is possibly related to subjects' a b i l i t y 
to derive the MP inference. There was no evidence of a v e r i f i c a t i o n ' 
bias, i n f a c t , subjects were found to s e l e c t s i g n i f i c a n t l y more FC 
than TC, across a l l four r u l e s . However, t h i s l a t t e r r e s u l t . 
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s i g n i f i c a n t at the Jfo l e v e l , should be treated with caution. 
Selection of FC on rule s having affirmative conclusions was unusually 
high - one third of the subjects selected FC on the AA rule. 
Manktelow & Evans (1979) report two r e p l i c a t i o n s of the Evans & Lynch 
study and, although r e p l i c a t i n g .the matching e f f e c t s , their data 
show no o v e r a l l difference between frequencies of TC and FC selections, 
They comment: "taking the Evans & Lynch r e s u l t s together with the 
present data, i t seems that the idea of a v e r i f i c a t i o n (or 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n ) tendency in the selection task should be used with 
extreme caution". 
Explanation of selection task responses as a function of 
matching has been attacked on various grounds by several workers in 
the f i e l d . Bracewell (1974) , for instance, claimed that r e s u l t s can 
be wholly explained by the way in which the subject interprets the 
ru l e . Taking written protocols as subjects progressed through a 
s e r i e s of selection tasks, he argued that these written explanations 
could account for a l l the data. He c r i t i c i s e d matching bias theory 
on the grounds that protocols c l e a r l y demonstrated that subjects 
were reasoning with a p a r t i c u l a r interpretation and that they were 
attempting to v e r i f y or f a l s i f y . However, Evans (197^) replied that 
i t was a non-proven assumption that Introspection mirrors the causes 
of behaviour although, on the selection task, i t frequently correlates 
with behaviour. Evans also argued that the matching bias explanation 
cannot e a s i l y be overlooked as i t i s the only explanation of r e s u l t s 
that was o r i g i n a l l y observed on a d i f f e r e n t task and subsequently 
predicted and observed on the selection task. 
Van Duyne (1973) published what i s perhaps the most 
comprehensive attack upon the matching bias theory. He argues that 
the prepositional calculus should not be used as a baseline for 
assessing l o g i c a l performance and that a theory i s required•that 
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r e f e r s to the logic used in 'natural language'. He suggests that such 
a theory may well explain the data, and thus that search for such a 
theory would prove more f r u i t f u l than a search for theories such as 
matching bias. Unfortunately, he neglects to mention how a 'natural 
logic' theory should be searched for, or why the need for such an 
(unknown) theory automatically invalidates the (known) e f f e c t s of 
matching. 
Van Duyne argues that matching bias i s limited 
primarily to performance on the AA conditional, as the 'P and Q' 
combination i s r a r e l y chosen on disjunctive tasks and" many other 
forms y i e l d t h i s combination only infrequently. To support t h i s 
c r i t i c i s m . Van Duyne supplies data from selection tasks using the 
following three r u l e s : 
'Either P or Q' 
'Not P and not Q' 
' I f not P then Q' 
The l o g i c a l l y correct answer i s 'P and Q' in a l l 
three cases and these ru!ks y i e l d a very low incidence of selection 
of the 'P and Q' combination. The r e s u l t s of Wason & Johnson-Laird 
(1969a) suggest that matching bias i s not found on disjunctive r u l e s 
but, in the case of the conjunction and the conditional r u l e . Van Duyne 
appears to have missed the point. The matching bias theory merely 
predicts a tendency to s e l e c t P and to s e l e c t Q, not that the P and 
Q combination w i l l be most frequently observed on a l l r u l e s . This 
tendency i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y noticeable across a l l four conditional 
r u l e s , but the data from one rule alone can demonstrate neither the 
presence, nor the absence of, the bias. Further, Evans (1975) points 
out that matching bias i s found on other tasks, as i t was i n i t i a l l y 
observed on a truth table' task, and that i t extends to the 01 form 
of the conditional. 
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SECTION 3.5 THE DUAL PROCESS HYPOTHESIS: AN EXPLANATION OF 
DJTROSIECTION 
Perhaps the most persistent objection to the matching 
bias hypothesis was that subjects' introspective protocols suggest 
that their responses are due to such factors as interpretation or 
v e r i f i c a t i o n bias. As has been mentioned, such protoeols have been 
used to support theories of reasoning by a variety of workers (e.g. 
Bracewell, 197^, Goodwin & Wason, 1972, Smalley, 197^) although 
Evans (197^) pointed out that such protocols do not necessarily 
mirror thecauses of behaviour. Van Duyne (1973) went so far as to 
argue that i f an experiment wishes to demonstrate matching bias, 
then i t should be supported by protocol data. This reliance on 
introspection ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the absurd suggestion that a response 
bias should be introspectable) i s somewhat peculiar as, i n most 
other areas of psychology, introspection has not been accorded such 
an important place i n research for many years. In f a c t , protocol 
data may be explained by the r e s u l t s of Wason & Evans (1975)* 
Wason & Evans presented 2k subjects with two r u l e s 
to evaluate, ©ne of the (AA) form, ' i f P then Q', and one of the 
(AN) form, ' i f P then not Q', and asked them to give written reasons 
for t h e i r selections. There were 15 (correct) 'P and Q' selections 
on the AN rule and 12 ( i n c o r r e c t ) 'P and Q' selections (and no 
correct selections) on the AA r u l e . Responses were thus in 
accordance with matching bias predictions. However, subjects tended 
to explain selection of 'P and Q' as aimed at v e r i f y i n g the'AA rule 
but as aimed at f a l s i f y i n g the AN r u l e . These explanations are 
consistent with the selections, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that 
subjects attempt to v e r i f y one rule and f a l s i f y the other. The 
121-
subject appears to give the most plausible post hoc explanation of 
hi s selections. I t i s clear from t h i s r e s u l t that introspective 
data do not reveal the causes of behaviour and thus cannot be used 
to support theories about such causes. I t i s not surprising that 
protocols have appeared to support such theories as, on the AA rule , 
the most plausible explanation ( v e r i f i c a t i o n bias) was adopted by 
both experimenters and subjects. 
Wason & Evans propose a ''dual process' theory of 
reasoning which posits; 
a) Processes underlying behaviour, that axe not usually 
available to introspection, 
b) Introspections, which r e f l e c t a tendency to construct 
a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of behaviour - that i s , to r a t i o n a l i s e 
the response that has been made. 
This explanation of introspections as constituting 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s appears to be a useful synthesis that i s consistent 
with a l l the previous data. Further, i t i s not an explanation that 
need be r e s t r i c t e d to the f i e l d of human reasoning. Nisbett & 
Wilson ( 1 9 7 7 )t who discuss data from a wide range of s o c i a l and 
cognitive psychological experiments, also conclude that subjects' 
introspections do not reveal underlying causes o f behaviour and that 
such introspections are e s s e n t i a l l y post hoc r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s . 
I t i s of some h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t to note that Wason 
& Johnson-Laird (1969b) came close to producing a similar theory to 
that of Wason & Evans, some years before, as the following quote shows: 
" I t i s as i f two p a r a l l e l thought processes were going 
on: a non-verbal unconscious decision process, connected 
with the selection or r e j e c t i o n of cards, which 
controls (and d i s t o r t s ) a more s u p e r f i c i a l , conscious 
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verbal process connected with the evaluation of the 
cards with respect to the truth or f a l s i t y of the r u l e . 
Thus, what the subject says i s a compromise between a 
need to have a card f u l l y revealed and a need to main-
t a i n a semblance of r a t i o n a l i t y " . 
Clearly, there are differences between t h i s position 
and the 'dual-process' hypothesis. For instance, the two processes 
are seen as p a r a l l e l . However, there i s a s i m i l a r i t y i n that a 
di s t i n c t i o n i s made between an anconscious decision process (s e l e c t i o n 
behaviour) and verbal report of a v e r i f i c a t i o n or f a l s i f i c a t i o n bias. 
Also, the quote suggests that the reasons given are 'controlled' by 
the selections made. This i s exactly the point that was demonstrated 
by Wason & Evans. 
Wason & Evans point out that the strong form of their • 
'dual-process' hypothesis would be to argue that responses determine 
conscious thought and suggest that a comparison could be drawn between 
t h i s strong form of the hypothesis and the Jaines-Lange theory of 
emotion. However, they also point out that a subject's r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s 
may be "wholly appropriate when the problem l i e s within h i s competence 
or experience". I t should be noted, however, that, although i t i s 
quite possible that a subject's introspections w i l l y i e l d the causes 
of h i s behaviour on certain occasions, the c r u c i a l point i s that the 
observer can never be sure when such an occasion w i l l occur. Thus 
introspections can never be used to i n f e r the process underlying 
behaviour. 
Evans & Wason (1976) s p e c i f i c a l l y investigated the 
theory that introspections are r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s of selections. V/ason 
(1969b) had previously presented subjects with the l o g i c a l l y correct 
answer and asked them to explain i t . A l l 20 subjects were able to 
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do t h i s . Evans & Wason note that "at the time Wason supposed that 
the subjects had been prevented from imposing the i r own erroneous 
structure on the problem" but suggest that, i n the l i g h t of the 
Wason & Evans (1975) r e s u l t s , a more parsimonious explanation i s 
that subjects had been simply " r a t i o n a l i s i n g someone e l s e ' s solution". 
They presented four groups of subjects each with a d i f f e r e n t solution 
to explain. The four solutions used were those most commonly observed 
'TA', 'TA and TC* and 'TA, TC and F C , and the correct solution 'TA 
and FC*, Most subjects in each group were w i l l i n g to agree with, 
and explain, the given solution. 
Subjects were asked to indicate t h e i r confidence in 
t h e i r explanations on a four point scale and most subjects indicated 
'confident agreement' (defined as 'highly confident* or 'confident* 
r a t i n g s ) . The authors note that r e s u l t s could be explained in 
terms of the Asch (1956) work on conformity but argue that t h i s high 
rate of confident agreement suggests that the r e s u l t s cannot be 
merely due to compliance. 75^ of subjects confidently agreed with 
selection or r e j e c t i o n of TC or FC. Subjects were thus equally 
confident i n agreeing with selection or r e j e c t i o n of these cards 
which suggests that presentation of a solution involving selection 
of FC did not f a c i l i t a t e any genuine understanding of the problem. 
In f a c t , confidence ratings for TA selection and FA r e j e c t i o n tended 
to be lower i n the groups given the 'TA, TC and F C or 'TA and FC* 
solutions than in the groups given the, more t y p i c a l l y observed, 'TA' 
and 'TA and T C solutions. Evans & Wason conclude that these r e s u l t s 
indicate that "the presentation of the correct solution does not 
induce enlightenment" ctnd that they support the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
hypothesis. 
In discussing t h i s tendency to r a t i o n a l i s e responses, 
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the authors invoke the ideas of Festinger (1957) in suggesting that 
subjects' motive i s to appear, both to themselves and to others (for 
instance the experimenter), as consistent in the i r behaviour. Thus, 
knowing that they have made a pa r t i c u l a r response, they construct 
reasons to show why t h i s response was correct. E a r l i e r studies 
(e,g, Wason & Golding, 197^) show that subjects occasionally produce 
highly inconsistent arguments in order to avoid admitting that t h e i r 
i n i t i a l selection was wrong, 
A similar explanation may be applied to the r e s u l t s 
of Smalley (197^) whose 'therapy' procedure produced some increase 
in FC selection even though no feedback from the experimenter was 
received. Some subjects may have f a i l e d to answer 'therapy' questions 
in a manner consistent with their previous selections, and may then 
have made a (revised) selection consistent with t h e i r answers to the 
'therapy' questions. One substrate of the eff e c t of 'therapy', then, 
may be the number of occasions on which the subject i s required to 
r a t i o n a l i s e . I f a break in the r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n chain i s induced, 
producing a v a l i d response, then the subject w i l l continue to respond 
consistently (and thus v a l i d l y ) from that point, Wason (1964) pres-
ented subjects with a task i n which they were repeatedly given the 
opportunity of drawing an AC inference. Subjects who made AC tended 
to consistently continue to do so. However, when presented with the 
opportunity of making a v a l i d inference, whose conclusion was 
inconsistent with a previous AC conclusion, subjects subsequently 
tended to avoid making AC inferences. This r e s u l t also could be 
taken as an example of a consistent sequence of f a l l a c i o u s reasoning 
encountering an induced break in consistency and, from that point, 
transposing into a consistent sequence of v a l i d reasoning. 
Results from selection task studies using a l l four 
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conditional r u l e s suggest that there i s an ove r a l l tendency to s e l e c t 
TA and r e j e c t FA, and a matching tendency, mediating selection of 
each card, which may well be the only determinant of TC and FC 
selection. This position views selection of each card as independently 
determined. E a r l i e r workers, however, has assumed that card s e l e c t -
ions were influenced by each other and that p a r t i c u l a r combinations 
of cards had psychological'relevance (e.g. the models of Johnson-Laird 
& Wason, 1 9 7 0 , Bree, 1 9 7 3 . and Smalley, 197^) Evans (1977b) 
tested t h i s assumption of association between card selections. 
Two problems are encountered in t h i s respect. F i r s t l y 
the incidence of TA selection i s usually so high, and the incidence 
of FA selection so low, that i t i s not possible to answer questions 
about associations between these and other cards. Secondly, many 
studies report the data in terms of combinations of responses, with 
often a f a i r l y large number of ( a t y p i c a l ) combinations being reported 
simply as 'others' or 'miscellaneous', Evans bypassed the f i r s t 
problem by looking, s p e c i f i c a l l y , for association between selection 
of TC and FC. This association i s probably the most c r u c i a l as i t 
i s the frequency of selection of these cards that i s the most 
variable. He overcame the second problem by u t i l i s i n g some of h i s 
own data and by obtaining f u l l data from other experiments by 
correspondence. 
Evans analysed the data from a variety of experiments 
and found no case of a s i g n i f i c a n t association between TC and FC 
selections. Two r e s u l t s were f a i r l y close to significance at the 
5^ l e v e l but t h i s i s perhaps only to be expected, as 17 separate 
blocks of data were analysed. Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t was the lack 
of association during the successive stages of therapy i n the 
experiment of Wason (1969a) . The theory that therapy produces an 
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('insight') state of greater understanding would have to predict 
that understanding of the relevance of FC i s associated with the 
understanding of the non-relevance of TC. Evans points out that one 
cannot prove a n u l l hypothesis but th a t , i n the l i g h t of the analyses 
carried out, i t i s reasonable to t r e a t selections as independent. 
Such independence cl e a r l y lends f u r t h e r support to the view that 
selections, p a r t i c u l a r l y consequent selections, are not mediated 
by any overa l l understanding (or misunderstanding) of the problem. 
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SECTION 3,6 USE OF THEMATIC CQNIENT 
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi (1972) presented 
selection tasks using four envelopes i n place of cards. In the a"bs-
t r a c t condition, the rule referred to l e t t e r s and numbers on the 
fr o n t and back of these envelopes. I n the thematic condition, rules 
were of the form ' i f a l e t t e r i s sealed then i t has a 5d stamp on i t * 
and subjects were presented with the back of a sealed (TA) and 
unsealed (FA) envelope, and the front of envelopes stamped with 5d 
(TC) and ^  (FC) stamps. Each subject performed a selection task 
under each of these two conditions and under two similar conditions 
that used the 01 form of the conditional r u l e . 
The authors report a very high frequency of l o g i c a l l y 
correct (TA and FC) solutions on thematic problems. For the 
standard conditional, 8?% of subjects were correct i n the thematic 
condition as against only 8% i n the abstract condition. For the 01 
r u l e , the comparison was 75% to 21%, Apart from the very clear 
e f f e c t of thematic material, two subsidiary r e s u l t s are apparent i n 
the data. F i r s t l y , there was no s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n performance 
between tasks using the standard, and 01, forms of the conditional 
and, secondly, the f a c i l i t a t i o n of correct responding observed'on 
the thematic problems did not transfer to the abstract problems. 
This lack of transfer suggests that the thematic condition did not 
induce an appreciation of the l o g i c a l structure of the problem. 
I t should be noted that, although at the present 
date the question of whether or not an envelope i s sealed i s 
irrelevant to the value of the stamp required, near the time of the 
study unsealed envelopes could be posted at a cheaper rate. Subjects 
were asked to imagine that they were Post Office workers, sorting 
l e t t e r s , and to discover whether or not the rule had been violated. 
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Given the form of the i n s t r u c t i o n , and the f a c t that a postal sorter 
would be s p e c i f i c a l l y looking f o r incorrectly stajnped l e t t e r s , i t 
i s not surprising that almost a l l subjects played the role and 
'checked' the ^ stamp. I n f a c t , many subjects may well have done 
t h i s to t h e i r own l e t t e r s i n 'real l i f e * , I t i s thus debatable 
whether t h i s was t r u l y a 'reasoning* task and the r e s u l t s are 
perhaps best explained i n terms of the f a l s i f y i n g case being readily 
available on the basis of the subjects* experience. 
A similar explanation may be applied to the r e s u l t s 
of Legrenzi ( I 9 7 I ) , He presented subjects with four cards, divided 
in t o two sections. The cards depicted each of the four possible 
combinations of permuting a triangle or c i r c l e on the l e f t , with a 
tria n g l e or c i r c l e on the r i g h t . Three of these were labelled 
underneath with a plus, and one with a minus, and subjects were t o l d 
that the plusses suid minus showed whether the cards did, or d i d not 
conform to a r u l e , which the subjects were asked to deduce and write 
down. Subjects were then presented with a selection task using a 
rule expressed i n the same way as the subject's w r i t t e n formulation 
of the deduced r u l e . A 'matched' control group were also given a 
selection task using these same formulations of the r u l e . Signif-
i c a n t l y more of the experimental group gave the correct solution. 
Legrenzi repeated the experiment, asking the subjects to deduce the 
rule and then complete the conditional sentence ' i f there is....on 
the l e f t , then there is....on the r i g h t ' . 10 of the 11 subjects did 
t h i s correctly and a l l ten selected 'TA and FC, on the subsequent 
selection task, as against only two i n the control group. 
Subjects were i n i t i a l l y exposed to four cards, three 
of which conformed to the rule to be evaluated and one of which did 
not. I t i s thus l i k e l y t h a t , when presented with the selection task. 
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they would expect there to be, again, three conforming, and one 
nonconforming, instances. Also, i a deducing the r u l e i n the f i r s t 
part of the experiment, the 'minus' card would have been most 
salient. The selection task results could thus be explained i n terms 
of the subject having been led to expect, and focus upon, the f a l s i f y -
ing case. As f o r the Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi (1972) 
study, these r e s u l t s may thus be seen as a function of the subjects' 
experience, 
Wason & Shapiro (1971) used thematic rules whose 
antecedent referred to the name of a town and whose consequent 
> 
referred to a means of t r a v e l (e.g. 'every time I go to Leeds I 
t r a v e l by car*). Subjects were t o l d that the r u l e referred to 
journeys the experimenter had made on four separate days. The four 
cards (with 'Manchester*, 'Leeds', 'cax* and ' t r a i n ' printed on them) 
each had a d i f f e r e n t day of the week i n smaller type at the top. 
Results showed a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t of use of such material, the 
authors reporting that 10 of the 16 subjects gave the l o g i c a l l y 
correct solution, as against only 2 out of 16 i n a control group 
who were presented with abstract material.. (Unfortunately, no 
fu r t h e r analysis of responses was given). 
The use of a l l four possible s t i m u l i i n the r u l e was 
"systematically rotated between the subjects to control f o r any 
possible preconceptions about the r e l a t i o n between destinations and 
modes of transport". Thus i t cannot be argued, i n t h i s case, that 
the subjects* experience would lead him to select the f a l s i f y i n g 
case, Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) suggest that "the 'story' 
provides a frajnework in t o which the subjects can project themselves 
by an act of imagination" thus allowing "the conditional nature of 
the rules to be grasped". 
-130-
Van Duyne (197^) used 'student record cards' and 
rules expressing a relationship between degree topic and place of 
study. Comparable results to those of Wason & Shapiro were observed, 
the correct solution being obtained from 50% of subjects using a 
conditional, and 38% of subjects using a universal r u l e . Again, the 
rules used appear to represent a believable 'story' as (student), 
subjects would be aware that d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s often offer 
d i f f e r e n t courses. However, Van Duyne reports that use of thematic 
materials had no ef f e c t (as compared with a group given abstract 
materials) when the rules were expressed i n the disjunctive form 
•either not P or Q' , or i n the form 'not both P and not Q' (argued by 
Strawson, 1952, to be the most unaonbiguous expression of implication). 
Bracewell & Midi (197^) investigated whether the 
e f f e c t of thematic materials i s due primarily to the fact that the 
terms used have some everyday meaning or to the f a c t that there i s 
a meaningful relationship between the terms used (e.g. the concept 
of t r a v e l l i n g ) . They used four types of universal r u l e , permuting 
thematic and abstract terms (names of towns and transport or l e t t e r s 
and numbers) with a thematic or abstract r e l a t i o n ( t r a v e l l i n g * or 
reference to s t i m u l i being on one, or the other, side of a card). 
Thus one condition (A) essentially replicated the Wason & Shapiro 
study, whereas another condition (D) was a standard abstract task. 
The authors report that a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t of 
r e l a t i o n , but not of terms, was observed. However, t h i s r e s u l t 
may well have been a function of t h e i r method of analysis. Visual 
inspection of t h e i r data reveals that response p r o f i l e s from 
conditions B and C d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from those obtained from the 
standard abstract task (condition D), whereas data from conditions 
A and D were noticeably d i f f e r e n t . 75% of subjects i n condition A 
131 
made the correct solution and thus the data were compatible with 
those of Wason & Shapiro. A disturbing feature of the results 
however, i s the very low incidence of TC selection. The authors 
state i n t h e i r procedure section that "subjects were t o l d that the 
conditional was not reversible" but they do not mention how t h i s was 
done. The form of such an i n s t r u c t i o n i s c r u c i a l and i t would 
appear from the data ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , the data from the standard 
abstract condition) that the instructions may have inadvertently cued 
subjects to ignore the TC card. However, i t i s u n l i k e l y , given the 
re s u l t s of Evans (l977b), that t h i s can explain why 11 out of 12 
subjects i n condition A selected FC. 
The best explanation of these r e s u l t s , then, i s to 
conclude, with certain reservations, that they represent a r e p l i c a t i o n 
of the r e s u l t s of Wason & Shapiro (I97I), and that they suggest that 
both thematic terms and r e l a t i o n are necessary to produce a noticeable 
e f f e c t . I t may be that the statement has to appear wholly non-
arbitraxy i n order to made the story 'believable'. The authors 
report a study i n preparation using rules such as 'every time I think 
of Ottowa I remember car', which apparently had no e f f e c t . This type 
of statement may again be less believable as, although i t i s common 
to use means of transport when t r a v e l l i n g to places, i t i s not common 
to remember means of transport when thinking of places. A similar 
argument may be applied to the r e s u l t s of Lunzer. Harrison & Davey 
(1972) who appear to have found no e f f e c t of thematic materials 
except when an unusual presentation (of TC and FC cases only) was 
used. Their rules also expressed a seemingly a r b i t r a r y relationship 
(between colour of l o r r i e s and whether or not they carried coal). 
However, Bracewell & Hidi also used reversed forms of 
rule such as " I t r a v e l by car every time I go to Ottowa". For these 
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r u l e forms, the thematic content apparently had no ef f e c t on 
responses, as there was no difference between the conditions. This 
i s a very surprising r e s u l t that suggests that the e f f e c t of thematic 
materials i s f a r more specific than even the Van Duyne (197^) study 
indicated. The 'story' context generated by ' I t r a v e l by car every 
time I go to Ottowa' appears to be the same as that generated by 
'every time I go to Ottowa I t r a v e l by car'. Bracewell & Hidi suggest 
that the former rule may be more often interpreted as implying i t s 
converse, but t h i s i s u n l i k e l y and the suggestion cannot explain 
t h e i r data, as there i s no evidence of d i f f e r e n t i a l TC selection, 
Gilhooly & Falconer (197^) report a study i d e n t i c a l 
to that of Bracewell & H i d i , except that conditional rules were used 
and English towns were referred t o , 'Reversed' rules were not used. 
They report that i t i s thematic terms, and not r e l a t i o n s , that produce 
an e f f e c t . However, t h e i r e f f e c t appears to be very marginal. Only 
36^ of subjects selected FC i n the two conditions using thematic 
terms, as against 26^ i n the two conditions using abstract terms 
(data from Evans, 1977b). I f the thematic terms and r e l a t i o n condition 
i s compared with the abstract condition, s i g n i f i c a n t l y more correct 
solutions were observed (11 out of 50 to 3 out of 50), and thus the 
r e s u l t s do provide a further r e p l i c a t i o n of the Wason & Shapiro (1971) 
study. However, the reported ef f e c t i s considerably weaker than that 
observed by Wason & Shapiro and these r e s u l t s , together with the 
'reversed' rule results of Bracewell & Hidi, indicate that the e f f e c t 
of thematic materials i s less stable or pervasive than was o r i g i n a l l y 
believed. 
I t appears from the above re s u l t s that, f o r rules that 
create a 'believable' story, an e f f e c t of thematic content (although 
variable) i s observed and that no e f f e c t i s observed when more 
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a r b i t r a r y thematic rules are used. However, the r e s u l t s of Majiktelow 
& Evans (1979) challenge both of these interpretations. 
They report data from four experiments using thematic 
rules expressing a relationship between what the experimenter eats 
and drinks at par t i c u l a r meals (e.g. * i f I eat haddock then I drink 
g i n ' ) . Two of these experiments u t i l i s e d a l l four forms (AA, AN, NA 
and NN) of conditional r u l e . In no case did response p r o f i l e s on 
thematic rules d i f f e r from those on abstract rules. This f i n d i n g 
may be interpreted as compatible with previous r e s u l t s as, f o r 
instance, there i s no more relationship between drinking gin and 
eating haddock than there i s between remembering car and thinking 
of Ottowa. However, Manktelow (1978) reported that differences were 
observed between these thematic and abstract rules on a number of 
t r u t h table tasks. A l l four forms of conditional rules were used 
and subjects c l a s s i f i e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more double mismatching (PQ) 
cases as * irrelevant* on thematic, than on abstract rules. This re-
s u l t held f o r both standard and 0 1 conditional rules and also f o r 
disjunctive rules, although i n the l a t t e r case i t i s questionable 
whether the r e s u l t should be described as a function of matching. 
Thus, although t h i s thematic content had no ef f e c t on responses to 
the selection task, i t cannot be considered to be simply equivalent 
to abstract content. 
Experiment 5 of Manktelow & Evans (1979) i s very 
d i f f i c u l t to i n t e r p r e t . The design and the thematic rules used were 
as i n the Wason & Shapiro (1971) study but they found no effe c t of 
content. Only two out of 16 subjects selected FC i n the thematic 
condition. Although Manktelow & Evans accept that the Wason & 
Shapiro study "contains few obvious defects", they point out that, 
i n the Gilhooly & Falconer (197^) study, the thematic (terms and 
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r e l a t i o n ) condition "shows a generally low lev e l of correct 
responding - only 22^" . This i s correct but the fa c t remains that, 
as was demonstrated above, appropriate analysis of the data of 
Gilhooly & Falconer reveals that they provide a s i g n i f i c a n t 
r e p l i c a t i o n of the Wason & Shapiro r e s u l t . Similarly, the Bracewell 
& Hidi (197^) r e p l i c a t i o n i s c r i t i c i s e d by Manktelow & Evans on the 
grounds that "only the r e l a t i o n and order main ef f e c t s and r e l a t i o n • 
order interaction are s i g n i f i c a n t " , but t h i s hardly accounts f o r the 
fac t that, i n the d i r e c t l y comparable thematic condition, 15% of 
subjects gave the correct solution and 92^ selected FC. In t h e i r 
concluding paragraph, Manktelow & Evans summarise t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s 
of various studies but f a i l to., mention both Gilhooly & Falconer and 
Bracewell & Hidi and, i n f a c t , at no point i n t h e i r discussion do 
they present an explanation, either of why these two studies r e p l i c -
ated that of Wason & Shapiro, or of why t h e i r own study f a i l e d to 
do so. 
One difference between the Manktelow & Evans 
experiment (5) and that of Wason & Shapiro i s that i n the former 
the experimenter l a i d four cards on the table under four headings 
giving the day of the week, whereas i n the l a t t e r experiment, each 
card was actually labelled with a day of the week. The ( l a t t e r ) 
procedure of Wason & Shapiro may have helped convince the subject 
that the cards did represent an actual record of the experimenter's 
journeys on pa r t i c u l a r days. The point i s that thematic content may 
only have an ef f e c t on selection task responses i f i t leads the 
subject to believe that he i s dealing with a 'real', rather than an 
a r t i f i c i a l , problem. 
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SECTION 3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The c r u c i a l determinants of responses to abstract 
selection tasks appear to be matching bias and the v a l i d i t y of TA, 
and i n v a l i d i t y of FA, selections. Responses can thus once again be 
described i n terms of a combination of" l o g i c a l and nonlogical factors. 
I t should be noted, however, that the r e s u l t s of Manktelow & Evans 
(1979) suggest that consequent selections are determined by non-
lo g i c a l factors only. The 'ra t i o n a l i s a t i o n ' hypothesis of Wason & 
Evans (1975) and Evans & Wason (1976) adequately accounts f o r the 
fac t that subjects' introspections do not reveal the existence of 
such nonlogical tendencies. I n l i n e with Wason & Johnson-Laird 
(1972) , i t has been argued that use of thematic content on the 
selection task w i l l only a f f e c t responses when i t creates a 'believable 
story'. For instance, i n the case of the 'towns and transport' content, 
i t i s possible that an e f f e c t i s obtained only i f the subject i s 
led to believe that the experimenter i s making a r e a l , rather than 
a hypothetical claim about ^journeys he has actually made. 
When thematic content does have an ef f e c t on selection 
task responses, i t appears to be to 'cue' the f a l s i f y i n g (FC) card. 
However, t h i s e f f e c t i s not necessarily due to the content having 
aided appreciation of the l o g i c a l structure of the problem. In f a c t , 
that i t i s not due t o an appreciation of l o g i c a l structure, i s 
suggested by i t s f a i l u r e to transfer to a subsequent abstract task 
(Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi, 1972) . 
An alternative explanation, which accords with similar 
arguments developed i n chapters 1 and 2, i s that the ef f e c t i s a 
function of the subjects' experience. The way i n which the subjects' 
experience would have 'cued' the f a l s i f y i n g case i n the experiments 
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of Legrenzi (1971) and Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi (1972) 
has been discussed i n chapter "3,6, However, i t i s not so readily 
apparent how the subjects' experience cues the f a l s i f y i n g case when 
the 'towns and transport' content is used. One possible explanation 
i s that, i f the subject believes that the rule i s a 'real' claim 
about the experimenter's actual journeys, his responses may be i n f l -
uenced by the context within which such claims are made i n 'real 
l i f e ' . I f a person makes a statement about his own behaviour and 
requests someone else to f i n d out whether t h i s statement is 'true 
or f a l s e ', the request usually implies: " t h i s i s what I claim and I 
challenge you to prove me' wrong". 
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SECTION ^.1 'LOGICAL' EXPLANATIONS 
Nineteenth century logicians c l e a r l y believed that the 
structure of formal logic was a model of the thought processes 
involved i n human reasoning (Henle, 1962). A similar view i s 
i m p l i c i t i n Piagetian theory which holds that adults are capable 
of 'formal operations', that i s , that they are capable of l o g i c a l 
reasoning with abstract s t i m u l i . Data from reasoning tasks, however, 
show t h i s position to be untenable as subjects frequently make 
l o g i c a l l y erroneous responses. Thus, although subjects* responses 
may be pa r t l y determined by the influence of logic, the observed 
data disconfirm the hypothesis that t h e i r behaviour i s wholly 
l o g i c a l . 
The only way to maintain the position that subjects' 
reasoning i s wholly l o g i c a l i s to argue that the subject misinterprets 
the premisses and that his apparent errors are thus the r i g h t 
answer to the wrong question. The main proponent of t h i s 
viewpoint has been Henle (I962) who reported a 'q u a l i t a t i v e ' 
analysis of subjects* responses to syllogisms involving thematic 
content r e l a t i n g to *real l i f e * issues. She argued that errors 
could be explained i n four main ways: 
1) Restatement of a premiss or conclusion so that i t s 
meaning i s changed ( i . e . the premiss i s misinterpreted) 
2) Omission of one or both premisses leading to d i r e c t 
evaluation of only one premiss and the conclusion, 
or of the conclusion only. 
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3) The addition of a premiss which i s inferred from one 
of the other premisses. 
A general " f a i l u r e to accept the l o g i c a l task". 
Subjects pay attention to the content rather than the 
structure, 
There are several c r i t i c i s m s that may be levelled at 
t h i s argument. F i r s t l y , she places great reliance on subjects' 
explanations of t h e i r responses. The Wason & Evans (1973) results 
suggest that t h i s reliance i s misplaced. Evans (1976) refers to 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s creating the ' i l l u s i o n ' of the subject's awareness 
of his thought processes and t h i s ' i l l u s i o n * i s l i k e l y to be even 
stronger when the content of the problems relates to.issues that 
both the subject and the experimenter have certain preconceptions 
about. More importantly, her analysis presents no evidence f o r her 
theory that subjects are always capable of l o g i c a l reasoning. She 
appears to be arguing that subjects would have reasoned l o g i c a l l y i f 
they had not ignored premisses, made i n v a l i d assumptions and mis-
interpretations, and generally showed themselves incapable of attending 
to the l o g i c a l structure of the problem. Further, most of these 
explajiations cannot be applied to data from abstract tasks i n which, 
f o r instance, the given premisses are u n l i k e l y to imply additional 
premisses. Admittedly, the existence of response biases suggests 
that subjects do d i r e c t l y evaluate conclusions and * f a i l to accept 
the l o g i c a l task', but i t would be r i d i c u l o u s to take t h i s as 
evidence i n favour of l o g i c a l competence. The only explanation that 
can feasibly be applied to abstract tasks i s premiss-misinterpretation, 
A possible misinterpretation, that has figured 
prominently i n the l i t e r a t u r e , i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of universals 
and conditionals as implying t h e i r converse (conversion), This was 
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f i r s t proposed by Chapman & Chapman (1959) as a p a r t i a l explanation 
of errors i n s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning, but has since been used i n 
explaining data from both syllogisms and the selection task (e.g. 
Bracewell, 197^, Bree. 1973, Dickstein, 1975. Johnson-Laird & Wason, 
1970, Smalley, 197^) . On conditional inference tasks i t has often 
been assumed that AC and DA inferences are uniquely determined 'by 
conversion (e.g. Rips & Marcus, 1977. Staudenmayer, 1975» Taplin, 
1971) . Many workers i n the f i e l d have argued that conditionals cause 
confusion because, when used i n 'real l i f e ' discourse, t h e i r i n t e r -
pretation (as implication or equivalence) i s dependent on the context 
(e.g. Bracewell & Hidi, 197^, Bree, 197^. Bucci, 1978, Fillenbaum, 
1975. 1976, Geis & Zwicky. 1971. Legrenzi, 1970, Rips & Marcus, 1977, 
Staudenmayer, 1975) . A somewhat d i f f e r e n t view was proposed by 
Tsal (1977) who presented subjects with groups of statements such as 
"either Pat (-) Bob or Pat (-) Fred' and found that (-) was usually 
interpreted as being symmetrical. He argued that conversion (as 
evidenced by AC affirmation) i s mediated by a preference for symmetr-
i c a l relationships. 
The prevalent view i s thus that, on abstract tasks 
devoid of contextual 'cues', the conditional w i l l be interpreted, 
sometimes as implying implication and sometimes as implying 
equivalence. This theory has been attacked by Braine ( I 9 7 8 ) , who 
refers to i t as the 'chameleon' theory. He presents four specific 
c r i t i c i s m s as follows; 
1) The theory f a i l s to explain why more errors are made 
on MT than on MP. 
2) The Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l (1972) re s u l t s , suggesting 
that subjects usually i n t e r p r e t the conditional as 
implying defective implication, cause problems f o r the 
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theory as i t cannot then explain why, on inference tasks, 
most subjects appear to in t e r p r e t the conditional as 
implying either (material) implication or equivalence. 
3) None of the three possible interpretations (material 
or defective implication, or equivalence) resolves 
the problem of counterfactuals. 
^) Different formulations of the conditional have the 
same t r u t h table and thus should be interpreted i n 
the same way. However, fo r instance, the IT and 01 
forms of the conditional rule are psychologically 
d i s t i n c t , as certain content can be used on one form 
but not the other (e.g, ' i f one p u l l s out the knob, 
the t e l e v i s i o n goes on' cannot sensibly be transposed 
into 'one pu l l s out the knob only i f the te l e v i s i o n 
goes on'). 
Points 1 and 2 are only v a l i d i f i t i s claimed that 
^'chameleon' theory exi^lains a l l the data. However, no theorists 
have claimed t h i s and i t i s a separate problem as to why subjects 
f a i l to make MT, or make more AC and DA responses on inference tasks 
than FT - false and FF - true responses on t r u t h table tasks. I t 
should be noted, however, that the apparent defective implication 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n observed on t r u t h table tasks i s not wholly inconsistent 
with data from other tasks. There i s very l i t t l e evidence that 
subjects ever i n t e r p r e t a conditional as implying material implication. 
Point 3 i s somewhat unfair as 'chaimeleon' theory i s 
not aimed at resolving the problem of counterfactuals, Braine notes, 
however, that "the defective trxith table provides no meaning at a l l 
f o r such sentences". Thus, from a l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t viewpoint (e,g, 
Ayer, 1936), the defective t r u t h table does cope adequately with 
counterfactuals 
To support point ^, Braine (1978) reports data from 
Braine ( I 9 7 6 ) , comparing inference frequencies on IT and 01 
conditional, r u l e s . He reports that, for the 01 r u l e s , l e s s errors, 
and shorter latencies, were observed on MT than on MP and argues that 
t h i s i s due to 01 r u l e s being processed from consequent to antecedent. 
However, t h i s finding i s inconsistent with the data of Evans (1977a) 
although he did find that more MT, and l e s s MP inferences were 
affirmed on 01, than on IT r u l e s . He agrees with Braine that there 
i s a tendency to process 01 r u l e s from consequent to antecedent, as 
they are often used when the consequent precedes the antecedent in 
time. However, i t i s not clear why Braine considers t h i s view to be 
inconsistent with 'chameleon* theory. In f a c t , point ^ appears to 
be based on a misunderstanding of 'chameleon' theory as i t i s 
s p e c i f i c a l l y because 'real l i f e ' usages vary that interpretation i s 
held to be variable. I f d i f f e r e n t forms of r u l e s are used in 
di f f e r e n t ways in 're a l l i f e ' , then these rule forms would be expected 
to be interpreted d i f f e r e n t l y on abstract tasks. 
Thus, Braine's arguments in no way invalidate the 
theory that subjects sometimes, but not always, convert conditional 
r u l e s . There i s reasonable evidence that conversion does play some 
role in determining responses. For instance, on s y l l o g i s t i c tasks, 
more errors are observed on problems involving an A premiss and, on 
truth table tasks, although the most prevalent response to FT and FF 
i s 'irrelevant', there i s a r e s i d u a l tendency to c l a s s i f y FT as f a l s e 
rather than true and FF as true rather than f a l s e . However, the 
existence of matching and conclusion bias shows that i t cannot be the 
case that these truth table c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , or affirmation of AC 
and DA inferences, are uniquely determined by conversion. Also, many 
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observed errors (such as errors on c e r t a i n s y l l o g i s t i c premiss p a i r s , 
f a i l u r e to make the MT inference and f a i l u r e to se l e c t the FC card 
on the selection task) cannot be explained i n terms of conversion 
and i t i s thus impossible to explain the data solely i n terms of 
premiss misinterpretation. 
However, there are other forms of 'logical* explanation, 
such as the hypothesis that errors are due to the application of 
inappropriate reasoning strategies. For instance, Chapman & 
Chapman (1959) proposed that subjects reason by 'probabilistic 
inference*, accepting not only necessary, but also probable 
conclusions. I t i s possible that, in 'real l i f e ' reasoning, subjects 
axe often concerned with how l i k e l y a conclusion i s , given a set of 
premisses, and thus, although the subject i s not viewed as reasoning 
i n accordance with formal logic, he i s seen as reasoning i n a 
consistent, ' l o g i c a l ' manner."^ Braine ( 1978 ) argues that 'real l i f e ' 
reasoning conforms to a pattern of 'natural' logic and presents a 
set of inference r u l e s (the basis of which i s attributed to Gentzen, 
1964) upon which t h i s 'natural'.logic i s based. However, he presents 
no evidence for h i s system and makes no e f f o r t to show how i t may 
explain errors on reasoning tasks. Although i t i s c e r t a i n l y possible 
that subjects may consider plausible inferences to be v a l i d in 'rea l 
l i f e ' reasoning, i t i s imlikely that any set of 'rea l l i f e ' 
inferences could f u l l y explain a l l the data. 
Reference has been made to ' l o g i c a l ' theories con-
cerning premiss misinterpretation and the acceptance of formally 
i n v a l i d inferences that axe considered v a l i d i n 'real l i f e ' . /- t h i r d 
type of ' l o g i c a l ' approach i s to focus upon s p e c i f i c aspects of the 
problem that cause d i f f i c u l t y and thus lead to ch a x a c t e r i s t i c e r r o r s . 
For instance, i t has been proposed that denial of a negative causes 
- l i * A -
problems on certain d i sjunctive tasks (e.g. Johnson-Laird & 
T r i d g e l l , 1972, Roberge, 1976a, 1976b) , There i s also some evidence 
from latency data that negatives per se cause problems on reasoning 
tasks (e.g. Evans, 1977» Evans & Newstead, 1977, Lippman, 1972 ) , 
although the r e s u l t s of Johnson-Laird & T r i d g e l l (1972) show 
that t h i s i s not necesscirily always the case. One finding that 
any general theory of reasoning must take into account i s the 
preference for 'forward processing' observed on s y l l o g i s t i c tasks. 
Subjects find i t very d i f f i c u l t to reason 'backwards' through a 
chain of premisses (e.g. Dickstein, 1978b, Erase, 1968b, Johnson-
Laird & Steedman, 1978) and t h i s d i f f i c u l t y also appears to apply 
to conditional problems. Subjects affirm more MP, than MT, inferences 
and s e l e c t more TA, than FC, cards on the selection task. Thus 
more v a l i d responses are observed on problems concerning the 
antecedent than-on problems concerning the consequent, of a 
conditional r u l e . 
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SECTION 4,2 THE NEED FOR 'NONLOGIGAL' EXPLANATIONS AND THE 
THEORIES OF EVANS~(l972a, 1977b). 
A l l the 'logical* explanations, considered in the 
l a s t section, presume that the subject attends to the l o g i c a l structure 
of the problem. Logically correct responses are accepted as being 
due to the subjects' appreciation of their l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y and 
l o g i c a l l y incorrect responses are explained in one, or more, of the 
following three ways: 
1) As due to a v a l i d inference drawn from a misinterpret-
ation of a premiss (e.g. the conversion theory of 
Chapman & Chapman, 1 9 5 9 ) . 
2) As due to the application of an i n v a l i d strategy that 
i s v a l i d in 'real l i f e * logic (e.g. Chapman & Chapman's 
'pr o b a b i l i s t i c inference' theory). 
3) As due to a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c error that occurs during 
analysis of the structure of the problem (e.g. the 
sources of error proposed in the Johnson-Laird & 
Steedman, 1978, model). 
However, many responses are not susceptible to a 
' l o g i c a l ' explanation. At present, i t would be impossible to present 
a ' l o g i c a l ' explanation of matching bias and very d i f f i c u l t to do so 
for conclusion bias. Thus, as has been argued throughout t h i s review, 
i t i s apparent that responses to problems involving conditionals are 
mediated by both ' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical' factors. 
In the case of s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning, although there 
are alternative information processing theories, data can also be 
explained i n terms of a combination of l o g i c a l and nonlogical 
factors. At the end of chapter 1, i t was concluded that the l a t t e r 
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explanation i s preferable, and consideration of data from tasks 
using conditional r u l e s lends further support to t h i s conclusion for 
two reasons. F i r s t l y , in the case of the selection task, information 
processing approaches have had l i t t l e success. An explanation of 
s y l l o g i s t i c data i n terms of a combination of ' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical' 
factors i s thus preferable, as i t generalises across paradigms. 
Secondly, there are noticeable s i m i l a r i t i e s between the nonlogical 
biases. Both 'atmosphere' and 'matching' are feature matching 
biases, and the dominance of 'negative atmosphere' may be related to 
the preference for negative conclusions observed on conditional 
inference tasks. 
At l e a s t in the area of conditional reasoning tasks, 
the view that subjects' responses are mediated by a combination of 
' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical' factors i s by no means nowel. This theory 
was f i r s t proposed by Evans ( l 9 7 2 a ) who argued that responses on 
reasoning tasks are mediated by a combination of interpretational 
factors (tendencies to respond r e s u l t i n g from the subjects' 
comprehension of the r u l e ) and operational (nonlogical) factors. 
Evans (1977b) reformulated t h i s theory in mathematical terms, proposing 
that responses are determined by a weighted addition of interpretation-
a l ( I ) and response bias (R) tendencies. 
Formally, the probability of a response (P(R)) i s 
given by: 
P( r ) = OCI + ( 1 - O < . ) R 
0 4 4 1 
0 I 1 
0 R 4 1 
•14?. 
The model assumes reasoning responses to be probabil-
i s t i c within subjects. Evans points out that i t i s "not, of course, 
suggested that individual differences do not af f e c t reasoning 
behaviour. I f , however, behaviour i s p r o b a b i l i s t i c at the l e v e l of 
individual subjects, we might regard t h i s as the pri n c i p a l source of 
observed variation within an homogeneous sample such as undergraduate 
students". Evans compares t h i s approach to the ' c l a s s i c a l * learning 
theory of Hull (19^3) and points out that, although the idea of 
stochastic behaviour i s unusual i n the study of reasoning, the 
"assumption i s common in the study of learning". 
Evans f i t t e d t h i s model to the sele c t i o n task data of 
Evans & Lynch ( 1 9 7 3 ) . and with the adoption of certa i n assumptions, 
an impressively good f i t was obtained. Some of the assumptions 
adopted in f i t t i n g the model were derived from the data to which i t 
i s f i t t e d and thus the extent of the support which t h i s f i t lends to 
the general model i s debatable (as Evans admits). However, the Evans 
theory i n general does provide the best published explanation of 
reasoning task data i n that i t focusses upon a combination of l o g i c a l 
and nonlogical factors. 
FOOTNOTES 
1, A clear d i s t i n c t i o n can be made between the ('logical') 
hypothesis that subjects may accept plausible or 'pr o b a b i l i s t i c ' 
inferences and the ('nonlogical') hypothesis that subjects may 
accept conclusions that they know to be true or l i k e l y to be true. 
In the former case, the subject i s held to be attending to the 
l o g i c a l structure of the problem and in f e r r i n g a conclusion that 
i s l i k e l y , given the premisses. In the l a t t e r case, the subject 
i s held to be evaluating the conclusion d i r e c t l y , without reference 
to the premisses. 
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A l l the reasoning task paradigms reviewed have 
produced evidence for the existence of nonlogical response biases. 
However, the 'conclusion bias' observed on conditional inference 
tasks (Evans, 1972b, 1977a) has been l i t t l e investigated as most 
studies in the area have used only AA r u l e s . This i s unfortunate 
as l i t t l e attempt has been made to assess the influence of l o g i c a l 
factors when a l l four forms of conditional rule (formed by systematic 
negation of the components) axe used, Cleaxly, the extent of a 
nonlogical bias can only be assessed r e l a t i v e to the e f f e c t of such 
l o g i c a l factors. For instance, i t has been found that matching bias 
i s probably the major determinant of consequent selections on the 
selection task but that l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i s an equally strong 
determinant of antecedent selections (Evans, 1977b, Evstns & Lynch, 
1973. Manktelow & Evans, 1978), 
I t would thus be of i n t e r e s t to investigate further 
the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t of l o g i c a l factors on an inference task using a l l 
four forms of conditional r u l e . The e f f e c t of such factors should 
be reflected in the r e l a t i v e frequencies of the d i f f e r e n t inferences 
and in relationships between them. In p a r t i c u l a r , i f some subjects 
affirm MT because they 'understand' that i t i s l o g i c a l l y v a l i d , then 
a subject who affirms MT on one rule form should be more l i k e l y to 
do so on another. 
The choice of inference task used i n t h i s experiment 
was influenced by the notable dearth of research on the contrapositive, 
converse and inverse inferences, which axe l o g i c a l l y related to the 
MT, AC and DA inferences, respectively. These inferences may be 
referred to as conditional inferences. For instance, on the AA r u l e , 
the MT inference i n f e r s *not P', given 'not Q', whereas the contra-
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Table 5 A 
Form of Two Valid and Two Invalid Inferences, and the Related Conditional Inferences, from the 
Conditional Rule ' I f P then Q' 
INFERENCE 
DESIGNATION 
MODUS PONENS (MP) 
RELATED CONDITIONAL INFERENCE VALIDITY 
GIVEN INFER DESIGNATION FORM (assuming 
implication) 
P Q CONDITIONAL I f P then Q VALID 
I 
MODUS TOLLENS 
AFFIRMATION OF 
THE CONSEQUENT 
DENIAL OF THE 
ANTECEDENT 
(MT) 
(AC) 
(DA) 
Not Q Not P CONTRAPOSITIVE I f not Q then not P VALID 
Q P CONVERSE I f Q then P INVALID 
Not P Not Q INVERSE I f not P then not Q INVALID 
positive i n f e r s 'not P ' i f 'not Q', and thus may be expressed as a 
conditional statement. The f u l l form of the conditional inferences 
related to HP, MT. AC and DA i s shown, for the AA rule form, in 
Table 5-1. 
I t w i l l be noted from Table 5.1 that the (conditional) 
inference related to MP i s simply the conditional statement from which 
the inference i s made. For the other three inferences, the equivalent 
conditional inference i s d i f f e r e n t from the conditional statement from 
which the inference i s made. 
Clearly, there i s also a conditional inference related 
to each inference on the AN, NA and NN forms of conditional r u l e . 
For purposes of c l a r i t y . Table 5.2 provides a reference table for the 
relationships, concerning MT, AC and DA, on a l l four forms of 
conditional r u l e . I t w i l l be seen from the table that the contra-
positive, converse and inverse are a l l conditional statements and may 
thus be referred to as AA, AN, NA, NN, which defines th e i r antecedent 
and consequent polar i t y . I t should be noted, however, that, i n the 
case of the contrapositive and converse, Q i s the antecedent value 
and P i s the consequent value. In the text of chapter 5i these 
statements are referred to as AA, AN, NA or NN conclusions to disti n g u i s h 
them from the rule forms from which they are derived. 
I t would be predicted that subjects* behaviour concerning 
the contrapositive, converse and inverse would be comparable with 
behaviour concerning the MT, AC and DA inferences, respectively, but 
t h i s has not, as yet, been tested. I n such case, conclusion bias 
would appear as a tendency to affirm conditionals with negative -
consequents. 
Experiment 1 was thus designed to investigate whether such 
r e s u l t s would be obtained and to further investigate the r e l a t i v e 
e f f e c t s of both nonlogical and l o g i c a l factors on inference affirmation. 
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Table 5 . 2 
Relationship between the Contrapositive. Converse and Inverse and 
MT, AC and DA, respectively on the Four Forms of Conditional Rule 
Rule Form MT Contrapositive 
Given Infer 
I f P then Q (AA) 'not Q' 'not P' I f not Q then not P (NN) 
I f P then not Q (AN) 'Q' 'not P' I f Q then not P (AN) 
I f not P then Q (NA) 'not Q' 'P* I f not Q then P (NA) 
I f not P then not Q(NN) I f Q then P (AA) 
AC Converse 
Given Infer 
I f P then Q (AA) •Q' 'P' I f Q then P (AA) 
I f P then not Q (AN) 'not Q' 'P* I f not Q then P (NA) 
I f not P then Q (NA) 'Q' 'not P' I f Q then not P (AN) 
I f not P then not Q(NN) 'not Q' 'not P' I f not Q then not P (NN) 
DA Inverse 
Given I n f e r 
I f P then Q (AA) 'not P' 'not Q' I f not P then not Q (NN) 
I f P then not Q (AN) 'not P' 'Q* I f not P then Q (NA) 
I f not P then Q (NA) •P' 'not Q' I f P then not Q (AN) 
I f not P then not Q(NN) .p. .Q. I f P then Q (AA) 
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EXIERBENT 1 
M E T H O D 
Design 
A sixteen item reasoning task was presented in booklet 
form. Each question was presented on a separate page and involved 
a conditional r u l e of the form ' I f P then Q'. The components were 
systematically negated to y i e l d four types of r u l e . Each rule was 
presented four times. 
Each of the sijxteen r u l e s (four instances of each of the 
four types of r u l e ) was printed at the top of a page and labelled 
'KEY STATEMENT', Below t h i s was a l i s t of seven alternative cond-
i t i o n a l s which the subject was requested to underline i f he ' f e l t ' 
that they 'followed from' the key statement. Eight d i s t i n c t forms 
of a conditional can be constructed and these are shown (symbol i c a l l y ) 
below; 
1) I f P then Q 
2) I f P then not Q 
3) I f not P then Q 
4) I f not P then not Q 
5) I f Q then P 
6) I f Q then not P 
?) I f not Q then P 
8) I f not Q then not P 
Each of the key statements was of one of the forms 1 - 4 , 
and the seven alternative conditionals used were the remaining seven 
members of the l i s t . Thus each question gave the subject the 
opportunity to affirm a ( v a l i d ) contrapositive conclusion and six 
i n v a l i d conclusions, including the converse and inverse. Additionally, 
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they were offered the alternative of underlining the statement 'none 
of the above' (always appearing l a s t on the l i s t ) i f they ' f e l t ' 
that none of the a l t e r n a t i v e s followed from the key statement. 
The order i n which the seven alternative conditionals 
were presented was randomised for each of the sixteen questions. 
The order i n which the questions were presented was randomised for 
each subject with the constraint that there should be four blocks 
of four questions in which one of each type of rule appeared and 
that no two adjacent questions should use the sajne type of r u l e . 
Subjects 
Forty undergraduates at Plymouth Polytechnic acted on 
a paid volunteer basis. They were tested i n groups of from two to 
f i f t e e n . 
Materials 
Conditionals involving c a p i t a l l e t t e r s and numbers 
were used. I f the antecedent referred to a l e t t e r , then the 
consequent referred to a number and vice versa. Thus the 'key 
statement' and the seven alternative conditionals were a l l sentences 
such as ' i f the l e t t e r i s a C then the number i s a 7 ' . Vfhether or 
not the antecedent referred to the l e t t e r was randomly determined 
for each question. The l e t t e r s and numbers used were randomly 
determined with the constraint that no l e t t e r should be used on more 
than one question. Each problem was presented on an A^ page. 
Procedure 
Each subject was f i r s t shown a few white index cards 
with a v e r t i c a l l i n e drawn down the centre and a c a p i t a l l e t t e r on 
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the l e f t hand side and a number on the r i g h t . The l e t t e r s used on 
these cards did not appear in any of the questions. Instructions 
were presented on the f i r s t page of the task booklet. A copy of t h i s 
i n struction page i s shown i n Appendix A. 
RESULTS 
Each rule form was presented four times to kO subjects. 
The percentage frequency (out of 160) of affirmation of the three 
main a l t e r n a t i v e s i s shown i n Table 5 . 3 (the other four a l t e r n a t i v e s 
were i n v a l i d l y affirmed on only 1 .7^ of occasions). The following 
two points about Table 5 . 3 should be noted: 
1) The column headings r e f e r to the form of the conclusion 
affirmed and not to the form of the rule from which the 
conclusion i s drawn ( i . e . the 'key statement'). 
2) Reference to the form of conclusion as simply AA, AN, 
NA or NN allows a standardised comparison between 
contrapositive and converse conclusions, which argue 
from Q to P, and inverse conclusions, which argue from 
P to Q. 
As i t was predicted that the experiment would y i e l d 
s imilar data to "that obtained from studies of MT, AC and DA, the data 
axe compaxed i n the table with those of Evans ( 1 9 7 7 a ) . In each c e l l , 
each inference i s compared with the related conditional inference, 
i n accordance with the relationships shown in Table 5 . 2 . 
Two factors indicate that the two sets of data shown 
in Table 5 , 3 are comparable: 
1) The average c e l l frequencies are about the same - 51^ 
for the data from t h i s experiment and ^-9% from Evans ( 1 9 7 7 a ) . 
2) I f the two sets of data are ranked from 1 to 12 across 
the c e l l s , a rank c o r r e l ation of 0 .886 i s obtained (p <- 0 . 0 0 1 ) , 
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Table 5-3 
Percentage Frequencies of Affirmation of each of the Four Forms of 
Contrapositive^ Converse and Inverse conclusions i n Experiment 1 
(160 data points per c e l l ) compared with Percentage Frequencies of 
Affirmation of MT, AC and DA obtained by Evans (l977a) (16 data 
points per c e l l ) 
FORM OF CONCLUSION AFFIRMED 
RESPONSE AA AN NA NN 
CONTRAPOSITIVE il4 72 59 
MT (EVANS 1977a) 25 56 12 75 
CONVERSE 66 72 37 64 
AC (EVANS 1977a) 75 81 31 81 
INVERSE 37 47 30 54 
DA (EVANS 1977a) 19 50 12 69 
In general, i t i s reasonable to conclude that contra-
positive, converse and inverse frequencies are similar to MT, AC 
and DA frequencies, although i t would be premature to conclude that 
they are psychologically equivalent. However, f o r purposes of brevity 
and c l a r i t y , the contrapositive, converse and inverse w i l l henceforth 
be referred to as MT, AC and DA, respectively. 
A three-way analysis of variance was performed on the 
data from MT, AC and DA, conclusions, analysed by; 
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1) Conclusion type (MT» AC or D A ) , 
2) Polarity of the consequent of the conclusion. 
3) P o l a r i t y of the antecedent of the conclusion. 
Results of t h i s analysis were as follows; 
1) There was a si g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of conclusion 
type (p ^  0.01), Across a l l rules, subjects affirmed 
AC on 60^ of occasions, MT on 52% occasions and DA 
on ^2% of occasions. Paired comparisons showed that 
subjects affirmed s i g n i f i c a n t l y less DA than MT ( p 0 . 0 5 ) , 
or AC (p < 0.01), conclusions. There was no s i g n i f i c a n t 
difference between frequencies of AC and MT affirmation. 
2) There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of consequent 
p o l a r i t y , such that subjects affirmed more conclusions 
having negative consequents (p < O.Ol). This r e s u l t 
i s consistent with the conclusion bias observed by 
Evans (1972c, l977a). 
3) There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of antecedent 
p o l a r i t y , such that subjects affirmed more conclusions 
having affirmative antecedents. However, there was a 
si g n i f i c a n t interaction between antecedent p o l a r i t y and 
conclusion type (p < 0.05). This interaction i s shown 
i n Figure 1. The source of the interaction appeared 
to be that antecedent p o l a r i t y had no e f f e c t on DA 
affi r m a t i o n , as the figure c l e a r l y shows. 
Further analysis of MT responses was carried out to test 
f o r consistent l o g i c a l behaviour across the four forms of r u l e . As 
MT i s a v a l i d response on a l l possible interpretations of a condit-
ional r u l e , i t should be equally v a l i d on a l l four rules. Thus i f 
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MT affixmation i s a function of ' l o g i c a l ' behaviour, then MT 
responses should be associated across the four rules ( i . e . those 
subjects affirming a high frequency of MT on one rule should do so 
on another r u l e ) . This was tested (by median tests) and found to 
be the case. However, MT responses were also found to be associated 
with AC and DA responses on other rules and, s i m i l a r l y , there was 
a strong association between a l l three inferences on each particular 
rule (the relevant analyses are tabulated i n Appendix B ) . What these 
re s u l t s appear to reveal i s that subjects have d i f f e r e n t i a l 
tendencies to a f f i r m conclusions. 
I f l o g i c a l consistency across rule forms i s to be 
investigated, t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l tendency to a f f i r m conclusions must 
be controlled f o r . One method of accomplishing t h i s i s to express, 
f o r each subject, on each r u l e , frequencies of affirmation as a 
proportion of a l l affirmations by that subject on that r u l e . 
This expresses the extent to which each conclusion i s affirmed 
r e l a t i v e to other conclusions. I f subjects ciffirm MT f o r l o g i c a l 
reasons, then subjects who a f f i r m r e l a t i v e l y (to other conclusions) 
more MT conclusions on one rule should a f f i r m r e l a t i v e l y more MT 
conclusions on another r u l e . 
The data were transformed i n the manner described ahove 
(the convention 0/0=0 being adopted) and median tests on MT 
affirmation across rules were carried out. The results of these 
tests are shown i n Table 5*^ . 
The data of Table 3 A reveal no evidence of a 
consistent positive relationship between MT affirmation on one 
rule and MT affirmation on other rules. 
162-
Table 5.4 
Comparison (by Median Tests) o'f MT Conclusions on one Rule with MT Conclusions on Other Rules 
(Data from Experiment 1, Expressed as a Proportion of a l l Affirmations on that Rule.) 
ON 
RULE FORM 
COMPARISON 
BOTH ABOVE 
MEDIAN 
FIRST 
ABOVE MEDIAN 
SECOND 
MEDIAN OR 
BELOW 
FIRST 
MEDIAN OR 
BELOW 
SECOND 
ABOVE MEDIAN 
BOTH 
MEDIAN OR 
BELOW 
AA v AN 
AA v NA 
AA V NN 
AN V NA 
AN V NN 
NA v.NN 
7 
6 
8 
3 
6 
10 
6 
7 
5 
15 
12 
9 
11 
13 
12 
16 
m-
10 
16 
14 
15 
6 
8 
11 
+ 0.44 
0.00 
+ 0.68 
- 3.21 
- 1.59 
0.00 
Average Z 0.61 
DISCUSSION 
Subjects affiimed s i g n i f i c a n t l y more conclusions with 
negative consequents and t h i s f i n d i n g i s a p a r a l l e l of the conclusion 
bias r e s u l t s of Evans (1972b and 1977a). Evans (1977a) also observed 
higher frequencies of AC responses when the minor premiss was 
affirmative. This l a t t e r f i n d i n g was extended i n the present study, 
as subjects affirmed more AC, and MT, conclusions having affirmative 
antecedents. 
There are thus apparently two *nonlogical' effects of 
pol a r i t y mediating responses: a preference f o r conclusions having 
negative consequents and a preference f o r conclusions having 
affirmative antecedents. The bases of these biases are not at present 
known. However, on the basis of the re s u l t s of t h i s experiment, i t 
appeared possible that they r e f l e c t a h e u r i s t i c that majcimises the 
subjects' chances of accepting statements that are un l i k e l y to be 
proved wrong. The larger the class of event to which a statement 
refers, and the more specific i t s predictions, the more p o t e n t i a l l y 
f a l s i f i a b l e the statement. Thus, i n most non-binary situations, a 
preference f o r affirmative antecedents and negative consequents would 
produce less p o t e n t i a l l y f a l s i f i a b l e statements, that r e f e r to 
a small class of events (the specific antecedent value) and make 
nonspecific predictions (that anything but the specific consequent 
value w i l l be the case). For instance, a statement such as ' i f 
P then not 7* can only be f a l s i f i e d by the concurrence of P and 7i 
whereas the statement ' i f not P then 7' can be f a l s i f i e d i n many 
ways. In conditions of uncertainty about the content, subjects 
may have learned that the former type of statement i s 'safer* to 
adopt. 
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There i s l i t t l e evidence that l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y 
played a role i n mediating responses. The strong association 
between a l l conclusion types, across a l l forms of major premiss, 
indicates that subjects d i f f e r i n t h e i r tendency to a f f i r m a 
given conclusion, but t h i s difference i s u n l i k e l y to have a 
' l o g i c a l ' substrate. The highest, and most consistent, 
associations appear to be between MT and DA (see tables i n 
Appendix B) and i t would be very d i f f i c u l t to construct an 
' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l ' explanation of ihis f i n d i n g . 
The analysis of consistency i n MT responses across 
the four rules, shown i n Table 5.4, controlled for t h i s 
d i f f e r e n t i a l tendency to a f f i r m conclusions. There i s clearly 
no evidence of a consistent positive relationship between MT 
af f i r m a t i o n on one rule and another, and thus no evidence that 
MT affirmation results from an appreciation of i t s l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y . 
One aspect of the r e s u l t s of experiment 1 that 
might be considered evidence of subjects* l o g i c a l a b i l i t y i s 
the very low frequency of (erroneous) a f f i r m a t i o n of the other 
(four) i n v a l i d conclusions offered, which were affirmed on only 
1,7% of occasions. These alternatives have a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n -
ship with MP, MT AC and DA and may be referred to as t h e i r 
opposites. This relationship i s shown f o r the AA rule i n 
Table 5.5. 
The relationship shown i n Table 5.5 can be easily 
extended to inferences expressed i n the form of conditional 
statements. For instance, the contrapositive opposite i s ' i f 
not Q then P*. 
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Table 5.5 
The Relationship Between the MP, MT, AC and DA Inferences and t h e i r 
Opposites on the Conditional Rule; ' I f P then Q' 
INFERENCE FORM OPPOSIIE FORM 
_ INFERENCE 
MP Inf e r Q, given P MP (O) • Inf e r 'not Q', 
given P 
MT Infer 'not P', MT (O) Infer P, 
given 'not Q' given 'not Q' 
AC Infer P given Q AC (O) Infer 'not P'. 
given Q 
DA In f e r 'not Q', DA (O) Inf e r Q, 
given 'not P' given 'not P' 
As may be seen from Table 5.5i i f MP, MT, AC or DA are 
considered true then t h e i r opposites should be 
considered false and, i f they are considered indeterminate, then 
t h e i r opposites should also be considered indeterminate. In f a c t , 
these 'opposites' have been used by various workers as d i r e c t 
measures of the four inferences (e.g. Evans, 1972c, Roberge, 1971^» 
Taplin, 1971, Taplin & Staudenmayer, 1973). This use has rested 
on an assumption that subjects reason consistently. However, 
inferences that are l o g i c a l l y equivalent are not necessarily 
psychologically equivalent. For instance, although l o g i c a l l y related 
AC affirm a t i o n cannot be used as a d i r e c t measure of DA affirmation. 
I t would thus be of inte r e s t to investigate these 
'opposites' i n more d e t a i l , as the design of experiment 1 did not 
allow subjects to evaluate them as either 'false' or 'indeterminate'. 
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Accordingly, the experiment was repeated, asking subjects to respond 
'true* (a t i c k ) , 'false* (a cross) or 'neither' (a question mark) 
to each conclusion. Apart from providing a r e p l i c a t i o n of the 
res u l t s of experiment 1, t h i s design allows f o r the following 
additional tests; 
1) I f subjects understand the l o g i c a l relationship 
between a conclusion and i t s opposite, then, i f they 
evaluate a conclusion as *true*, they should evaluate 
i t s opposite asTalse*, and, i f they evaluate a 
conclusion as 'indeterminate', they should evaluate 
i t s opposite as 'indeterminate*. Thus an association 
would be expected between 'true' responses on MT, AC 
and DA and 'false* responses on MT (O), AC (O) and 
DA (O) respectively. 
2) As MT (O) i s i n v a l i d on any in t e r p r e t a t i o n of the major 
premiss, then, i f MT (O) denial i s a function of * l o g i c a l 
behaviour, such denials should be associated across 
the four rules. The influence of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y can 
thus be investigated by testing (with suitable control 
f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l tendencies to a f f i n n or deny) f o r 
consistency across the four rules i n the case of both 
MT and MT (o). 
3) I f the effects of p o l a r i t y of antecedent and consequent 
of conclusion, observed i n experiment 1, are the res-
ult a n t ~ o f a preference f o r less f a l s i f i a b l e statements 
(as suggested above), then subjects would be expected 
to respond *false', more often to statements that are 
more f a l s i f i a b l e (than others). The broader the 
referent, and the more specific the prediction, the 
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more f a l s i f i a b l e the statement and thus more 
denial of 'opposite* conclusions having negative 
antecedents, and affirmative consequents, would be 
expected. 
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EXIERIMENT 2 
METHOD 
This experiment used i d e n t i c a l t e s t booklets to 
those used i n experiment 1 and again used 40 undergraduates at 
Plymouth Polytechnic as subjects on a paid volunteer basis. 
The only difference was that, on the ins t r u c t i o n page 
of the booklet, subjects were requested to put a t i c k by any 
statement that they thought necessarily true i f the key statement 
was truBt a cross by any statement that they thoiight necessarily 
false and a question mark by a statement i f they thought i t to be 
neither necessarily true nor false. A copy of the in s t r u c t i o n 
page i s shown i n Appendix A. 
RESULTS 
The percentage frequencies of responses on a l l seven 
conclusions i s shown i n Table 5-6, Again, i t should be noted 
that, as i n Table 5«3» the column headings refer to the form of 
conclusion evaluated and not to the form of the rule from which the 
conclusion i s drawn. 
Results of ANOVA on 'True' Responses 
As i n experiment 1, a three-way analysis of variance 
was performed on affirmation ('true' responses) of MT, AC and 
DA conclusions. 
There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of conclusion type 
(p < 0.01). Across a l l rules, subjects affirmed AC on 31% of 
occasions, MT on 62% of occasions and DA on 5^% of occasions. Paired 
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comparisons showed that subjects affirmed s i g n i f i c a n t l y more 
AC than MT (p < O.Ol), or DA (p O.Ol), conclusions. There 
was no s i g n i f i c a n t difference between frequencies of MT and DA 
affirmation. However, the l a t t e r comparison was s i g n i f i c a n t i n 
experiment 1 and, on the basis of the two studies, i t i s reasonable 
to conclude that subjects tend to a f f i r m more AC than MT, and more 
MT than DA, conclusions. 
Table 5.6 
Percentage Frequencies of T, F and ? Evaluations of a l l Seven 
Conclusions i n Experiment 2, Analysed by Form of Conclusion Evaluated 
FORM OF CONCLUSION EVALUATED 
INFERENCE T 
AA 
F 7 T 
AN 
F 7 T 
NA 
F 9 T 
NN 
F ? 
MT 52 14 34 76 11 13 42 14 44 77 4 19 
AC 84 2 13 87 2 11 61 6 33 91 3 6 
DA 53 13 34 66 11 22 29 15 56 75 6 19 
MP (0) 2 96 2 2 96 1 0 89 11 4 79 1? 
MT (0) 1 93 6 5 72 23 2 86 12 11 54 35 
AC (0) 2 90 7 4 82 14 3 72 24 6 52 42 
DA (0) 4 84 12 5 69 26 2 76 22 4 44 52 
As i n experiment 1, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t 
of consequent p o l a r i t y , such that subjects affirmed s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
more conclusions having negative consequents (p <• 0.01), 
However, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n between consequent 
p o l a r i t y and conclusion type (p < 0.05). This i n t e r a c t i o n i s 
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shown i n figure 2A. The s i g n i f i c a n t interaction i s possibly due 
to the apparently weaker e f f e c t of consequent p o l a r i t y on AC 
conclusions. However, the e f f e c t of consequent p o l a r i t y was 
s i g n i f i c a n t on a l l three conclusion types. 
As i n experiment 1, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t main 
e f f e c t of antecedent p o l a r i t y , such that subjects affirmed si g -
n i f i c a n t l y more conclusions having affirmative antecedents (p < 0,01) 
However, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t interaction between antecedent, and 
consequent, p o l a r i t y . This interaction i s readily apparent from 
figures 2B and 2C. There was no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t of antecedent 
p o l a r i t y on conclusions having negative consequents (figure 2C). 
Reanalysis of the results of experiment 1 showed that a similar 
r e s u l t obtained, although the interaction between antecedent and 
consequent p o l a r i t y was not s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Results of ANOVA on 'False' Responses 
A three-way analysis of variance was performed on 
denial ('false* responses) of MP (O), MT (o), AC (O) and DA (o) 
conclusions. 
There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of conclusion type 
(p < 0,01). Across a l l rules, subjects denied MP (O) on 90% of 
occasions, MT (o) on 76^ of occasions, AC (O) on 7^-% of occasions 
and DA (O) on 68% of occasions. Paired comparisons showed that 
subjects denied s i g n i f i c a n t l y more MP (O), than any other type of 
conclusion. No other comparisons were s i g n i f i c a n t . 
There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of consequent 
p o l a r i t y , such that subjects denied s i g n i f i c a n t l y more conclusions 
having affirmative consequents. This accords with the hypothesis 
that subjects would prefer to deny conclusions that make specific, 
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a f f i r m a t i v e , predictions. However, as i n the case of 'true' 
responses, there was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n between consequent 
p o l a r i t y and conclusion type (p <. 0.01), This interaction i s 
shown i n figure 3A. The interaction appears to be due to two 
factors. F i r s t l y that the e f f e c t of consequent p o l a r i t y was not 
s i g n i f i c a n t on MP (O) conclusions and, secondly, that the e f f e c t 
appears to be weaker (although s i g n i f i c a n t ) on AC (O) conclusions. 
There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t of antecedent 
p o l a r i t y , such that subjects denied more conclusions having 
aiffirmative antecedents (p 0,01), This f i n d i n g i s not i n 
accordance with the hypothesis that subjects would prefer to deny 
(more f a l s i f i a b l e ) statements that have 'broad* ( i . e . negative) 
referents. As i n the case of 'true' responses, there was a s i g -
n i f i c a n t i nteraction between the effects of antecedent, and consequent, 
p o l a r i t y (p < O . O 5 ) , This interaction may be inferred from figures 
3B and 3C. The e f f e c t of antecedent p o l a r i t y i s clearly stronger 
f o r conclusions having negative consequents. Thus, as f o r 'true* 
responses, antecedent p o l a r i t y has a greater e f f e c t when the 
consequent p o l a r i t y does not favour the response. However, f o r 
•false* responses, separate analyses showed that the e f f e c t of 
antecedent p o l a r i t y was s i g n i f i c a n t on conclusions having negative 
and conclusions having aff i r m a t i v e , consequents. 
I t i s worth noting that the e f f e c t of antecedent p o l a r i t y 
appeared to be stronger on *false*, than on 'true', responses 
(F = 48,255 compared with F = 9.416). 
Chi-Squared Analyses 
Associations between evaluation of a conclusion as 'true' 
and i t s 'opposite' as 'false', were compared by median tests on each 
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o f the f o u r r u l e forms and a f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s was conducted across 
a l l f o u r forms of r u l e . As i n experiment 1, subjects' response t o 
a given conclusion was expressed i n terms of a percentage o f 
t o t a l 'true* ( o r ' f a l s e * i n the case of opposite conclusions) 
responses, by t h a t s u b j e c t , on t h a t r u l e , (the ^ = 0 convention was 
not necessary i n t h i s experiment). The r e s u l t s of the median t e s t s 
are shown i n Table 5«7 . 
A r e l a t i o n s h i p between MT and MT .(O) and DA and DA (O) 
conclusions i s c l e a r l y apparent from Table 5'7« ^OT these two 
comparisons, there i s a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n on each of the f o u r 
r u l e s and, although i n most cases these a s s o c i a t i o n s do not reach 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , a n a l y s i s across a l l f o u r r u l e s y i e l d s a s i g n i f i c a n t 
a s s o c i a t i o n i n both cases (p < 0.03, t w o - t a i l e d ) . However, no such 
r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between AC and AC (O). 
As data are expressed as a p r o p o r t i o n o f t o t a l 
conclusions a f f i r m e d (or denied), data from each conclusion type 
are not independent w i t h i n a f f i r m a t i o n or d e n i a l , and thus 
s t a t i s t i c a l comparisons cannot be made between (MT, AC and DA) 
conclusions, or between 'opposite' conclusions. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
t o note, however, t h a t only f i v e subjects were c l a s s i f i e d as above 
median (across a l l f o u r r u l e s ) on both DA and AC or on both MT and 
AC, whereas 15 subjects were c l a s s i f i e d as above median on both MT 
and DA. This l a t t e r r e s u l t would y i e l d a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e 
a s s o c i a t i o n i f t e s t e d by chi-squared, although such a t e s t would be 
t e c h n i c a l l y i n v a l i d . However, the v i o l a t i o n of the chi-squared 
assumption of independence should^ on these data, favour negative 
a s s o c i a t i o n s and increase the l i k e l i h o o d o f a Type 2 e r r o r when 
- — 2 t e s t i n g p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
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Table 5.7 
Comparison of "True* Responses t o Conclusions w i t h 'False' Responses t o t h e i r Opposites, on each 
of the Four Rules i n Experiment 2. (Data f o r each Conclusion expressed as a p r o p o r t i o n of a l l 
A f f i r m a t i o n s or Denials on t h a t Rule. 
COMPARISON RUIE 
MT V MT (O) 
ON I AC V AC (0) 
DA V DA (O) 
BOTH 
ABOVE 
1st ABOVE 
MEDIAN 
1st MEDIAN 
OR BELOW 
BOTH 
MEDIAN 
MEDIAN 2nd MEDIAN 2nd ABOVE OR BELOW 
- • - MEDIAN OR BELOW 
IF P THEN Q 5 3 8 2k + 1.60 
I F P THEN NOT Q 13 6 7 Ik + 1.90 
I F NOT P THEN Q 13 7 6 14 + 1.90 
IF NOT P THEN NOT Q 11 7 8 Ik + 1.24 
ACROSS ALL RULES Ik 6 6 Ik + 2.21 
IF P THEN Q 7 9 12 12 - 0 .06 
I F P THEN NOT Q 8 6 12 Ik + 0 .33 
I F NOT P THEN Q 10 8 9 13 + 0.60 
I F NOT P THEN NOT Q 6 13 12 9 - 1 .30 
ACROSS ALL RULES 10 10 10 10 0.00 
IF P THEN Q 12 8 7 13 + 1.27 
IF P THEN NOT Q 13 7 6 Ik + 1 .90 
I F NOT P THEN Q 10 10 8 12 + 0.32 
I F NOT P THEN NOT Q 14 6 e' Ik + 2.21 
ACROSS ALL RUIES IJ^ 6 6 Ik + 2.21 
There i s thus q u i t e good i n d i c a t i o n t h a t , even when 
d i f f e r e n t i a l tendencies t o a f f i r m statements are c o n t r o l l e d f o r , 
there i s a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between a f f i r m a t i o n o f MT and DA. 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s compatible w i t h the suggestion made i n 
experiment 1 t h a t , when the raw (untransformed) frequencies are 
considered, the as s o c i a t i o n s between MT and DA appear, i n general, 
t o be somewhat stronger, and more c o n s i s t e n t , than those between 
MT and AC or those between DA and AC. 
F i n a l l y , the consistency of MT a f f i r m a t i o n , and MT (o) 
d e n i a l , across r u l e s may be considered. The a s s o c i a t i o n between MT 
a f f i r m a t i o n across r u l e s was t e s t e d as i n experiment 1, and the 
r e s u l t s are shown i n Table 5-8. As the same n u l l hypothesis was 
tes t e d i n both experiments, the ta b l e shows the Z values obtained 
from both experiments, together w i t h an estimate o f the combined Z 
value c a l c u l a t e d by the S t o u f f e r method. ^ 
Across the two studi e s , there i s no i n d i c a t i o n of a 
cons i s t e n t p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between MT a f f i r m a t i o n across a l l 
r u l e s . There i s one s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n , between MT 
a f f i r m a t i o n on NA and NN r u l e s , (p < 0,02, t w o - t a i l e d ) , but there 
i s also one s i g n i f i c a n t negative a s s o c i a t i o n , between MT a f f i r m a t i o n 
on AN and NA r u l e s , (p < 0.03, t w o - t a i l e d ) . I t should be noted, 
however, t h a t there are a s u f f i c i e n t number o f hi g h Z values t o 
i n d i c a t e t h a t MT a f f i r m a t i o n s are not independent o f MT a f f i n n a t i o n s 
on other r u l e s . 
As MT (O) i s eq u a l l y i n v a l i d on a l l possible i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n s o f a c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e , s i m i l a r t e s t s f o r l o g i c a l c o n s i s t -
ency may also be performed on t h i s i n f e r e n c e . The r e s u l t s of such 
t e s t s axe shown i n Table 5 .9 . As f o r MT a f f i r m a t i o n , although there 
i s one s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n (between MT (O) d e n i a l on NA and 
NN r u l e s , p < 0.03, t w o - t a i l e d ) , there i s no i n d i c a t i o n of a c o n s i s t e n t 
p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between MT (O) d e n i a l across the f o u r r u l e s 
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Table 5>8 
Comparison (By Median Tests) o f A f f i r m a t i o n of MT on one Rule w i t h A f f i r m a t i o n o f MT on Other 
RuleB (Data--from Experiment 2, expressed as a p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l a f f i r m a t i o n s on t h a t r u l e ) 
Together w i t h Z Values Obtained i n Experiment 1 and Combined Estimate o f Z Values. 
RULE FORM 
COMPARISON 
BOTH 
ABOVE 
MEDIAN 
1st ABOVE 
MEDIAN 
1st MEDIAN 
OR BELOW 
2nd MEDIAN 2nd ABOVE 
OR BELOW MEDIAN 
BOTH 
MEDIAN 
OR BELOW 
Z VALUE Z VALUE 
EXPERIMENT 1 
COMBINED 
OBTAINED IN ESTIMATE 
OF Z 
CO 
I 
AA V AN 
AA V NA 
AA V NN 
AN V. NA 
AN V NN 
NA V NN 
Average Z 
7 
3 
5 
10 
10 
15 
12 
1? 
13 
10 
8 
3 
20 + 2.1-^ + OM + 1.82 
15 - OAO 0.00 - 0.28 
19 + 0.72 + 0.68 + 0.99 
11 0.00 - 3.21 - 2.27 
13 + 0.60 - 1.59 - 0.70 
17 + 3.50 0.00 + 2.il7 
+ 1.09 - 0.61 + o.> 
Table 5-9 
Comparison (By Median Tests) o f Denial o f MT (O^ on one Rule w i t h Denial o f MT (O) on Other Rules 
Data from Experiment 2, Expressed as a ProBortion o f a l l Denials on t h a t Rule. 
RULE FORM BOTH ABOVE 
COMPARISON MEDIAN 
I AA V AN 
AA V NA 
AA V NN 
AN V NA 
AN V NN 
NA V NN 
Average Z 
7 
7 
6 
7 
11 
13 
1st ABOVE 
MEDIAN 
2nd MEDIAN 
OR BELOW 
6 
6 
7 
13 
9 
6 
1st MEDIAN 
OR BELOW 
2nd ABOVE 
MEDIAN 
13 
12 
13 
12 
8 
6 
BOTH MEDIAN 
OR BELOW 
14 
15 
14 
8 
12 
15 
0.00 
+ 0.22 
0.00 
- 1.27 
+ 0.63 
+ 2.20 
+ 0.30 
DISCUSSION 
Main E f f e c t s of P o l a r i t y 
I n both experiments 1 and 2, subjects a f f i r m e d more 
MT, AC and DA conclusions having negative consequents and more such 
conclusions having a f f i r m a t i v e antecedents. The e f f e c t o f 
consequent p o l a r i t y was s i g n i f i c a n t on a l l three types o f 
conclusion, i n both experiments. The e f f e c t of antecedent p o l a r i t y 
was s i g n i f i c a n t only f o r AC and MT i n experiment 1, but was 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r DA i n experiment 2. I t i s thus reasonable t o 
conclude t h a t both p o l a r i t y o f antecedent and consequent a f f e c t s 
the a f f i r m a t i o n o f a l l three conclusions. I n both experiments, 
however, there was no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f antecedent when the 
consequent was negative. 
I n experiment 2, subjects denied more 'opposite* 
conclusions having a f f i r m a t i v e consequents and more such conclusions 
having a f f i r m a t i v e antecedents. These e f f e c t s of p o l a r i t y were 
s i g n i f i c a n t on a l l f o u r conclusions except MP (O), f o r which the 
e f f e c t o f consequent p o l a r i t y was not s i g n i f i c a n t . 
I n the d i s c u s s i o n o f experiment 1, the hypothesis was 
developed t h a t the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y on a f f i r m a t i o n are the r e s u l t 
o f a preference f o r less f a l s i f i a b l e statements. That i s , 
statements t h a t have narrow ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) r e f e r e n t s and t h a t make 
non s p e c i f i c (negative) p r e d i c t i o n s . This hypothesis can e x p l a i n 
why subjects c i f f i r m more conclusions having a f f i r m a t i v e ante-
cedents and more conclusions having negative consequents. On the 
basis o f t h i s hypothesis, i t was presumed t h a t subjects would 
d i s p l a y a preference f o r d e n i a l o f more f a l s i f i a b l e statements. 
That i s , statements t h a t have broad (negative) r e f e r e n t s and t h a t 
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make s p e c i f i c ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) p r e d i c t i o n s . Accordingly, i t was 
pred i c t e d t h a t subjects would deny more conclusions having negative 
antecedents, and more conclusions having a f f i r m a t i v e consequents. 
The f i r s t o f these p r e d i c t i o n s was disconfirmed, as subjects denied 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more conclusions having a f f i r m a t i v e antecedents. 
However, somewhat u n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t was r e a l i s e d i n 
r e t r o s p e c t t h a t t h i s (disconfirmed) p r e d i c t i o n d i d not f o l l o w from 
the hypothesis. I t i s t r u e t h a t statements w i t h broad r e f e r e n t s 
are more f a l s i f i a b l e , than statements w i t h narrow r e f e r e n t s , but 
the d e n i a l o f statements w i t h broad r e f e r e n t s i s also more f a l s i f i -
able than the d e n i a l o f statements w i t h narrow r e f e r e n t s . I n e f f e c t 
d e n i a l o f a statement merely reverses the p o l a r i t y o f the consequent 
For instance, t o s t a t e t h a t ' i t i s not the case t h a t , i f not P 
then Q', i s e q u i v a l e n t (presuming d e f e c t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n ) t o s t a t i n g 
t h a t ' i f not P then not Q' . 
I f subjects are attempting t o make de c i s i o n s t h a t 
are l e a s t l i k e l y t o be wrong, they thus should tend t o avoid both 
a f f i r m a t i o n and d e n i a l of statements w i t h negative antecedents 
( i . e . w i t h broad r e f e r e n t s ) , and the data from experiment 2 are 
co n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s 'caution* hypothesis. I n summary, t h i s e f f e c t 
of 'caution' may be seen as operating i n the f o l l o w i n g two ways: 
1) Subjects tend t o avoid making any p r e d i c t i o n about 
statements w i t h broad ( n e g a t i v e ) r e f e r e n t s . I n most 
non-binaxy s i t u a t i o n s , such statements provide more 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the p r e d i c t i o n t o be te s t e d (and thus 
more o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the p r e d i c t i o n t o be disconfirmed). 
2) I n most non-binary s i t u a t i o n s , negative p r e d i c t i o n s 
are l e s s s p e c i f i c than a f f i r m a t i v e p r e d i c t i o n s . Sub-
j e c t s may thus be seen as a f f i r m i n g more, and denying 
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l e s s , statements making n o n s p e c i f i c , than s p e c i f i c , 
p r e d i c t i o n s . Nonspecific p r e d i c t i o n s , when t e s t e d , 
are more l i k e l y t o be confirmed. 
However, there are a l t e r n a t i v e ' l o g i c a l ' explanations 
t h a t must be considered. 
For each conclusion, i t s opposite w i l l have the same 
p o l a r i t y o f antecedent and the opposite p o l a r i t y of consequent. 
For instance, on the AA r u l e , the MT conclusion has a negative 
antecedent and a negative consequent ( * i f not Q then not P*), 
whereas the MT (o) conclusion has a negative antecedent and an 
a f f i r m a t i v e consequent ( ' i f not Q then P*), Thus, given the 
d i r e c t i o n o f the p o l a r i t y e f f e c t s , i f they are i n favour o f a 
conclusion, they w i l l also be i n f a v o i i r o f i t s opposite. 
I t could thus q u i t e reasonably be objected t h a t e f f e c t s 
o f antecedent and consequent p o l a r i t y are not n o n l o g i c a l biases, 
but simply ^ r e f l e c t the f a c t t h a t there i s a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between a f f i r m i n g a conclusion.and denying i t s opposite. The 
s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n s between a f f i r m a t i o n of MT and d e n i a l o f 
MT (O), and between a f f i r m a t i o n o f DA and d e n i a l o f DA (O), support 
the idea t h a t subjects d i d perceive the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between conclusions and t h e i r opposites. 
However, although apparent n o n l o g i c a l e f f e c t s of p o l -
a r i t y on * f a l s e * responses may be explained i n terms of a perceived 
l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between conclusions and t h e i r ' o p p o s i t e s , t h i s 
cannot e x p l a i n p o l a r i t y e f f e c t s on 't r u e * responses, Further, 
i n chapter 2 i t has been pointed out t h a t no ( * l o g i c a l ' ) 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l explanation of the e f f e c t s of p o l a r i t y on 'tru e ' 
responses i s p o s s i b l e , f o r two main reasons: 
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1) Differences i n MT a f f i r m a t i o n cannot be explained, 
2) The e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y of conclusion apply t o d i f f e r e n t 
r u l e forms i n the case o f AC than they do i n the case 
of DA, but i t i s impossible t o co n s t r u c t an i n t e r p r e t -
a t i o n a l theory i n which the v a l i d i t y o f AC does not 
•move' w i t h the v a l i d i t y o f DA. 
Thus, as there i s good reason t o view the c o n s i s t e n t 
e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y of conclusion on ' t r u e ' responses as n o n l o g i c a l , 
there are two possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y 
on both ' t r u e ' and ' f a l s e ' responses, as f o l l o w s : 
NONLOGICAL As st a t e d e a r l i e r 
(SEMI) LOGICAL That n o n l o g i c a l biases a f f e c t ' t r u e ' 
responses but not ' f a l s e * responses, 
which are determined by an apprec-
i a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
a conclusion and i t s opposite. 
The second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n l a c k s parsimony and appears 
t o assume t h a t subjects make ' f a l s e ' responses a f t e r making ' t r u e ' 
responses. I t i s thus argued t h a t , t o be acceptable, a ( ' l o g i c a l ' ) 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y on ' f a l s e ' responses, as 
s o l e l y due t o the subjects* a p p r e c i a t i o n of the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between a conclusion and i t s opposite, would need t o also present 
a v i a b l e ' l o g i c a l ' e x p lanation o f the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y on ' t r u e ' 
responses. 
As i t appears t h i no such explanation i s po s s i b l e , i t 
i s concluded t h a t ' f a l s e ' responses are not simply a 'mirror image* 
of ' t r u e ' responses, determined by the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between them, but t h a t . n o n l o g i c a l e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y a f f e c t both 
' t r u e ' and ' f a l s e ' responses. I n f a c t , the e f f e c t o f antecedent 
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p o l a r i t y appears stronger on ' f a l s e ' responses. 
I m p l i c a t i o n s o f the Results o f the Chi-Squared Analyses 
I f a subject a f f i r m s r e l a t i v e l y more MT (than o t h e r ) 
conclusions, or denies r e l a t i v e l y more MT (O) conclusions, due t o 
an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e i r l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y ( o r i n v a l i d i t y ) , then 
t h i s behaviour should be c o n s i s t e n t across the f o u r r u l e s . That 
i s , i f c e r t a i n subjects understand the l o g i c a l necessity o f MT, 
then these subjects should c o n s i s t e n t l y a f f i r m r e l a t i v e l y more MT, 
and deny r e l a t i v e l y more MT (O), than other subjects. However, 
c o n t r o l l i n g f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l tendencies t o a f f i r m , the t e s t s of 
consistency i n MT a f f i r m a t i o n across the f o u r - r u l e s s t r o n g l y suggest 
t h a t MT a f f i r m a t i o n i s not mediated by an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f i t s 
l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . 
I t i s n o t i c e a b l e , however, t h a t there i s a s i g n i f i c a j i t 
p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between MT a f f i r m a t i o n on the NA and NN r u l e s , 
and a near s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between MT a f f i r m a t i o n 
on the AA and AN r u l e s (p ^  O.O7). I n both cases, consequent 
p o l a r i t y - h a s the sajne e f f e c t on both r u l e s . However, there i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t negative a s s o c i a t i o n between MT a f f i r m a t i o n on NA and 
AN r u l e s . P o l a r i t y o f both antecedent and consequent favours MT 
a f f i r m a t i o n on the AN r u l e and i s against MT a f f i r m a t i o n on the 
NA r u l e . 
Thus, although p r o v i d i n g no evidence o f l o g i c a l 
consistency, the data provide some i n d i c a t i o n o f consistency i n 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o the e f f e c t s of p o l a r i t y . No ' l o g i c a l ' e x p lanation 
could cope w i t h a negative a s s o c i a t i o n , as how could a s u b j e c t , who 
i s more l i k e l y (than others) t o appreciate the v a l i d i t y o f MT on 
one r u l e , be l e s s l i k e l y t o appreciate i t s v a l i d i t y on another r u l e ? 
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However, i f a subject was more susceptible t o the e f f e c t s of 
p o l a r i t y than other s u b j e c t s , he would be expected t o be more 
l i k e l y (than other s ubjects) t o a f f i r m MT conclusions on the AN r u l e , 
when both e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y favour a f f i r m a t i o n , and t o be l e s s 
l i k e l y t o a f f i r m MT conclusions on the NA r u l e , when both e f f e c t s 
o f p o l a r i t y a c t against a f f i r m a t i o n . Also, as the e f f e c t of 
consequent p o l a r i t y i s stronger than t h a t o f antecedent p o l a r i t y , 
h i s responses would be expected t o be p o s i t i v e l y associated on 
conclusions having the sajne p o l a r i t y o f consequent. 
The idea t h a t subjects are c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y thus accounts f o r the main 
( p o s i t i v e and negative) a s s o c i a t i o n s observed between MT a f f i r m a t i o n 
on d i f f e r e n t r u l e s . The t e s t s o f a s s o c i a t i o n between MT (O) d e n i a l 
on d i f f e r e n t r u l e s y i e l d somewhat weaker support f o r t h i s i n t e r p r -
e t a t i o n ( f o r instance, given the n o n s i g n i f i c a n t negative a s s o c i a t i o n 
between MT(0) d e n i a l on AN and NA r u l e s ) but again y i e l d no 
evidence of l o g i c a l consistency. 
I f s ubjects are c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o 
the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y , then t h i s i s c l e a r l y an a l t e r n a t i v e 
e xplanation o f the as s o c i a t i o n s between MT a f f i r m a t i o n and MT (O) 
d e n i a l , and between DA a f f i r m a t i o n and DA (O) d e n i a l , which may 
w e l l not have been due to an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between a conclusion and i t s opposite. For instance, subjects who 
are more l i k e l y t o a f f i r m MT when i t s consequent i s negative, nay 
be more l i k e l y t o deny MT (O) when i t s consequent i s a f f i r m a t i v e , 
simply because they are more susc e p t i b l e t o the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y . 
Admittedly, i f subjects are c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o the e f f e c t s of p o l a r i t y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
e x p l a i n why AC a f f i r m a t i o n was not associated w i t h AC (O) d e n i a l . 
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However, t h i s problem equally a p p l i e s t o the argument t h a t subjects 
perceive a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between conclusions and t h e i r opp-
o s i t e s , A possible explanation of the l a c k of a s s o c i a t i o n between 
AC a f f i r m a t i o n and AC (o) d e n i a l w i l l be considered l a t e r . 
Preferences f o r A f f i r m a t i o n or Denial o f the D i f f e r e n t Conclusions 
Although the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y appear t o be non-
l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , there i s evidence o f the apparent e f f e c t o f l o g i c a l 
f a c t o r s on the data. Subjects showed a stron g tendency t o a f f i r m 
MT." AC and DA and t o deny MT (O), AC'(O), and DA (O) and, i f they 
d i d not make these e v a l u a t i o n s , they u s u a l l y evaluated these 
conclusions as 'indeterminate'. Subjects thus appear t o be f a i r l y 
capable o f determining t h a t MT, AC and DA are not ' f a l s e ' and t h a t 
MP (O)., MT (O), AC (O) and DA (o) are not ' t r u e ' . However, the 
amount o f a p p r e c i a t i o n of l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s i s 
debatable. ' " 
There was some divergence from t h i s p a t t e r n . For 
instance, MT, which was evaluated as indeterminate on 27-3?^ of 
occasions, was denied .on 10,8% of occasions. 
Main E f f e c t s o f Inference 
I n both experiments, suojects a f f i r m e d more AC than 
MT., and more: MT"tHan DA;, conclusions.^ I t would p o s s i b l y be 
expected t h a t a main e f f e c t o f conclusion type would be evidence 
f o r the e f f e c t o f l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . However, t h a t subjects a f f i r m 
f a r more AC than MT and DA, i s almost impossible t o i n t e r p r e t i n 
t h i s way. 
As has been mentioned, the highest AC frequencies 
are not yielded- by the same r u l e s as y i e l d the highest DA frequencies. 
Given t h i s , and the much higher frequency o f AC, than DA, a f f i r m a t i o n s . 
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i t would be very d i f f i c u l t t o a t t r i b u t e AC a f f i r m a t i o n t o a 
perception^ o f the c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e as i m p l y i n g equivalence, I n 
any case, as AC can never be more v a l i d than MT, the higher f r e q u -
ency of AG, than MT, a f f i r m a t i o n does not appear t o be e x p l i c a b l e 
i n terms of a ' l o g i c a l ' theory. 
One possible e x p l a n a t i o n , of the strong tendency t o 
a f f i r m AC, i s t h a t i t represents an exact restatement o f the terms 
of the major premiss ( i n a d i f f e r e n t o r d e r ) . This explanation i s 
of p a r t i c u l a r use, as apart from e x p l a i n i n g the higher frequencies 
of AC a f f i r m a t i o n s , i t i s able t o e x p l a i n c e r t a i n other anomalies 
i n the data. F i r s t l y , i t would e x p l a i n why subjects a f f i r m e d more 
AC, than MT, conclusions but d i d not deny more AC (O), than MT (O) 
conclusions. AC a f f i r m a t i o n , but not AC (O) d e n i a l , i s mediated 
by one e x t r a favourable f a c t o r ( i . e . t h a t i t r e s t a t e s the terms of 
the major premiss) than i s the a f f i r m a t i o n or d e n i a l o f any other 
conclusion type (except MP). Thus, although subjects a f f i r m more 
AC thaji MT, there i s no reason why they should deny more AC (O) 
than MT (O). Secondly, as there i s no comparable f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g 
AC (O) d e n i a l , i t would e x p l a i n the lack o f a s s o c i a t i o n between AC 
a f f i r m a t i o n and AC (O) d e n i a l . 
This hypothesis would also e x p l a i n an apparent 
discrepancy between data from inference and t r u t h t a b l e tasks. 
Subjects appear t o i n t e r p r e t the c o n d i t i o n a l as i m p l y i n g equivalence 
more o f t e n on inference tasks, than on t i n i t h t a b l e tasks. However, 
i f AC a f f i r m a t i o n i s explained as due t o i t s r e s t a t i n g the terms 
of the major premiss, then t h i s i s seen not t o be the case. The 
apparent discrepancy i s due t o an unwarranted comparison o f AC 
a f f i r m a t i o n w i t h e v a l u a t i o n s o f the FT and FF t r u t h t a b l e cases. 
However, the most r e l e v a n t t r u t h t a b l e case to AC a f f i r m a t i o n may 
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w e l l be the TT case. Most subjects appreciate t h a t the TT case, 
which r e s t a t e s the two components o f the r u l e , i s a ' t r u e ' case o f 
the r u l e and t h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n may w e l l be one f a c t o r mediating 
AC a f f i r m a t i o n 
Conclusions 
The high frequency o f MP (O) d e n i a l suggests t h a t i t s 
l o g i c a l i n v a l i d i t y s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d responses. This accords 
w i t h the r e s u l t s o f other s t u d i e s t h a t have rep o r t e d very low 
e r r o r frequencies f o r MP a f f i r m a t i o n . (e.g. Evans, 1977a, T a p l i n , 
1971), A f f i r m a t i o n o f DA was less f requent than a f f i r m a t i o n o f AC 
and MT i n both experiments (although not s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s frequent 
than a f f i r m a t i o n o f MT, i n experiment 2) and i t i s thus reasonable 
to assume t h a t the l o g i c a l s t a t u s o f t h i s conclusion may have 
inf l u e n c e d responses. Data concerning DA (O) were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
t h i s assumption, as d e n i a l of DA (O) was le s s frequent than d e n i a l 
o f MT (0) and AC (O), although these comparisons were not 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
That l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y may i n f l u e n c e responses to MP 
and DA may be compared w i t h the f i n d i n g t h a t l o g i c a l f a c t o r s play 
an important r o l e i n mediating TA and FA s e l e c t i o n s on the Wason 
s e l e c t i o n task. Thus, i n both cases, l o g i c a l f a c t o r s appear t o 
in f l u e n c e behaviour concerning the antecedent o f the r u l e . However, 
the ( ' i n h i b i t o r y ' ) e f f e c t o f l o g i c appears t o have l e s s i n f l u e n c e 
on DA a f f i r m a t i o n (and much le s s i n f l u e n c e , i f any, on DA (O) d e n i a l ) 
than i t does on FA s e l e c t i o n . 
I t can also be argued t h a t behaviour on AC and MT 
conclusions, and t h e i r opposites (which argue from the consequent 
of the c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e ) , i s comparable w i t h behaviour concerning 
consequent s e l e c t i o n s on the s e l e c t i o n task, i n t h a t ' l o g i c a l ' 
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f a c t o r s play l i t t l e r o l e i n mediating responses. This discussion 
w i l l be-concluded by l i s t i n g the three main reasons f o r t h i s p o i n t 
o f view: 
1) There i s no evidence o f c o n s i s t e n t MT a f f i r m a t i o n , or 
MT (O) d e n i a l , across the f o u r r u l e s and thus no 
evidence t h a t a f f i r m a t i o n or d e n i a l o f these conclusions 
i s mediated by an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y 
of MT, There i s , however, some i n d i c a t i o n of consistency 
i n s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o the e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y . 
2) That there was no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between d e n i a l 
of MT (O) and AC (O) s t r o n g l y suggests t h a t l o g i c a l 
f a c t o r s had l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on d e n i a l o f these con-
c l u s i o n s . That subjects a f f i r m e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more 
AC than MT conclusions, does a t t e s t t o a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between these conclusions, but t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n cannot 
be due t o the i n f l u e n c e o f l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , as no i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f the r u l e can make AC more v a l i d than MT. 
The d i f f e r e n c e ca,n be accounted f o r by the explanation 
given e a r l i e r , 
3) Consideration o f Table 5«6 shows t h a t frequencies o f 
MT and AC (and DA) a f f i r m a t i o n are more s i m i l a r when 
compared by form o f conclusion (as i s done i n the t a b l e ) , 
than when compared by the form o f the r u l e from which 
the conclusion i s d e r i v e d . This p o i n t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t r u e o f the 'opposite' conclusions. For instance, 
percentage d e n i a l o f conclusions o f the AA form was 
93^ f o r MT (O) and 90% f o r AC (O), whereas percentage 
d e n i a l o f conclusions o f the NN form was 5^% f o r MT (O) 
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and 52?S f o r AC (O), Comparison by major premiss would 
y i e l d percentage frequencies o f MT (O) and AC (O) 
d e n i a l , r e s p e c t i v e l y , o f 3k% and 9O9S on the NA r u l e 
and 93^ and 52% on the AN r u l e . 
The above comparisons c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s the 
form o f conclusion t h a t p r i j n a r i l y determines the response. A f f i r -
mation o f MT and AC, and d e n i a l o f MT (o) and AC (O) are p r i m a r i l y 
determined by the n o n l o g i c a l e f f e c t s o f p o l a r i t y on responses t o 
a conclusion, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f the type o f argument by which the 
conclusion i s supposedly de r i v e d . S i m i l a r l y , on the s e l e c t i o n 
task, consequent s e l e c t i o n s are p r i m a r i l y determined by matching 
bi a s , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f the l o g i c a l s t a t u s o f the card selected. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1, Z values axe derived from chi-squared t e s t s . A l l chi-squared 
t e s t s c a r r i e d out i n t h i s , and l a t e r , experiments have employed 
Yates* c o r r e c t i o n i n accordance w i t h standard textbooks (e.g. S i e g a l , 
1956). However, i t should be noted t h a t the r e s u l t s o f C a m i l l i & 
Hopkins (1978) i n d i c a t e t h a t , i n the words o f the authors, " i n a l l 
instances the Yates* c o r r e c t i o n decreases the accuracy o f the 
p r o b a b i l i t y statements". They conclude t h a t use of Yates' c o r r e c t i o n 
r e s u l t s **in an unnecessary l o s s o f power" and thus the chi-squared 
t e s t s used i n t h i s chapter should be regarded as conservative, 
2. When a su b j e c t ' s MT, AC and DA a f f i r m a t i o n s are expressed as 
a p r o p o r t i o n o f h i s t o t a l a f f i r m a t i o n s , i f one conclusion gains a 
high p r o p o r t i o n , then other conclusions should tend t o have a low 
p r o p o r t i o n . Thus, i f responses were random, subjects a f f i r m i n g an 
above median ( r e l a t i v e ) frequency o f DA would be less l i k e l y (than 
other s u b j e c t s ) t o also a f f i r m an above median ( r e l a t i v e ) frequency 
o f MT. The nonindependence thus a c t s a g a i n s t p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
3. The S t o u f f e r method i s a t t r i b u t e d t o S t o u f f e r e t a l (19^9) and 
i s given by Rosenthal (1978) . The formula i s : 
Est. (z) = ^y^ir 
As Z i s a u n i t normal v a r i a t e under the n u l l hypothesis, the standard 
e r r o r o f the average o f a sample o f Zs i s thus Hence: 
Est (Z) = ^ d i v i d e d b y ^ = ^ 
s t r i c t l y , t h i s explanation can account f o r the e f f e c t s o f 
p o l a r i t y on e i t h e r ' f a l s e ' or ' t r u e ' responses ( i . e . by e x p l a i n i n g 
one set o f responses on the grounds t h a t i t 'moves' w i t h the o t h e r ) , 
but the c r u c i a l p o i n t i s t h a t i t cannot account f o r the e f f e c t s o f 
p o l a r i t y on both ' t r u e ' and ' f a l s e * responses. 
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APPENDIX A 
COPIES OF THE INSTRUCTION PAGES ON THE TASK BOOKIETS USED 
IN EXTERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
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I n s t r u c t i o n Page Heading Test Booklets i n Experiment 1 
You have been shown a set of cards a l l having a l e t t e r on the 
l e f t hand side and a munber on the r i g h t hand side. 
You w i l l be given a s e r i e s o f r u l e s t o consider, each o f which 
apply t o these kinds o f cards and de f i n e which l e t t e r s may be pa i r e d 
w i t h which numbers ( o r vice v e r s a ) . 
For instance-, here are some examples o f the type"* o f r u l e s you may be given 
EG ( l ) I f the l e t t e r i s not a V then the number i s a 6 
EG (2) I f the l e t t e r i s not an S then the number i s not a 9 
EG ( 3 ) I f the l e t t e r i s a C then the number i s a 5 
EG (4) I f the number i s a 2 then the l e t t e r i s not an M 
You w i l l f i n d on each page a KEY STATEMENT which i s a r u l e of t h i s 
k i n d . Under t h i s are seven other statements. 
Your task i s t o un d e r l i n e any of the other statements t h a t you 
believe t o f o l l o w l o g i c a l l y from the KEY STATEMENT. 
I f you do not believe t h a t any o f the l i s t e d statements ne c e s s a r i l y 
f o l l o w from the KEY STATEMENT, you should u n d e r l i n e the e i g h t h 
a l t e r n a t i v e (*None o f the above')-
Thus you may und e r l i n e 
EITHER one or more o f a l t e r n a t i v e s 1 t o ? 
OR a l t e r n a t i v e 8 
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I n s t r u c t i o n Page Heading Test Booklet i n Experijnent 2 
You have been shown a set of cards a l l having a l e t t e r on the l e f t 
hand side and a number on the r i g h t hand s i d e . 
You w i l l be given a ser i e s of r u l e s t o consider, each o f which apply 
t o these kinds o f cards and de f i n e which l e t t e r s may be paired w i t h 
which numbers ( o r v i c e v e r s a ) . 
For instance, here are some examples of the types of r u l e s you may 
be given; 
EG ( 1 ) I f the l e t t e r i s not a V then the number i s a 6 
EG (2) I f the l e t t e r i s not an S then the number i s not a 9 
EG (3) I f the l e t t e r i s a C then the number i s a 5 
EG ( 4 ) I f the number i s a 2 then the l e t t e r i s not an M 
You w i l l f i n d on each page a KEY STATEMENT which i s a r u l e of t h i s 
k i n d . Under t h i s there are seven other statements. 
Your task i s t o assume t h a t the KEY STATEMENT IS TRUE and on the 
basis o f t h i s assumption t o ; 
a) Put a t i c k by any o f the other statements t h a t are 
th e r e f o r e also n e c e s s a r i l y TRUE 
b) Put a cross by any o f the other statements t h a t are 
the r e f o r e n e c e s s a r i l y FALSE 
c) Put a question mark by any statement t h a t i s n e i t h e r 
n e c e s s a r i l y TRUE or FALSE 
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APTENDIX B 
TABLES SHOWING THE ASSOCIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN 
INFERENCES IN EXPERIMENT 1 (UNTRANSFORMED DATA) 
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Table 5.B.1 
INFERENCE 
COMPARISON 
MT V MT 
MT V AC 
MT V DA 
Average Z 
* A l l associations are positive 
For key to columns see Table 5.B.2 
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other rules. (Experime nt 1) 
MAJOR A B C D Z 
PREMISS 
COMPARISON 
AA V AN 11 9 6 14 1.28 
AA V NA 12 8 2 .18 2.98 
AA V NN 9 11 5 15 0.99 
AN V NA 10 7 19 2.38 
AN V NN 9 8 5 18 1.71 
NA V NN 8 6 6 20 1.81 
Average Z 1.86 
AA V AN 13 7 16 2 .56 
AA V NA 17 3 2 18 4.43 
AA V. NN 13 7 5 15 2.22 
AN V NA 8 9 11 12 0.00 
AN V NN 10 7 8 15 1.19 
NA V NN 10 8 18 2.i;3 
Average Z 2 .09 
AA V AN 13 7 7 13 1.58 
AA V NA 11 9 16 1.96 
AA V NN 13 7 2 18 3.27 
AN V NA 12 5 3 20 3.39 
AN V NN 10 7 5 18 2 .06 
NA V NN 12 2 3 23 4.28 
2.76 
Table 3.B .2. 
Median Tests comparing the three inferences across the four types 
of Major Premiss (Experiment 1) 
COMPARISON 
H^RENCES FORM OF A B c D z 
MAJOR 
PREMISS 
MT v AC AA Ik 6 3 17 3.20 
AN 10 7 7 16 1 .47 
NA 11 3 8 18 2.56 
NN 8 6 10 16 0.80 
Average Z 2.01 
MT V DA 
AC V DA 
AA 15 5 3 17 3.50 
AN 13 4 7 16 2.56 
NA 11 3 4 22 3.59 
NN 11 3 4 22 ?-59 
Average Z 3.31 
AA 15 2 3 20 4.40 
AN 13 4 7 16 2.56 
NA 10 9 5 16 1.55 
NN 9 9 6 16 1 .1^ 
Average Z 2.41 
* A l l associations are positive 
Key to Columns 
A - Both above median 
B - 1s t above median; 2nd median or below 
C - 1 s t median or below; 2nd above median 
D - Both median or below 
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APIENDIX C 
TABLES FOR ANOVAS PERFORMED 
IN EXIERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
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TABIE OF ANOVA RESULTS. EXTERIMENT 1 
SOURCE OF SUMS OF d of f 
VARIATION SQUARES 
MEAN 'F' 
SQUARES RATIO 
SIGNIFICANCE 
C 
CS 
79.21875 1 79.21875 40.108 
77.03125 39 1.97516 
1^ 
A 
AS 
18.01875 1 
37.89792 39 
18.01875 18.5^3 
0.97174 
Vfo 
T 
TS 
40.13750 2 20.06875 16.023 
97.69583 78 1.25251 
1 ^ 
CA 
CAS 
5.41875 
63.49792 
1 
39 
5.41875 3.328 
1.62815 
n. s, 
CT 
CTS 
4.16250 
48 .33750 
2 
78 
2.O8I25 3.358 
0.61971 
n.s. * 
AT 
ATS 
10.38750 
69.44583 
2 
78 
5.19375 
0.89033 
5.834 5% 
CAT 
CATS 
4.51250 
73.32083 
2 
78 
2.25625 
0.94001 
2.400 n.s. * 
* Based on a conservative t e s t 
KEY 
C Polarity of consequent (of conclusion) 
A Polarity of antecedent (of conclusion) 
T Conclusion type 
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TABLE OF ANOV A RESULTS. EXIERIMENT 2 : ' TRUE * RESPONSES 
SOURCE OF SUMS OF d of f MEAN SIGNIFICANCE 
VARIATION SQUARES SQUARES RATIO 
C 121.00208 1 
CS 61.08125 39 
121.00208 77.259 
1.56619 
1% 
A 
AS 
11.10208 1 11.10208 9.^16 
/*5.98125 39 1.17901 
1^ 
T 85.8375 2 42.91875 20.455 
TS 163.66250 78 2.09824 
1% 
CA 
CAS 
27.55208 1 27.55208 24.130 
44.53125 39 1.14183 
1% 
CT 
CTS 
7.52917 
50.63750 
2 
78 
3.76458 5.799 
0.64920 
5% 
AT 
ATS 
0.80417 
48.36250 
2 
78 
0.40208 0.648 
0.62003 
n.s, 
CAT 
CATS 
4.12917 
47.03750 
2 
78 
2.06458 3.^24 
0.60304 
n.s. * 
* Based on a conservative t e s t 
KEY 
C Polarity of consequent (of conclusion) 
A Polarity of antecedent (of conclusion) 
T Conclusion type 
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TABIE OF ANOVA RESULTS. EXPERIMENT 2: 'FALSE' RESPONSES 
SOURCE OF SUMS OF 
VARIATION SQUARES 
d of f MEAN ^ F ; 
SQUARES RATIO 
SIGNIFICANCE 
C 
CS 
74.93906 1 74.93906 52.075 
56.12344 39 1.43906 
195 
A 
AS 
66.95156 
54.11094 
1 
39 
66.95156 
1.38746 
48 .255 Ifo 
T 
TS 
66.32969 
119.85781 
3 
117 
22.10990 
1.02443 
21.583 
CA 
CAS 
9.75156 1 
74.81094 39 
9.75156 5.084 
I.9I823 
5% 
CT 
CTS 
18.76719 
79.^2031 
3 
117 
6.25573 9.216 
O.6788I 
AT 
ATS 
5.55^69 
68.63281 
3 
117 
1.85156 3.156 
0.58661 
n. s, 
CAT 
CATS 
0.65469 3 
44.O328I 117 
0.21823 
0.37635 
0.580 n.s. • 
Based on a conservative t e s t 
KEY 
C Polarity of conseg-uent (of conclusion) 
A Polarity of antecedent (of conclusion) 
T Conclusion type 
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CHAPTER 6 
TRUTH STATUS EFFECTS ON SEI£CTION TASK BEHAVIOUR 
EXTERIMENT 3 208 
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The second type of nonlogical bias discussed in the 
review i s the e f f e c t of content that r e l a t e s to the subjects* 
experience. Subjects tend to evaluate conclusions on the basis of 
th e i r perceived truth or f a l s i t y . This bias has been much invest-
igated i n the s y l l o g i s t i c litera?ture (see section 3 of Chapter 1) 
and has been suggested e a r l i e r as underlying the data of certain 
thematic conditional inference studies (e.g, those of Bucci, 1978 
and Roberge, 1977) . However, study of the bias has been almost 
wholly r e s t r i c t e d to i t s e f f e c t upon conclusion evaluation and 
l i t t l e attempt has been made to investigate i t s e f f e c t on other 
aspects of reasoning behaviour. 
An exception to t h i s i s the study, of Van Duyne (1976) , 
who investigated the e f f e c t of truth status on selection task 
behaviour. This was a welcome extension as, due to the large 
amount of research on t h i s task, i t could be argued that the 
general influence of any bias on reasoning cannot be assessed u n t i l 
i t s role i n mediating selection task responses i s determined. 
Subjects were asked to evaluate t e s t statements that had previously 
been generated by the subjects themselves, subjects having been 
asked to generate sentences that they believed to be always true 
('necessity' condition) and sentences that they believed to be only 
sometimes true ('contingency' condition). Van Duyne reports that 
subsequent selection task performance was more ' l o g i c a l ' ( i . e . 
biased towards f a l s i f i c a t i o n ) on the contingent sentences and 
speculates that subjects' behaviour might to some extent be deter-
mined by a desire to f u l f i l t h e i r expectations - s p e c i f i c a l l y , 
that, the l e s s the subject believes the statement to be true, the 
more l i k e l y he i s to attempt to f a l s i f y i t . 
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The method employed d i f f e r e d from the usual p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of the task i n f o u r main ways: 
1) Subjects generated t h e i r own t e s t statements. 
2) S t i m u l i were not presented i n card form. Instead, subjects were 
asked whether they thought i t necessary t o look f o r a d d i t i o n a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n i f they only knew t h a t TA, FA, TC or FC was the case. 
For example, given the statement ' a l l glucose i s sweet*, subjects 
were asked whether any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n would be r e q u i r e d 
i n the case o f a substance known t o be: a) glucose; b) sweet; 
c) p r o t e i n ( i . e . not glucose) and d) b i t t e r ( i . e . not sweet). 
3) Sequential p r e s e n t a t i o n was used, whereas u s u a l l y the subject 
i s presented w i t h a l l f o u r s t i m u l i simultaneously. 
4) Subjects evaluated statements r e f e r r i n g t o p o t e n t i a l l y i n f i n i t e 
universes o f instances (e.g. an i n f i n i t e number of samples of 
glucose, only one o f which may be t e s t e d ) . 
However, despite these v a r i a t i o n s , Vaxi Duyne's f i n d i n g 
t h a t subjects appear t o be more l i k e l y t o attempt t o f a l s i f y an 
( o n l y ) sometimes t r u e statement, opened new p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t i s 
of i n t e r e s t , then, t o take a cl o s e r look a t the data from which 
t h i s r e s u l t was d e r i v e d . 
Van Duyne was s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n ' l o g i c a l l y 
c o r r e c t * responses ( i . e . s e l e c t i o n of TA and FC and r e j e c t i o n o f 
FA and TC). Noting the e f f e c t o f matching bias on responses, he 
observed t h a t s u b j ects "sometimes make the c o r r e c t s e l e c t i o n f o r 
the wrong reason". Accordingly, he only scored a response as 
c o r r e c t i f the su b j e c t gave the l o g i c a l l y c o r r e c t response and, i n 
a d d i t i o n , "gave the c o r r e c t reasons f o r t h i s s e l e c t i o n " . Subjects* 
s e l e c t i o n s were deemed t o be * f o r the c o r r e c t reason* i f they 
-205-
explained them i n terms of f a l s i f i c a t i o n . This procedure yielded 
the data shown in Table 6 , 1 . As can be seen, the finding that 
subjects performed s i g n i f i c a n t l y "'better' on contingency sentences 
( i . e . sentences that were more l i k e l y to be f a l s e ) i s primarily 
based on response to TA, although subjects did perform 'better* 
under the contingency condition in a l l four cases. 
Table 6 .1 
Data from Van Duyne (1976) . Analysis of the 22 subjects 
Table 6 . 1 .A Table 6.1.B 
Number of subjects making l o g i c a l l y Actual frequency of 
v a l i d decision, deemed to be for selection 
'correct reason' 
Selection Rejection Rejection Selection 
of TA of FA of TC . of FC TA FA TC FC 
NECESSITY 
CONDITION 16 6 13 21 5 14 20 
CONTINOTCY 
CONDITION 17 19 8 14 22 3 1^ 19 
However, given the r e s u l t s of Wason & Evans ( 1 9 7 5 )i 
i t i s unsound to c l a s s i f y subjects* responses on the basis of t h e i r 
post hoc explanations. For t h i s reason. Van Duyne*s data were 
reanalysed in terms of the actual frequency of selections made. 
The r e s u l t s of t h i s a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table 6,1.B and i t i s 
apparent from the table that actual selection behaviour was not 
affected by the experimental conditions. Van Duyne's data thus do 
not reveal asi e f f e c t of truth status on selection task responses. 
His procedure modified not what subjects did on the task, but the 
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reasons why they thought they had done i t . Analysed i n t h i s way, 
Van Duyne's experiment provides even better evidence f o r the dual-
process hypothesis, than d i d that of Wason & Evans (1975). I n 
the l a t t e r study, one condition (using the AN r u l e ) produced a 
change i n selection behaviour and a corresponding change i n 
explanations. The authors argued that the selection differences 
(to those observed on the AA r u l e ) were more l i k e l y to be due to 
the syntactic form of the AN rule than to the reasons preferred i n 
the explanations, and thus they suggested that two processes were 
involved. However, that an experimental condition can af f e c t 
explanations without a f f e c t i n g selection frequencies (as i n Van 
Duyne's study), i s very clear cut evidence that introspection does 
not reveal the causes o^ behaviour. 
However, the main question of interest was whether 
differences i n responses would be observed as a function of the 
d i f f e r e n t l y perceived t r u t h status of the statements to be evaluated 
By using only 'always true* and 'sometimes true' statements, i t was 
considered that Van Duyne's experiment had not f u l l y tested t h i s 
question. There was clearly only a small difference between the 
two types of statement and'it was f e l t that t h i s was due to the use 
of the word 'true' to describe both conditions. As t h i s produced 
f a i r l y similar statements (as regards t r u t h status), i t i s not 
surprising that responses were also similar. Accordingly, the 
experiment was replicated with a major change: subjects being asked 
to generate four types of sentence, those that they believed always 
and usually true and those they believed always and usually false. 
This procedure allowed f o r both a t r u t h / f a l s i t y comparison and a 
necessity/contingency comparison. 
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I t was decided to again ask subjects f o r explanations 
of t h e i r responses as t h i s would keep the procedure as close to 
that of Van Duyne as possible. Van Duyne's r e s u l t was interpreted 
as showing that perceived f a l s i t y leads to j u s t i f i c a t i o n of responses 
i n terms of f a l s i t y . I t was thus expected that f a l s i t y , not 
contingency per se> would f a c i l i t a t e verbal report scores. 
There was no a p r i o r i reason to believe that either 
contingency or f a l s i t y would f a c i l i t a t e or i n h i b i t selections. 
I t was thus decided to test a l l behavioural measures two-tailed. 
EXI^RIMENT 3 
METHOD 
Design 
Subjects were asked to generate t h e i r own (written) 
sentences to be used on four subsequent selection tasks. They were 
asked to generate f i v e sentences that they considered 'always true', 
f i v e that they considered 'usually true', f i v e that they considered 
'usually false' and f i v e that they considered 'always false'. They 
were asked to generate one set of sentences at a time, with 2^' 
subjects receiving a l l possible orders of presentation. 
The experimenter selected one test statement from each 
category and presented these test statements on the four selection 
tasks i n the same order as they had been generated by the subject. 
The selection tasks were presented i n such a way that the subject 
had to answer questions about whether he would wish to investigate 
TA, FA. TC and FG instances of the r u l e . To keep order effects 
constant, the instances were always put to the subject i n that order. 
Subjects' responses were recorded and t h e i r explanations scored as 
'correct' or 'incorrect', i n accordance with the scoring procedure. 
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Subjects 
Twenty four undergraduates at Plymouth Polytechnic 
acted as paid volunteers. They had no previous selection task 
experience and were tested i n d i v i d u a l l y . 
Apparatus 
A tape recorder ( v i s i b l e to the subject) was used 
during the experiment. 
Procedure 
When asked to generate the sentences, subjects were 
handed a piece of paper with a heading relevant to the sentences 
required (e.g. 'usually t r u e * ) . They were asked to generate only 
sentences of the form ' I f P then Q' and asked not to include 
negatives or to construct sentences i n which Q also implies P. 
After having finished the f i r s t set, subjects were immediately 
handed another sheet of paper and asked to generate the next set 
required; t h i s procedure being repeated u n t i l the subject had 
generated a l l four sets of sentences. 
The experimenter then selected a suitable sentence 
from each category f o r use on ithe subsequent selection tasks. The 
c r i t e r i a used were whether or not the sentence could be used on 
the task, which required that the sentence conform to the instructions 
and that i t be possible that the presence or absence of either 
antecedent or consequent could be independently observed. The 
f i r s t sentence meeting these c r i t e r i a was selected. Some changes 
were made to certain sentences to make them grammatical or more 
formal. 
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After the sentence had been selected, i t was presented 
to the subject as a statement that the experimenter would l i k e to 
evaluate. The subject was asked to imagine that the experimenter 
did not know whether the statement was true or false and to imagine 
that the experimenter could observe only one f a c t , concerning 
either the f i r s t or second paxt of the statement, at a time. Four 
questions were posed on each of the four statements, constituting 
examples of (the knowledge of) TA, FA, TC and FC. After asking the 
subject to imagine each instance, the following question was put: 
"Would I need to f i n d out anything else i n order to f i n d out 
whether the statement was true or false?". For example, f o r the 
sentence ' I f a person drinks a bottle of whisky then he w i l l be 
drunk*, the subject was asked whether extra information would be 
required i f i t was known only that a person: had drank a bottle of 
;*iisky (TA) ; had not drunk a bottle of whisky (FA) ; was drunk (TC); 
and was sober (FC). For each instance, a f t e r the subject had 
answered *yes* or 'no*, the experimenter asked "why?". Subjects 
were asked furt h e r questions as required u n t i l t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
was f u l l y ascertained. This was scored as 'correct' or 'incorrect' 
i n accordance with the scoring procedure used by Van Duyne. 
Scoring Procedure 
An explanation of a ( l o g i c a l l y correct) decision to 
select or r e j e c t was scored as 'correct' i f i t met the following 
c r i t e r i a : 
TA The explcLnation was scored as 'correct* i f the subject 
said that he selected TA i n order to see whether the 
consequent might or might not happen, 
TC The explanation was scored as 'correct' i f the subject 
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said either ( i ) that he rejected TC because the presence 
or absence of TA would not prove anything or ( i i ) that 
TC did not imply TA. 
FA The explanation was scored as 'correct* i f the subject 
said that he rejected FA because i t was irrelevant or 
because the presence or absence of TC would not prove 
anything. 
FC The explcination was scored as 'correct* i f the subject 
said that he selected FC because i t could (by 
discovering TA) show the statement to be false or 
reveal an exception. 
RESULTS 
Data were analysed by comparing necessity ('always*) 
and contingency ('usually*) statements and by compajring *true* and 
'false' statements. This involved pooling data from two statements 
f o r each condition. 
The percentage frequency of selection of the four 
instances i s shown i n Table 6.2. There was no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t 
of contingency on these selections and no s i g n i f i c a n t interactions 
between contingency and t r u t h status. 
Table 6.2 
Percentage Frequencies of Selections (N = 24 for each Condition) 
Experiment 3 
Sentence Type TA FA TC FG 
ALWAYS TRUE 96 50 96 5^ 
USUALLY TRUE 92 42 8? 6? 
USUALLY FALSE 92 46 8? 8? 
ALWAYS FALSE 92 37 71 8? 
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There was no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t of t r u t h status on 
selection of TA or FA. However, there was strong evidence that 
f a l s i t y f a c i l i t a t e d FC selection (sign t e s t p < 0.001, two-tailed) 
and some suggestion(although not s i g n i f i c a n t ) that f a l s i t y i n h i b i t e d 
TC selection (sign t e s t , p < 0.08, two-tailed). 
The percentage frequencies of subjects who made the 
l o g i c a l l y correct response and whose verbal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s were 
scored as meeting the c r i t e r i a are shown i n Table 6.3. ( i t should be 
noted that the basis of t h i s table i s l o g i c a l l y correct decisions, 
not selection frequencies.) As f o r actual responses, there was no 
si g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t of contingency and no s i g n i f i c a n t interactions 
between contingency and t r u t h status. 
Table 6.3 
Percentage Frequencies of Subjects (N = 24) Making the Logically 
Correct Response AND Giving a Verbal Explanation that met the 
Scoring C r i t e r i a (Experiment 3) 
Sentence Type Selection Rejection Rejection Selection 
of TA of FA of TC of FC 
ALWAYS TRUE 25 46 4 3? 
USUALLY TRUE 37 58 4 42 
USUALLY FALSE 58 46 8 ?1 
ALWAYS FALSE 79 58 8 83 
There was no evidence of an e f f e c t of t r u t h status on 
verbal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of re j e c t i o n of either TC or FA. However, 
f a l s i t y was found s i g n i f i c a n t l y to f a c i l i t a t e verbal report scores 
f o r both selection of TA (sign t e s t , p < 0.0001) and selection of 
FC (sign t e s t , p < O.OOOl). 
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DISCUSSION 
The findings apropos selection and verbal report are 
not independent as, to explain correctly a selection decision, that 
selection decision must f i r s t be correct. I n the case of TA, there 
i s no difference i n selection frequency between the two conditions 
but, f o r FC, the f a c i l i t a t i o n of verbal report scores i n the false 
condition could simply be due to the greater number of correct 
selections of t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e . However, expressing correct verbal 
report as a percentage of correct selections (only), verbal 
explanations of FC selection were scored as 'correct' on Q3% of 
occasions i n the 'false' conditions, as opposed to only 65% of 
occasions i n the 'true' conditions. I t i s thus apparent that t r u t h 
status affected both of the 'dual processes' proposed by Wason & 
Evans (1975). I t i s worth noting i n passing that, i f introspections 
revealed the causes of behaviour, percentage of correct selections 
correctly explained should not vary between conditions. That they 
did so constitutes f u r t h e r evidence (as did Van Duyne's results) 
supporting the independence of the dual processes. 
The c r u c i a l f i n d i n g of t h i s experiment, however, was 
that t r u t h status affected the behavioural as well as introspective 
process, FC being selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the 
'false' condition. I t should be noted that, even i f Van Duyne had 
asked subjects to generate 'false' statements, he could not have 
obtained t h i s r e s u l t , due to a 'ceiling e f f e c t ' (although he may 
have observed an e f f e c t on verbal report scores f o r FC). 91^ of 
his subjects selected FC on 'always true' statements. I t i s , 
perhaps, f o r t u i t o u s that the present experiment was conducted on 
a sample of subjects who showed less o v e r a l l tendency to select FC. 
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The two studies d i d , i n f a c t , y i e l d somewhat d i f f e r e n t 
response p r o f i l e s . Subjects i n the present study, when using the 
( d i r e c t l y comparable) 'always true' statements, selected FC 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y less often (Fishers exact, p < 0.02, two-tailed), 
and selected TC s i g n i f i c a n t l y more often (Fishers exact, p < 0,02, 
two-tailed), than did subjects i n Van Buyne's experiment. However, 
there i s s u f f i c i e n t variety of temporal , geographic and other 
d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two studies to render speculation as 
to the reasons f o r these differences injudicious. One noticeable 
s i m i l a r i t y between the two studies was that i n a l l conditions, the 
median number of selections per subject was three. In almost a l l 
other selection task experiments (both abstract and thematic), the 
median number of selections has been two. I t i s possible that 
sequential presentation of the four alternatives leads to higher 
selection frequencies. 
Apart from the f a c i l i t a t i o n of FC selection, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that f a l s i t y i n h i b i t s TC selection i s also worthy of 
consideration, as i t suggests that f a l s i t y has a general e f f e c t 
on consequent selections. The question arises as to the basis of 
t h i s e f f e c t . Van Duyne, who believed that he had found such an 
e f f e c t , proposed that subjects were essentially seeking information 
that v e r i f i e d t h e i r own opinions, r e f e r r i n g to t h i s as 'cognitive 
self-reinforcement'. 
One objection to t h i s theory i s that i t i s very task 
specific and does not contribute to the understainding of behaviour 
on the standard abstract selection task. As has been discussed 
e a r l i e r , the r e s u l t s of Manktelow & Evans (1979) suggest that there 
i s no tendency to either v e r i f y or f a l s i f y on abstract selection 
tasks. Where, then, i s the subject's motivation to prove his belief? 
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The best that could be said i s that subjects have no b e l i e f s 
about the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of the rule on abstract tasks and 
therefore no motivation to prove i t true or false. 
A second objection i s based on the f a c t that Evans 
(1977b), analysing a wide variety of selection task r e s u l t s , 
f a i l e d to f i n d any evidence of an association between TC and FC 
selections. Similarly, there was no evidence of such an association 
i n either the present study or that of Van Duyne. I f subjects are 
v e r i f y i n g t h e i r own b e l i e f s , they w i l l select TC i f they believe 
the rule to be true and FC i f they believe the rule to be false. 
However, i t follows from the apparent independence of TC and FC, 
that selections 'to prove the rule true' must be independent of 
selections 'to prove the rule false'; and thus (as these selections 
are aimed at v e r i f y i n g the subject's b e l i e f s ) , that b e l i e f that the 
rule i s true i s independent of b e l i e f that the rule i s false. 
This seems absurd, although i t cannot be ruled out completely as 
there i s ample evidence that subjects do not always behave 
consistently. For instance, Winthrop (1946) observed a high degree 
of inconsistency when subjects were asked to evaluate separately 
pairs of ( a t t i t u d e ) propositions that were either contradictory or 
equivalent. However, the empirical independence of FC and TC s e l -
ections would make i t very d i f f i c u l t to construct a satisfactory 
theory based on the cognitive self-reinforcement p r i n c i p l e . 
Further, b e l i e f s must depend on past experience. 
However, such past experience should not be confused with b e l i e f -
b e l i e f i s the a f f e c t i v e consequence of that experience entering 
awareness. When a statement i s evaluated, relevant past experience 
i s retrieved and may then produce a conscious b e l i e f . Thus, a 
theory explaining responses i n terms of b e l i e f i s inadequate as i t 
f a i l s to account f o r the p r i o r process of r e t r i e v a l . 
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A possible basis of the r e t r i e v a l process i s the 
association between the constituent items of the statement. That 
i s , one substrate of a b e l i e f about a conditional statement may be 
the strength of association between the antecedent and consequent. 
I f subjects do evaluate conditionals on the basis of association 
strength, then t h i s may well a f f e c t t h e i r behaviour on the selection 
task, leading to the selection of those alternatives that are 
associated. This i s clearly a possible explanation of the ef f e c t 
of t r u t h status. On false statements there i s a stronger 
association between FC and TA than on true statements. 
For instance, when thinking of a swan, the colour 
white i s l i k e l y to come to mind and may be said to be an associate 
of swan. I f the subject i s given the opportunity of investigating 
various consequent values of a statement about the colour of swans, 
he may thus be l i k e l y to select white. This would be a TC case of 
the ('true') statement ' i f i t i s a swan, then i t i s white' but 
would be an FC case of the ('false') statement ' i f i t i s a swan, 
then i t i s black'. The increased selection of FC i n the 'false' 
condition of experiment 3 could thus be due to FC alternatives 
tending to have been more associated with TA i n that condition. 
On an abstract selection task, the subject has no p r i o r 
information available that w i l l modify his consequent selections 
i n the manner suggested above. However, when engaged on the task, 
he does have one relevant p r i o r experience, as he has been exposed 
to the conjoint mention of P and Q i n the rule to be evaluated. 
I t i s thus possible that an association i s set up between P and Q 
that, i n the absence of any other source of association, becomes 
the dominant nonlogical determinant of selections, leading to the 
selection of these 'matching' values. 
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The association theory can thus be extended to tasks 
using abstract materials. Further, i n experiment 3. t r u t h status 
affected both selections and verbal reports, which suggests that 
the associations not only modify selection behaviour but also 
give r i s e to conscious b e l i e f s that subsequently modify verbal 
explanations. This i s e n t i r e l y consistent with the re s u l t s of 
Wason & Evans (1975). I f the subject 'believes' that Q occurs with 
P, he w i l l expect that his selection w i l l show ' I f P then Q* to be 
true, and ' I f P then not Q* to be false. Also he should tend to 
explain P selection i n terms of finding (the expected) Q and Q 
selection i n terms of find i n g P. Wason & Evans did i n f a c t , 
notice such a tendency, r e f e r r i n g to i t as 'secondary matching bias'. 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, i t i s argued 
that the association theory has much to recommend i t . Essentially, 
i t has three d i s t i n c t adj/antages; 
1) I t provides an explanation of t r u t h status effects that 
generalises to standard tasks using abstract materials, 
2) Although Evans (1975) suggested that the basis of 
matching bias may be that the subjects' attention i s 
directed towards those values mentioned i n the r u l e , 
no f u l l attempt has been made to explain why subjects 
match. The association theory provides such an explanation, 
3) Possibly the most important advantage i s that i t provides 
a consistent explanation of both selection behaviour 
and introspection on the selection task. 
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Experiment 3 used an unusual form of the selection 
task. Subjects generated t h e i r own (thematic) test statements, 
evaluated statements r e f e r r i n g to p o t e n t i a l l y i n f i n i t e universes 
of instances and selected or rejected sequentially presented 
alternatives. Thus, i t i s not necessarily the case that results 
obtained are generalisable to other selection tasks and the f i r s t 
problem, i n the further investigation of the ef f e c t of t r u t h status, 
must be to determine that a general e f f e c t has been discovered. 
Clearly, i f responses are to some extent determined by the previously 
learned t r u t h status of the conditional r u l e , i t should be possible 
to produce response differences on abstract tasks by providing 
subjects with the relevant experimentally contrived experience. 
In order to test t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , a pack of cards was 
developed that had l e t t e r s (A or B) on one side and numbers (1 or 2) 
on the other, so arranged that most As had 1 on the back and most 
Bs had 2 on the back. I t was decided to expose subjects to the 
contingencies of t h i s pack v i a a p r o b a b i l i t y learning task, 
conducted p r i o r to selection task presentation. I t was presumed 
that the e f f e c t of the probability learning task would be to 
induce more association between TA and FC, and less association 
between TA and TC, on the ('usually false') relationships, ' I f A 
then 2' and ' I f B then 1', than on the ('usually true') 
relationships, ' I f A then 1' and ' I f B then 2'. 
I t was expected that t h i s procedure would produce 
results comparable to those obtained i n Experiment 3, S p e c i f i c a l l y , 
i t was predicted that subjects would make more FG, and less TC 
selections when reasoning with 'usually f a l s e ' statements. 
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EXI^]RIMENT 4 
METHOD 
Design 
Subjects were presented with a probability learning 
task, p r i o r to a selection task, to f a m i l i a r i s e them with the 
contingencies of the card pack (four of which were used i n the 
selection task). I n one selection task condition subjects evaluated 
a rule having a high p r o b a b i l i t y of being true and, i n "the other 
condition, subjects evaluated a rule having a low pro b a b i l i t y of 
being time. The responses of those subjects who had shown 
si g n i f i c a n t evidence of ( p r o b a b i l i t y ) learning were compared between 
the two conditions. 
Materials 
1) A pack of 20 record cards consisting of; 
8 cards with A on one side and 1 on the other 
(p (l/A) = p (A/1) =0.8) 
2 cards with B on one side and 1 on the other 
(p (l/B) = p (B/1) = 0.2) 
2 cards with A on one side and 2 on the other 
(p (2/A) = P (A/2) = 0.2 
8 cards with B on one side and 2 on the other 
(p (2/B) = p (B/2) = 0.8) 
2) Four sheets of paper with a conditional rule typed on 
them as follows: 
I f there i s an A on one side of a card, then there i s 
a 1 on the other side. 
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I f there i s a B on one side of a card, then there i s 
a 2 on the other side 
I f there i s a B on one side of a card, then there i s 
a 1 on the other side 
I f there i s an A on one side of a card, then there i s 
a 2 on the other side. 
Given that four appropriate cards are drawn at random 
for the selection task, the f i r s t two rules have a probability of 
approximately 6^'fo of being true ^ and were assigned alternately to 
subjects i n the f i r s t condition, which was designated 'usually true 
The l a s t two rules have a probability of only approximately k% 
2 
of being true and were assigned alternately to subjects i n t\ 
second condition, which was designated 'usually false'. 
Subjects 
Thirty two undergraduates at Plymouth Polytechnic 
acted as paid volunteers. They were tested i n d i v i d u a l l y and 
assigned alternately to the two conditions. 
Procedure 
The card pack was shuffled and placed on the table, 
l e t t e r sides up. The following instructions were them given: 
"These cards a l l have a l e t t e r on one side and a number 
on the other side. The l e t t e r i s either an A or a B and the number 
i s either a 1 or a 2. I ajn going to go through the pack one card 
at a time showing you the l e t t e r side of the card. For each card, 
I want you to guess whether the number on the othfer side i s a 1 
or a 2. I w i l l turn each card over after your guess so that you 
can see whether or not you were r i g h t , " 
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The subject then commenced to guess and, alter each 
guess, the experimenter turned over the card, called out the number 
and called either "correct" or "wrong". At the same time, the 
experimenter recorded the subject's guess and marked i t with a t i c k 
or a cross so that the subject could see that the experimenter was 
'scoring' his answers. After the f i r s t run through, the pack was 
reshuffled and the subject asked to repeat the procedure. Four 
runs altogether were carried out and, at the end of each run, the 
subject's t i c k s were added up and his 'score' (out of 20) announced. 
The subject was then introduced to the selection task, the following 
instructions being given: 
" I ajn now going to shuffle the cards again and ask you 
to select one 'A' card and one 'B' card without looking at the other 
side". (This was done and the two cards l a i d on the table, the 
pack was then turned over) "Now I ajn going to shuffle again and 
ask you to select one '1' card and one '2' card without looking at 
the other side." (these two cards were then placed on the table, 
producing the usual four cstrd layout) "Now, we do not know what 
i s on the other side of these four cards do you agree with 
that?" (the experimenter waited f o r the subject to indicate 
agreement) "but I want you to suppose that somebody makes the 
following statement about them." (The appropriate rule was then read 
twice to the subject who was then handed i t on a typed sheet of 
paper and allowed to read i t . ) "Now, as we do not know what i s on 
the other side of those cards, we do not know whether that 
statement i s true or f a l s e . What I would l i k e you to do i s to 
decide which of the cards i t would be necessary to turn over i n 
order to f i n d out whether that statement was true or fa l s e . " (This 
i n s t r u c t i o n was repeated from the words 'which of the cards'). 
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"You may choose any number of cards but take your time and don't 
give me an answer u n t i l you have made a decision about every card. 
That i s , I want you to decide, for each card, whether or not i t 
would be necessary to turn i t over and then give me your answer 
about a l l the cards. Please don't actually turn any cards over." 
The experimenter then recorded the subject's selections. 
The l a s t run of the probability learning task was 
taken for each subject and a score (out of 20) assigned to i t based 
not on correct answers but on 'optimal' answers ( i . e . the most 
probable answer - a response of '1' to A or '2' to B). I t was not 
expected that subjects would make wholly optimal responses as 
various studies (e.g. Grant et a l , 1951) have reported that subjects 
match predictions to p r o b a b i l i t i e s . A c r i t e r i o n was thus set at 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y above chance 'optimal' scoring. For 20 t r i a l s , t h i s 
entailed that subjects had to achieve an optimal score of 15 to 
be considered as having properly learned the contingencies. 
Results 
Eight subjects f a i l e d to reach c r i t e r i o n in the 
probability learning task, and were excluded from the anal y s i s . 
Of the remaining 24 subjects, 14 were in the 'usually true' condition 
and 10 were in the Visually f a l s e ' condition. The percentage 
frequency of selection of the four caxds, in the two conditions, 
i s shown in Table 7.1. 
The prediction that more FC cards would be selected 
in the ' f a l s e ! condition was confirmed, but was only near to 
significance (p < 0.08, F i s h e r s exact, one-tailed). The prediction 
that l e s s TC cards would be selected in the ' f a l s e ' condition was 
not confirmed, the r e s u l t s being in the opposite direction. 
However, a post hoc text showed the l a t t e r finding to be not 
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s i g n i f i c a n t (p < 0,11, F i s h e r s exact, two-tailed). I t i s evident 
from Table 7.1 that no s i g n i f i c a n t differences were observed on TA 
and FA selections (although t h i s could possibly have been due to 
•floor* and ' c e i l i n g ' e f f e c t s ) . 
Table 7.1 
Percentage Frequency of Selections of the Four Cards, Experiment 4 
CARD TA FA TO FC 
CONDITION 
•USUALLY TRUE* (N = 14) 86 
•USUALLY FALSE' (N = lO) ICQ 
50 
90 
14 
50 
There was a noticeable tendency for subjects to se l e c t 
more cards generally i n the "false* condition and t h i s tendency 
was found to be s i g n i f i c a n t (p < 0.02, Kendall's S, two-tailed). 
An analysis of the number of cards selected i n each condition i s 
shown in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 
Frequencies of Cards Selected per Sub.ject i n the Two Conditions 
of ExperiJiient 4 
3 CARDS 
2 CARDS 
1 CARD 
NO CARDS 
TRUE CONDITION 
0 
9 
4 
1 
14 
FALSE CONDITION 
5 
4 
1 
0 
10 
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DISCUSSION 
The r e s u l t s for TC selection suggest that i t was 
probably premature to interpret the near s i g n i f i c a n t difference * 
observed in Experiment 3 as a genuine e f f e c t . Experiment ^ did, 
however come near to r e p l i c a t i n g the one s i g n i f i c a n t finding of 
Experiment 3. as subjects selected more FC in the 'iSLse' condition 
(p < 0.08). 
The basic question posed i n t h i s experiment was whether 
experimentally produced experience relevant to truth status can 
af f e c t selection task responses. ' F a l s i t y ' did s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
a f f e c t responses, in that subjects tended to s e l e c t more cards 
generally (p < 0,02). Unfortunately, t h i s r e s u l t makes interpretation 
of the FC r e s u l t d i f f i c u l t . I t could be regarded as further 
evidence of the s p e c i f i c e f f e c t of truth status on FC selections 
observed i n Experiment 3, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , merely as an aspect of 
the general tendency. The l a t t e r interpretation would suggest that, 
although truth status e f f e c t s may be produced as a function of 
either 'real l i f e ' or experimentally produced experience, these 
e f f e c t s may well be q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t . 
Clearly, although Experiment ^ did demonstrate that 
experimentally manipulated truth status can a f f e c t responses, the 
nature of t h i s e f f e c t was f a r from precisely determined. 
Accordingly, a further experiment was designed, with two notable 
a l t e r a t i o n s to improve the power of the design: a within subject 
design was adopted and a change made to the probability learning 
task. A set number of probability learning t r i a l s was presented 
to each subject i n Experiment ^, so that each subject had an equal 
amount of prior exposure to the task materials. However, the loss 
of eight subjects on the probability learning task indicated that 
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i t would be preferable to take a l l subjects up to a fixed c r i t e r i o n 
before presenting them with the selection task. 
Various other changes were also made. Four conditions 
were used (an cilways f a l s e * and an 'always true' condition being 
added) and the whole task was presented v i a an on-line computer 
terminal. Predictions were that subjects would s e l e c t s p e c i f i c a l l y 
more FC in the 'false' conditions and, on the basis of. the r e s u l t s 
of Experiment that they would s e l e c t more cards generally in the 
'fa l s e ' conditions, 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Method 
Design 
Subjects were f i r s t given a probability learning task 
on which they learned that; 
a) 'A' was always paired with '1' 
b) 'B* was usually paired with '2 ' , but was occasionally 
paired with '1' or '3* 
c) 'C* was usually paired with '3 ' i but was occasionally 
paired with '1' or '2' 
The task was presented on a computer terminal and 
controlled by an on-line computer, as a somewhat complex 'irunning' 
c r i t e r i o n was employed. 
After reaching c r i t e r i o n on the f i r s t probability 
learning task, the subject was presented with the f i r s t of four 
selection tasks. These four tasks were so formulated that, on the 
basis of t h e i r (probability learning) experience, subjects should 
perceive them as 'always true' ( ' I f A then 1'), Visually true' ( i f 
B then 2 ' ) , 'usually f a l s e ' ( ' I f B then 1') and 'always f a l s e ' 
( ' I f A then 2 ' ) . Subjects were asked to s e l e c t or r e j e c t each 
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of the four possible instances (of occurrence or non-occurrence of 
the components) sequentially. ' l * and '2' were invariably used to 
represent TC and FC (or vice versa). TA was represented by either 
A or B (depending on the r u l e ) and FA was always represented by C 
(thus giving a comparable FA instance for a l l four r u l e s ) . The 
order i n which the instances were presented was randomly determined. 
After the selection task, subjects were returned to a 
subsequent probability learning task ( i d e n t i c a l to the f i r s t , but 
with a lowered c r i t e r i o n ) three times. Each subsequent probability 
learning task was followed by another selection task such that each 
subject used each of the four types of r u l e . A l l 24 possible 
orders of presenting the four selection tasks were used, responses 
being recorded by the program. 
A measure of each subject's probability learning 
performance ( t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n on the f i r s t task) was also taken. 
Materials 
There were no s p e c i f i c task materials as subjects 
received a l l instructions v i a the computer terminal. However, for 
the probability learning task, a set of letter/number p a i r s was 
stored i n the computer and i t i s more convenient to describe t h i s 
i n a separate section. F i f t e e n pairs were stored as follows: 
3 cases of A and 1 . (p (1 /A) = 1,0; p (A/1) = 0.6; 
p (2 or 3/A) = p (A/2 or 3) = O.O) 
4 cases of B and 2 (p ( 2 / B ) = 0.6?; p (B/2)-= 0,8) 
1 case of B and 1 (p ( 1 /B) = 0,17; P (B/1) = 0.2) 
1 case of B and 3 (p ( 3 /B) = 0.17; P (B/3) = 0.2) 
4 cases of C and 3 (p (3/c) = 0.67; p (c / 3 ) = 0.8) 
1 case of C and 1 (p ( l / c ) = 0.17; P ( c / l ) = 0.2) 
J^case of C and 2 (p (2/c) = 0.17; p (C /2) =0 .2 ) 
15 
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From the above conditional p r o b a b i l i t i e s , the 
approximate p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the four r u l e s used in the selection 
tasks can be calculated. These are: 100^ for ' I f A then 1' ('always 
true ' ) ; 53^ * for ' I f B then 2' ('usually true'); 3^ for ' I f B 
then 1' ('usually f a l s e ' ) and 0% for ' I f A then 2' ('always f a l s e ' ) . 
Subjects 
Twenty four undergraduates, recent graduates and s t a f f 
at Plymouth Polytechnic acted as paid volunteers. They were 
randomly assigned to the 24 possible orders of presenting the four 
selection tasks. 
Procedure 
Subjects were seated at the computer terminal and 
instructed i n the operation of i t s controls. The only instruction 
about the task given verbally was: " I f you try and do as sensibly 
as possible then you w i l l f i n i s h the task quicker," This 
instruction was aimed at preventing subjects from 'playing' with 
the probability learning task (and thus never meeting the c r i t e r i i o n ) 
I t was not presented as a requirement of the experiment but more 
as an 'inside t i p ' in the subjects' own in t e r e s t (the 't i p ' did, 
in f a c t , benefit subjects as they were paid a set amount to complete 
the tas k ) . 
The subject then received instructions for the 
probability learning task v i a the terminal. He was told that the 
computer held a store of letter/number p a i r s (although he was not 
told how many), involving only As, Bs, Cs, I s , 2s and 3s, and that 
* See notes 1, 2 and 3 
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the computer would randomly select a pair, show him the l e t t e r and 
ask him to guess the number. The instructions then continued as 
follows: 
"After you have made your guess, the computer w i l l t e l l 
you what the number actually i s so that you can see whether 
you were r i g h t or wrong. 
Please note that, although the computer w i l l present 
you with random examples of the letter/number pairs stored 
the association between l e t t e r s and numbers within the 
pairs i s not random. 
Thus, for each l e t t e r , the three possible numbers are 
not equiprobable and one number i s more l i k e l y to be 
paired with i t . 
I f you try and work out what the relationships between 
the l e t t e r s and numbers are, you w i l l a t t a i n more correct 
answers and complete the task sooner." 
The above 'clues*to the nature of the task were included 
as i t was f e l t that subjects would find a computer an unfajniliar 
(and thus potentially confusing) medium of communication. 
Although subjects were told that the selection of the 
p a i r s i n store was randomly determined, t h i s was not wholly true. 
The stored pairs were presented in an equivalent manner to a manual 
presentation. The store was presented sequentially ajid, a t the end 
of a sequence, the store was randomly rearranged and the f i f t e e n 
p a i r s presented sigain. Subjects were told that p a i r s were 
selected randomly so that the subject could never be ( l o g i c a l l y ) 
c e r t a i n that a l l As were paired with 1. I f the subject could be 
certa i n that ' I f A then 1' had a probability of 1.0, then t h i s 
would aff e c t the logic of the subsequent selection tasks. 
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After reaching c r i t e r i o n on the probability learning 
task, the computer presented the subject with the following 
instructions prior to the selection task: 
"Suppose that the computer w i l l set a l o g i c a l reasoning 
task to another subject. 
I t has chosen at random a few of the stored pairs that 
you have been working with and placed them i n a separate 
store. I t w i l l make a p a r t i c u l a r statement, about pairs i n 
t h i s new store, which w i l l have the following general form; 
I f the l e t t e r i s (A or B or C) then the number i s 
(1 or 2 or 3) 
The subject (who has not seen any of the p a i r s ) w i l l 
be asked to attempt to find out whether the statement i s true 
or f a l s e . 
To help him do t h i s the computer w i l l offer him the 
chance of viewing a p a r t i c u l a r letter/number pair held in 
the new store. I t w i l l do t h i s in one of two ways; 
Ei t h e r by the offer: The l e t t e r part of t h i s pair 
i s (A or B or C), would you 
l i k e to know the number? 
Or by the offer: The number part of t h i s pair 
i s (1 or 2 or 3) , would you 
l i k e to know the l e t t e r ? 
The problem i s that the information may or may not be 
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helpful i n finding out whether the statement i s true or 
f a l s e and, because t h i s i s a l o g i c a l reasoning task, the 
subject must be c a r e f u l not to ask for information that does 
not, l o g i c a l l y , help find out whether the statement i s true 
or f a l s e . 
Your task w i l l be to advise the subject. You w i l l be 
shown various possible offers tha t the computer may make and 
w i l l be asked whether i t would be l o g i c a l to accept or 
r e j e c t them. Please only advise him to take up the offer 
i f i t i s l o g i c a l l y helpful from h i s point of view." 
The subject was then presented with a conditional rule 
and with four 'offers' representing TA, FA, TG and FC instances ( i n 
a random order). For each offer he was asked: 'Would i t be l o g i c a l 
for the subject to accept t h i s o ffer?' 
I t w i l l be noted that the subject i s asked to advise 
another person whether i t i s l o g i c a l to accept or r e j e c t an offer. 
This was a further ciontrol for the e f f e c t s of 'always' r u l e s . I f 
the subject forms an (inductive) conclusion that he 'knows' that a l l 
As are paired with ones, he may personally f e e l i t unnecessary to 
accept any of the offers on r u l e s concerning As. However, given that 
he i s not allowed to t e l l the other person what he 'knows', he must 
help the other person find out for himself. The l o g i c a l l y correct 
choice for the 'other person' i s thus the sajne for a l l four r u l e s . 
After completion of the selection task, the subject 
was transferred back to a probability learning task prior to each 
subsequent selection task. Subsequent selection tasks were preceded 
by the following instructions: 
"The computer has again fed a few of the pairs at random 
into a separate store and i s once more going to make a 
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statement about t h i s new store. 
Suppose that another subject (who has never seen any 
of the letter/number p a i r s ) i s given the l o g i c a l reasoning 
task. 
As before, your task i s to advise him whether, from 
h i s point of view, i t would be l o g i c a l to accept or r e j e c t 
the computer's o f f e r . " 
Data for each subject were recorded by the program which 
presented a summary table once the sequence of tasks was completed. 
C r i t e r i a for Probability Learning Tasks 
To reach c r i t e r i o n on t h e f i r s t probability learning 
task, the subject was required to have; 
l ) Responded '1' to the l a s t s i x As 
AND 2) Responded '2' to at l e a s t s i x of the l a s t ten Bs and 
to have responded '1' or '3' to no more than three of 
the l a s t ten Bs 
AND 3) Responded '3' to at l e a s t s i x of the l a s t ten Cs and 
to have responded '1' or '2' to no more than three of 
the l a s t ten Cs. 
To reach c r i t e r i o n on subsequent probability learning 
tasks, the subject was required to have; 
1) Responded '1' to the l a s t four As 
AND 2) Responded '2' to at l e a s t four of the l a s t seven Bs 
and to have responded '1' or '3* to no more than two 
of the l a s t seven Bs 
AND 3) Responded '3' to at l e a s t four of the l a s t seven Cs 
and to have responded '1' or '2' to no more than two 
of the l a s t seven Cs. 
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RESULTS 
The percentage frequencies (N = 24) of selection of 
the four a l t e r n a t i v e s , i n the four conditions, are shown in Table 
7.3. 
Table 7-3 
Percentage Selection Frequencies (N = 24) for the Four Conditions 
of Experiment 5. 
TA FA TC F C 
• I F A THEN 1^  (ALWAYS TRUE) 37 62 54 62 
• I F B THEN 2' (USUALLY TRUE) 46 37 42 58 
' I F B THEN 1' (USUALLY F A L S E ) 46 50 62 71 
' I F A THEN 2' (ALWAYS F A L S E ) 58 71 46 75 
Analyses were performed on data 'pooled' between 'always' 
and 'usually' true conditions, and 'always* and 'usually' f a l s e 
conditions. The prediction that f a l s i t y would f a c i l i t a t e general 
sel e c t i o n was confirmed. Subjects accepted more 'offers' under 
'fa l s e ' , than under 'true' conditions (sign t e s t , p < 0,04, one-
t a i l e d ) . However, there were no s i g n i f i c a n t differences i n selection 
of any of the four a l t e r n a t i v e s individually and thus the prediction 
that subjects would s e l e c t s p e c i f i c a l l y more FC in the f a l s e 
conditions was not confirmed (although r e s u l t s were in the predicted 
d i r e c t i o n ) , 
There was a significatnt tendency to s e l e c t more FA on 
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'always' statements (sign t e s t , p < 0.04, two-tailed). There was 
no d i r e c t evidence of an interaction between t h i s e f f e c t and that 
of truth status. However, the e f f e c t of f a l s i t y i n increasing 
selection frequencies was s i g n i f i c a n t on 'usually' statements alone 
(sign t e s t , p < 0.02, two-tailed) but no way near s i g n i f i c a n t on 
'always' statements alone (sign t e s t , p > 0 .5i two-tailed). 
The number of t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n taken by each subject 
on the f i r s t probability learning task was taken as a measure of 
learning performance and associations were observed between t h i s 
measure and selection task performance. Subjects taking a below 
median number of t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n were categorised as 'fast 
learners' (N = 10) and subjects taking an above median number of 
t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n were categorised as 'slow learners' (N = 11) . 
Table 7 A shows the data for each of these two groups under 
(pooled) 'true' and 'fa l s e ' conditions. 
Table 7.^ 
Fercentcige Frequencies of Selections of 'Fast' and 'Slow' Learners 
Under (Pooled) True and False Conditions in Experiment 5. 
FAST I£ARNERS 
(N = 10) 
SLOW lEARNERS 
(N = 11) 
'TRUE' 
CONDITIONS 
'FALSE' 
CONDITIONS 
'TRUE' 
CONDITIONS 
'FALSE' 
CONDITIONS 
TA 
FA 
TC 
FC 
65 
ko 
60 
40 
80 
55 
55 
65 
23 
59 
41 
68 
32 
64 
55 
77 
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There was s i g n i f i c a n t indication that f a s t learning 
was related to greater TA selection and lower FC selection and 
these differences are v i s u a l l y apparent from Table 7.4, Subjects 
who made an above median number of TA selections across the four 
tasks had taken s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n than subjects 
who made a below median number of TA selections (Mann-Whitney, 
p < 0,01, two-tailed) and subjects who made a below median number 
of FC selections had taken s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n 
than subjects who made an above median number of FC selections 
(Mann-Whitney, p < 0.05, two-tailed).^ 
F i n a l l y , i t was noted that the high frequency of FA, 
and low frequency of TA selections provides an opportunity to t e s t 
for correlations ^ between various selections. Evans (l977b) 
tested for such correlations and, on the basis of the observed 
independence of TC and FC selections, concluded that correlations 
probably do not ex i s t . However, as Evans points out, the high 
frequency of TA, and low frequency of FA, selections t y p i c a l l y 
observed would not be expecrted to y i e l d s i g n i f i c a n t correlations. 
Thus correlations involving TA and FA selections are usually 
d i f f i c u l t to t e s t but may well be present. Table 7.5 shows the 
ana l y s i s of a l l s i x possible pairs of selections and shows the 
dir e c t i o n of correlation and two-tailed significance l e v e l ( i f 5% 
or below). 
As a l l 24 subjects performed a selection task under 
each of the four conditions, the data shown in Table 7.5 do not 
represent four independent t e s t s of each correlation. Given t h i s , 
and given the lack of significance i n most cases, the data could be 
interpreted as consistent with an absence of any correlation 
between selections. 
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Table 7.5 
Data Showing Relationships of Selections within Each of the s i x 
Experiment 5 
COMPARISON CONDITION A B C D DIRECTION OF p 
CORRELATION 
TA V FA AT 3 6 12 3 n. s. 
(P V P) UT 3 8 6 7 n,s. 
UF 2 9 10 3 < 0.02 
AF 10 4 7 3 + n.s. 
TA V TC AT 8 1 5 10 + < 0.03 
(P V Q) UT 8 3 2 11 + < 0.02 
UF 9 2 6 7 + n.s. 
AF 9 " 5 2 8 + h. s, 
TA V FC AT 4 5 11 4 n.s. 
(P V Q) UT 6 5 8 5 n.s. 
UF 7 4 10 3 n.s. 
AF 9 5 9 1 n.s. 
FA V TC AT 6 9 7 2 n.s. 
(P V Q) UT 5 4 5 10 + n.s. 
UF 6 6 9 3 n.s. 
AF •6- • 11- 5" 2 n.s. 
FA V FC AT 10 5 5 4 + n.s. 
(P V Q) UT 8 1 6 9 + n.s. 
UF 10 2 7 5 + n.s. 
AF 14 3 4 • "3 + n.s. 
TC V FC AT 9 4 6 5 + n.s. 
(Q V Q) UT 4 6 10 4 n.s. 
UF 9 6 8 1 n.s. 
AF 9 2 9 4 + n.s. 
A - Both selected B 
D - Neither selected 
KEY 
F i r s t only selected C - Second only selected 
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Alternatively, however, cert a i n trends could be d i s -
tinguished as worth further investigation. F i r s t l y , although the 
data are consistent with the Evans (l977b) finding of lack of 
correlation between TG and FC selections, there i s a suggestion of 
a negative correlation between TA and FA selections and, under one 
condition, t h i s correlation reaches significance (p < 0.02, two-
t a i l e d ) . Secondly, the data are c l e a r l y consistent with a tendency 
to select TC, and not FC, when TA i s selected, and to s e l e c t FC, 
and not TC, when FA i s selected. I t i s possible that card selections 
are p o s i t i v e l y correlated when they have the same matching status, 
and negatively correlated when they have opposite matching status. 
However, given the number of t e s t s , any s i g n i f i c a n t correlations 
i n Table 7.5 would require r e p l i c a t i o n before further discussion. 
DISCUSSION 
The p r o f i l e of selections i n Experiment 5 was somewhat 
unusual in comparison with r e s u l t s t y p i c a l l y observed. In 
part i c u l a r , FA selection was very high and i t may well be that 
computer presentation of the task had more e f f e c t on responses 
than had been expected. 
The associations observed between probability 
learning speed and selection task performance were unexpected and 
are d i f f i c u l t to interpret. I t i s possible that individual cognitive 
differences within the sample mediated both tasks. However, i t 
should be noted that f a s t e r learners would have had l e s s prior exposure 
to the l e t t e r s and numbers used in the selection tasks and thus 
t h i s factor could have been responsible for the differences in 
selection task responses. 
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The e f f e c t of truth status in t h i s experiment was to 
produce a greater overall selection tendency in the ' f a l s e ' 
condition. Although t h i s finding r e p l i c a t e s the r e s u l t s of 
Experiment 4 and again demonstrates an e f f e c t of truth status on 
an abstract selection task, i t lends l i t t l e apparent support to the 
association theory developed in the discussion of Experiment 3* 
The association theory would not predict that a l l selection 
frequencies would r i s e in the 'false' condition and, in fact, should 
predict that TC frequencies would f a l l , as TC i s l e s s associated 
with TA i n the 'false' condition. 
However, there i s a possible explanation of t h i s 
apparent inconsistency. I t may well be that f a l s i t y did not 
reduce TC selection frequencies because such selections matched. 
Further, TA w i l l be l e s s associated, and FA comparitively (to TA) 
more associated, with TC i n the ' f a l s e ' condition, which may also 
have an e f f e c t on selection frequencies. In t h i s case, f a l s i t y 
would be expected to increase both FC and FA selection and to 
decrease both TC and TA selection. However, i f both these decreases 
were inhibited by matching bias, then the o v e r a l l e f f e c t would 
be an increase in t o t a l selection frequencies. This interpretation 
i s neither supported nor opposed by the data of Experiment 5i as 
evidence of a s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher o v e r a l l selection frequency 
cannot be taken as evidence either for, or against, a higher 
selection frequency in any individual case. To t e s t t h i s 
interpretation, i t would be necessary to control for matching bias 
by designing an experiment that u t i l i s e s a l l four possible 
conditional r u l e s , in which the presence of negative components 
i s systematically manipulated. F a l s i t y would then be expected, 
across the four r u l e s , to increase FC and FA selections but to 
decrease TA and TC selections. 
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However, the data also lend themselves to an e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n the pr o b a b i l i t y learning phase of 
both Experiment .^ and Experiment 5. the contingency that subjects 
learned was, as f a r as lik e l i h o o d was concerned, one of 
equivalence. That i s , not only was ( f o r instance) 2 the most 
l i k e l y number, given B, but alse B was the most l i k e l y l e t t e r , 
given 2 . The subjects may thus have been led to interpr e t rules 
presented on the selection task as implying equivalence. When 
the r u l e implies equivalence, a l l cards are,potential f a l s i f i e r s 
and the l o g i c a l l y correct solution i s to select a l l four cards. 
I t i s thus possible that f a l s i t y leads subjects to behave more 
l o g i c a l l y . This explanation i s also consistent with the data of 
Experiment J SLS, i n that case, subjects were presented with 
(thematic) rules that depended on t h e i r past experience of material 
implication. Thus f a l s i t y could have caused subjects to behave 
more l o g i c a l l y i n a l l three t r u t h status experiments;- selecting 
more FC (but not more TA, due to a ' c e i l i n g e f f e c t ' ) on the 
implication rules of Experiment 3 and selecting more cards generally 
on the equivalence rules of Experiments ^ and 5. 
This explanation i s testable by.teaching subjects a 
contingency that implies implication rather than equivalence, I f 
the e f f e c t of f a l s i t y on selection tasks i s to lead subjects to 
behave more l o g i c a l l y , then, i f subjects learn an 'implication' 
contingency, they should select more TA and FC, but less FA and TC, 
i n the 'false' condition. In order to observe effects on TA and 
FA, i t would be necessary to u t i l i s e a l l four conditional rules 
as, when the ' I f P then Q' form only i s used, ' c e i l i n g ' and 'floor' 
e f f e c t s are usually observed on TA and FA respectively. 
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An experiment that discriminates between the above 
alternative interpretations of the re s u l t s of Experiments 3» ^ and 
5 i s reported i n chapter 8, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. For the f i r s t r u l e , the probability of a '1' being on the back 
of the *A' i s 0.8 and the probability of an A not being on the back 
of the2 i s also 0.8, The probability of the rule being true f o r 
the four cards i s thus 0,8 x 0.8 = 0.64. This analysis also applies 
to the * I f B then 2* relationship. However, certain complications 
arise from the presence of other cards on the table. (See further 
note i n Appendix) 
2. For the second two rules, a similar analysis yields a 
prob a b i l i t y of the rule being true o f 0 . 2 x 0 . 2 = 0 . 0 4 . 
3. Of course, i t cannot be assumed that the subjective p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
are the same as the objective p r o b a b i l i t i e s quoted, or that the 
subjective p r o b a b i l i t i e s perceived by one subject are the same as 
those perceived by another. In f a c t , subjects may well not perceive 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s i n mathematical terms, a p o s s i b i l i t y suggested by 
Fhaner (1977) . 
4. I t should be noted that, f o r c l a r i t y , Table 7 . ^ presents 
selection frequencies f o r subjects c l a s s i f i e d as above and below 
median on t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n , whereas analyses were performed on 
numbers of t r i a l s to c r i t e r i o n between subjects c l a s s i f i e d as 
making an above or below mediaui number of selections. 
5. The term correlation i s used here, although independence 
between card selections i s tested by chi-squared. Such tests of 
association are essentially tests of correlation, and the l a t t e r 
term i s used henceforth to distinguish s t a t i s t i c a l association 
(correlation) from psychological association, referred to elsewhere 
i n the text. 
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APIENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 
A FURTHER NOTE ON THE OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY OF 'TRUE 
AND ' FALSE' STATEMENTS USED IN EXIERIKENTS 
^ and 5 
-2k2-
In Experiments 4 and 5, various p r o b a b i l i t i e s have 
been quoted, i n the method sections, of the lik e l i h o o d of the rule 
•holding' f o r the four cards used i n the selection task. The 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s quoted have not been s t r i c t l y accurate due to the 
d i s t o r t i n g effects of other cards having been drawn from the pack. 
To avoid undue complication, t h i s point w i l l be i l l u s t r a t e d only 
f o r the case of a 'true' rule i n Experiment 4: 
as follows: 
In Experiment 4, the pack was composed of 20 cards 
8 cards having A on one side and 1 on the other 
8 cards having B on one side and 2 on the other 
2 cards having A on one side and 2 on the other 
2 cards having B on one side and 1 on the other 
For the 'true* rule ' i f A then 1*, the following four 
faces are displayed on the table; 
A B 1 2 
The pr o b a b i l i t y of t h i s rule holding f o r these cards 
was given as 0.64. This i s obtained from the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of 
the p r o b a b i l i t y of a 1 being on the back of an A (0.8) and the 
pr o b a b i l i t y of a B being on the back of a 2 (0.8). 
This calculation, however, ignores the presence of the 
other cards. For instance, i f ten B cards were displayed then the 
prob a b i l i t y of the rule holding would be zero (as the 2 card must 
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have an A on the back). Similarly, the rule would d e f i n i t e l y be 
false i f ten 1 cards were displayed. Even the presence of one B 
and one 1 card a l t e r s the p r o b a b i l i t i e s ( f o r instance, i f a 2 i s 
on the back of the B, then the-probability of a B being on the back 
of the 2 i s 7 / 9 , not 8 / l 0 ) . 
The pro b a b i l i t y of the rule holding i s possibly a 
function of the order i n which the cards are considered to have been 
drawn from the pack. The pro b a b i l i t y of the rule holding i s 0.64 
only i f the A and 2 cards are drawn f i r s t . However, i f the four 
cards are considered to have been drawn i n the order (from l e f t to 
r i g h t ) depicted, then: 
1) The pr o b a b i l i t y of the A having a 1 on the back i s 0.8 
2) The pr o b a b i l i t y of the 2 having a B on the back i s : 
a) 0.8, i f the B card has a one on the back (p = 0.2) 
b) 7/9 = 0 .77 . i f the B card has a 2 on the back (p = 0.8) 
* 
And i s thus; (0.2)(0.8) + (0.8)(0.77) = 0.782. approx. 
The p r o b a b i l i t y of the rule holding i s thus (approximately) 
(0.8)(0.782) = 0.626 
However, the pro b a b i l i t y w i l l not be the same i f 
d i f f e r e n t orders axe considered. Thus an exact p r o b a b i l i t y of the 
rule holding cannot be given, as i t depends upon the order i n which 
the cards are drawn from the pack. 
CHAPIER 8 
THE EFFECT OF EXI^RIMENTALLY MANIPULATED TRUTH STATUS ON SEIECTION 
TASK RESPONSES ACROSS ALL FOUR FORMS OF A CONDITIONAL RUIE 
EXPERIMENT 6 248 
APPENDIX 268 
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In accordance with the points raised i n the discussion 
of Experiment 5, a further experiment was designed that u t i l i s e d 
a l l four forms of conditional r u l e , formed by systematic negation 
of the components, and ensured that subjects were exposed to an 
implication contingency during the p r o b a b i l i t y learning phases. 
Packs of cards were constructed that either d i d , or 
did not,-, have a given symbol on one side, and d i d , or did not, have 
another symbol on the other, and these packs were used to teach 
subjects the four types of contingent relationship. Subjects who 
had learned, f o r instance, the ' I f P then Q'contingency, were 
presented with a selection task using a rule of t h i s form i n the 
'true' condition, or a selection task using a rule of the form 
' I f P then Q' i n the Yalse' condition. Thus, the consequent of 
the contingency learned was negated i n the 'false' condition. 
The composition of packs teaching an ' I f P then Q' r e l a t i o n i s 
l i s t e d below! 
7 cards having P on one side and Q on the other 
1 card having P on one side and Q ( i . e . blank) on the other 
7 cards having P ( i . e . blank) on one side and Q on the other 
7 cards having P on one side and Q on the other 
The side of the card to which the antecedent referred 
was red and the other side was blue, to distinguish between blank 
cards. For the above contingency, subjects evaluated the rule 
' I f P then Q' i n the 'true' condition or evaluated the rule ' I f P 
then not Q' i n the 'false' condition. That the contingency i s one 
of implication should be clear from the r e l a t i v e numbers of cards. 
Although Q i s on the back of most Ps (7 out of 8 ) , i t i s on the back 
of only half the blank (P) cards (7 out of 14) and P i s on the back 
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of only half the Q cards (again, 7 out of 1 4 ) . Put simply, whereas 
i n Experiment 4 , P(P/Q) = p (O/P) = 0 . 8 , i n t h i s experiment, 
p (Q/P) = 0.873 p (P/Q) = p (Q/P) = 0 .5 . 
The central aim of t h i s experiment was to distinguish 
between various possible theoretical interpretations of the effects 
of t r u t h status observed i n Experiments 3» 4 and 5- As was 
discussed i n chapter 7 i the association theory would predict an 
increase i n FC and FA selections and a decrease i n TC and TA selections, 
whereas the theory that f a l s i t y leads subjects to behave more 
l o g i c a l l y would predict an increase i n TA and FC selections and a 
decrease i n FA and TC selections. A t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y i s that 
the e f f e c t of t r u t h status on abstract tasks i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y 
d i f f e r e n t from i t s e f f e c t on thematic tasks and that i t does, i n 
accordance with the results of Experiments 4 and 5 i simply 
f a c i l i t a t e selection of a l l cards i n the 'false' condition. This 
l a s t hypothesis leads to a t h i r d set of predictions. The various 
predictions are compared i n Table 8 , 1 . I t should be noted that a l l 
predictions about FC are the same and t h i s prediction may thus be 
tested one-tailed, whereas differences i n selections of other 
cards must be tested two-tailed. 
The use of a l l four conditional rules i n t h i s 
experiment also allowed f o r a more detailed analysis of selection 
differences between 'fast' and 'slow* learners, as i t was possible 
to determine whether such differences are observed on the basis of 
l o g i c a l , or matching status. 
Selection task rules were designed to be 'usually true' 
or 'usually false'. 'Always' conditions were not used because, as 
has been mentioned e a r l i e r , they disrupt the logic of the selection 
task ( i , e . subjects know the rule to be true or false and need turn 
over no cards). This disruption i s not easy to overcome when manual 
presentation i s used, 
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Table 8.1 
Predictions of Three Possible Explanations of the Effects of 
Truth Status as to Increase or Decrease of Selections i n the 
*False' Condition, 
ASSOCIATION THEORY ' 
MORE LOGICAL IN FALSE CONDITION 
TA FA TC FC 
lESS MORE LESS MORE 
MORE lESS lESS MORE 
MORE MORE MORE MORE 
EXIERIMENT 6 
METHOD 
Design 
Subjects were p^^esented with four p r o b a b i l i t y learning 
tasks, to teach them the contingency relationships of four separate 
packs of cards. These represented a l l four possible contingencies 
that can be formed by making the presence or absence of a given 
symbol on the (blue) back of the cards contingent upon the presence 
or absence of another given symbol on the (red) f r o n t of the cards. 
Different symbols were used i n each pack and the absence of a symbol 
was represented by a blank. 
After the subject had reached c r i t e r i o n on each 
pr o b a b i l i t y learning task, four cards of that pack were used f o r 
a selection task. Subjects i n the 'true' condition were presented 
with a rule to evaluate that, on the basis of t h e i r p r o bability 
learning experience, was l i k e l y to hold f o r the four cards (the rule 
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was a statement of the contingency that the subject had learned); 
whereas subjects i n the 'false* condition were presented with a 
rule that was unli k e l y to hold (the rule was a statement of the 
contingency that the subject had learned, with the consequent 
negated). Thus, f o r instance, i f the contingency learned was that 
cards with no symbol on the f r o n t usually had no symbol on the back, 
a subject i n the 'true' condition would evaluate a rule of the 
form ' I f not P then not Q* and a subject i n the 'false* condition 
would evaluate a rule of the form * I f not P then Q'. 
Subjects i n both conditions performed one selection 
task on each of the four forms of the conditional r u l e . A l l 24 
possible orders of presenting the p r o b a b i l i t y learning/selection 
task pairs were used i n each condition. 
Materials 
Packs of 22 6" x 4" cards were used, coloured red on 
the f r o n t and blue on the back. Four d i f f e r e n t types of symbol 
combination were used; 
1) Packs having Triangles on the f r o n t and Stars on the back 
2) Packs having Rectangles on the f r o n t and Ticks on the back 
3) Packs having Diamonds on the f r o n t and Crosses on the back 
4) Packs having Squares on the f r o n t and Circles on the back 
Each subject was presented with one pr o b a b i l i t y learning 
task followed by one selection task with each of the above sets of 
cards, each representing a d i f f e r e n t contingency. Each card set 
was used to present each of the four types of contingency r e l a t i o n 
to 12 of the 48 subjects. There were thus l 6 packs of cards (four 
symbol types x four types of contingency). The composition of the 
packs to represent the four contingencies i s shown overleaf f o r 
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the Squares and Circles set. 
I f Square then Circle 
7 cards having a Square on the f r o n t and a Circle on the back 
(p (C/S) = 0.875; P (S/C) = O.5) 
1 card having a Square on the f r o n t and a Blank on the back 
(p (Bl/S) = 0.125; P (S/Bl) = 0 .125) 
7 cards having a Blank on the fro n t and a Circle on the back 
(p (C/Bl) = 0 .5 ; P (Bl/C) = 0 .5 ) 
7 cards having a Blank on both sides 
(p (blue blank/red blank)= 0 .5 ; P (red blank/blue blank) 
" = 0.875) 
22 cards 
I f Square then not Circle 
7 cards with Square and Blank 
1 card with Square and Circle 
7 cards with Blank and Circle 
7 cards with both sides Blank 
I f not Square then Circle 
7 cards with Square and Circle 
7 cards with Square and Blank 
7 cards with Blank and Circle 
1 card with both sides Blank 
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I f not Square then not Circle 
7 cards with Square and Circle 
7 cards with Square and Blank 
7 cards with both sides Blank 
1 card with Blank and Circle 
Sixteen conditional rules were typed on separate sheets 
of paper (four forms of rule x four sets of symbols). These a l l 
had the same format, f o r instance: 
" I f there i s a Square on the red side, then there i s 
not a Star on the blue side." 
The rules had a pro b a b i l i t y of being true, f o r the four 
cards used, (see notes 1 , 2 and 3 of chapter 7) of approximately 
11% i n the 'true' condition and of approximately t% i n the 'false' 
condition. 
Subjects 
48 undergraduates at Plymouth Polytechnic acted as paid 
volunteers and were tested i n d i v i d u a l l y . They were assigned 
alternately to each condition and, vrithin each condition, were 
randomly assigned to each of the 24 possible presentation orders. 
Procedure 
The procedure was essentially the same as i n Experiment 
3, with substitution of the relevant symbols f o r references to 
l e t t e r s and numbers. The main difference was that the procedure 
was repeated four times, using a. d i f f e r e n t pack (and contingency) 
on each occasion. 
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The other difference was i n the c r i t e r i o n set for'the 
p r o b a b i l i t y learning task. Subjects were not given a set number 
of t r i a l s , but continued with the p r o b a b i l i t y learning task u n t i l 
they reached c r i t e r i o n . Eight'of the 22 cards'were salient to the 
contingency relationship and thus, on each run through- the pack, 
ei{;ht of the subject*s guesses could be scored as to whether they 
conformed to the most probable outcome. The c r i t e r i o n set was that 
the subject should have scored either 13 (out of 16) on the l a s t 
two t r i a l s or 17 (out-of 2 4 ) on the l a s t three t r i a l s . These are 
minimum scores that would be s i g n i f i c a n t on a one-tailed test 
(although given that the subject may have many more than two or 
three t r i a l s and that 4 8 subjects are involved, attainment of the 
c r i t e r i o n does not necessarily represent s i g n i f i c a n t evidence of 
learning i n each case). I t was decided that, i f the subject had 
f a i l e d to reach c r i t e r i o n a f t e r 20 t r i a l s , he would be dropped from 
the sainple and replaced. The same c r i t e r i o n was applied to a l l 
four probability learning tasks, 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Four subjects f a i l e d to reach c r i t e r i o n on the 
prob a b i l i t y learning tasks and were replaced. Analysis of 
prob a b i l i t y learning task results yielded no s i g n i f i c a n t evidence 
that any contingencies were more d i f f i c u l t to learn than others. 
The percentage frequency of selection (N = 24) of the 
four cards, f o r each of the four rules, under each of the two 
conditions, i s shown i n Table 8.2, 
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Table 8.2 
Percentage Selection Frequencies of the Four Cards i n the 'True' and 'False' Conditions of 
Experiment 6 
IF P THEN Q IF P THEN Q IF P THEN Q IF P THEN Q ALL FOUR RULES 
• TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE 
Logical Status 
of Card 
TA 96 75 96 79 100 88 88 71 95 78 
FA 13 33 17 25 17 29 21 46 17 33 
TC 83 58 67 58 83 71 75 38 77 56 
FC 29 50 50 67 25 54 38 63 35 58 
T?^ffpot^ o f ^ i t h S+^tUS 
Subjects i n the 'false' condition selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more 
FC (Kendall's S, p < O.O3, one-tailed), less TC (Kendall's S p < 0 .02 , 
two-tailed) and less TA (Kendall's S, p < 0 ,05 . two-tailed) than did 
subjects i n the 'true' condition. Subjects i n the 'false' condition 
selected more FA on a l l four rules, but t h i s f a i l e d to reach 
significance. 
Subjects selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more FC i n the 'false' 
condition and thus t h i s experiment replicated, on abstract rules, 
the main e f f e c t of t r u t h status observed on thematic rules i n 
Experiment 3, This r e s u l t accords with a l l three sets of predictions 
l i s t e d i n Table 8 . 1 . Subjects also selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y less TC 
i n the 'false' condition and thus the e f f e c t of f a l s i t y i s not a 
simple f a c i l i t a t i o n of. card selection. There was, i n f a c t , no 
overal l f a c i l i t a t i o n of card selection i n the 'false' condition. 
Given that subjects learned 'implication' contingencies, 
the e f f e c t of t r u t h status on consequent selections accords both 
with the association theory predictions and with those of the theory 
that f a l s i t y leads subjects to behave more i n accordance with 
l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y (see Table 8 . 1 ) . However, on the basis of the 
antecedent selections, i t i s clear that subjects are not 
behaving more ' l o g i c a l l y ' i n the 'false' condition. This hypothesis 
i s disconfirmed by the s i g n i f i c a n t decrease i n TA selection 
(p < 0 .05, two-tailed). This decrease i n TA selection, and the 
increase i n FA selection, does accord with the association theory 
predictions (see Table 8 .1) 
I t had been expected that the 'matching bias' e f f e c t 
observed by Evans & Lynch (1973) a-nd replicated by Manktelow & Evans 
(1979) would be further replicated on these data. Across both con-
d i t i o n s , as predicted, s i g n i f i c a n t l y more TC was selected when the 
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consequent was a f f i r m a t i v e ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0 .005, o n e - t a i l e d ) and 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more FC was selected when the consequent was negative 
( s i g n t e s t , p < 0.01, o n e - t a i l e d ) . Generally, across both c o n d i t i o n s , 
more Q than Q s e l e c t i o n s were made ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0.001, o n e - t a i l e d ) , 
t h i s r e s u l t h o l d i n g f o r both the *true* ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0.02, one-
t a i l e d ) , a n d the ' f a l s e ' ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0.02, one- t a i l e d ) , conditions. 
There was thus good evidence of a matching e f f e c t on consequent 
s e l e c t i o n s . However, there was no s i g n i f i c a n t evidence o f an 
o v e r a l l matching e f f e c t on antecedent s e l e c t i o n s . 
P r o b a b i l i t y Learning D i f f e r e n c e s 
The median number o f t r i a l s t o c r i t e r i o n on the f i r s t 
p r o b a b i l i t y l e a r n i n g task was f o u r . The data were s p l i t i n t o a 
below median ( ' f a s t l e a r n e r ' ) group (N = 2 1 ) and an above median 
('slow l e a r n e r ' ) group (N = 20). Twelve of the f a s t l e a r n e r s , and 
ten o f the slow l e a r n e r s , were from the ' t r u e ' c o n d i t i o n . Table 
8.3 shows an a n a l y s i s o f s e l e c t i o n s f o r both of these groups and 
Table 8.4 presents a s i m p l i f i e d v e r s i o n , w i t h data pooled across a l l 
f o u r r u l e s . 
I n Experiment 5, f a s t l e a r n e r s selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more 
TA and l e s s FC. As only AA r u l e s were used, they thus also selected 
more P and l e s s Q. However, these r e s u l t s were not r e p l i c a t e d f o r 
e i t h e r l o g i c a l or matching values. .Fast l e a r n e r s d i d s e l e c t more 
TA than slow l e a r n e r s , but t h i s r e s u l t was not s i g n i f i c a n t . 
The only s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the groups was on FA 
s e l e c t i o n , f a s t l e a r n e r s s e l e c t i n g l e s s FA than slow l e a r n e r s 
(Kendall's S, p < 0.04, two t a i l e d ) . 
-255-
Table 8 . 3 
I 
Ox 
ON 
I F P THEN Q IF P THEN Q IF P THEN Q IF P THEN Q 
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE 
Table 8.3A Fast Learners (N = 1 2 f o r 'true',and N = 9 f o r 'false', c o n d i t i o n ) 
TA 9 2 8 9 1 0 0 8 9 1 0 0 8 9 8 3 8 9 
FA 8 2 2 1 7 1 1 8 1 1 25 1 1 
TC 83 55 5 8 6? 8 3 7 8 7 5 33 
FG 33 6? 50 8 9 25 55 50 7 8 
Table 8 . 3 B Slow Learners (N = 1 0 i n each c o n d i t i o n ) 
TA 1 0 0 60 90 7 0 1 0 0 8 0 90 50 
FA 2 0 50 1 0 2 0 30 60 1 0 8 0 
TC 90 8 0 8 0 4 0 90 7 0 8 0 4 0 
FC 30 30 50 50 30 50 2 0 60 
Table 8 .^ 
Comparison Between Fast and Slow Learners of Percentage Selections 
(Pooled Across the Four Rule Forms i n Experiment 6) 
*TRUE' CONDITION FALSE' CONDITION 
FAST lEARNERS SLOW lEARNERS FAST lEARNERS SLOW I£ARNERS 
TA 
FA 
TC 
FC 
94 
15 
75 
40 
95 
1? 
85 
32 
89 
Ik 
58 
72 
65 
52 
57 
47 
D i f f e r e n t i a l E f f e c t s of Truth Status 
I t i s apparent from Table 8.4 t h a t t r u t h s t a t u s d i d not 
a f f e c t the antecedent s e l e c t i o n s o f f a s t l e a r n e r s . Faist l e a r n e r s 
showed no s t a t i s t i c a l evidence of s e l e c t i n g less TA i n the ' f a l s e ' 
c o n d i t i o n (Kendall's S, p > 0.8, t w o - t a i l e d ) and a n o n s i g n i f i c a n t 
tendency t o s e l e c t l e s s FA (Kendall's S, p > 0 . 5 , t w o - t a i l e d ) . 
Slow lea r n e r s however, selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more FA (Kendall's 
S, p < 0 .03 , t w o - t a i l e d ) , and . s i g n i f i c a n t l y l ess TA (Kendall's 
S, p < 0.04, t w o - t a i l e d ) , i n the ' f a l s e * c o n d i t i o n . 
The e f f e c t o f t r u t h s t a t u s on TA s e l e c t i o n s was thus 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the slow le a r n e r s but nowhere near s i g n i f i c a n c e 
f o r the f a s t l e a r n e r s , and the e f f e c t o f t r u t h s t a t u s on FA s e l e c t i o n s 
was ( m a r g i n a l l y ) reversed f o r f a s t l e a r n e r s . I t may thus be 
concluded from t h i s a n a l y s i s t h a t the e f f e c t o f t r u t h s t a t u s on 
antecedent s e l e c t i o n s i s both t o increase FA, and decrease TA, 
se l e c t i o n s i n the ' f a l s e ' c o n d i t i o n , but t h a t f a s t l e a r n e r s are 
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'immune t o t h i s e f f e c t . I t appeajTs, however, t h a t both f a s t and 
slow l e a r n e r s are equ a l l y a f f e c t e d by the e f f e c t of t r u t h s t a t u s 
on consequent s e l e c t i o n s . 
D i f f e r e n t i a l E f f e c t s o f Matching Bias 
Although slow l e a r n e r s showed a s i g n i f i c a n t o v e r a l l ^ 
e f f e c t o f matching b i a s , (p < O.O3, o n e - t a i l e d ) , t h i s e f f e c t was, 
only near s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r antecedent ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0 .09 i one-
t a i l e d ) and consequent ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0 ,08 , o n e - t a i l e d ) s e l e c t i o n s 
analysed separately. I n c o n t r a s t , f a s t l e a r n e r s showed no tendency 
t o match on antecedent s e l e c t i o n s (p = l.O) but a h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
tendency t o match on consequent s e l e c t i o n s ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0 .001) , 
These r e s u l t s show t h a t matching only a f f e c t s consequent 
s e l e c t i o n s o f f a s t l e a r n e r s but suggest t h a t f o r slow l e a r n e r s , 
matching has an equal e f f e c t on antecedent and consequent s e l e c t i o n s . 
This d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t can be te s t e d d i r e c t l y by t e s t i n g the 
i n t e r a c t i o n between matching bias and component ( i . e . antecedent 
or consequent) o f s e l e c t i o n . This i n t e r a c t i o n was found t o be 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r f a s t l e a r n e r s ( s i g n t e s t , p < 0 . 0 1 , t w o - t a i l e d ) but 
wholly n o n s i g n i f i c a n t f o r slow le a r n e r s ( s i g n t e s t , p = 1.0, two-
t a i l e d ) . Thus matching bias only a f f e c t e d consequent s e l e c t i o n s 
o f f a s t l e a r n e r s but had an equal e f f e c t on antecedent and consequent 
s e l e c t i o n s o f slow l e a r n e r s . 
Correlations'^ Between Selections - • 
A thorough a n a l y s i s by Evans (1977b) has i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
no c o r r e l a t i o n s e x i s t between TC and FC (or Q and Q) s e l e c t i o n s . 
However, a n a l y s i s o f the data o f experiment 5 suggested the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t there i s a (negative) c o r r e l a t i o n between TA and 
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FA (or P and P), and t h a t antecedent s e l e c t i o n s are p o s i t i v e l y 
c o r r e l a t e d w i t h consequent s e l e c t i o n s o f the same matching s t a t u s , 
and n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h consequent s e l e c t i o n s o f opposite 
matching s t a t u s (see Table 7 . 5 ) . However, few of the t e s t s per-
formed y i e l d e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t and no conclusions may be 
drawn from those data. C l e a r l y , a f a r more thorough t e s t , of those 
c o r r e l a t i o n s not t e s t e d by Evans (1977b) , i s r e q u i r e d . 
The problem, as Evans (1977b) pointed out, i s t h a t most 
s e l e c t i o n task s t u d i e s have used the AA r u l e only, on which P i s 
almost always selected and P very r a r e l y selected. To t e s t 
c o r r e l a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g these cards, i t i s thus p r e f e r a b l e t o consider 
data from a l l f o u r forms o f c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e . Such data are 
avadlable from Experiment 6, but are also a v a i l a b l e from the 
experiment o f Evans & Lynch (1973) and also from Experiments 1 
and 2 o f Manktelow & Evans (1979) . I t was thus decided t h a t , t o 
provide the strongest possible t e s t o f n u l l hypotheses concerning 
c o r r e l a t i o n s , an a n a l y s i s o f data from a l l these f o u r studies would 
be conducted. Tests o f c o r r e l a t i o n on the AA r u l e were included, 
but were r e s t r i c t e d t o these f o u r s t u d i e s t o maintain c o m p a r a b i l i t y 
w i t h other r u l e forms. 
Tests of a l l f i v e possible c o r r e l a t i o n s not considered 
by Evans ( l977b) were conducted, on each o f the f o u r r u l e s , i n the 
f o l l o w i n g manner: 
1) Tests o f c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h i n each study were conducted by 
use o f Fisher's Exact Tests ( i n accordance w i t h Evans, 
1977b). To provide the strongest possible t e s t , data f^om 
't r u e ' and ' f a l s e ' c o n d i t i o n s i n Experiment 6 were 'pooled' 
(as the groups were independent), as were the data from 
a b s t r a c t and thematic groups i n the two experiments o f 
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Manktelow & Evans (1979) i producing N = 48 i n each case. 
I t might be objected t h a t data from a b s t r a c t and thematic 
groups should not be confused, but i t should be noted 
t h a t no d i f f e r e n c e s between a b s t r a c t and thematic 
c o n d i t i o n s were observed by Manktelow & Evans. 
2) For t h i s purpose, the Fisher's Exact t e s t s were conducted 
o n e - t a i l e d , i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n present 
and a p o s i t i v e or negative Z value assigned t o each r e s u l t . 
Z was set equal t o zero, whenever Fisher's Exact t e s t s 
y i e l d e d p > 0.5 i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n , 
3) Tests o f c o r r e l a t i o n were conducted across a l l f o u r s e t s 
of data by the S t o u f f e r method ( also employed 
i n chapter 5 - see Rosenthal, 1978) . That i s . the 
Z values from each set o f data were used t o produce a 
combined estimate o f Z. 
The r e s u l t s of these t e s t s are shown i n Table 8 .5 . When 
considering c o r r e l a t i o n s between antecedent and consequent s e l e c t i o n s , 
i t i s possible t o present them ordered as t o l o g i c a l or matching 
s t a t u s . Presentation in-^terms o f matching s t a t u s has been adopted 
i n Table 8.5 on the grounds t h a t the p a t t e r n suggested by the data 
of Experiment 5 concerned matching, r a t h e r than l o g i c a l , s t a t u s . 
(The t e s t s are o f course the sajne - i t i s only a question o f 
pre s e n t a t i o n . ) 
Table 8.5 shows the Z value obtained from each study, 
together w i t h the combined estimate o f Z. The l a s t column gives 
the t w o - t a i l e d s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l ( i f s i g n i f i c a n t ) o f the 20 t e s t s . 
Tables of the raw data are given i n the Appendix. 
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Table 8.5 
'Z' Values Assigned t o Results o f Tests of C o r r e l a t i o n Between P a i r s o f 
Card Selections on the Four Rules. Data from Experiment 6, 
COMPARISON RUI£ STUDY FROM WHICH Z VALUE IS DERIVED Combined 2 
FORM E & L M & E 1 M & E 2 Exp 6 'Z' 2 - t a i l 
Estimate 
P V P AA - 0.70 - 0.60 - 1.84 - 1.75 - 2.44 0.02 
AN - 1.38 0.00 - 0.34 - 1.30 - 1.51 n. s. 
NA - 2.50 - 2.94 - 2.69 - 2.34 - 5.23 0.0001 
NN - 2.06 - 4.00 - 4.00 - 3.83 - 6.94 0.0001 
P V Q AA 0.00 0.00 + 0.87 + 0.44 + 0.65 n.s. 
AN + 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 + 0.49 n. s. 
NA - 0.15 + 2.09 + 0.32 - 0.81 + 0.72 n.s. 
NN 0.00 + 2.41 + 2.65 + 0.91 + 2.98 0.005 
P V Q AA - 0.67 - 1.17 - 2.28 - 0.61 - 2.36 0.02 
AN - 2.68 - 0.50 + 0.30 0.00 - l.-W. n.s. 
NA - 0.72 - 1.17 + 1.01 + 0.80 - 0.04 n.s. 
NN - 0.89 - 2.38 - 2 .91 - 1.54 - 3.86 0.0005 
P V Q AA 0.00 - 0.12 - 1.24 - 0.24 - 0.80 n.s. 
AN - 0.21 - 0.65 - 1.07 + 0.46 - 0.73 n.s. 
NA 0.00 - 1.40 0.00 + 1.13 - 0.13 n.s. 
NN 0.00 - 2.46 - 2.29 - 1.06 - 2.90 0.005 
P V Q AA + 1.27 + 0.87 + 2.66 + 0.80 + 2.80 0.01 
AN + 1.38 + 2.26 + 1.60 + 0.91 + 3.07 0.005 
NA + 0.89 + 1.59 + 1.67 0.00 + 2.07 0.04 
NN + 1.82 + 1.35 + 3.98 + 2.25 + 4.70 0.0001 
Key 
E & L - Evans & Lynch (1973) M & E - Manktelow & Evans (1979) 
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Before d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f Table 8 ,5 , one general 
p o i n t should be made. When performing 20 analyses, there i s a 
problem w i t h s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s as, mathematically, i t would be 
'expected' t h a t one r e s u l t would prove s i g n i f i c a n t a t the % l e v e l , 
( i . e . t h a t one 'type 1* e r r o r would occ u r ) . Even f o u r or f i v e such 
r e s u l t s , i n 20 t e s t s , would be very d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e r p r e t . 
However, t h i s d i f f i c u l t y does not g r e a t l y apply t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f the r e s u l t s o f t h e r t e s t s shown i n Table 8 . 5 i f o r two reasons. 
F i r s t l y , i t would c e r t a i n l y not be 'expected' t h a t eleven out o f 
20 analyses would prove s i g n i f i c a n t and, secondly, i t i s noticeable 
t h a t many o f the s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s have a p r o b a b i l i t y which i s 
f a r lower than Three r e s u l t s y i e l d a p r o b a b i l i t y o f a type 1 
e r r o r of l e s s than one i n 10,000 and f o u r other r e s u l t s y i e l d a 
p r o b a b i l i t y of a type 1 e r r o r o f l e s s than one i n 200, 
The most c l e a r cut f i n d i n g shown i n Table 8.5 i s t h a t P 
se l e c t i o n s are p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h Q s e l e c t i o n s . This 
r e s u l t i s s i g n i f i c a n t on a l l r u l e s and i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y noticeable 
t h a t , w i t h i n each i n d i v i d u a l study, no t e s t y i e l d s a negative 
c o r r e l a t i o n . As t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n proved s i g n i f i c a n t on the AA 
r u l e , the r e s u l t was f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t e d , w i t h respect t o the data 
from a l l the other s e l e c t i o n task experiments presented i n t h i s 
t h e s i s , and i t was found t h a t P and Q s e l e c t i o n s on AA r u l e s were 
i n v a r i a b l y p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d i n a l l c o n d i t i o n s o f each 
experiment (although not always s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o r r e l a t e d ) . This 
c o r r e l a t i o n i s thus very c o n s i s t e n t . 
I t i s also reasonable t o conclude from Table 8,5 t h a t 
there i s a negative c o r r e l a t i o n between P and P s e l e c t i o n s , although 
t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n was not s i g n i f i c a n t f o r t h e AN r u l e and produced 
no t i c e a b l y b e t t e r l e v e l s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e on the NA and NN r u l e s 
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(which produce lower frequencies of P, and higher frequencies o f 
P, s e l e c t i o n s . The c o r r e l a t i o n was c o n s i s t e n t l y negative across 
the f o u r s t u d i e s . However, a n a l y s i s across the ( A A r u l e s o f ) 
other experiments presented i n t h i s t h e s i s d i d not r e v e a l a 
c o n s i s t e n t negative a s s o c i a t i o n between P and P, although i n some 
cases, such t e s t s were p o s s i b l y meaningless, due to the very high 
frequencies of P s e l e c t i o n . 
Generally, the sign o f the combined Z estimates i s 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the idea t h a t antecedent and consequent s e l e c t i o n s 
cire p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d when they have s i m i l a r matching st a t u s 
and n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d when they have d i s s i m i l a r matching s t a t u s . 
However, apart from the P v Q comparison, these c o r r e l a t i o n s r a r e l y 
approached s i g n i f i c a n c e , except i n the case of the NN r u l e . Although 
i t i s possible t h a t these t e s t s may prove s i g n i f i c a n t across a 
large number of s t u d i e s , i t i s probable t h a t , even i f t h i s general 
tendency e x i s t s , i t plays a very minor r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the data. 
Only i n the case o f the NN r u l e does t h i s p a t t e r n play a c l e a r r o l e . 
I n conclusion, the r e s u l t s shown i n T^ble 8.5 may be 
summarised i n three ways: 
1) There i s a h i g h l y c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 
between P and Q s e l e c t i o n s . 
2) There i s a negative c o r r e l a t i o n between P and P s e l e c t i o n s 
although t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n appears t o be much stronger 
on the NA and NN r u l e s and d i d not reach s i g n i f i c a n c e 
on the AN r u l e . Further t e s t s on the data of other 
experiments presented i n t h i s t h e s i s suggested t h a t , on 
the AA r u l e , t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n i s not as c o n s i s t e n t as 
t h a t between P and Q s e l e c t i o n s . 
3) On the NN r u l e there i s a h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t tendency 
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f o r s e l e c t i o n o f cards o f s i m i l a r matching s t a t u s t o be 
p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d and f o r s e l e c t i o n o f cards of 
d i s s i m i l a r matching s t a t u s t o be ne g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d . 
I t i s possible t h a t t h i s general tendency extends t o 
other r u l e forms but, even i f t h i s were the case, i t i s 
u n l i k e l y t h a t i t would play an important r o l e i n 
determining responses, 
CONCLUSIONS 
I n the ' f a l s e ' c o n d i t i o n o f Experiment 6, subjects 
selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more FC and s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s TA and TC. 
They also selected more FA, although t h i s r e s u l t d i d not reach 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . However, t h a t the increase i n FA s e l e c t i o n f a i l e d 
t o reach s i g n i f i c a n c e may be ignored, as f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s revealed 
t h a t t r u t h s t a t u s d i d not a f f e c t the antecedent s e l e c t i o n s 6 f f a s t 
l e a r n e r s , but t h a t slow l e a r n e r s selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s TA, 
and s i g n i f i c c i n t l y more FA, i n the ' f a l s e ' c o n d i t i o n . 
The r e s u l t s o f Experiment 6, concerning t r u t h s t a t u s 
e f f e c t s , were thus a l l i n accord w i t h the a s s o c i a t i o n theory 
p r e d i c t i o n s shown i n Table 8 . 1 . The other sets o f p r e d i c t i o n s 
were not confirmed. There was no o v e r a l l f a c i l i t a t i o n o f card 
s e l e c t i o n i n the ' f a l s e ' c o n d i t i o n and the hypothesis t h a t ' f a l s i t y ' 
leads subjects t o behave more i n accordance w i t h l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y 
was disconfirmed by the observed e f f e c t s o f t r u t h s t a t u s on 
antecedent s e l e c t i o n s . 
Fast l e a r n e r s selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e ss FA, and non-
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more TA, than slow l e a r n e r s . These r e s u l t s are 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Experiment 5 f i n d i n g t h a t f a s t l e a r n e r s selected 
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s i g n i f i c a n t l y more TA and n o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s FA than slow 
lea r n e r s (see Table 7 - ^ ) . Further, i n Experiment 6, f a s t l e a r n e r s 
appeared t o be 'immune' from the e f f e c t o f both matching and t r u t h 
s t a t u s on antecedent s e l e c t i o n s . These r e s u l t s suggest t h a t f a s t 
l e a r n e r s d i s p l a y response d i f f e r e n c e s , t o slow l e a r n e r s , on 
antecedent s e l e c t i o n s i n general, such t h a t t h e i r behaviour i s more 
i n accordance w i t h Iq^-cal v a l i d i t y and less susceptible to the 
e f f e c t o f n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . I t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o consider why 
t h i s should be the case. 
The most apparent explanation i s t h a t f a s t l e a r n e r s have 
a stronger a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the ( l o g i c a l ) necessity t o t e s t modus 
ponens. I n the d i s c u s s i o n o f Experiment 5 i t wa^ pointed out t h a t 
an a l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t s e l e c t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s are a 
r e s u l t of the f a c t t h a t slow l e a r n e r s had a longer p e r i o d o f 
exposure t o the task m a t e r i a l s . For instance, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t 
longer exposure may enhance the e f f e c t o f t r u t h s t a t u s on 
antecedent s e l e c t i o n s . However, i t cannot be argued t h a t the 
shor t e r p r i o r exposure t o the m a t e r i a l s i n h i b i t e d the f a s t l e a r n e r s 
from making antecedent matching responses. A l l subjects i n 
Experiment 6 r e c e i v e d considerably more p r i o r exposure t o the task 
m a t e r i a l s than has been the case i n other experiments which have 
produced matching e f f e c t s . Thus d i f f e r e n c e s i n the e f f e c t s of 
matching bias, between f a s t and slow l e a r n e r s , i n d i c a t e t h a t 
response d i f f e r e n c e s between them are not a f u n c t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a l 
p r i o r exposure t o the task m a t e r i a l s . I t i s thus not unreasonable 
to conclude t h a t i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s do play a r o l e i n s e l e c t i o n 
task behaviour, such t h a t some subjects are 'better* a t both 
p r o b a b i l i t y l e a r n i n g and making l o g i c a l l y v a l i d antecedent s e l e c t i o n s . 
There was no evidence of academic d i f f e r e n c e s between f a s t , and 
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slow, l e a r n e r s , who were sampled from the same year o f the same 
course. I t i s thus reasonable t o assume t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a l a b i l i t i e s 
were s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o behaviour concerning c o n d i t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the c o r r e l a t i o n s between c e r t a i n 
s e l e c t i o n s , shown i n Table 8 .5 , w i l l be considered i n r e l e v a n t 
p a r t s o f the general discussion. 
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FOOTOOTES 
1. Analysed across both c o n d i t i o n s and across antecedent and 
consequent, ( i . e . , f o r each subject, s u b t r a c t i n g P and Q, from 
P and Q s e l e c t i o n s . 
2. This may be done by computing (P - P) - (Q - Q) f o r each 
su b j e c t , where P, P, Q and Q stand f o r the t o t a l number of t h a t 
type o f s e l e c t i o n . A negative r e s u l t i n d i c a t e s t h a t the subject 
matched more on consequent s e l e c t i o n s and a p o s i t i v e r e s u l t 
i n d i c a t e s t h a t the subject matched more on antecedent s e l e c t i o n s 
3. See Note 5 of Chapter 7 . 
•267-
APH3NDIX TO CHAPTER 8 
SOURCE TABIES FOR TABLE 8.5 
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Table 8.Al 
Tests' o f Association between P and P 
RUIE SOURCE BOTH P ONLY P ONLY ] EITHER D i r e c t i o n of Z value 
FORM Association 
AA E & L 1 20 1 2 - 0.70 
M & E 1 6 40 1 1 - 0.60 
M & E 2 3 38 3 4 - 1.84 
Expt 6 7 34 4 3 - 1.75 
AN E & L 0 22 1 1 - 1.38 
M & E 1 4 42 0 2 + 0.00 
M & E 2 4 40 1 3 - 0,34 
Expt 6 7 35 3 3 - 1.30 
NA E & L 1 7 12 4 - 2.50 
M & E 1 6 6 34 2 - 2.94 
M & E 2 9 11 24 4 - 2.69 
Expt 6 8 3 37 0 - 2.34 
NN E & L 3 9 9 3 - 2.06 
M & E 1 5 9 33 1 - 4.00 
M & E 2 7 15 24 2 - 4,00 
Expt 6 7 9 
Key 
31 1 3.83 
E & L 
M & E 
M & E 
- Evans & Lynch (1973) 
1 - Manktelow & Evans (1979) Expt 1 
2 - Manktelow & Evans (1979) Expt 2 
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Table 8.A2 
Tests o f Association between P and Q 
RUI£ SOURCE BOTH P ONLY Q ONLY NEITHER D i r e c t i o n o f Z value 
FORM Association 
AA 
AN 
NA 
NN 
E & L 10 11 2 1 - 0.00 
M & E 1 24 22 1 1 + 0.00 
M & E 2 28 13 3 4 + 0.8'7 
Expt 6 30 11 4 3 + 0.44 
E & L 14 8 0 2 + 0.98 
M & E 1 34 12 2 0 - 0.00 
M & E 2 31 13 3 1 - 0.00 
Expt 6 24 18 4 2 - 0.00 
E & L 4 4 10 6 - 0.15 
M & E 1 12 0 24 12 + 2.09 
M & E 2 18 2 23 5 + 0.32 
Expt 6 7 4 30 7 - 0.81 
E & L 9 3 8 4 + 0.00 
M & E 1 13 1 18 16 + 2.41 
M & E 2 19 3 12 14 + 2.65 
Expt 6 10 6 14 18 + 0.91 
Key 
• Evans & Lynch (1973) 
- Manktelow & Evans (1979) Expt 1 
- Manktelow & Evans (1979) Expt 2 
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Table . A3 
Tests of Association between P and Q 
RUI£ SOURCE 
FORM 
BOTH P ONLY Q ONLY NEITHER Direction of Z value 
Association 
AA 
AN 
NA 
NN 
E & L 6 1 5 2 1 
M & E 1 1 5 3 1 2 0 
M & E 2 8 3 3 5 2 
Expt 6 1 5 2 6 i | 3 
E & L 0 2 2 2 0 
M & E 1 7 3 9 1 1 
M & E 2 1 0 3 ^ 0 4 
Expt 6 2 6 1 6 2 
E & L 2 6 8 8 
M & E 1 3 9 18 18 
M & E 2 7 1 3 5 2 3 
Expt 6 6 5 1 3 2k 
E & L 2 1 0 5 7 
M & E 1 2 1 2 1 9 1 5 
M & E 2 3 1 9 1 5 1 1 
Expt 6 6 1 0 2 1 1 1 
0 . 6 7 
1 . 1 7 
2.28 
0 . 6 1 
2 . 6 8 
0 . 5 0 
0 . 3 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 7 2 
1 . 1 7 
1 . 0 1 
0.-80 
0 . 8 9 
2 . 3 8 
2 . 9 1 
1 . 5 ^ 
E & L - Evans & Lynch ( 1 9 7 3 ) 
M & E 1 - Manktelow & Evans ( 1 9 7 9 ) Expt 1 
M & E 2 - Manktelow & Evans ( 1 9 7 9 ) Expt 2 
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Table 8.A^ 
Tests of Association between P and Q 
RULE SOURCE BOTH P ONLY Q ONLY NEITHER Direction of Z value 
FORM association 
AA E & L 1 1 1 1 1 1 = 0 . 0 0 
M & E 1 3 2 2 1 9 - 0 . 1 2 
M & E 2 2 k 2 9 1 3 - 1.24 
Expt 6 7 k 2 7 1 0 - 0.24 
AK E & L 0 1 14 9 - 0 . 2 1 
M & E 1 2 2 3 4 1 0 - 0 . 6 5 
M & E 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 - 1 . 0 7 
Expt 6 7 3 2 1 1 7 + 0.46 
NA E & L 8 5 6 5 + 0 . 0 0 
M & E 1 28 1 2 8 0 - 1.40 
M & E 2 28 5 1 3 2 - 0 . 0 0 
Expt 6 3 6 9 1 2 + 1 . 1 3 
NN E & L 9 3 8 4 + 0 . 0 0 
M & E 1 2 1 1 7 1 0 0 - 2.46 
M & E 2 16 1 5 1 5 2 - 2 . 2 9 
Expt 6 1 7 2 1 7 3 - 1 . 0 6 
Key 
E & L - Evans & Lynch ( 1 9 7 3 ) 
M & E 1 - Manktelow & Evans ( 1 9 7 9 ) Experiment 1 
M & E 2 - Manktelow & Evans ( 1 9 7 9 ) Experiment 2 
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Table 8,A5 
Tests of Association between P and Q 
RUI£ SOURCE BOTH P ONLY Q ONLY NEITHER Direction of Z value 
FORM Association 
AA E & L 2 0 6 16 + 1.27 
M & E 1 3 1 3 28 + 0 . 8 7 
M & E 2 5 1 8 3 4 + 2 . 6 6 
Expt 6 6 5 1 3 24 + 0.80 
AN E & L 1 0 1 2 2 + 1 . 3 8 
M & E 1 3 1 5 3 9 + 2 . 2 6 
M & E 2 3 2 7 3 6 + 1 . 6 0 
Expt 6 8 2 2 2 16 + 0 . 9 1 
NA E & L 7 6 3 8 + 0 . 8 9 
M & E 1 2 0 2 0 1 7 + 1 . 5 9 
M & E 2 1 1 2 2 1 14 + 1 . 6 7 
Expt 6 18 2 7 1 2 + 0 . 0 0 
NN E & L 6 6 1 1 1 + 1.82 
M & E 1 1 9 1 9 2 8 + 1 . 3 5 
M & E 2 18 1 3 0 1 7 + 3 . 9 8 
Expt 6 2 5 1 3 
Key 
2 8 + 2 . 2 5 
E & L - Evans & Lynch ( 1 9 7 3 ) 
M & E 1 - Manktelow & Evans ( 1 9 7 9 ) Experiment 1 
M & E 2 - Manktelow & Evans ( 1 9 7 9 ) Experiment 2 
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CHAPTER 9 
AN EXPERIMENT ON THE EFFECT OF IMPLICIT TRUTH STATUS, 
USING THEMATIC RULES 
EXIERIMENT 7 2?? 
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In the three abstract experiments on truth status 
(Experiments 4 , 5 and 6 ) , the truth status was always i m p l i c i t , 
whereas i t was e x p l i c i t i n the thematic Experiment 3 ( i . e . subjects 
were s p e c i f i c a l l y asked to generate 'true* or 'false* r u l e s ) . I t 
was thus decided to extend investigation to thematic r u l e s having 
i m p l i c i t truth status. For t h i s purpose, i t was decided that an 
i m p l i c i t relationship e x i s t s between certain words and colours and 
that r u l e s such as ' i f the word on one side, i s grass, then the 
colour on the other side i s 'green!,-would serve to introduce an 
i m p l i c i t truth status to the selection task. 
The experiments carried out to date have used 'true' 
conditions in which TC i s related to TA and 'false' conditions in 
which FC i s related to TA. For c l a r i t y , an example of these two 
conditions i s shown in Table 9-1A and 9-IB, using thematic terms 
of the type used in t h i s experiment; 
Table 9.1 
Table showing Possible Thematic Content of a 'True' Rule ( 9'1A) 
and Various Possible Alternative Contents of 'False' Rules (9.1B, 
9.1G and 9>1D) to be used in Experiment 7 
LOGICAL 'TRUE' RUIE: 'FALSE' RUIE; ' I F GRASS THEN RED' 
STATUS •IF GRASS THEN GREEN' 
9.IA 9.IB 9.1c 9.ID 
TA GRASS GRASS GRASS GRASS 
FA COAL COAL COAL BLOOD 
TC GREEN RED RED RED 
FC RED GREEN BLUE BLUE 
I t can be seen from Table 9,iA and 9 . I B that the four 
cards used are the same i n each condition but that the l o g i c a l 
status of the 'green' and 'red' cards i s dependent on the rule to 
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be evaluated. In explaining the e f f e c t of t r u t h status, i t has 
been argued that FC i s more frequently selected i n the 'false* con-
d i t i o n due to i t s association with TA ( i , e . that subjects w i l l tend 
to select the 'green' card i n both 'true' and 'false' conditions). 
However, there are other forms of 'false' condition such as that 
depicted i n Table 9.1C. 
In condition C, neither TO nor FC i s associated with 
TA, Grass i s neither red nor blue. Thus, i f t r u t h status effects 
axe mediated by association, FC selection should be f a c i l i t a t e d i n 
'false' condition B, but not i n 'false' condition C. 
A further possible 'false' condition i s that depicted 
i n Table 9 .ID. As i n condition C, TA (grass) i s associated with 
neither TC (red) nor FC (blue). However, TC (red) i s associated 
with FA (blood) and t h i s greater association with the consequent 
value mentioned i n the r u l e should f a c i l i t a t e FA selection. 
Accordingly, an experiment was designed.which presented 
subjects with four selection tasks, one of each of the above four 
types. The 'true' condition A was used as a comparison condition 
f o r the three 'false' conditions and the following predictions 
were made: 
A - B Comparison; That subjects would select less TC 
and more FC i n condition B ( i n accord 
with previous r e s u l t s ) , 
A - C Comparison: That subjects would select less TC, 
but would not select more FC i n 
condition C, 
A - D Comparison; That subjects would select more FA 
in condition D. 
F i n a l l y , a fur t h e r feature was introduced into t h i s 
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experiment. Subjects were asked to write down the cards they 
wished to select and the cards they .wished not to select ( i n 
separate columns of a sheet of paper). This modification has two 
advantages. F i r s t l y , i t minimises experimenter/subject interaction 
during the task and, secondly, i t allows f o r an analysis of the 
order in which cards are selected or rejected. 
Due to the d i f f i c u l t y of deriving NA conditional rules 
from nonbinary s t i m u l i , only affirmative (AA)'rules were used i n 
t h i s experiment. 
EXIERIMENT 7 
METHOD 
Design 
Subjects were presented with four selection tasks, a l l 
concerned with the evaluation of a (thematic) AA conditional r u l e . 
One task was presented under each of four conditions, as follows: 
1) A 'true' condition (A) i n which there was a natural relationship 
between TA and TC, 
2) A 'false* condition (B) i n which there was a natural 
relationship between TA and FC, 
3 ) A 'false* condition (c) i n which TA was related to neither TC 
nor FC. 
4) A 'false' condition (D) i n which TA was related to neither TC 
nor'FC but i n which FA was related to TC. 
These four conditions were presented to each subject i n 
a random order. 
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Materials 
l ) A pack of 3" x 4" cards was constructed, a l l having one 
coloured side and a word written i n brown ink on the other (white) 
side. The following words and colours were used: 
Words Colours 
Grass Green 
Blood Red 
Canary Yellow 
Sky Blue 
Coal Black 
The pack consisted of 5 0 cards, comprising 2 each of a l l 
possible ( 5 ^ 5 = 2 5 ) combinations of the above. 
The cards to be used i n the selection task were pre-
assigned such that: 
a) Each word was used as TA and FA, and each colour was used 
as TC and FC, an equal number of times i n each of the four conditions. 
b) Each of the ten possible pairs of words, and ten possible 
pairs of colours, ^^^2)* ^^^^ used on at least one problem. 
c) Each word was used as TA no more than once f o r each subject 
d) For each TA, the colour used as the 'false' TC i n 
conditions B, C and D was also used as FC i n condition A. Thus, 
f o r a given TA word, the sajne two colours were used i n conditions 
A and B. For instance, f o r rules about the word 'sky', condition 
A used (an expansion of) the rule 'sky then blue' and used blue as 
TC and green as FC, whereas condition B used the rule 'sky then 
green', and used blue as FC and green as TC. 
2 ) Ten sheets of paper with conditional rules typed on them 
as follows: 
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For use in Condition A 
I f the word on one side of the card i s SKY, then the colour on 
the other side i s BLUE, 
I f the word on one side of the card i s GRASS, then the colour on 
the other side i s GREEN. 
I f the word on one side of the card i s BK)OD, then the colour on 
the other side i s RED. 
I f the colour on one side of the card i s COAL, then the colour on 
the other side i s BLACK. 
I f the word on one side of the card i s CANARY, then the colour on 
the other side i s YELLOW. 
For use In Conditions B, C and D 
I f the word on one side of the card i s SKY, then the colour on 
the other side i s GREEN. 
I f the word on one side of the card i s GRASS, then the colour on 
the other side i s RED. 
I f the word on one side of the card i s BLOOD, then the colour on 
the other side i s YELLOW. 
I f the word on one side of the card i s COAL, then the colour on 
the other side i s BLUE, 
I f the word on one side of the card i s CANARY, then the colour on 
the other side i s BLACK, 
3 ) Sheets of duplicated paper of the following form: 
NECESSARY 
TO TURN OVER 
NOT NECESSARY 
TO TURN OVER 
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Subjects 
• Thirty undergraduates at Plymouth Polytechnic acted as 
paid volunteers. 
Procedure 
The selection task presentation was essentially the 
same as f o r Experiments 4 and 6, Changes i n the presentation are 
l i s t e d below: 
1) The subject was not asked to choose the cards to be l a i d 
on the table, the experimenter selecting the f i r s t cards 
that were the preassigned designates f o r that condition. 
2) At no time during the experiment was a subject allowed 
to see both sides of the sajne card. 
3 ) Instead of verbally indicating t h e i r selections, subjects 
were asked to categorise a l l four cards as either 
necessary, or not necessary, to turn over, on the piece 
of paper i l l u s t r a t e d i n the Materials section. 
As analysis was to be conducted on the order i n which 
the subject wrote down his selections or rejections, the order i n 
which the cards were l a i d on the table was of p a r t i c u l a r importance. 
Two orders were used;- A) word, word, colour, colour; and B) colour, 
colour, word, word. These orders were alternated across the four 
tasks, with f i f t e e n subjects being presented with order A f i r s t . 
The position (within a p a i r ) of TA or FA. and of TC or FC, was 
determined randomly - the f i r s t required word or colour encountered -
being placed on the r i g h t of the pair. The pack was shuffled a f t e r 
each selection task. 
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RESULTS 
The percentage frequencies of selection of the four 
cards, i n the four conditions, i s shown in Table 9 , 2 . 
Table 9 . 2 
Percentage Frequencies of Selections of the Four Cards in the Four 
Conditions of Experiment 7 
C O N D I T I O N 
CARD A B C D 
TA 8 7 9 0 8 7 9 3 
FA 1 0 7 1 3 1 7 
TC 5 7 5 7 5 3 5 0 
FC 2 7 2 7 2 3 2 3 
There i s c l e a r l y no difference between any of the 
conditions and no s t a t i s t i c a l a nalysis was carried out. 
Order E f f e c t s 
Analysis of the order i n which subjects write down thei r 
evaluations i s best carried out by analysing separately each of 
the s i x possible p a i r s of cards. For each pair, a data point i s 
thus obtained whenever a subject s e l e c t s or r e j e c t s both members 
of the pair ( i f he s e l e c t s one, and r e j e c t s the other, no data 
i s obtained, as the cards w i l l be written i n d i f f e r e n t columns). 
Each subject may thus contribute between 0 and 4 data points to 
each comparison. 
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Table 9 . 3 shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of these data points, 
together with the significance l e v e l obtained from two-tailed 
sign tests. I t should be noted that the figures i n the table con-
t a i n more than one measure from some subjects and thus they are not 
the figures on which the sign tests are based. 
Table 9 - 3 
Analysis of the Order i n which Pairs of Cards were Selected or 
Rejected i n Experiment 7 
COMPARISON OF 
PAIR SELECTED 
OR REJECTED 
TOGETHER 
FIRST NAMED 
WRITTEN DOWN 
SECOND NAMED 
WRITTEN DOWN 
FIRST BY SUBJECT FIRST BY SUBJECT 
2 
2 - t a i l e d 
TA v TC 
TA v FA 
TA V FC 
FA V FC 
TC V FC 
FA V TC 
3 8 
1 5 
2 9 
6 3 
3 2 
3 1 
1 6 
6 
3 7 
2 3 
3 0 
0 , 0 1 
0.04 
0 . 0 3 
0 . 0 2 
n.s. 
n.s. 
For the TC v FC comparison, TC was written f i r s t 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more often (p < 0.04) when TC and FC were selected 
but there was no difference when TC and FC were rejected. There 
was also some suggestion i n the data that TC i s selected before FA 
a l l f i v e subjects who selected both TC and FA, on one or more 
occasions, wrote TC down f i r s t . I t appears reasonable to draw the 
following conclusions; 
1 ) There i s a si g n i f i c a n t tendency to respond to TA before 
a l l other cards. 
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2 ) There i s a s i g n i f i c a n t tendency to respond to FA before FC. 
3 ) There i s a p o s s i b i l i t y that the position of TC i n t h i s 
hierarchy v a r i e s . I t may be selected, but not rejected, 
before FA and FC. 
One further t e s t was carried out. I t was considered of 
in t e r e s t to te s t whether comparative association strength had any 
ef f e c t on order. In conditions A and B there i s one associated, 
and one nonassociated (with TA), consequent stimulus, the 
associated stimulus acting as TC in condition A and as FG in 
condition B. As there were no selection differences between the 
conditions, associated and nonassociated stimuli can thus be 
compared across conditions A and B, with l o g i c a l status controlled 
for. 
Whenever TC and FC were selected or rejected together i n 
conditions A and B, the associated stimulus tended to be written 
down f i r s t . This tendency, however, j u s t f a i l e d to reach 
significance (sign t e s t , p < O . O 6 , two-tailed). However, the 
tendency was weakened in the case of selections by the strong 
tendency to s e l e c t TG before FC. When re j e c t i o n s alone were 
considered, subjects did show a s i g n i f i c a n t tendency to write down 
the associated card before the nonassociated card (sign t e s t , p < 0 . 0 5 . 
two-tailed). 
DISCUSSION 
Comparisons between the various ' f a l s e ' conditions cannot 
be made as no e f f e c t of truth status was observed. 
One possible explanation of t h i s i s that sequential 
presentation of four selection tasks (without another task i n 
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between , as was the case i n Experiment 5 and 6) w i l l i n h i b i t 
d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s . In f a c t , 17 of the 30 subjects made the same 
selection on each of the four tasks. However, when i n i t i a l tasks 
only are considered, there i s s t i l l no evidence of an e f f e c t of 
t r u t h status. For instance, FC was selected by two of the eight 
subjects who received condition B f i r s t and by one of the ten 
subjects who received condition A f i r s t . There i s thus no evidence, 
from i n i t i a l selections, that condition B f a c i l i t a t e d FC selection 
and i t would appear that t r u t h status does not a f f e c t behaviour 
with these materials. 
That subjects attended to the associated consequent 
before the nonassociated consequent i s suggested by the fa c t that 
they showed some tendency to write t h i s value down f i r s t . This 
'cueing' of the associated value has been argued i n Experiments 3i 
4, 5 and 6 to lead to selection. In Experiment 7» however, subjects 
correctly reevaluated the association as ir r e l e v a n t . One possible 
explanation i s that the association between, f o r instance, 'grass' 
and 'green' i s too available. I t may be that the association i s 
so obvious to the subject that he becomes suspicious of the 
experimenter's motives and discounts i t . 
There were, however, other more clear cut findings of 
Experiment 7. I t i s of in t e r e s t that TA i s responded to before 
the other cards and that FA i s responded t o before FC. Clearly, 
knowledge of the order in which the cards are responded to can 
contribute to the understanding of behaviour on the task. For 
instance, the p r i o r i t y of TA selection suggests that subjects f i n d 
t h i s decision more 'obvious', and i s consistent with the t y p i c a l 
f i n d i n g that most subjects select i t . I t i s also consistent with 
the f i n d i n g of Evans & Newstead (1977) that, on a t r u t h table task, 
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the least variable responses across subjects (e.g. evaluation of 
the TT case as 'true') tended to have a lower latency. 
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PART 3 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
-286-
Truth status effects axe discussed i n Chapter 10 with 
p a r t i c u l a r reference to the ' a v a i l a b i l i t y * theory of Tversky & 
Kahnemcm ( 1 9 7 3 ) . Theoretical implications of t h i s discussion are 
extended, i n Chapter 11, to other areas of reasoning research. 
Chapter 12 focusses upon the position of Evans ( 1 9 7 7 b ) , which i t 
was concluded, at the end of Part 1, was the best available 
published explanation of reasoning behaviour. The structure of the 
mathematical model i s considered i n some d e t a i l and the Evans ( 1 9 7 7 b , 
1980a, 1980b) position i s evaluated, both i n terms of the theoretical 
discussion contained i n Chapters 10 and 11, and i n the l i g h t of 
various experimental findings of Part 2. 
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SECTION 10.1 MAIN EXJERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
A s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t of t r u t h status on selection task 
behaviour was observed i n a l l relevant experiinents, except 
Experiment ?» Any f u l l explanation of t r u t h status must take 
account of the findings of t h i s l a t t e r study but they w i l l be 
disregarded i n t h i s i n i t i a l discussion. 
The s i g n i f i c a j i t r esults obtained i n experiinents 3i 5 
and 6 are shown i n Table 10.1, which f o r each card, shows whether 
more, or less, selections were observed i n the 'false' conditions 
r e l a t i v e to the 'true* conditions. I f there was no si g n i f i c a n t 
difference, t h i s i s indicated i n the table by 'N.S.D.''. The l a s t 
column of the table shows the results of analyses across a l l four 
cards. 
Table 10.1 
Significant Effects of Truth Status Observed i n Experiments 3» 
5 and 6. Differences Expressed i n Terms of Selection Frequencies 
i n the False Condition Relative to the I ^ e Condition. 
CARD TA 
EXIERIMENT. NSD 
3 
FA 
NSD 
TC 
NSD 
FC 
MORE 
ALL 4 
CARDS 
NSD 
EXIERIMENT NSD 
4 
NSD NSD NSD MORE 
EXTERIMENT 
5 
NSD NSD NSD NSD MORE 
EXIERIMENT 
6 
JESS MORE I£SS MORE NSD 
* This r e s u l t was not s i g n i f i c a n t across a l l subjects, but i t was 
sig n i f i c a n t f o r slow learners. The ef f e c t of t r u t h status on both 
FA and TA selections was not s i g n i f i c a n t f o r f a s t learners. 
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The e f f e c t of t r u t h status on FC selection i s reasonably 
cleax cut. Subjects selected more FC i n the 'false* condition, 
than i n the *true* condition, of Experiments 3» ^» 5 and. 6 and t h i s 
r e s u l t reached significance i n Experiments 3 and 6, I t has been 
suggested that t h i s r e s u l t i s due to the greater associational 
bond between TA and FC i n the 'false' condition. In the probability 
learning phases of Experiments ^, 5 aJid 6, subjects had learned an 
association that connected TA and TC i n the 'true' conditions and 
TA and FC i n the 'false* conditions. 
I t follows from t h i s theory that there should also be a 
decrease i n TC selection i n the 'false' condition, as t h i s card 
w i l l be less associated with TA than i t i s i n the 'true' condition. 
However, results regarding TC selection have been somewhat variable. 
Subjects did select less TG i n the 'false* conditions of Experiments 
3 and 6, t h i s r e s u l t reaching significance i n the l a t t e r case and 
being near significance i n the former. In Experiments ^ and 5» 
however, subjects selected more TC i n the 'false' condition, although 
t h i s r e s u l t was not s i g n i f i c a n t i n either case. In Experiments ^ 
and 51 subjects selected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more cards over a l l i n the 
'false' condition, but t h i s r e s u l t cannot be taken as s i g n i f i c a n t 
evidence of a tendency to select more of one particular card. The 
frequencies of selections i n Experiment 3* i n f a c t , suggest that 
there was l i t t l e difference in TC selections between the conditions, 
although, i n Experiment 4 ,the difference i n TC selection was near 
significance. As subjects also selected (nonsignificantly)-more 
FA i n Experiment 5i the r e s u l t s of Experiments and 5 suggested 
an alternative explanation of the e f f e c t of t r u t h status. I f the 
pro b a b i l i t y learning phase of these experiments did induce the 
subjects to i n t e r p r e t the rule as implying equivalence (see discussion 
of Experiment 5, i n Chapter ? ) , then selection of TC and FA would 
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be l o g i c a l l y v a l i d responses. TC and FA are po'tential f a l s i f i e r s 
i f the rule implies equivalence but not i f the rule implies 
implication, whereas FC i s a po t e n t i a l f a l s i f i e r on both i n t e r p r e t -
ations. I t was thus possible, on the basis of the r e s u l t s of 
Experiments 3 , 4 and 5 , that ' f a l s i t y ' led subjects to behave more 
i n accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y : producing a tendency to select 
more TC and FA on equivalence rules, less TC and FA on implication 
rules, and more FC on a l l rules. Subjects also selected 
(nonsignificantly) more TA i n the false condition of Experiment 5 , 
although generally differences i n TA selection on AA rules would 
not be expected due to a c e i l i n g e f f e c t . 
However, t h i s explanation does not f i t the data of 
Experiment 6 with regard to antecedent selections. Subjects 
selected less TA, and more FA, i n the 'false' condition, and thus 
t h i s condition clearly did not produce behaviour more i n accordance 
with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . However these r e s u l t s would be expected i f 
subjects* behaviour i s mediated by associations between the cards. 
I f consequent selections are mediated by t h e i r association with 
the antecedent value mentioned i n the rule ( i . e . TA), then ante-
cedent selections w i l l be mediated by t h e i r association with the 
consequent value mentioned i n the rule ( i . e . TC). In Experiment 
6 , FA was more associated, and TA less associated, with TC i n the 
'false' condition, than i n the 'true' condition.^ 
Given that subjects do not appear to be behaving more i n 
accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i n the 'false' condition, an 
explanation of antecedent and consequent responses i n terms of t h e i r 
association with TC and TA, respectively, appears to be the best 
available. Given t h i s , the results of Experijment 6 could be taken 
as revealing the f u l l e f f e c t of t r u t h status on responses. That 
i s , that ' f a l s i t y ' leads subjects to select more FA and FC, and 
less TA and TC. 
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However, t h i s position i s presented with two problems 
that require explanation. F i r s t l y , no decrease i n TA and TC 
selections was observed i n the *fake' conditions of Experiments 
^ and 5» A possible explanation of these results has already been 
proposed i n Chapter 7 . On AA rules, a decrease i n TA and TC 
selections may not be observed because these values match. Clearly, 
i f FA and FC selections were f a c i l i t a t e d i n the 'false* conditions 
of Experiments ^  and 5 , and the decrease i n TA and TC selections 
was inhibited by matching bias, then the net e f f e c t would be an 
increase i n o v e r a l l selection frequencies i n the 'false* condition. 
However, t h i s hypothesis must be treated with reservations. I t 
could not explain an increase i n TA or TC selections i n the 'false* 
condition. The res u l t s of Experiments k and 5» regarding these 
selections, although not s i g n i f i c a n t , are thus i n the * wrong* 
di r e c t i o n . Further, i t i s noticeable that, i n Experiment 6 , less 
TA and TC selections were made i n the 'false' condition even on AA 
rules. 
The second problem concerns the findings of Experiment 3* 
In t h i s experiment, subjects did select less TC i n the 'false* 
condition, but no effects of t r u t h status were observed on antecedent 
selections. That they selected less TC may have been due to match-
ing having had less e f f e c t on responses i n t h i s experiment, due to 
the thematic content and the mode of presentation employed. The 
near s i g n i f i c a n t reduction i n TC selection i n the 'false* condition 
may thus be seen as consistent with the association theory i n a 
situ a t i o n where t r u t h status effects were not in h i b i t e d by matching 
bias. The main problem, f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u l t s of t h i s 
experiment, a.ppears to be that t r u t h status had no ef f e c t on FA 
selections. The lack of e f f e c t on TA selections may be explained 
as due to a * c e i l i n g ' e f f e c t but the lack of e f f e c t on FA selections 
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cannot be explained as due to a 'floor* e f f e c t , as a reasonable 
frequency of FA selections was observed i n Experiment 3-
The lack of ef f e c t of t r u t h status on FA selections i n 
Experijnent 3 i s probably due to the content of the rules. In 
Experiment 6 , FA was far more l i k e l y , given TC, i n the 'false' 
condition, than i n the 'true' condition. In the 'false' condition, 
seven of the eight cards having TC on one side would have FA on the 
other side, whereas, i n the 'true' condition, only ha l f the cards 
having TC on one side would have FA on the other side. The higher 
frequency of FA selection i n the 'false' condition has thus been 
argued to be due to i t s greater association with the consequent 
value mentioned i n the r u l e . However, i n experiments based on the 
Van Duyne ( 1 9 7 6 ) paradigm, t h i s i s not the case. 
For instance, i n the exajnple given by Van Duyne, using 
'sugar', 'protein', 'sweet' and ' b i t t e r ' , the FA value ('protein') 
i s no more related to one consequent value than another. Further, 
i t was realised i n retrospect that there i s an unavoidable experi-
menter bias i n t h i s paradigm, that makes in t e r p r e t a t i o n of results 
concerning FA selections very d i f f i c u l t . Consider, f o r instance, 
the following examples of 'true* and 'false' statements used i n 
Experiment 3 : 
TRUE ' I f a person has a bath then he gets wet' 
FALSE ' I f a person cuts his finger, then he dies' 
Most subjects generated such statements, i n which the 
consequent value, but not the antecedent value, i s essentially binary 
When constructing an FC instance, i t i s clear that, i f a person 
has not died, then he i s a l i v e , and that, i f a person i s not wet, 
then he i s dry. However, when constructing an FA instance, there 
i s no such clear cut alternative. For instance, f o r the 'false' 
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statement, there are a variety of PA alternatives, such as; 
A) A person has not cut h i s finger 
B) A person has broken his leg 
C) A person i s i n perfect health 
D) A person has contracted bubonic plsigue 
Clearly, the association between FA and the consequent 
values w i l l be determined by the nature of the FA alternative adopted. 
I f alternative D above were adopted, then t h i s would have a strong 
association with 'dies', but the opposite of t h i s association would 
be l i k e l y to r e s u l t (to varying degrees) from the adoption of 
alternatives A, B or C. 
Bearing the above points i n mind, three reasons may be 
advanced f o r the absence of an e f f e c t of t r u t h status on FA 
selections i n Experiment 3 J 
1) During the conduct of the experiment, i t was always attempted 
to construct 'neutral* instances of FA to avoid influencing the 
subject's decisions. I n retrospect, t h i s procedure led to a lack 
of any associative effects and thus was possibly the basis of the 
absence of a t r u t h status e f f e c t on FA selections. However, although 
i n some cases (such as the 'sugar' example), a neutral FA instance 
may be constructed, i n other cases the nearest alternative to a 
neutral instance i s the e x p l i c i t negation of TA (alternative A above) 
This may lead to some association between FA and TC or between FA 
and FC. 
2) I f , however, some effects of association were present, they did 
not necessarily consistently lead to a stronger association between 
FA and TC on 'fauLse' statements. The examples given above show 
that an FA instance that i s associated with either TC or FC may be 
constructed ( i n any condition). 
3 ) I f any associative effects were present they could not have had 
an opposite e f f e c t on one condition to another, as d i f f e r e n t 
thematic rules were used i n each condition. 
Thus, due to the attempt to construct 'neutral' instances, 
i t i s unl i k e l y that, i n most cases, FA had any d i f f e r e n t i a l 
association with either TC or FC i n any condition. I f such 
associations did e x i s t i n some cases, there i s no reason why the 
association with TC should have been always stronger i n the 'false' 
condition, and thus no reason why subjects should have selected more 
FA i n the 'falLse' conditions of Experiment 3 . 
In summary, evaluation of the association theory as an 
explanation of the results of Experiments 3 , 4 , 5'and 6 , leads to 
the f o l l o w i n g conclusions: 
1) The most consistent e f f e c t of t r u t h status has been the 
increase i n FC selection i n the 'false' condition and the 
association theory provides a very good explanation of 
why t h i s card i s 'cued'. 
2 ) The e f f e c t of t r u t h status on antecedent selections i n exper-
iment 6 was consistent with the association theory but inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that ' f a l s i t y ' leads subjects to 
behave more i n accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . 
3 ) The data lend support to the idea that FA selections w i l l 
be more frequent i n the 'false' condition when FA i s more 
l i k e l y , given TC, than i n the 'true' condition. That i s , 
that t r u t h status affected FA selections i n Experiment 6 , 
but not in Experiment 3 . i s consistent with the association 
theory. 
4 ) The only s i g n i f i c a n t r esults concerning TA and TC 
selection have revealed a decrease i n frequency of these 
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selections i n the 'false* condition (see Table 1 0 . 1 ) . These 
results were consistent with the association theory predictions. 
The association theory i s very similar to the ' a v a i l a b i l i t y * 
theory of Tversky & Kahneman ( 1 9 7 3 ) and, i n f a c t , may be regarded 
as a 'special case' of the-ir theory, as applied to reasoning 
problems. Although primarily concerned with subjects* frequency 
judgements, i t i s of interest to consider the work on * a v a i l a b i l i t y * 
i n some d e t a i l , as i t w i l l provide a broader perspective within 
which to view the possible effects of association i n a range of 
problem environments. 
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SECTION 10.2 THE 'AVAILABILITY' THEORY OF TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN ( 1 9 7 3 ) 
Tversky & Kahneman ( 1 9 7 3 ) p^^opose that frequency judgements 
are made on the basis of the information that the subject can 
re t r i e v e , r e f e r r i n g to t h i s as ' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' . They present a 
variety of experimental evidence for t h i s . For instance, they 
found that the majority of subjects report that words beginning 
with K, L, N, R or V are more frequent than words having these 
l e t t e r s i n the third position, although, in fa c t , the l a t t e r type 
of words are more frequent. They point out that the former type 
of words are more e a s i l y 'brought to mind'. In another experiment, 
subjects were presented with l i s t s of names, 19 of them famous 
people of one sex and 20 of l e s s famous people of the other sex. 
One group of subjects r e c a l l e d more of the famous names and another 
group of subjects judged that sex to have occurred more frequently. 
The authors argue that, as more examples of one sex were 'available', 
that sex was judged to have occurred more frequently. As general 
support for thei r findings, they quote Leicht (1968) and Underwood, 
Zimmerman & Freund ( 1 9 7 1 ) as showing that items that are better 
r e c a l l e d are judged more frequent. A l e s s a r t i f i c i a l e f f e c t of 
a v a i l a b i l i t y i s to be observed in the data of Lichtenstein et a l 
(1978). They found that, i n estimating r e l a t i v e frequencies of 
l e t h a l events, subjects tended to overestimate the frequency of 
those events l i k e l y to a t t a i n sensational media coverage (e.g. 
hurricanes and murder). Subjects were f a r more accurate in judging 
the r e l a t i v e frequency of common words, for which the subjects' 
prior exposure would have 'matched' actual frequency (see also 
Shanteau, 1978). 
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Tversky & Kahneman propose that " a v a i l a b i l i t y provides 
a natural explanation for" the * i l l u s o r y correlation* findings of 
Chapman ( I 9 6 7 ) . Chapman presented subjects with l i s t s of pairs of 
words, some pairs repeated, and found that subjects overestimated 
the frequency of coocurrence of associated p a i r s . For instance, 
subjects tended to estimate the word pair * bacon-eggs' as having 
occurred more often that the word pair * lion-eggs'. In subsequent 
experiments, subjects were exposed to a l i s t of c l i n i c a l diagnoses 
and t e s t r e s u l t s and asked to evaluate the coocurrence of various 
symptoms and diagnoses. Subjects overestimated the cooccurrence 
of pairs that were judged to be natural associates by an independent 
group of subjects. Subjects perceived correlations between such 
pai r s , even when the actual correlation was negative (Chapman & 
Chapman, I 9 6 7 , 1 9 ^ 9 ). Tversky & Kahneman replicated these findings 
with minor modifications to ensure that the ef f e c t was due to the 
presence of associations. 
Tversky & Kahneman argue that, i f stimuli occur together, 
then they tend to become associated and thus that subjects are 
" l i k e l y to conclude" that high association strength indicates a high 
frequency of cooccurrence. They point out, however, that there are 
other sources of association, besides repetition, and conclude: 
"thus, the various sources of i l l u s o r y correlation can a l l be 
explained by the operation of a single mechanism - the assessment 
of ' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' or associative strength". 
On the basis of t h i s analysis, the ' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' of 
associations between antecedent and consequent values w i l l determine 
a subject's evaluation of a conditional statement. There w i l l be 
more available TA-TC examples in the case of 'true* statements and 
more available TA-FC examples in the case of 'fa l s e ' statements. 
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On the selection task, the FC card w i l l thus be more 'available', 
and the TC card l e s s 'available' on ' f a l s e ' statements. Similarly, 
on standard abstract tasks, the matching values w i l l be more 
'available' as they have been mentioned in the rul e , in the same 
way as l e t h a l events are more 'available' i f they have been mentioned 
in the media. Of course, although a v a i l a b i l i t y may explain the 
mechanism underlying subjects* b e l i e f , there i s no l o g i c a l reason 
why the subject should s e l e c t 'available' cards and thus, i f 
' a v a i l a b i l i t y ' does mediate selections, i t s e f f e c t in 'cueing' 
certain cards must be seen as a nonlogical influence. 
That experimentally manipulated a v a i l a b i l i t y can affect 
subjects' responses i s well demonstrated by the work of Kubovy 
(Kubovy, 1977. Kubovy & Psotka, 1976). When asked to report the 
" f i r s t d i g i t that comes to mind", 2QA% of subjects chose 'seven' 
and only 2.2% chose 'one', whereas, when asked to report the " f i r s t 
one-digit number that comes to mind", 18% chose 'one'. Similarly 
when asked for a number between 1,000 and 9»999. only 4.3% of 
subjects chose a number beginning with four, whereas, when the f i r s t 
f our-digit number that 'comes to mind' was requested, 2?A% of 
subjects chose a number beginning with four. Subjects tend to 
respond with the 'available* number that i s embedded in the task 
instructions. Although i t i s not suggested that subjects, perfor-
ming a selection task, are asked to s e l e c t the ' f i r s t card that 
comes to mind*, i t should be remembered that data, from both the 
selection task and conditional inference tasks, suggest that 
l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y has l i t t l e e f f e c t on responses to problems 
concerning the consequent of a conditional, r u l e . Thus the selection 
task presents subjects with two consequent cards, whose relevance, 
or irrelevance, to the l o g i c a l structure of the problem they are 
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apparently incapable of comprehending. The problem, f o r the subject, i s 
thus very similar to being asked to select any card that 'comes to 
mind', and i t i s perhaps not surprising that his consequent 
selections are determined by the 'available' cues. 
A finrther f i n d i n g of Kubovy (1977) i s of relevance to the 
n u l l results of Experiment ?. Although embedding the number 'one' 
i n the task instructions increased i t s frequency of choice by the 
subjects, e x p l i c i t mention of 'one', as an exajnple of a number 
between zero and nine, did not a f f e c t i t s frequency of choice. In 
f a c t , Kubovy & Psotka found that e x p l i c i t mention of 'seven' 
actually reduced i t s frequency of choice. Kubovy suggests that 
"the a v a i l a b i l i t y heuristic does not operate i n a context i n which 
the most available response i s made to appear externally caused". 
A reasonable explanation of the results of Experiment 7 i s thus that 
the associations present i n the materials were, i n e f f e c t , 'too 
available'. There was some suggestion i n the data that, when a 
consequent value was associated with TA (TC i n condition A and FC 
in condition' B), a decision was made about t h i s value, before the 
other consequent value. When both values were rejected, the 
aissociated value was rejected s i g n i f i c a n t l y more often before, than 
a f t e r , the nonassociated va,lue. I t was suggested i n the discussion 
of Experiment 7 that the associated card thus'was 'cued' but that 
the 'cue' was so obvious that the subject may well have ignored i t , 
due to suspicion of the experimenter's motives. Given the Kubovy 
re s u l t s , a more sophisticated form of t h i s explanation may be put 
forward. The subjects may have been well aware that the available 
cue was a fU.nction of the experimental design ( i . e . that i t was 
'externally caused') and avoided making the response cued by 
a v a i l a b i l i t y , not because they were suspicious of the experimenter's 
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motives, but simply becaoase they are capable of avoiding the bias 
when they are made aware of i t . 
The lack of e f f e c t of 'too available' cues, i n the Kubovy 
experiments and in Experiment 7, appears to represent an interaction 
between the type 1 and type 2 processes, proposed by Wason & Evans 
(1975)' Many subjects in Experiment 7 spontaneously reported that 
they had noticed, and purposely ignored, associations in the cards, 
and i t was often obvious that they were aware of the associations 
during performance of the task. In contrast, subjects i n Experiment 
6 made no spontaneous reports about the truth status of the ru l e s . 
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SECTION 10,3 SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE 'AVAILABILITY' HEURISTIC TO 
THEMATIC REASOND^ G STUDIES 
When subjects are presented with l o g i c a l l y structured 
problems having thematic content r e l a t i n g to t h e i r experience, a 
variety of available cues are l i k e l y to be embedded i n t h i s content. 
The experiments discussed i n Chapter I . 3 presented subjects 
with thematic s y l l o g i s t i c arguments and required them to evaluate 
both the t r u t h status and the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y of the conclusion. 
Most of these studies reported that subjects' evaluation of the l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y of a conclusion was affected by the perceived t r u t h status 
of that conclusion, such that subjects tended to accept conclusions 
with which they ctgreed, and r e j e c t conclusions with which they 
disagreed. I t was .concluded i n Chapter I . 3 that, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
the experiments of Feather (196^) and Kaufman & Goldstein (I967) 
provide reasonable evidence of the nonlogical e f f e c t of t r u t h status 
on the evaluation of the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y of a syllogism's 
conclusion. I f Tversky & Kahneman are correct, evaluation of the 
t r u t h status of a conclusion i s mediated by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
that conclusion. However, there i s no reason to assume a sequential 
chain such that subjects evaluate a conclusion as 'valid' because 
i t i s 'true' and as 'true' because i t i s available. 
The Kubovy experiments indicate that a v a i l a b i l i t y may 
mediate other responses, besides frequency assessment (which 
underlies t r u t h status evaluations). An alternative explanation, 
of the correlation between subjects' evaluations of t r u t h status 
and l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , i s thus that both evaluations are d i r e c t l y 
mediated by a v a i l a b i l i t y . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suggests that subjects 
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do not have a m o t i v a t i o n t o accept statements t h a t accord w i t h 
t h e i r b e l i e f s , as no cause and e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s pos tu l a t ed 
"between e v a l u a t i o n o f t r u t h s t a t u s and e v a l u a t i o n o f l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . 
Both are held. . to be determined by a v a i l a b i l i t y , which produces a 
pseudo-associa t ion between the two. 
Some i n d i c a t i o n , t h a t apparent t r u t h s t a tu s e f f e c t s are 
no t a r e s u l t a n t o f s u b j e c t s ' m o t i v a t i o n s t o accept statements 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r b e l i e f s , i s p rov ided by research on the so-
c a l l e d 'knew i t a l l a long e f f e c t ' . Th i s paradigm i s o f p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t as i t represents a j io ther area o f research i n which t r u t h 
s t a t u s has been e x p e r i m e n t a l l y manipula ted , a l though not by 
p r o b a b i l i t y l e a r n i n g tasks but s imply by the experimenter t e l l i n g 
sub j ec t s whether p a r t i c u l a r statements axe t r u e or f a l s e . Subjec ts 
have been asked t o p r e d i c t the l i k e l i h o o d o f va r i ous outcomes o f pas t 
h i s t o r i c a l events ( F i s c h h o f f , 1975) and f u t u r e h i s t o r i c a l events 
( F i s c h h o f f & Beyth , 1975) or t o p r e d i c t the l i k e l i h o o d o f a l t e r n a t i v e 
answers t o genera l knowledge problems ( F i s c h h o f f , 1977» Wood, 1978). 
Subjec ts have been t o l d the c o r r e c t 'ou tcome ' , a t v a r i o u s stages 
of . the exper iment , and the f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t s have t y p i c a l l y been 
observed: 
1) Given outcome knowledge, s u b j e c t s r a t e t h a t outcome as 
more l i k e l y than do sub jec t s w i t h o u t outcome knowledge. 
2) Subjec ts g iven outcome knowledge, a f t e r having made t h e i r 
l i k e l i h o o d e s t ima tes , tend t o overes t imate t h e i r o r i g i n a l 
es t imate o f the c o r r e c t outcome, when asked t d r e c a l l i t . 
3) Subjec ts g iven outcome knowledge, overes t imate the 
l i k e l i h o o d they would have assigned t o t h a t outcome, and 
overes t imate the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t h y p o t h e t i c a l peer group 
sub jec t s would have assigned t o t h a t outcome. Subjec ts 
w i t h o u t outcome knowledge a t t r i b u t e lower l i k e l i h o o d 
es t imates ( o f the c o r r e c t outcome) t o h y p o t h e t i c a l peer 
group s u b j e c t s , than do sub j ec t s w i t h outcome knowledge, 
Various c o n t r o l s i n d i c a t e t h a t these r e s u l t s are not due 
t o sub jec t s a t t e m p t i n g t o present a 'good ' impress ion o f themselves 
or o f h y p o t h e t i c a l peers . For ins t ance , S l o v i c & F i s c h h o f f (197?) 
found t h a t s u b j e c t s , g iven the r e s u l t o f an exper iment , considered 
r e p l i c a t i o n t o be more l i k e l y than d i d sub j ec t s asked the l i k e l i h o o d 
o f r e p l i c a t i o n , i f t h a t p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t was obta ined ( i n the 
f u t u r e ) . C l e a r l y , the perce ived l i k e l i h o o d o f r e p l i c a t i o n ( l o g i c a l l y ) 
should be the same whether the sub j ec t knows, or merely assumes, 
t h a t a g iven r e s u l t has been ob ta ined . 
The e x p l a n a t i o n most c o n s i s t e n t l y advanced f o r the 'knew 
i t a l l a long e f f e c t ' i s t h a t outcome knowledge r a i s e s the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h a t outcome a t the cos t o f a l l o the r poss ib le 
outcomes. (Expe r imen ta l l y i n d u c i n g an increase i n the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
o f o ther outcomes reduces the b i a s ) . When asked t o r e c a l l h i s 
o r i g i n a l judgements, o r asked t o g ive es t imates o f the judgements 
o f h y p o t h e t i c a l peers not having outcome knowledge, the sub jec t i s 
biased by the increased a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the a c t u a l outcome. Thus, 
a l though judgements are i n f l u e n c e d by the t r u t h s t a t u s imposed by 
the exper imenter , t h i s judgemental b i a s i s d e r i v e d d i r e c t l y f rom 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the outcome, r a t h e r than f rom any i n t e n t i o n 
on b e h a l f o f the s u b j e c t t o take t r u t h s t a t u s i n t o account . Th i s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p a r a l l e l s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f apparent t r u t h s t a t u s 
e f f e c t s on s y l l o g i s m e v a l u a t i o n , as be ing mediated by the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
o f the c o n c l u s i o n , r a t h e r than by any b i a s o f the s u b j e c t towards 
accep t ing the v a l i d i t y o f conclus ions because he b e l i e v e s them. 
Experiments which have presented sub jec t s w i t h themat ic 
s e l e c t i o n tasks were d iscussed i n Chapter 3 ,6 , I n c e r t a i n o f 
these experiments use o f themat ic conten t f a c i l i t a t e d FC s e l e c t i o n 
and i t was concluded t h a t such an e f f e c t i s obta ined on ly i f the 
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s u b j e c t i s presented w i t h a * b e l i e v a b l e ' problem t h a t r e l a t e s t o 
h i s experience o f ' r e a l l i f e ' . For i n s t ance , sub j ec t s have 
experience o f the necess i ty t o stamp l e t t e r s c o r r e c t l y and thus 
the con tex t o f the Johnson-Laird , Legrenzi & Legrenzi (1972) 
experiment d i d r e l a t e t o t h e i r exper ience . I n the case o f those 
themat ic experiments t h a t have r epo r t ed a f a c i l i t a t i o n o f FC 
s e l e c t i o n , the e f f e c t was explained. ' . in Chapter 3.6 as due to the 
FC card having been ' cued ' by the content or con tex t o f the problem. 
Th is i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s e a s i l y transposed i n t o the hypothes is t h a t 
the e f f e c t i s mediated by the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the FC c a r d . 
I n the f i r s t p a r t o f the Legrenz i (1971) s tudy , the 
f a l s i f y i n g ( n e g a t i v e ) ins tance was most s a l i e n t t o the s u b j e c t ' s 
o r i g i n a l d e r i v a t i o n o f the r u l e and thus was more a v a i l a b l e on the 
0 
subsequent s e l e c t i o n t a sk . I n the Johnson-Lai rd , Legrenz i & Legrenz i 
(1972) s tudy, the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the TA-FC r e l a t i o n was enhanced 
by the con tex t o f the r o l e p l a y i n g e x e r c i s e . Thus, i n these s t u d i e s , 
as i n the ' f a l s e * c o n d i t i o n s o f the t r u t h s t a t u s experiments o f 
Pa r t 2, the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the FC card i s enhanced. Such an 
e f f e c t w i l l not be ob ta ined , however, i f themat ic conten t i s used 
t h a t does not enhance the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f FC. The d r i n k s and 
f o o d s t u f f s conten t used by Manktelow & Evans (1978) produced no 
a v a i l a b i l i t y e f f e c t s as w h o l l y a r b i t r a r y p a i r i n g s , o f p a r t i c u l a r 
foods and d r i n k s , were used. 
I f subje 'cts cannot reason 'backwards ' f rom a c o n d i t i o n a l 
r u l e , then consequent s e l e c t i o n s w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y suscep t ib le 
t o any sub t l e i n f l u e n c e or b i a s and these s e l e c t i o n s may w e l l be 
s o l e l y ' cued ' by a v a i l a b i l i t y . Any exper imen ta l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f 
the r e l a t i v e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f consequent va lues w i l l thus a l so 
mod i fy the s u b j e c t s ' a c t u a l s e l e c t i o n s . There i s no reason to 
be l i eve t h a t such exper imenta l m o d i f i c a t i o n has any o ther e f f e c t 
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SECTION 10 A SOME .APPLICATIONS O F ' T H E " ' A V A I I A B I L i r Y ' ' HEURISTIC TO 
ABSTRACT REASONING STUDIES 
On the bas i s o f the 'cueing* e f f e c t .of a v a i l a b i l i t y i t 
would be expected t h a t , i f the s u b j e c t i s presented w i t h a problem 
whose premisses employ p a r t i c u l a r terms, then he w i l l e x h i b i t a 
preference f o r conclus ions employing those sajne terms. However, 
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y does not apply to s y l l o g i s t i c , and c o n d i t i o n a l 
i n f e r e n c e , problems, as a l l poss ib le conc lus ions c o n t a i n terms t h a t 
have appeared i n the premisses. I t i s , o f course, poss ib l e t h a t 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the terms i n the premisses accounts f o r what 
R e v l i s (1975a, 1975b) has r e f e r r e d t o as a ' b i a s aga in s t nonprop-
o s l t i o n a l c o n c l u s i o n s ' . That i s , on s y l l o g i s t i c t a sks , sub jec t s 
may be biased aga ins t n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l conc lus ions , s imply because 
they do no t c o n t a i n any terms used i n the premisses. 
I t has been po in t ed out i n Sec t ion 10,3 t h a t matching b ia s 
r e a d i l y lends i t s e l f t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n terms o f a v a i l a b i l i t y , 
as i t i s s imply a b i a s towards those terms t h a t are a v a i l a b l e i n 
the g iven r u l e . I n Chapter 6, i t was suggested t h a t the concur ren t 
mention o f the antecedent and consequent va lues produced an 
( a v a i l a b l e ) a s s o c i a t i o n between the two , which l e d t o t h e i r 
s e l e c t i o n on the s e l e c t i o n t a sk . 
However, i f sub j ec t s s e l e c t the matching s t i m u l i f o r t h i s , 
reason, then matching e f f e c t s on P and Q should be r e l a t e d , as 
sub j ec t s are he ld t o be f o c u s s i n g on the PQ case. The more a 
s u b j e c t focusses upon t h i s a v a i l a b l e case, the more l i k e l y he should 
be t o s e l e c t both P and Q, A c o r r e l a t i o n between s e l e c t i o n o f 
these cards would thus be expected. However, the analyses g iven 
i n Chapter 8 (see Table 8 .5) y i e l d l i t t l e support f o r t h i s , except 
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i n the case o f the NN r u l e , a l though they do y i e l d s t rong support 
f o r the exis tence o f a c o r r e l a t i o n between P and Q s e l e c t i o n s . 
I t appears, f rom these r e s u l t s , t h a t matching b ias should 
be more p r o p e r l y regarded as a 'mismatching b i a s ' . That i s , i f a 
s u b j e c t ' s behaviour i s i n f l u e n c e d by the b i a s , i t appears l i k e l y 
t o lead t o avoidance o f s e l e c t i o n o f mismatching cards , bu t not 
nece s sa r i l y to s e l e c t i o n o f both matching cards . Th i s i s c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h the r e s u l t s o f t r u t h t a b l e exper i jnents , i n which , a l though the 
PQ and PQ cases are eva lua ted as ' i r r e l e v a n t ' more o f t e n than the 
PQ case, the b i a s i s most no t i ceab l e i n the l a rge increase i n 
' i r r e l e v a n t ' responses to the PQ case ( e , g . Evans & Newstead, 1977). 
On the bas i s o f the above, i t i s reasonable t o conclude 
t h a t i t i s the terms t h a t are a v a i l a b l e and not the connect ion 
between them. I f matching s e l e c t i o n s are exp la ined as due to the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l terms, r a t h e r than the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
o f the a s s o c i a t i o n between them, then t h i s i s c l e a r l y s i m i l a r t o 
the a t t e n t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f Evans (1975). However, i t does not 
appear t o be the case t h a t sub j ec t s s e l e c t those cards t h a t they 
a t t end t o , bu t r a t h e r t h a t they f a i l t o s e l e c t those cards t h a t 
they do not a t t end t o . The sub j ec t w i l l no t nece s sa r i l y s e l e c t 
a l l a v a i l a b l e terms, bu t c l e a r l y w i l l f a i l t o s e l e c t a l l nonava i l ab le 
terms. 
While on the s u b j e c t o f a v a i l a b i l i t y e f f e c t s on a b s t r a c t 
t a sks , i t i s wor th n o t i n g t h a t a v a i l a b i l i t y p rov ides a reasonable 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f the Wason '2 , 4, 6' experiments (Wason , I96O, 1968b, 
1971). Wason (1971) e x p l a i n s the task used as f o l l o w s : " sub jec t s 
were t o l d t h a t the three numbers, 2, 4, 6, conformed t o a simple 
r e l a t i o n a l r u l e , which they were to t r y t o d i scove r by genera t ing 
successive t r i a d s o f numbers. Each t ime they were t o l d whether t h e i r 
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numbers conformed to the r u l e . " They were warned t o announce the 
r u l e "only when they were h i g h l y c o n f i d e n t t h a t they had d i scovered 
i t , " The r u l e was, i n f a c t s imply 'numbers i n c r e a s i n g i n order o f 
magni tude ' . 
T y p i c a l r e s u l t s f r om t h i s research may be summarised as 
f o l l o w s : 
1) Most s u b j e c t s announced an ( i n c o r r e c t ) r u l e premature ly 
on a t l e a s t one occasion and, appa ren t ly , "they a l l 
appeared bewi ldered when t o l d t h a t t h e i r announcements 
were wrong ." 
2) That the g iven ins tance was an a r i t h m e t i c a l p rogress ion 
s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d s u b j e c t s ' e a r l y gene ra t ion o f t r i a d s 
and many sub j ec t s i n c o r r e c t l y announced a r u l e t h a t 
depended on a r i t h m e t i c a l p r o g r e s s i o n . 
3) Sub j ec t s ' gene ra t ion o f t r i a d s p r i o r t o an announcement 
appeared t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t ctnnouncement. That 
i s , s u b j e c t s appeared t o be o b t a i n i n g v e r i f y i n g support 
f o r t h e i r supposed hypothes i s , be fo re announcing i t as 
the r u l e . There was a l so some tendency f o r sub jec t s who 
had announced an i n c o r r e c t r u l e t o generate immediately 
a f u r t h e r t r i a d t h a t was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the r u l e t h a t 
they had announced. 
The poss ib l e e f f e c t s o f a v a i l a b i l i t y i n these r e s u l t s are 
s e l f - e v i d e n t . The a v a i l a b l e a r i t h m e t i c p rogress ion had a s t rong 
e f f e c t on responses and, once a s u b j e c t had developed an hypothes is 
about the r u l e , the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t h i s i n f l u e n c e d h i s responses 
both b e f o r e , and a f t e r , announcement o f t h i s hypothes i s , A very 
good example o f the s t r o n g e f f e c t o f the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the 
a r i t h m e t i c a l p rogress ion i s shown i n p r o t o c o l 2 o f Wason (1971). 
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Thi s s u b j e c t generated 6, 8' and '6 , 8, 10' and announced the 
r u l e ' a r i t h m e t i c a l p rogress ion by t w o ' . Subsequent t o t h i s , he 
generated three t r i a d s , each f o l l o w e d by an i n c o r r e c t announcement 
o f the r u l e , as f o l l o w s : '8 , 10, 12' ( ' p r o g r e s s i o n o f even i n t e g e r s ' ) , 
•13» 15. 17' ( ^ n y three p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r s ' ) and '3 , 5. 7' ( ' any 
three numbers ' ) . I t w i l l be noted t h a t , a l though each o f the th ree 
generated t r i a d s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the subsequent announcement, 
they are a l so c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the ( o r i g i n a l ) hypothes is ' a r i t h m e t i c a l 
p rogress ion by t w o ' . There was no reason f o r t h i s i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the hypotheses announced. The s u b j e c t s ' responses thus appear t o 
be i n f l u e n c e d by the progress ion made a v a i l a b l e by the o r i g i n a l 
example, even though (on the bas i s o f h i s announcements) he appears 
t o have accepted t h a t t h i s p rogress ion i s i r r e l e v a n t t o the r u l e . 
Wason & Evans (1975) suggest t h a t the '2 , 4, 6' r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e 
t h a t the gene ra t ion o f t r i a d s i s i n f l u e n c e d by d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s 
f rom those t h a t i n f l u e n c e the announcement o f the r u l e . They 
suggest t h a t gene ra t ion o f t r i a d s i s a type 1 process, unconsciously 
i n f l u e n c e d by an e a r l i e r hypo thes i s , whereas the r u l e announcement 
i s a type 2 process which r a t i o n a l i s e s p rev ious genera t ions by 
f o r m u l a t i n g a r u l e which i s cons i s t en t w i t h them. 
I t should be noted t h a t the i n f l u e n c e o f the a v a i l a b l e 
p rogress ion by two, i n the above p r o t o c o l , does no t i n d i c a t e a 
v e r i f i c a t i o n b i a s , as the s u b j e c t ' s second, t h i r d and f o u r t h 
announcements d i d no t concern progress ion by two. There i s thus 
no reason t o be l i eve t h a t the f i r s t two t r i a d s generated p r i o r t o 
h i s f i r s t announcement ( ' a r i t h m e t i c a l p rogress ion by t w o ' ) were 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y aimed a t v e r i f i c a t i o n . The s u b j e c t ' s responses were 
i n f l u e n c e d by the a v a i l a b l e p rog res s ion , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f h i s 
subsequent announcements. 
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As i n the case o f s e l e c t i o n tasks us ing the AA r u l e , the 
'2 , 6' experiments may produce the i l l u s i o n o f a v e r i f i c a t i o n 
b i a s , due t o the i n f l u e n c e o f c e r t a i n a v a i l a b l e f e a t u r e s o f the 
problem. 
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SECTION 10.5 FUNCTIONAL UTILITY OF AVAIUBILITY 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y h e u r i s t i c has been shown t o be a 
pos s ib l e source o f b i a s i n a v a r i e t y o f exper imenta l s i t u a t i o n s . 
However, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t d e c i s i o n s would be mediated by 
a v a i l a b i l i t y i f the h e u r i s t i c had no f u n c t i o n a l u t i l i t y . 
I n gene ra l , the h e u r i s t i c c l e a r l y has u t i l i t y w i t h regard 
t o i t s e f f e c t on f requency judgements, a l though the work o f 
Chapman & Chapman shows t h a t i t can lead t o e r r o r . However, i n 
• r e a l l i f e ' judgements, the h e u r i s t i c most probably leads t o the 
best es t imate p o s s i b l e , on the bas i s o f the s u b j e c t ' s exper ience , 
and the h e u r i s t i c may, i n f a c t , on ly prove who l ly useless on 
a r t i f i c i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d exper imenta l t a sks . I n the l i g h t o f t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y , i t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o consider whether a v a i l a b i l i t y , 
a l though producing i n a p p r o p r i a t e b i a s on exper imenta l reasoning 
t a sks , may have f u n c t i o n a l u t i l i t y i n ' r e a l l i f e ' r eason ing . 
When cons ide r i ng whether the a v a i l a b i l i t y h e u r i s t i c a i d s 
reasoning i n ' r e a l l i f e ' s i t u a t i o n s , i t may be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o 
ask whether i t f a c i l i t a t e s the drawing o f l o g i c a l l y v a l i d 
conc lus ions . The s u b j e c t w i l l l e a r n behaviours t h a t are l i k e l y t o 
produce c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s and the assessment o f l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y 
has no i n t r i n s i c u t i l i t y i n ' r e a l l i f e ' , except i n as much as i t 
can a i d the s u b j e c t i n maJcing such c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s . F u r t h e r , 
there are drawbacks t o assessment o f l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y as a method 
o f assessing whether statements are c o r r e c t . I f arguments are 
evalua ted as i n v a l i d , then t h i s y i e l d s no i n f o r m a t i o n whatsoever 
as to whether the conc lus ion i s r i g h t or wrong. Even i f the 
argument i s evaluated as v a l i d , t h i s y i e l d s only the i n f o r m a t i o n 
t h a t the conc lus ion i s t r u e , i f the premisses are t r u e . An 
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a p p r e c i a t i o n t h a t the argument i s v a l i d i s thus on ly o f use i n 
those s i t u a t i o n s i n which e v a l u a t i o n o f the t r u t h s t a t u s o f the 
premisses i s eas ie r than e v a l u a t i o n o f the t r u t h s t a tu s o f the 
c o n c l u s i o n . 
D i r e c t e v a l u a t i o n o f conc lus ions , on the bas i s o f 
exper ience , i s thus an advantageous ' r e a l l i f e ' behaviour t h a t 
expedi tes acceptance o f c o r r e c t , and r e j e c t i o n o f i n c o r r e c t , 
conc lus ions . I f an argument were advanced t h a t concluded t h a t 'London i s the 
c a p i t a l o f F r a n c e ' , i t would be a h i g h l y i n e f f i c i e n t method o f 
e v a l u a t i o n t o evaluate the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f the argument. I t 
i s i r r e l e v a n t whether the argument i s i n v a l i d , o r whether the 
argument i s v a l i d and the premisses i n c o r r e c t . The e s s e n t i a l 
d i f f e r e n c e between exper imenta l and r e a l l i f e s i t u a t i o n s i s t h a t , 
i n the l a t t e r , l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i s no t the s a l i e n t dimension and 
i t mat te rs no t a t a l l whether an i n v a l i d c o n c l u s i o n , or i n f e r e n c e , 
i s accepted, as l ong as i t i s t r u e , or whether a v a l i d conc lus ion 
i s r e j e c t e d , as long as i t i s f a l s e . I n c e r t a i n cases, assessment 
o f l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y may be o f p o t e n t i a l use i n d e c i d i n g whether a 
statement i s c o r r e c t b u t , i n most cases, there w i l l be a more 
u s e f u l ' s h o r t c u t ' method. 
Thus, i n ' r e a l l i f ^ problem s o l v i n g , a v a i l a b l e cues w i l l 
have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t i n a i d i n g c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n making. When 
e v a l u a t i n g arguments, any a v a i l a b l e cues f rom the s u b j e c t ' s 
experience w i l l p rov ide a s h o r t c u t method o f d e c i d i n g whether a 
conc lus ion i s c o r r e c t . Th i s i s l i k e l y t o be so automat ic t h a t , 
even when a s u b j e c t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y asked t o judge the l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y o f a themat ic argument, a v a i l a b l e cues w i l l a f f e c t h i s 
responses. I n f a c t , i t i s debatable whether a l l sub j ec t s share the 
expe r imen te r ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f ' l o g i c a l l y v a l i d ' . I n r e a l l i f e , the 
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phrase ' v a l i d argument' may sometimes be taken t o mean an argument 
w i t h a t r u e c o n c l u s i o n , and i t may be unusual t o apply the word 
' v a l i d ' t o an argument w i t h a f a l s e c o n c l u s i o n . 
The u t i l i t y o f a v a i l a b i l i t y i n e v a l u a t i n g c o n d i t i o n a l 
statements may be t h a t i t leads to the accessing o f r e l e v a n t ( f r e q u e n t ) 
i n s t ances . A l o g i c i a n w i l l d i s c o u n t any number o f v e r i f y i n g 
ins tances o f a c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e as i r r e l e v a n t , and accept one 
f a l s i f y i n g ins tance as p r o v i n g the r u l e f a l s e . However, t h i s i s 
u n l i k e l y t o be the procedure o f the n o n l o g i c i a n , who i s more l i k e l y 
t o evaluate c o n d i t i o n a l statements i n an i n d u c t i v e , r a t h e r than 
d e d u c t i v e , manner. The n o n l o g i c i a n ' s need i s t o produce sense and 
order i n h i s environment , and the prime de terminant o f the p e r c e p t i o n 
o f a c o n d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l be the r e l a t i v e ajnount o f 
v e r i f y i n g and f a l s i f y i n g ins tances ( t h i s i s , i n f a c t , the basis o f 
dec i s ions about con t ingen t r e l a t i o n s h i p s - Jenkins & Ward, 19^5• 
Smedslund, I963 , Ward & Jenkins , I965) . I f the re axe a g rea t e r 
number o f v e r i f y i n g , t h a j i f a l s i f y i n g cases, then the r u l e w i l l prove 
a u s e f u l t o o l i n d e c i s i o n making, even though some except ions may 
e x i s t . Thus, s u b j e c t s w i l l t r e a t i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s r e a d i l y 
a v a i l a b l e as having p o t e n t i a l re levance t o e v a l u a t i o n o f a c o n d i t i o n a l 
r u l e , and i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s not r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e w i l l tend t o 
be perce ived as n o t r e l e v a n t ( a t bes t , i t can on ly r e v e a l an 
e x c e p t i o n ) . Th i s behaviour w i l l have ' r e a l l i f e ' u t i l i t y , as 
a v a i l a b l e cues w i l l l ead t o r e c a l l o f , - o r a t t e n t i o n t o , v e r i f y i n g 
ins tances o f s tatements t h a t are ( g e n e r a l l y ) t r u e , and f a l s i f y i n g 
ins tances o f s tatements t h a t are ( g e n e r a l l y ) f a l s e . 
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A v a i l a b i l i t y can thus mediate c o r r e c t e v a l u a t i o n o f r e a l 
l i f e c o n d i t i o n a l s ta tements . That i t serves no u s e f u l purpose on 
the s e l e c t i o n t a sk , i s due t o the a r t i f i c i a l nature o f the t a sk . 
Subjects are very u n l i k e l y t o have encountered such a problem i n 
r e a l l i f e and w i l l thus have had no o p p o r t u n i t y t o l e a r n r e l e v a n t 
behaviours , or ' u n l e a r n ' i r r e l e v a n t behaviours . 
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SECTION 10,6 BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
On the bas i s o f the above arguments, sub j ec t s may have 
learned t o use the a v a i l a b i l i t y h e u r i s t i c , as i t a ids the making 
o f a v a r i e t y o f ' r e a l l i f e ' d e c i s i o n s . That the h e u r i s t i c leads 
t o e r r o r on exper imenta l tasks may be i n t e r p r e t e d , no t as r e v e a l i n g 
the e s s e n t i a l i r r a t i o n a l i t y o f the s u b j e c t , bu t more as r e v e a l i n g 
the a r t i f i c i a l nature o f the exper imenta l s i t u a t i o n . A s i m i l a r 
argument has been advanced by Navon (1978) w i t h regard t o 
' conse rva t i sm ' i n Bayesian p r o b a b i l i t y r e v i s i o n . He argues t h a t , 
i n exper imenta l t a sks , the g iven p r o b a b i l i t i e s are r e l i a b l e but t h a t 
i n r e a l l i f e ' s i t u a t i o n s , there i s an e s s e n t i a l u n r e l i a b i l i t y i n 
any p r o b a b i l i s t i c e s t ima te , and thus t h a t ' conse rva t i sm ' may be an 
adapt ive h e u r i s t i c t h a t the s u b j e c t has learned t o u t i l i s e t o 
o f f s e t the u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f ' r e a l w o r l d ' p r o b a b i l i t i e s . He p o i n t s 
ou t t h a t "s ince t h a t ( p r o b a b i l i t y assessment) system i s adapted t o 
everyday ' r e a l w o r l d ' judgement s i t u a t i o n s , i t may f a i l when 
c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a r t i f i c i a l tasks which l a c k those ( r e a l l i f e ) 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . " 
Thus observed b i a s on a range o f exper imenta l tasks may 
be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e s u l t i n g f rom the a p p l i c a t i o n o f behaviours 
t h a t y i e l d o p t i m a l performance i n ' r e a l l i f e ' . Th i s g ives r i s e to 
the ques t ion o f whether o the r t y p i c a l l y observed responses to 
reasoning t a sks , no t so f a r cons idered , r e f l e c t the a p p l i c a t i o n o f 
such behaviours . Chapter 11 w i l l exp lore the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a l l 
the main prefe2rred responses t o a b s t r a c t reasoning tasks are the r e s u l t 
o f learned behaviour p a t t e r n s t h a t f a c i l i t a t e ' r e a l l i f e ' d e c i s i o n 
making. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. I n the ' f a l s e ' c o n d i t i o n , g iven TC, FA was f a r more l i k e l y 
than TA, whereas i n the ' t r u e ' c o n d i t i o n , g iven TC, TA and FA 
were e q u a l l y l i k e l y , 
2. Th i s r e s u l t has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r research on c o j i i i t i o n a l 
s ta tements . I t suggests, f o r ins tance , t h a t the c o n t r a p o s i t i v e 
i s no t p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t t o the MT i n f e r e n c e . For the 
AA r u l e , the MT i n f e r e n c e i s 'Q i s the case, t h e r e f o r e P i s the 
case ' , whereas the c o n t r a p o s i t i v e i n f e r ence i s e s s e n t i a l l y ' i f Q 
were the case, then P would be the case ' . The S l o v i k & F i s c h h o f f 
r e s u l t s suggest t h a t there i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between 
a rgu ing f rom the knowledge o f Q and a rgu ing f rom the assumption o f Q. 
3. Some poss ib le e m p i r i c a l support f o r the idea t h a t sub jec t s 
have a preference f o r genera l laws about t h e i r environment i s the 
preference f o r u n i v e r s a l , r a t h e r than p a r t i c u l a r , s tatements 
r e p o r t e d by R e v l i s (197^). R e v l i s & Hayes (1972) and R e v l i s . L i p k i n 
& Hayes ( l 9 7 l ) . 
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SECTIOfI 11.1 NONLOGICAL FACTORS 
Several n o n l o g i c a l f a c t o r s have been discussed i n Par t 1 
and these are summarised below: 
1) Matching b i a s . This b i a s i s known t o a f f e c t c o n d i t i o n a l 
t r u t h t a b l e tasks (see Chapter 2 ,2) and the s e l e c t i o n 
task (see Chapter 3 -^) . 
2) Atmosphere b i a s . Al though there are a l t e r n a t i v e exp lana t ions 
t h i s has been argued t o s i f f e c t responses t o s y l l o g i s t i c 
problems (see Chapter 1,2 and 1 ,6 ) . This b ias has a l so 
been argued t o be p r e f e r a b l e t o a l t e r n a t i v e exp lana t ions 
on the grounds t h a t such exp lana t ions are i n a p p l i c a b l e 
t o s e l e c t i o n task behaviour (see Chapter 4 . 2 ) . An 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f a ' f e a t u r e matching ' b i a s thus 
extends across paradigms. 
3) Conclusion b i a s . On c o n d i t i o n a l i n f e r ence t a sks , s u b j e c t s 
have a preference f o r a f f i r m i n g MT, AC and DA in fe r ences 
having negat ive conclus ions (see Chapter 2 .3-1) Related 
t o t h i s i s the preference observed i n Experiments 1 and 
2 f o r a f f i r m a t i o n o f c o n t r a p o s i t i v e , converse and inverse 
arguments having negat ive consequents (see Chapter 5)« 
k) The e f f e c t o f t r u t h s t a tu s o f conc lus ion on e v a l u a t i o n 
o f the l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f t h a t conc lus ion (see Chapter 1 .3 ) . 
That e f f e c t s o f t r u t h s t a tu s o f c o n c l u s i o n , and e f f e c t s 
o f matching b i a s , are the r e s u l t a n t o f a learned behaviour 
( responding on the bas i s o f a v a i l a b i l i t y ) t h a t has ' r e a l l i f e * 
u t i l i t y , has been argued i n Chapter 10. I t thus on ly remains t o 
consider the poss ib l e u t i l i t y o f atmosphere and conc lus ion b i a s . 
I n cons ide r i ng the f u n c t i o n a l u t i l i t y o f atmosphere b i a s , 
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i t i s worth noting the following two features of determinate 
premiss pairs: 
1) When both premisses are a f f i r m a t i v e , the v a l i d conclusion 
i s always af f i r m a t i v e , otherwise i t i s always negative. 
2) When both premisses are universal, the conclusion i s 
always universal i n the case of figure 2 and figure 1/4- premiss pairs 
having 'forwards* conclusions, (although never universal i n the case 
of figure 3 or figure 1/^ premiss pairs having 'backwards' conclusions) 
otherwise ( f o r a l l figures) the v a l i d conclusion i s always p a r t i c u l a r . 
The above features of determinate premiss pairs have a 
s t r i k i n g resemblance to the principles of atmosphere. I f i t was 
known that a premiss pair was determinate then matching the mood 
of the conclusion to the atmosphere of the premisses, and allowing 
negative and pa r t i c u l a r atmospheres to dominate when the atmospheres 
were 'mixed', would aljnost always produce the correct mood of 
conclusion. I t would only f a i l i n the case of two universal 
premisses i n figure 3i ox figure 1/4, allowing only a 'backwards* 
conclusion, which are probably r a r e l y , i f ever, used. Thus 
responding i n accordance with atmosphere i s a very useful behaviour 
pattern, when solving determinate premiss pairs, or evaluating 
v a l i d syllogisms. 
However, the u t i l i t y of atmosphere bias depends upon the 
proportion of determinate arguments that the subject encounters i n 
*real l i f e * . I f the subject primarily encounters indeterminate 
arguments, then atmosphere responses have l i t t l e u t i l i t y and i t i s 
impossible to t e l l how the subject acquires them. However, i t i s 
quite possible that subjects primarily encounter determinate 
arguments i n 'real l i f e ' , and thus that they have learned to respond 
on the basis of atmosphere, which almost always produces correct 
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behaviour. I n t h i s case, atmosphere bias may be seen as a learned 
behaviour pattern which has functional u t i l i t y i n 'real l i f e ' , 
but which i s inappropriate to those ' a r t i f i c i a l * experimental 
situations i n which the subject i s presented with primarily 
indeterminate arguments. 
In Chapter 5f a- preference was observed f o r affirmation 
of contrapositive, converse and inverse conclusions having negative 
consequents and affirmative antecedents. This was interpreted as 
an e f f e c t of * caution' such that subjects are biased against any 
specific evaluation ( i . e . 'true' or 'false') of statements having 
broad (negative) referents, and i n favour of making nonspecific 
(negative) conditional predictions. The l a t t e r bias led to a 
greater tendency to a f f i r m conclusions having negative, and to deny 
conclusions having a f f i r m a t i v e , consequents. The r e s u l t s regarding 
affirmation of the contrapositive, converse and inverse paralleled 
r e s u l t s concerning affirmation of the MT, AC and DA inferences 
(e.g. Evans, 1977a), I t i s possible that a l l the e f f e c t s observed 
i n Experiments 1 and 2 would be paralleled by a relevant study of 
the MT, AC and DA inferences and t h e i r opposites. I t can thus be 
argued that observed nonlogical biases on such tasks have 'real 
l i f e * u t i l i t y , i n r a i s i n g the likelihood of subjects making correct 
decisions. Unless the consequent dimension i s binary, a negative 
statement, or conditional prediction, i s more l i k e l y to be less 
specific than an affirmative statement or prediction. That subjects 
may have learned to avoid making specific predictions about uncertain 
things, may now be seen as a viewpoiint consistent with the above 
suggestions about the possible u t i l i t y of other 'nonlogical' 
biases. 
However, t h i s behaviour i s l i k e l y to be only observed i n 
conditions of maximum uncertainty. The thematic content of most 
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conditional statements used i n 'real l i f e ' w i l l allow the likelihood 
of inferences to be d i r e c t l y evaluated on the basis of t h e i r 
a v a i l a b i l i t y (e.g. Bucci, 1978). Only when the subject has no 
relevant available experience, need he r e l y solely on the cautious 
adoption of statements making vague, nonspecific predictions. 
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SECTION 11.2 LOGICAL FACTORS 
There are a variety of t y p i c a l l y observed responses to 
reasoning tasks that accord with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . However, that 
they accord with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , i s not necessarily, i n i t s e l f , 
an adequate explanation of these responses. However, most 
workers i n the area accept (either e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y ) that 
behaviour i n accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i s the r e s u l t of an 
appreciation of l o g i c a l structure. Differences of opinion tend to 
concern those responses not i n accordance with v a l i d i t y . Indeed, 
most workers i n the area appear to believe that i t i s only 'errors' 
that require explanation (e.g. Chapman & Chapman, 1959• Dickstein, 
1978a. 1978b, Johnson-Laird, 1975, Revlis, 1975a. 1975b. Roberge, 
1971b, 197^, 1976a. 1976b, 1978, Taplin, 1971» Taplin & Staudenmayer, 
1973. Wason, 1968a, 1969a, Vason & Johnson-Laird. 1969b, 1970). 
There thus appears to be a general assumption that subjects 
do have some i n t r i n s i c a b i l i t y to appreciate the l o g i c a l structure 
of a problem ('valid' responses being t a c i t l y regarded as evidence 
f o r t h i s ) , and inte r e s t i s thus centered on 'i n v a l i d ' responses. 
However, there i s an alternative point of view. I f no such assumption 
i s made about subjects' a b i l i t i e s to reason i n a l o g i c a l manner, 
then a l l common responses to reasoning tasks are of equal inte r e s t . 
For instance, i f subjects apply learned behaviours to abstract 
reasoning tasks, and these behaviours f a c i l i t a t e correct decision 
making i n 'real l i f e ' , then i t would not be unexpected that some 
of these behaviours.would produce responses i n accordance with 
l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . These behaviours would be of equal in t e r e s t , 
whether or not they accorded with v a l i d i t y . 
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There are, i n f a c t , (at least) three possible explanations 
of preferred responses that accord with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y : 
1) As suggested above, the subject may be applying some 
learned behaviour that happens to produce an i d e n t i c a l 
response to one based on an analysis of the structure of 
the problem. This behaviour may relate to parts of the 
structure, s u p e r f i c i a l features of the problem, or to 
the learned manipulation of syntactic expressions. 
2) The subject may produce a l o g i c a l l y correct answer 
because he has been trained to apply the sequence of 
behaviours necessary to analyse the problem i n a formal 
way. That t h i s i s possible, i s clearly attested to by 
the f a c t that many people successfully complete logic 
courses, 
3) The subject's basic cognitive structure may be such 
that he can appreciate the l o g i c a l structure of the 
problem without any specific p r i o r experience. 
Alternative 2 i s an unlikely explanation, as subjects 
with t r a i n i n g i n formal logic are s p e c i f i c a l l y excluded from most 
reasoning task experiments. 
As has been noted, most workers, by concentrating on 
the explanation of 'errors', i m p l i c i t l y assume that responses i n 
accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y are explainable as under (3) 
above. The question to be considered i s whether there i s any 
evidence f o r t h i s position, or whether there i s not at least 
equally good indication that explanation ( l ) above i s a viable 
al t e r n a t i v e . 
This question w i l l be pursued with regard to four main 
categories of l o g i c a l l y v a l i d responses: 
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1) Behaviour concerning the antecedent of conditional 
statements. Of a l l tasks, such behaviour i s most 
consistent i n being frequently i n accordance with l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y , and would thus be expected to y i e l d the best 
indication that subjects are capable of appreciating 
l o g i c a l structure. 
2) Certain l o g i c a l behaviours observed on conditional i n f e r -
ence tasks, with reference to the findings of Chapter 5 
3) Disjunctive inference tasks, 
4) S y l l o g i s t i c reasoning tasks. 
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SECTION 11.2.1 BEHAVIOUR CONGEmiING THE ANTECEDENT 
OF CONDITIONAL RUI£S 
Subjects make few errors i n affir m i n g the MP inference 
or i n denying i t s opposite (see Chapter 2.3, p a r t i c u l a r l y with 
reference to Evans, 1977a, and Taplin, 1971)» and show some tendency 
to avoid affirmation of DA, Similarly, on the selection task, 
subjects show a strong tendency to select TA and to avoid selection 
of FA (see Chapter 3)• On t r u t h table tasks, subjects almost 
invariably report TT to be a v e r i f y i n g case and there i s a very strong 
tendency to report TF to be a f a l s i f y i n g case (see Chapter 2.2), 
Thus, on the basis of selection task responses, subjects appear to 
appreciate the need to test modus ponens and, on the basis of 
behaviour on both inference and t r u t h table tasks, they are usually 
capable of evaluating the outcome of such a te s t . 
A l l the above behaviours accord with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . 
However, that they r e f l e c t the fact that subjects* thinking processes 
are isomorphic with l o g i c a l structure, i s by no means demonstrated. 
To say that the MP inference follows l o g i c a l l y from a statement of 
the form ' i f P then Q*, may well cloud the issue, as i t can equally 
well be seen as a verbal equivalent of the conditional. The MT 
inference on the AA rule can be verbally expressed as (the 
contrapositive) * i f not Q then not P*, but the equivalent verbal 
expression of MP, as was shown i n Chapter 5» i s the conditional (see 
Table 5 .1) . I t would thus be impossible to learn to use conditional 
statements without acquiring both the a b i l i t y to draw MP and the • 
a b i l i t y to evaluate the TT and TF cases. A subject's a b i l i t i e s , 
concerning the antecedent of a conditional statement, are thus 
inextricably conjoined with his acquisition of the verbal use of 
-325-
such statements, and need not be based i n any formal structuring 
of his thinking processes. 
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SECTION 11 .2.2 CONDITIONAL INFERENCE TASKS 
There i s very l i t t l e evidence f o r l o g i c a l performance on 
conditional inference tasks except f o r those behaviours considered 
i n Section 11,2.1. In Experiments 1 and 2 (see Chapter 5) no evidence 
was found f o r the hypothesis that subjects a f f i r m the contrapositive, 
or deny i t s opposite, due to an appreciation of i t s l o g i c a l 
status. Although t h i s hypothesis has not been tested concerning 
affirmation of the MT inference, or denial of i t s opposite, there 
i s no reason to believe that subjects would appreciate the l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y of MT any more than the contrapositive. 
Although frequencies of AG affirmation can be manipulated 
by the content or context of the problem, (see Chapter 2.3.2) the 
changes most probably stem from the application of the subject's 
available past experience, rather than from d i f f e r e n t i a l acceptance 
of the v a l i d i t y of the inference. That AC and DA affirmation on abstract 
tasks i s not mediated by a perception of the major premiss as 
implying equivalence, i s indicated by the d i f f e r e n t i a l frequencies 
with which these inferences are affirmed and by the f a c t that AC 
and DA responses do not 'move together'. That i s . those rule forms 
that y i e l d the highest frequencies of AC affirmation are not 
necessarily those that y i e l d the highest frequencies of DA 
affirmation. 
The only apparently ' l o g i c a l ' behaviour on inferences 
concerning the consequent of a conditional rule i s that subjects 
usually avoid the evaluation of inferences as 'false' and the 
evaluation of 'opposite' inferences as 'true'. That i s , i f 
inferences are not affixmed, or i f t h e i r 'opposites' are not denied, 
then they tend to be evaluated as 'indeterminate'. However, i f the 
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subject takes account of the minor premiss, he need only be 
attending to the s u p e r f i c i a l structure of the problems. The 
major premiss w i l l either have an odd or even number of negatives 
and, taking account of both minor premiss and conclusion, the MP, 
DA, MT and AC inferences w i l l match the major premiss i n t h i s respect, 
whereas there w i l l be a mismatch i n the case of 'opposite' 
inferences. The inference forms used i n Experiments i and 2 may 
be evaluated i n a similar way. Instead of counting the negatives 
i n the minor premiss and conclusion, the subject would simply need 
to count the number of negatives i n the conditional statements 
offered and compare t h i s count with the key statement. Subjects' 
experience of negatives may simply lead them to assume that 
statements with an even number of negatives cannot mean the same 
as statements with an odd number of negatives, and vice versa. 
Thus subjects need perform no more than a simple negative 
count to avoid denying inferences or to avoid affir m i n g 'opposite' 
inferences. In the case of the AC inference, the comparison i s 
made p a r t i c u l a r l y easy as the negatives are attached to the same 
terms as they are i n the major premiss. Admittedly, subjects do 
not always avoid the denial of inferences. For instance, i n 
Experiment 2, the contrapositive was denied on over 10^ of 
occasions. However, subjects would be expected to miscount 
occasionally. 
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SECTION 11.2.3 DISJUNCTIVE INFERENCE TASKS 
There i s very l i t t l e behaviour i n accordance with l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y on disjunctive problems involving rules with negative 
components and there appears to be some tendency to evaluate a l l 
rule forms as i f they were AA disjunctions. In the case of 
problems involving AA disjunctions, error rates are very low (see 
Chapter 2.4). For abstract AN and NA rules, the data of Roberge 
(1978) show that across a l l problems (which were a l l determinate) 
subjects drew the v a l i d conclusion on 38^ of occasions, drew the 
opposite of the v a l i d conclusion on 35% of occasions and rated the 
argument as 'indeterminate' on 26% of occasions. There appears to 
be no ef f e c t of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y on t h i s response d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
although 'error' rates are much lower on exclusive NN rules. 
Typical responses on disjunctive tasks readily lend 
themselves to an explanation i n terms of the subject's experience. 
I t would surely be impossible f o r a subject to learn the use of 
the word 'or' without, at the same'time, acquiring the a b i l i t y to 
handle an AA disjunction. Subjects' experience of the use of 
disjunctives cannot be questioned. However, i t i s u n l i k e l y that 
subjects have encountered NA or AN disjunctive statements i n 'real 
l i f e ' , except on the most infrequent occasions. That subjects do 
not have an appreciation of the concept of disjunction, other than 
that acquired from the learned use of the word 'or', i s indicated 
by the f a c t that high frequencies of correct responses are only 
observed on the (AA) rule form with which they are f a m i l i a r , ^ 
Presented with a rule form that ddes not re l a t e to t h e i r 'real l i f e ' 
experience, subjects' frequencies of correct responses drops to 
l i t t l e above chance l e v e l . I f subjects had an i n t r i n s i c concept 
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of disjunction, t h i s concept would be expected to generalise to 
rule forms with which they were unfamiliar. 
F i n a l l y , i t should be noted that, i n 'real l i f e ' , the 
content of the disjunction w i l l aid inferences from i t . The data 
of Roberge (197?) suggest that semantic factors are at least as 
important as the structure. 
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SECTION 11,2.4 SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 
Valid responses to s y l l o g i s t i c arguments are d i f f i c u l t 
to analyse as there are a variety of syllogisms, each having i t s 
own structure. That behaviour i n accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y 
i s observed i s indicated by two findings. F i r s t l y , that atmosphere 
bias appears strongest when i t accords with the l o g i c a l l y v a l i d 
conclusion and, secondly, that subjects often affixm the v a l i d 
nonpropositional conclusion to indeterminate premiss pairs ( t h i s 
tendency was p a r t i c u l a r l y noticeable i n the data of Johnson-Laird 
& Steedman, 1978). However, certain syllogisms rarely produce 
v a l i d responses. 
Reference to t y p i c a l data from s y l l o g i s t i c studies reveals 
that those problems y i e l d i n g high frequencies of v a l i d nonproposit-
ional conclusions are those having EE, EO, OE and 00; and I I , 01 
and 10 premiss pairs. The reader w i l l note that these constitute 
the 'category 1' and 'category 2' premiss pairs discussed by Dickstein 
(1978b) (see Chapter 1.2). Frequencies of v a l i d nonpropositional 
conclusions are much lower on other premiss pairs, and i t i s thus 
these two categories that y i e l d the best evidence of subjects* 
a b i l i t y to derive a v a l i d conclusion from indeterminate premiss 
pairs. In fact i t i s also these premiss pairs that underlie the 
fin d i n g that more atmosphere responses are made when they accord 
with v a l i d i t y . The l a t t e r frequency i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y higher 
than atmosphere responses on indeterminate premiss pairs other 
than those i n category 1 and 2. Behaviour on these problems thus 
constitutes the main evidence f o r an e f f e c t of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y on 
responses to syllogisms 
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Dickstein (1978b) a t t r i b u t e s a pa r t i c u l a r error to each 
of these two categories, to explain why not a l l subjects accept a 
nonpropositional conclusion. He presents an interesting analysis 
showing within subject consistency i n performance within, but not 
between, the two categories. On the basis of t h i s analysis, 
Dickstein concluded that a subject susceptible to one type of 
error would tend to make t h i s error on a l l problems within one 
category, but would not be more, or less, l i k e l y , than other 
subjects, to be susceptible to the other type of error, Dickstein 
interpreted t h i s as evidence f o r the operation of two d i s t i n c t 
errors. However, i t i s possible that Dickstein was viewing his 
data from the wrong perspective. 
As the premiss pairs i n these two categories y i e l d the 
highest frequencies of l o g i c a l l y v a l i d nonpropositional conclusions, 
then surely the most interesting question i s why subjects avoid 
errors, rather than make errors on these problems. Given the 
simple statement, 'no v a l i d conclusion may be derived from two 
negative premisses', a l l category 1 premiss pairs can be v a l i d l y 
solved. Similarly, a l l category 2 premiss pairs can be v a l i d l y 
solved, given the simple statement, 'no v a l i d conclusion may be 
derived from two p a r t i c u l a r premisses'. Thus no complex analysis 
of these problems i s required f o r t h e i r solution. This does not 
necessarily imply that such complex analysis i s not performed, but 
i t at least suggests that subjects may have acquired one or both 
of the necessary rules as a 'shortcut' method. Two points may be 
advanced i n favour of the l a t t e r hypothesis; 
1) The hypothesis explains why more v a l i d nonpropositional 
conclusions are affirmed on these, than on other, indeter-
minate, premiss pairs. However, i f i t were held that 
these premiss pairs were 'solved' by l o g i c a l analysis. 
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t h i s would not explain why other indeterminate premiss 
pairs are not frequently solved, unless i t was argued that 
category 1 and 2 arguments are easier. I t i s not apparent 
why t h i s should be the case. 
2) I f acceptance of v a l i d nonpropositional conclusions i s 
a function of some i n t r i n s i c l o g i c a l a b i l i t y , then 
performance should correlate across, (as well as within) 
categories. 
The two rules given above may be combined with the atmos-
phere principles to produce the following two simple rules which 
w i l l y i e l d the correct solution to 28 of the 36 possible premiss 
pairs. 
A) I f no premiss i s negative, conclusion stff irmative; i f pne 
premiss negative, conclusion negative; i f two premisses 
negative, no v a l i d conclusion, 
B) I f no premiss i s p a r t i c u l a r , conclusion universal; i f one 
premiss p a r t i c u l a r , conclusion particulatr; i f two premisses 
p a r t i c u l a r , no v a l i d conclusion. 
I t could be objected that the above rules do not define 
the d i r e c t i o n of conclusion, but t h i s i s usually cued by the premisses 
For instance, f o r determinate premiss pairs, i f the word 'some' i s 
attached to a conclusion term i n one of the premisses, then i t i s 
attached to the same term i n the conclusion. 
The important point about the above i s that, i f subjects 
use such rules, then no formal l o g i c a l analysis i s required. That 
subjects' behaviour may possibly be a function of these rules i s 
suggested by the f a c t that 'error' rates are t y p i c a l l y very high 
on those 8 problems f o r which the above rules y i e l d an i n v a l i d 
solution. 
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Rule A above appears to have a stronger e f f e c t on 
responses than Rule B, The dominance of negative atmosphere when 
one premiss i s negative i s more msirked than the dominsmce of 
p a r t i c u l a r atmosphere when one premiss is p a r t i c u l a r , and the 
( i n v a l i d ) acceptance of a prepositional conclusion to two negative 
premisses i s t y p i c a l l y less frequent, than the acceptance of a 
prepositional conclusion to two p a r t i c u l a r premisses. The differences 
i n e f f e c t are thus consistent across both the atmosphere and the 
'added* parts of Rules A and B. However, the important point i s 
that, i n a l l cases, 'error' rates are lower on those problems f o r 
which the above rules y i e l d a v a l i d solution. Thus a simple 
extension of the atmosphere principles can explain behaviour on 
those (category 1 and category2) premiss pairs that appear to y i e l d 
the best evidence f o r subjects' 'logical* behaviour. The revised 
atmosphere theory given i n Rules A and B above i s , of course, very 
speculative. I t does explain a considerable amount of the data but 
i t i s clearly debatable whether subjects would*have had the 
opportunity of acquiring these rules. However, i f subjects respond 
on the basis of these rules, they need attend only to the s u p e r f i c i a l 
features of the problem and, given the p o s s i b i l i t y that these rules 
have been acquired, data from s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning tasks cannot 
be taken as d e f i n i t i v e evidence that subjects attend to, and perform 
operations upon, the formal structure of the problems. 
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SECTION 11.3 CONCLUSIONS 
I t i s not claimed that the issues raised i n t h i s , and 
the previous, chapter, have conclusively demonstrated that subjects 
do not have an i n t r i n s i c l o g i c a l competence. The intention has 
been, however, to demonstrate that v a l i d responses are not 
necessarily a function of such competence and that alternative 
explanations are possible. 
The alternative explanation presented here i s that 
subjects* responses on abstract tasks are a resultant of behaviours 
that they have learned to apply to 'real l i f e * problems. I t i s 
suggested that a strength of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that i t sees 
no essential difference between those behaviours that accord with 
l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y and those that do not. Both are held to r e f l e c t 
behaviour patterns that have functional u t i l i t y i n 'real l i f e * . 
This position essentially needs to demonstrate the following two 
things: 
1) That *nonlogical* behaviours can have u t i l i t y i n r e a l 
l i f e problem solving. 
2) That * l o g i c a l ' behaviours are not necessarily mediated 
by a l o g i c a l analysis of the structure of the problem and 
that they may be a resultant of aspects of the problem 
that the subject has learned to respond to. 
I t i s considered that there i s reasonable indication that 
*nonlogical' behaviours may have u t i l i t y i n *real l i f e * ( f o r instance 
i n d i r e c t evaluation of conclusions) and tha t the subject has acquired 
them p r i o r to the experimental s i t u a t i o n (see Chapters 10 and 11,1). 
The position regarding (2) above i s more complicated. Valid 
behaviours concerning the antecedent of conditional rules, and 
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concerning AA disjunctive rules, cannot be taken as evidence of 
subjects' appreciation of l o g i c a l structure, as these behaviours 
must be acquired at the same time as the subject acquires the use 
of the relevant language. However he need acquire nothing other 
than the use of the language. That subjects do not acquire a 
concept of disjunction when learning the use of the word 'or' i s 
indicated by the high error rate on negated rules. The learning 
i s stimulus-specific and does not generalise. There i s l i t t l e 
other evidence f o r l o g i c a l appreciation on propositional reasoning 
tasks. However, the evidence f o r l o g i c a l competence on s y l l o g i s t i c 
reasoning tasks cannot be dismissed l i g h t l y ani the suggestions 
advanced i n Chapter 11.6 axe V3ry speculative. 
The essential point i s that i t i s quite possible that 
the labels ' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical' r e f l e c t an a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n 
made by the experimenter on the basis of an irrelevant dimension 
( l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y ) . For instance, i f subjects have acquired the 
two simple rules suggested i n 11 .6, then the same form of behaviour 
'looks l i k e ' a nonlogical bias on some occasions and l i k e a ' l o g i c a l ' 
response on others. The rules would have u t i l i t y i n r e a l l i f e because 
they y i e l d correct behaviour on most problems, but they do not 
relate to l o g i c a l structure. 
I t cannot be denied that the subjects* experience has a 
strong e f f e c t upon responses. There are two areas of clear cut 
evidence f o r t h i s ; 
1) Use of meaningful thematic content that relates to a 
subject's experience affects his responses. Experiments 
4, 5 a-nd 6 have demonstrated that even a short period of 
pr i o r experience can af f e c t responses. 
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2) High frequencies of l o g i c a l l y v a l i d responses are 
observed on those problems whose solution depends on 
the subjects' learned use of the syntactic structure 
(see 11.3 and 11 . 5 ) . 
That some ' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical* behaviours are a 
function of the subjects* experience i s thus not i n question. 
Further, there i s no conclusive evidence that any particular 
behaviour i s not a function of the subjects' experience. However, 
i t i s not simply the point here to argue that l o g i c a l behaviours 
are learned. The point i s that there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
term 'learning' and the term 'understanding'. I t i s argued that 
subjects learn behaviours and that some of these behaviours happen 
to accord with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y but that there i s no reason why 
acquisition of a response that accords with v a l i d i t y need be taken 
as having induced a state of appreciation of that v a l i d i t y . At 
least i n the case of prepositional reasoning, those v a l i d responses 
that are frequently observed are notably related to a basic 
learning of the use of language ( i . e . MP affirmation or evaluation 
of the TT case). There i s no reason to believe that the subject 
acquires anything other than t h i s usage. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Error rates are low on exclusive rules of the NN form "but 
t h i s i s consistent with the argument. Response to an exclusive 
NN rule as though i t i s an AA rule does not lead to error. 
2. There are only 36 possible premiss pairs, when no conclusion 
i s presented f o r evaluation (as t h e i r order i s irrelevant to the 
argument): 10 each i n figures 2 and 3 and 16 i n figure 1/4. 
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SECTION 12.1 INTRODUCTION 
During Part 1, considerable emphasis was placed upon the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between apparent 'logical* and 'nonlogical* effects on 
reasoning task responses and, kt the end of that review, i t was 
concluded that the Evans ( l972a, 1977b) position was the best 
published interpretation of reasoning task data. In succeeding 
chapters, however, various experimental findings and theoretical 
issues have been discussed which have some bearing upon t h i s 
conclusion. I t i s thus necessary to reevaluate the Evans position 
i n the l i g h t of these developments. 
The following three central tenets may be i d e n t i f i e d i n 
the Evans position: 
1) That responses are not a simple function of in t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
as * operational' factors also influence the data and must 
be taken in t o account. This tenet i s c r u c i a l to a l l other 
theories that Evans has proposed. 
2) That the processes underlying responses are not necessarily 
available to introspection. Thus protocol data, although 
possibly of int e r e s t i n i t s e l f , cannot reveal the basis 
of responses to the task. Evans (1980a) c i t e s Byrne (1977) 
as pointing out that verbal reports are a form of data 
to be explained i n t h e i r own r i g h t , and not a means of 
explaining some other form of behaviour. Thus Evans i s 
not without support f o r his position, as the Nisbett & 
Wilson (1977) paper also shows. 
3) That processes underlying reasoning task responses are 
stochastic (rather than deterministic) within individual 
subjects. Thus differences i n responses between subjects 
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are not seen as due to some subjects being i n a d i f f e r e n t 
state of insight, or adopting a d i f f e r e n t (conscious) 
strategy, to other subjects. To c l a r i f y t h i s position, 
suppose that 70^ of subjects make a p a r t i c u l a r response. 
I f behaviour i s stochastic within subjects, then a l l 
subjects have a probability of making, or not making, 
t h i s response. The observed r e s u l t may thus be taken as 
an estimate of subjects* mean pro b a b i l i t y of making the 
response. 
A detailed exposition of these three tenets, and of t h e i r 
implications f o r other theories of reasoning, i s given by Evans (I980b) 
Before consideration of these general tenets, i t i s of 
inte r e s t to consider the more specific extension of the position 
to the selection task i n the form of the mathematical model of Evans 
(1977b). The development of t h i s model entailed the adoption of 
furthe r , subsidiary, assumptions, to those given above, and certain 
of the experimental findings of Part 2 bear a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to 
these assumptions. 
There are two ways to evaluate a mathematical model - to 
attempt to f i t the model to a set of data, or to evaluate i t s 
assumptions on the basis of theoretical considerations or 
experimental findings. Both of these approaches w i l l be adopted 
here, as one specific purpose of u t i l i s i n g a l l four conditional 
rules, i n Experiment 6, was to provide a set of data on which the 
model could be tested. 
In the following sections, the Evans position w i l l thus 
be evaluated i n three ways. F i r s t l y , the results of Experijnent 6 
w i l l be used as a d i r e c t t e s t of the model's a b i l i t y to f i t 
-3^1-
selection task data and, secondly, the assumptions of-the model 
w i l l be evaluated,'both on the basis of the results of t h i s f i t 
and on the basis of relevant experimental findings of Part 2, 
F i n a l l y , the three central tenets of the Evans position, given 
above, w i l l be evaluated on a more general basis. 
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SSGTION 1^2.2 A FTT'OF"THE DATA OF EX I ^ R I M E N T 6 TO THE MODEL 
OF EVANS (1977b) 
On the basis of the theory that reasoning responses are 
a'function of both l o g i c a l ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l ) and nonlogical 
(operational) factors, and that such responses are p r o b a b i l i s t i c 
within subjects, Evans (l977b) proposed that such responses could 
be modelled i n mathematical terms. He suggested a fonnulation which, 
although t h e o r e t i c a l l y a general model, was related s p e c i f i c a l l y 
to the selection task. He proposed that selection p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
f o r each card are determined by a weighted addition of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l 
( l ) and response bias (R) tendencies. Formally, the p r o b a b i l i t y 
of a response, p ( r ) , i s given by: 
p(r) = a I + (1 - a) R 
where 0 < a < 1 
0 < I < 1 
and 0 < R < 1 
The I values refer to the subjects' "interpretation of 
the sentences comprising the l o g i c a l premisses". Thus, f o r instance, 
as subjects apparently 'interpret' conditionals as requiring the = 
test of TA, I values would be expected to be higher ( i . e . be a 
stronger influence towards selection) i n the case of TA than i n 
the case of FA, Similarly, R values would be expected to be higher 
i n the case of 'matching' cards. 
The weighting f a c t o r , a, determines the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t 
of the I and R tendencies. The lower the a value, the more 
dominant the influence of nonlogical factors. Evans (1977b) 
proposes that a (values) are "a function of the s i t u a t i o n (e.g. presence 
of r e a l i s t i c or abstract materials) and certain gross l o g i c a l 
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d i s t i n c t i o n s ( i n t h i s application, the d i r e c t i o n of reasoning 
between antecedent and consequent)". The l a t t e r i s a reference to 
the apparent. greater e f f e c t of nonlogical influences on consequent 
selection. 
The selection p r o b a b i l i t y of each card may be represented 
i n terms of a p a r t i c u l a r expression of the general model ( i . e . 
including the specific I and R terms f o r that card). An estimate 
of t h i s expression can then be obtained from the selection frequency 
of t h i s card observed i n a sample of subjects. I t should be noted 
that, as Evans points out, t h i s procedure i m p l i c i t l y assumes that 
a l l subjects have the same parameter values. However, i n an 
homogeneous sample, l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n i n i n d i v i d u a l parameter values 
would be expected. (This point w i l l be returned to i n section 12.3.) 
The approach i s of l i t t l e value when applied only to 
affirmative rules as the true cases of the antecedent and consequent 
(TA and TC, respectively) always match and the false cases (FA and 
FC) always mismatch. Interpretation and matching (response) bias 
are thus confused. However, the two factors can be distinguished 
by use of a l l four rules formed by systematic negation of the 
antecedent and consequent components. Thus, f o r instSLnce, TA 
matches i n the case of ' I f P then Q* but mismatches i n the case 
of the r u l e * I f not P then Q*. I t was by t h i s method that Evans & 
Lynch (1973) demonstrated that the tendency to select P and Q on 
the a ffirmative rule i s a function of matching and not a function 
of a ( v e r i f y i n g ) tendency to select TA and TC. 
The r e s u l t s of Evans & Lynch (1973) appeared to suggest 
that more attention i s directed to matching on consequent selections 
than on antecedent selections and thus Evans (1977b) suggested that 
there should be two values of a (the weighting f a c t o r ) ; oa cind ac. 
I values w i l l d i f f e r f o r the d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l values of the cards 
and thus separate I values must be assigned to true and false 
instances of the antecedent and consequent (ITA, IFA, ITC and IFC). 
As the only known response bias on the selection task was matching 
bias, Evans proposed that R should take j u s t two values; one when 
the card matches (RM) and another when the card mismatches (RM). 
The results of an experiment, using a l l four forms of 
conditional r u l e , y i e l d sixteen data c e l l s (selection of four cards 
on four r u l e s ) . From these, two estimates of each of eight 
expressions derived from the model may be obtained. The nature 
and source of these expressions are shown i n Table 12.1. 
I t i s apparent from Table 12,1 t h a t , although numerical 
values can be assigned to each of the eight expressions, estimates 
of individual parameter values cannot be obtained. However, Evans 
(1977b) adopted p r i o r assumptions of certain parameter values i n 
order to test whether consistent estimates of the remaining 
parameters could be obtained. The basis of these assumptions i s 
best explained by quoting from the paper: 
"Now, i n the l i m i t i n g case of r e a l i i s t i c materials where 
a approaches 1, behaviour approaches that of being perfectly l o g i c a l 
on t h i s task (assuming a t r u t h table f o r material implication). 
Thus i t i s assumed that the I parameter has the value 1 f o r correct 
responses (p and q) and 0 f o r incorrect responses (p and q)". 
Spec i f i c a l l y , then, Evans assumed that ITA = IFC = 1, and 
that IFA = ITC = 0. Inspection of Table 12.1 shows that these 
assumptions greatly simplify the eight expressions, the a l values a l l 
reducing to either a or 0. Evans (1977b) f i t t e d the model, with 
these assumptions, to the data of Evans & Lynch (1973) and produced 
impressively consistent estimates of the remaining four parameters. 
The manner i n which these were derived i s shown i n Table 12.2, which i s 
a r e p r i n t of the relevant table i n the Evans (1977b) paper. 
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Table 12.1 
Source of the Eight Fundamental Expressions Derivable from the Model when F i t t e d to Selection Task Data 
INTERPRETATION AND 
MATCHING COMBINATION 
EXPRESSION SEIECTION FREQUENCIES FROM VfHICH THE TWO 
ESTIMATES ARE DERIVED 
I 
I 
TA, MATCH aa ITA + (1 - oa) RM P selections on ( i ) ' I f P then Q' 
( l i ) ' I f P then not Q' 
FA, MATCH aa IFA + (1 - Oa) RN P selections on ( i ) ' I f not P then Q' 
( i i ) ' I f not P then not Q* 
TA. MISMATCH Ota ITA + (1 - aa) RM P selections on ( i ) ' I f not P then Q' 
( i i ) ' I f not P then not Q' 
FA, MISMATCH aa IFA + (1 - aa) RM P selections on ( i ) ' I f P then Q' 
( i i ) ' I f P then not 
FC, MATCH ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM Q selections on ( i ) ' I f P then not 
( i i ) ' I f not P then not Q' 
TC, MATCH ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM Q selections on ( i ) ' I f P then Q' 
( i i ) ' I f not P then Q' 
FC, MISMATCH ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM Q selections on ( i ) ' I f P then Q' 
( i i ) ' I f not P then 
TC, MISMATCH ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM Q selections on ( i ) ' I f P then not Q' 
( i i ) ' I f not P then not Q' 
Table 12.2 
Table I I I of Evans (1977b). 
Predicted e q u a l i t i e s from provisional model based on probability estimated from the data of 
A. Probability Estimates 
Evans & Lynch ( 1 9 7 3 ) (N = 2 4 ) 
I 
Model ESTIMATE 1 ESTIMATE 2 MEAN ESTIMATE STANDARD ] 
a) aa + (1 -aa) . RM 0.875 0.917 0.896 0.0^ 
b) (1 - aa) . RM 0.292 0.458 0.375 0.070 
c) oa + (1 -aa) . RM 0.583 0.542 0.563 0.072 
d) (1 - aa) . RM 0.083 0.042 0,063 0.035 
e) ac + (1 - ac) . RM 0.583 0.750 0.667 0.068 
f ) (1 - ac) . RM 0.500 0.583 0.542 0.072 
s) ac + (1 - ac) . RM 0.333 0.41? 0.375 0.070 
h) (1 - ac) . RM 0.083 0.292 0.188 0.056 
Table 12,2 (Continued) 
B. Predicted equalities of model 
Using best estimates of aa and ac 
Parameter Estimate 1 S.E. Estimate 2 S.E. D i f f , S.E. Z 
oca (a) - (b) 0.521 0.09^ (c) - (d) 0,500 0.080 0.021 0.123 0.17 
ac (e) - ( f ) 0.125 0,099 (g) - (h) 0.187 0.090 0.062 0.13^ 0 A6 
RM * ( b ) / ( l -aa) 0.765 0.173 ( f ) / ( l - o^ c) 0,6^2 0.099 0,123 0.199 0,62 
m * ( d ) / ( l - aa) 0.129 0.073 ( h ) / ( l - ac) 0,223 0.068 0.09^ 0.098 0.96 
C, Best estimates of parajneters 
Par Bine t e r 
aa 
ac 
RM 
RM 
Estimate 
0.511 
0,156 
0.70-^ 
0.176 
Standard Error 
0.062 
0,067 
0.100 
0.0^9 
This table i s best explained by the following quote from Evans 
(1977b): " I t w i l l be seen, from Table I I I A (see Table 12.2) that 
estimates of the parameter value Oa may be obtained i n two independent 
ways from the data: by the subtraction (a) - (b) and the subtraction 
(c) - (d). Similarly, two estimates of ac are obtained. In both 
cases the two estimates are impressively close, and the difference 
between them f a r from s i g n i f i c a n t . By calculating best estimates f o r 
aa and ac (see T^ble I I I C ) i t i s also possible to calculate two 
independent estimates f o r each of the Parameters RM and RM. The 
predicted equalities here depend on r a t i o s and also f a i l to d i f f e r 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y . The r e l a t i v e l y large standard errctrs of these 
differences, however, suggest that the sample size i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
large f o r a powerful test of these e q u a l i t i e s , " 
Having explained the method, the data of Experiment 6 may now 
be f i t t e d to the model. The 'true' and 'false' conditions of 
Experiment 6 used d i f f e r e n t subjects and thus there are, i n f a c t , 
two sets of data which may be f i t t e d . The estimates of the eight 
expressions shown i n Table 12,1 are shown i n Table 12.3A, f o r the 
'true' condition, and i n Table 12,3B, f o r the 'false' condition. 
Table 12.3C shows a comparison of the estimates between the conditions, 
I t i s apparent from Table 12,3 that, f o r each condition, the 
two estimates of each expression do not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from each 
other. However, Table 12,3C shows that a l l but one of the expressions 
d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y between the conditions. In the case of the 
aa IFA + (1 - aa) RM expression, the difference between the conditions 
i s close to significance. 
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Table 12.3 A 
Estimates of the Eight Expressions of Table 12.1, Derived from the Data of Experiment 6 
'True' .Condition 
I 
o I 
EXPRESSION ESTIMATE 1 ESTIMATE 2 MEAN 
ESTIMATE 
S.E. z 
a) aa ITA + (1 - aa) RM 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.029 0.00 
b) aa IFA + (1 - oa) RM 0.167 0.208 0.188 0.056 0.37 
c) aa ITA + (1 - Oa) RM 1.000 0.875 0.938 0.034 1.84 
d) aa IFA + (1 - aa) RM 0.125 O.I67 0.146 0.051 0.41 
e) ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM 0.500 0.375 0.438 0.071 0.88 
f ) ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.054 0.00 
s ) ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM 0.292 0.250 0.271 0.064 0.33 
h) ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM 0.667 0.750 0,709 0.065 0.64 
Table 12.3 B 
Estimates of the Ei^ht Expressions of Table 12.1, Derived from the dlata of Experiment 6 
'False' condition 
I 
EXPRESSION ESTIMATE 1 ESTIMATE 2 MEAN 
ESTIMATE 
S.E. Z 
a) aa ITA + (1 - aa) RM 0.750 0,792 0.771 0.060 0.35 
b) CXa IFA + (1 - aa) RM 0.292 0.458 0.375 0.069 1.20 
c) oca ITA + (1 - Oa) RM 0.875 O.7O8 0.792 0.058 1.44 
d) aa IFA + (1 - oa) RM 0.333 0.250 0.292 0.065 0.64 
e) ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM 0.667 0.625 0*.646 0.069 0.30 
f ) ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM 0.583 0.708 0.646 0.069 0.91 
g) ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM 0.500 0.5^2 0.521 0.072 0.29 
h) ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM 0.583 0.375 0.479 0.071 1.46 
Table 12.3 C 
Estimates of the Eight Expressions of Table 12.1, Derived from the Data of Experiment 6 
Comparison Between Conditions 
EXPRESSION ESTIMATE FROM ESTIMATE-FROM DIFFERENCE S.E. OF 
'TRUE* COND • FALSE» COND. DIFFERENCE 
I 
a) aa ITA + (1 - aa) RM 0.958 0.771 0.187 0.067 2.79 
b) aa IFA + (1 - oca) RM 0.188 0.375 0.187 0.089 2.10 
c) aa ITA + (1 - oca) RM 0.938 0.792 0.146 0.067 2.18 
d) aa IFA + (1 - eta) RM 0.146 0.292 0.146 O.O83 1.76 
e) ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM 0.438 0.646 0.208 0.099 2.10 
f ) ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM 0.833 0.646 0.187 0.088 2.12 
s) ac IFC + (1 - ac) RM 0.271 0.521 0.250 0.096 2.60 
h) ac ITC + (1 - ac) RM 0.709 0.479 0.230 0.096 2.40 
I f the assumptions adopted by Evans (1977b),(i.e. that 
ITA = IFC = 1, and that IFA = ITC = O), are employed to simplify these 
expressions, two estimates of oa (a - b and c - d) and ac (e - f and 
g - h) may be derived. The re s u l t i n g estimates of these parajneters 
are shown i n Table 12,4 A f o r the 'true' condition, and i n Table 
12.4 B f o r the 'false* condition. Table 12A C shows a comparison 
of best estimates between the conditions. 
I t can be seen from Table 12.4 that the two estimates of 
each a value are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t within each condition 
but that the best estimates of aa and ac are s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
d i f f e r e n t between the conditions. However, the more crucial f i n d i n g 
shown i n Table 12.4 i s the negative value of ac obtained i n the 'true' 
condition. A l l parameter values should vary between 0 and 1 and thus 
ac cannot be negative and i t i s apparent from t h i s r e s u l t that 
there i s something fundamentally wrong, either with the model 
i t s e l f or with the method used to f i t i t to the data. Inspection 
of the method used by Evans (1977b) makes i t apparent that a 
negative value of ac w i l l always be obtained whenever overall TC 
selections are more frequent than FC selections, and thus that i t 
i s an assumption of the method that subjects w i l l always select more 
FC than TC. This assumption underlies the p r i o r assumptions about 
I values and thus these are clearly not v a l i d general assumptions. 
The problem posed by the conclusion that the assumptions 
about I values axe i n v a l i d i s that, i f no assumptions are made, i t 
i s impossible to derive estimates of any ind i v i d u a l paxajneter values 
as each of the eight basic expressions contains a l l three types of 
parameter. However, i t i s possible to obtain assumption-free estimates 
of expressions that contain only two parameters. Of par t i c u l a r 
i n t e r e s t i s an expression that contains no I parameter. 
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Table 12.^ 
Estimates of oa and ac from the Data of Experiment 6 
PARAMETER ESTIMATE 1 S.E. ESTIMATE 2 S.E. DIFFERENCE 
12.4 A 
•TRUE* 
CONDITION 
aa 
ac 
0.770 
•0.395 
0.063 
0.089 
0.792 
•0.W8 
0.061 
0.091 
0.022 
0.043 
S.E. OF 
DIFF. 
0.088 
0.127 
0.23 
0.34 
I 
12.4 B 
'FALSE' 
CONDITION 
aa 
ac 
0.396 
0.000 
0.091 
0.098 
0.500 
0.042 
0.087 
0.101 
0.104 
0.042 
0.126 
0.141 
0.83 
0.30 
12.4 C 
COMPARISON 
BETWEEN 
PARAMETER Best Est. S.E, Best Est. S.E 
'True* Gond 
aa 
CONDITIONS ac 
'False' Cond 
0.781 0.0^44 0.448 O.063 
•0.417 0.064 0.021 0.071 
DIFFERENCE 
0.333 
0.438 
S.E. OF 
DIFF. 
0.077 
0.096 
4.32 
4.56 
Subtraction of c from a (see Table 12.3) subtracts oa ITA from 
i t s e l f and subtraction of d from b involves the subtraction of 
Oa IFA from i t s e l f . The r e s u l t i n both cases i s an estimate of the 
expression (1 - aa) RM - (1 - Oa) RM which can be si m p l i f i e d as: 
(1 - aa) (RM - RM) 
A similar procedure can be followed to obtain two 
estimates of the expression (1 - ac) (RM - RM). An interesting 
r e s u l t i s obtained i f estimates of these two expressions are 
calculated f o r the data of Evans & Lynch (1973). The r e s u l t of 
t h i s procedure i s shown i n Table 12.5 ( l e t t e r s refer to the data 
shown i n Table 12 .2 ) . 
I t i s somewhat surprising that the two mean estimates 
are i d e n t i c a l . This arises from the f a c t that subjects selected 
exactly as many more P than P cards as they d i d Q than Q cards. 
However, the point of interest i s that, f o r the data of Evans & 
Lynch, the following r e s u l t obtains: 
(1 - aa) (RM - RM) = (1 - ac) (RM - RM) 
There are only two possible explanations of t h i s ; 
1) aa does not equal ac, and (RM - RM) vairies between antecedent 
and consequent selections i n j u s t such a way that the above 
equality i s obtained. This p o s s i b i l i t y i s d i f f i c u l t to 
accept i f a and R are assumed to be independent. 
2) (RM - RM) i s invariant across antecedent and consequent 
selections and, i n t h i s experiment, aa = ac. This i s 
certainly the simplest and most l i k e l y explanation. 
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Table 12.5 
Calculation of (1 - a) (RM - RM) Values from the Data of Evans & Lynch (1973). Estimates taken from 
Evans"(1977b)' 
EXPRESSION ESTIMATE 1 S.E. . ESTIMATE 2 S.E. DIFI?ERENGE S j : . OF Z MEAN 
a - c b" - d DIFF. ESTIMATE 
(1 - aa) (RM - RM) .0.333 0.084 .01312 0.078 0.021 0.115 0.18 0.323 
I 
T ESTIMATE 1 ESTIMATE' 2 
e _ ^ f - h 
(1 - ac) (RM - RM) 0.292 0.098 0.354 O.O9I 0.062 0.134 0.46 0.323 
The c r u c i a l point i s that the Evans method of f i t t i n g the 
model cannot cope with the above equality as» when the data 
were f i t t e d to the model assuming an invariant (RM - RM),.they 
produced widely d i f f e r i n g values of oca and ac. Given the above 
equality, these re s u l t s are clearly erroneous. 
I t should be noted that, i f (RM - RM) i s presumed invariant ^ 
then the conclusion that OCa = ac " (from the above equality) i s 
independent of assumptions about I values,=whereas the actual 
calculation of-aa and ac try Evans (1977b) was not independent of 
his assumptions about I values. 
However, Evans* calculations, of oca = O.5II and ac = O.I56, 
although wrong, do have some meaning. I f no assumptions are made 
about I values, then i t can be seen that the calculations of Oa 
and ac are, i n f a c t , calculations of the expressions: 
aa (ITA - IFA) 
and ac (IFC - ITC) 
(where, i n the case of the Evans & Lynch data, eta = ac) 
From the find i n g that eta = ac, i t may thus be concluded that: 
(ITA - IFA) > 3 (IFC - ITC) 
This r e s u l t i s of some in t e r e s t , as i t suggests that 
consequent selections are not t y p i f i e d by a lack of attention to 
the l o g i c a l structure. Evans argues that the r e l a t i v e influence 
of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l factors was stronger on antecedent 
selections, but t h i s was clearly not the "case, as aa = ac. I t may 
be inferred from the above expression that subjects' tendency to 
behave more i n accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y on antecedent, than 
on consequent, selections i s a function of t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the sentence. In f a c t , given the Manktelow & Evans (1979) r e s u l t s , 
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i t i s possible that, over a range of studies, the mean finding 
would be that IFC = ITC = 0 ,5 . That i s , that subjects have no 
appreciation of the l o g i c a l status of TC and FC and that response 
to these cards i s random, unless influenced by matching, 
The above analyses have used the model to obtain two 
estimates of each of the following expressions; 
(1 - aa)(RM - RM) which may be referred to as an index of antecedent 
matching 
(1 - ac)(RM - RM) which may be referred to as an index of 
consequent matching 
aa (iTA - IFA) which may be referred to as an index of antecedent 
int e r p r e t a t i o n 
ac (IFC - ITC) which may be referred to as an index of consequent 
int e r p r e t a t i o n . 
These indices contain only two terms and may vary 
between -1 and 1, There i s no a p r i o r i reason why the two estimates 
of these expressions should, i n f a c t , be equalities and thus t h e i r 
calculation constitutes a v a l i d t e s t of the model i t s e l f . Inspection 
of Tables 12.2 B and 12.5 shows that the two estimates were i n a l l 
cases impressively close. Thus, although i t has been shown that 
Evans (1977b) was somewhat premature i n his assumptions of parameter 
values, the above analysis supports his conclusion that the model 
f i t s the data of Evans & Lynch (1973)» 
An assumption-free method having been derived, the 
model can be f i t t e d to the data of Experiment 6. Table 12.6 shows 
the estimates of the (1 - a) (RM - RM) expressions, Table 12.6 A 
fo r the 'true' condition and Table 12.6 B f o r the 'false' condition 
( l e t t e r s r e f er to the data of Tables 12.3 A and 12.3 B respectively). 
Table 12.6 C shows a comparison of the best estimates between the 
conditions. 
-358-
I 
I 
Table 12.6 
Estimates of (1 - a) (RM - RM) Values from the Data of Experiment 6 
EXPRESSION ESTIMATE 1 S.E. ESTIMATE 2 S.E. DIFFERENCE S.E. OF 
DIFF. 
'12.6 A 
(1 - Oa) (RM - RM) 
'TRUE' (a - c and b - d) '0.020 0.045 « 0.042 O.O76 0.022 0.088 0.25 
CONDITION 
(1 - ac) (RM - RM) 
(e - g and f - h) O.I67 O.O96 0.124 O.O85 0.043 0.128 0.34 
12.6 B 
(1 - aa) (RM - RM) 
(a - c and b - d) -0.021 O.O83 O.O83 0.095 0.104 0.126 0.83 
'FALSE' 
CONDITION (1 - ac) (RM - RM) 
(e - g and f - h) 0.125 0.100 O.I67 0.099 0.042 0.141 O.3O 
Table 12.6 (Continued) 
Estimates of (1 - a) (RM - RM) Values from the Data of Experiment 6 
I 
ON 
o I 
EXPRESSION 
12.6 G 
COMPARISON (1 - Oa) (RM • 
BETWEEN 
CONDITIONS (1 - ac) (RM • 
(BEST ESTIMATES) 
•TRUE* S.E. 'FALSE' S.E. DIFFERENCE S.E. OF Z 
RM) 0.031 0.044 0.031 0.063 
RM) 0.146 0.064 0.146 O.07I 
DIFF. 
0.077 0.00 
0,096 0.00 
12.6 D 
MEAN ESTIMATE OF 
(1 - oa) (RM - RM) 
S.E. MEAN ESTIMATE OF 
(1 - ac) (RM - RM) 
S.E. DIFFERENCE S.E. OF 
DIFF, 
0.031 0.039 0.146 0.048 0.115 0.062 1.85 
The two estimates of each expression are very close i n 
each condition. The c r u c i a l f i n d i n g , however, i s shown i n Table 
12.6 C, which strongly suggests that these expressions are invariant 
2 
across conditions. I t i s possible that aa and ac are covarying 
with (RM - RM) i n j u s t such a way between conditions as to keep 
the (1 - a) (RM - RM) values constant, but t h i s i s highly u n l i k e l y , 
and i t i s reasonable to conclude that aa, ac and (RM - RM) are, i n 
f a c t , invariant across conditions. Thus i t may be concluded from 
t h i s analysis that tnath status affects only the I values. 
Thus two of the Evans assumptions about I values must 
be rejected. F i r s t l y , as was demonstrated e a r l i e r , his assumption • 
of the actual numerical values were unwarranted and, secondly, 
i t appears that Evans was also incorrect i n his assumption that I 
values cannot vary. This l a t t e r f i n d i n g has important implications 
which w i l l be discussed l a t e r . 
On the basis of the Evans & Lynch data, the difference 
between,(1 - oa) (RM - RM) and (1 - ac) (RM - RM) estimates must 
be tested two-tailed and, as can be seen i n Table 12.6 D, the 
observed difference i n Experiment 3 does not quite reach significance 
(p < 0.07). However, the r e s u l t suggests that the equality of 
these values observed on the Evans & Lynch data may not hold i n a l l 
cases. I t i s worth noting at t h i s point that any difference observed 
would not necessarily be due to differences between aa and ac, as 
(RM - RM) may change between antecedent and consequent. Thus, to 
avoid making any assumptions whatsoever about the source of 
pote n t i a l differences, these two expressions should properly be wr i t t e n 
as: 
(1 - aa) (RM^ - RM ) a a 
and (1 - ac) (RM - RM ) c c 
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Table 12.7 
(a x) Differences i n the Four I Values, 'False' Condition Relative to 'True' Condition 
ESTIMATE 1 S.E. ESTIMATE 2 S.E. MEAN EST OF S.E. OF Z 
OF OF DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE (D/S.E. ) 
DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE ( D ) 
aa (Difference i n I T A ) -0.187 O.O67 -0.146 O.067 -O.I67 0.047 3.55 
oca (Difference" i n I F A ) O.I87 O.O89 0.146 O.O83 O.I67 O.O6I 2.73 
ac (Difference i n I F C ) 0.208 0.099 O.25O O.O96 0.229 O.O69 3-31 
ac (Difference i n ITC) -0.187 0.088 -O.23O O.096 -0.209 O.O65 3.21 
The strong e f f e c t of t r u t h status on I values i s apparent 
from Table 12.4, i n which estimates of aa and ac are, i n f a c t , 
estimates of: 
Oa (ITA - IFA) 
and ac (IFC - ITC) 
However, i t cannot be inferred from changes i n (iTA - IFA) 
and (IFG - ITC) that a l l four I values d i f f e r between the conditions. 
Fortunately, use can be made of the (1 - a) (RM - RM) invariance 
across conditions to investigate t h i s f u r t h e r . Due to t h i s 
invariance, subtraction of expressions a and c i n the *true* 
condition from expressions a and c i n the 'false' condition 
respectively yields two estimates of the expression aa (iTA 'false' -
ITA 'true') which can be wri t t e n as aa (Difference i n ITA) and i s 
an index of the difference i n ITA i n the 'false* condition ( r e l a t i v e 
to the 'true' condition). A similar procedure yields estimates of 
a l l four expressions shown i n Tahle 12.7. 
The l a s t column of Table 12.7 shows the Z values derived 
from a test of the ( n u l l ) hypothesis that there i s no difference 
between the conditions. As can be seen, there i s a highly 
s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n each case. The table shows that differences 
i n ITA are similar to those of IFA and that differences i n IFC are 
similar to those of ITC. The absolute values of these differences 
Ccinnot be computed as the values of oa and ac are not known. In 
summary, analysis i n terms of the model yields three pieces of useful 
information: 
1) aa, ac, RM and RM values are invariant between conditions, 
2) ITA, IFA, IFC and ITC are a l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t 
between the conditions. 
3) In the 'true* condition, ITC > IFC whereas these values 
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are approximately the same i n the false condition. 
ITA > IFA holds f o r both conditions. 
The primary importance of these findings i s that t r u t h 
status affects I values only, and that such effects can be 
demonstrated to occur by an analysis i n terms of the model. Such . 
analysis can thus play a useful role i n i d e n t i f y i n g s i g n i f i c a n t 
e f f e c t s . More generally, the reader's attention i s drawn to the 
f a c t that the two estimates of the four indices were i n a l l cases 
impressively close i n both the 'true' and 'false' conditions. Thus, 
together with the analysis of the Evans & Lynch data, the model 
i t s e l f has been tested on three sets of data. I t i s thus argued 
that t h i s section has constituted a powerful test which the model 
can be considered as having passed. 
However, the assumptions of I values adopted by Evans 
(1977b) have clearly f a i l e d t h i s t e s t and i t has been shown that 
the specific parameter values derived from the Evans (1977b) f i t 
were incorrect. 
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SECTION 12.3 FURTHER EXAMDJATION OF THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 
OF THE MODEL 
Although the model has proved quite useful i n f i t t i n g 
the data of Experiment 6, these data, i n f a c t , v i o l a t e certain 
assumptions, regarding a values and the independence of responses, 
that were adopted to obtain the f i t . 
The analysis shown i n Table 8.5 reveals that there are 
correlations between various selections on the selection task, 
notably a negative correlation between P and P selections and a 
positive correlation between P and Q selections. This suggests, 
for instance, that Q selections w i l l be more frequent on rules 
having negative antecedents and thus that the i n i t i a l two estimates 
of the eight expressions are not estimates of the same pr o b a b i l i t y . 
However, an analysis (not presented here) across the data of Exp-
eriment 6, Evans & Lynch (1973) and both abstract experiments of 
Manktelow & Evans (1978) revealed no evidence that the two estimates, 
of each of the eight expressions, d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Thus, 
although correlations e x i s t i n the data, i t i s unl i k e l y that they 
badly d i s t o r t the f i t . 
The problem regarding a values i s that, f o r the purpose 
of f i t t i n g the model, Evans assumes that there w i l l be l i t t l e 
v a r i a b i l i t y between subjects "within an homogeneous sample such 
as undergraduate students". However, within such a sample, 
s i g n i f i c a n t differences i n selection frequencies were observed, 
i n Experiments 5 and 6, between 'fast' and 'slow' learners. I n 
Experiment 6, i t was observed that f a s t learners were 'immune' 
to the effects of matching bias on antecedent selections and, i n 
terms of the Evans model, t h i s would imply that 'fast' learners 
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had higher values of aa than 'slow' learners. Of course, in theory, 
a values may be expected to show some v a r i a b i l i t y across subjects 
(although individual a values cannot be computed), and calculation 
of the overall a value i s an average. However, the u t i l i t y of an 
average i s inversely related to the v a r i a b i l i t y of the data. I f 
there i s l i t t l e v a r i a b i l i t y across subjects, the computed average 
a value has psychological relevance but, i f there i s a large amount 
of v a r i a b i l i t y across subjects (as the s i g n i f i c a n t differences 
between 'fast' and 'slow' learners suggest), then the 
'representativeness' of the average a value i s debatable. 
However, the e f f e c t of a wholly unrepresentative a value 
would be to produce a bad f i t to the data. The good f i t to the 
data obtained i n the l a s t section, and the invariance of a values 
across the two conditions of Experiment 6, indicates that 
differences i n a values between 'fast' and 'slow* learners did not 
seriously d i s t o r t the calculations. Further, the existence of 
differences between subjects i s no essential problem f o r the Evans 
model. Evans (1977b) points out that parameter values may vary 
between groups of subjects "who vary i n i n t e l l i g e n c e , l o g i c a l 
experience, etc." Thus, the more subgroups of subjects that are 
analysed i n d i v i d u a l l y , the more sophisticated w i l l be the f i t to 
the model, but the results of section 12.2 indicate that the model 
i s s u f f i c i e n t l y robust to cope with a certain amount of v a r i a b i l i t y 
w i t hin the data. 
In conclusion, i t may be f a i r l y said that the v i o l a t i o n 
of assumptions, discussed above, would be expected to d i s t o r t a 
f i t to the model. Thus, the fa c t that these assumptions were to 
some extent violated cannot be used as an explanation of the good 
f i t achieved i n section 12.2. However, the f a c t that these 
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assumptions were violated to some extent suggests t h a t , although 
a simple model has i t s uses, a more complex model would allow a 
more sophisticated analysis. 
One fu r t h e r ( i m p l i c i t ) assumption, adopted i n f i t t i n g 
the model, i s that use of a l l four conditional rules disajnbiguates 
' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical' factors. This assumption warrants 
detailed consideration, as i t i s the basis of the methodology of 
some c u i c i a l experiments, both i n selection task research (notably 
Evans & Lynch, 1973 and Wason & Evans, 1975). and i n other research 
on conditional rules (e.g. Evans, 1972b, 1977a). This assiiraption 
i s s u f f i c i e n t l y c r u c i a l to be awarded i t s own section. 
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SECTION 12.4 THE USE OF THE FOaR CONDITIONAL RUI£S IN THE 
DISAMBIGUATION OF 'LOGICAL' AND 'NONLQGICAL' FACTORS 
The matching bias r e s u l t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , depend on the 
use of a l l four conditional rules to control f o r in t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
For instance, on the selection task, across the four rules P and 
P both have the status of TA, and FA, on 50% of occasions. Higher 
selection frequencies of P, than P, may thus be a t t r i b u t e d to 
matching, rather than l o g i c a l status. Similarly, TA and FA both 
match, and mismatch, on 50% of occasions. Higher selection 
frequencies of TA, than FA, may thus be at t r i b u t e d to l o g i c a l 
status, rather than matching. 
The use of the four rules i s thus a very neat technique 
which controls f o r one dimension, whilst assessing the effects of 
the other. Most of the important findings, from research on 
prepositional reasoning, depend upon t h i s technique. For instance 
a l l the following findings depend, to at least some extent, on a 
control i n one or other dimension: 
A) That matching bias mediates responses on both -the 
selection tisk and t r u t h table tasks. 
B) That conclusion bias mediates responses on inference tasks. 
C) That subjects have a strong tendency to select TA, and 
re j e c t FA, on the selection task. 
D) That subjects apparently have no pr e f e r e n t i a l tendency 
to select either FC or TC, on the selection task. 
E) That subjects have some tendency to evaluate the FT ( t r u t h 
table) case as 'false* and the FF case as 'true', and a 
very strong tendency to evaluate the TF case as 'false'. 
(Findings with respect to the TT case are so clear cut 
that they cannot be said to depend on a control for 
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matching, however the control does indicate the dominance 
of the tendency to evaluate the TT case as * true * ) . 
The use of a l l four conditional rules has thus garnered an 
important body of information. Unfortunately, to i n t e r p r e t the data 
as d e f i n i t e l y showing the above findings, the following two 
assumptions need to be adopted; 
1) That the e f f e c t of l o g i c , or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i s 
consistent across the four rules. 
2) That the e f f e c t of nonlogical factors i s consistent 
across the four rules. 
For instance, i f subjects considered that t e s t i n g MP was 
less importcint, and t e s t i n g DA more important, on rules having negative 
antecedents, then t h i s would i n f l a t e the apparent size of the matching 
bias e f f e c t on antecedent selections, and could even be responsible 
f o r the entire e f f e c t . Similarly, i f , f o r some (unknown) reason, 
subjects had a stronger tendency to match on rules having affirmative 
antecedents, then t h i s would i n f l a t e the size of the preference f o r 
TA selection, or could even create an apparent preference for TA selection, 
The analysis performed i n Chapter 8 (see Table 8.5) showed 
that, on selection tasks using the NN r u l e , there i s a strong positive 
correlation between selection of cards of similar matching status 
( P and Q, and P and Q) and a strong negative correlation between 
selection of cards of d i s s i m i l a r matching status ( P and Q, and P and Q) , 
However, on other rules, except i n the case of the correlation between 
P and Q, there was l i t t l e evidence f o r t h i s pattern. I t i s thus 
possible that matching effects are not consistent across the four 
rules, although these r e s u l t s clearly cannot be considered as good 
evidence f o r t h i s . However, i t i s a remote p o s s i b i l i t y that observed 
effects of ' l o g i c a l ' factors are a function of d i f f e r e n t i a l matching 
across the four rules, as similax effects ( i . e . a tendency to behave 
i n accordance 
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with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y on the antecedent but not the consequent) 
are also observed on conditional inference tasks, on which matching 
bias (presumably) has no e f f e c t . 
A f a r more r e a l i s t i c hypothesis, one that presents some 
challenge to the v a l i d i t y of the methodology, i s that there may 
be a d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t of inte r p r e t a t i o n across the four rules. 
In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s considered that there i s something 'unusual* 
about the NA rule f o r the following two reasons: 
1) I t has proved very d i f f i c u l t , and sometimes impossible, 
to construct meaningful NA rules, implying implication, 
compcLrable to the other three rule forms, (see relevant 
comments i n part 2) , . Unless the ajitecedent dimension 
i s binary, i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to construct a thematic 
statement such that everything that i s not P, i s Q and 
even some Ps are Q. Even with a binary antecedent, the 
task i s not easy, although i t i s simple to construct 
binary NA statements implying equivalence (e.g. I f a 
number i s not even, then i t i s odd*). Thus, as in 'real 
l i f e ' , NA rules w i l l almost always be used to imply 
equivalence, subjects may well i n t e r p r e t such rules as 
implying equivalence on aji abstract task. 
2) The NA rule states that everything i s either P or Q, 
whereas the other conditional rules, when implying 
implication, do not make such an assertion. That i s , i f 
implication rules are presented i n diagram form, then 
the diagrajns of AA, AN, and NN rules a l l have a blank 
space i n them, allowing f o r a (possible) state of the 
world i n which neither P nor Q i s the case. The NA rule 
i s thus unlike other rules i n that i t i s a disjunctive 
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statement about P and Q, a point made by the Greek philosopher, 
Galen. Given the ease with which subjects make inferences 
from AA disjunctives, and the d i f f i c u l t y incuired by a l l other 
(inclusive) disjunctives, i t i s probable that, i n 'real 
l i f e * , conditionals are used p r e f e r e n t i a l l y (to d i s j u n c t i o n ) , 
except i n the case of the AA disjunction, which i s used i n 
preference to the NA conditional. There are grounds f o r 
arguing that disjunctions are usually interpreted as exclusive 
(thus leading to an equivalence i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the NA 
conditional) but i t i s unnecessary to pursue t h i s point, as 
the very p o s s i b i l i t y that the NA conditional may be interpreted 
as an AA disjunction, i n i t s e l f , suggests that i t s i n t e r -
pretation may well not be equivalent to other conditionals. 
However, the purpose here i s not to suggest that apparent 
'nonlogical* e f f e c t s are due to in t e r p r e t a t i o n a l differences across 
the four rules...The above points have been made simply to introduce 
a note of caution. There are, i n f a c t , very good reasons for 
assuming that nonlogical effects axe not a function of d i f f e r e n t i a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the rules, f o r instance; 
1) The consistent lack of s i g n i f i c a n t difference, within 
the pairs of equalities predicted by the model, suggests 
that the NA rule does not y i e l d (selection task) responses 
inconsistent with other rule forms. For instance, i f 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was held to underlie responses, leading 
to more ('logical') 'tests' of AC and DA on rules implying 
equivalence ( i . e . by selection of TC and FA, respectively), 
then i t would be d i f f i c u l t to explain why AC i s 'tested' 
no more often on NA rules than on AA rules (on which DA 
i s r a r e l y 'tested') and why DA i s 'tested' no more often 
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on NA rules than on NN rules (on which AC i s rarely 
'tested'). 
2) The above findings," and other findings discussed e a r l i e r , 
show that behaviour that can be l o g i c a l l y related to the 
AC inference does not 'move' with behaviour that caji be 
l o g i c a l l y related to the DA inference. Clearly, these 
behaviours would be expected to 'move together* i f they 
were a function of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
3) Behaviour that can be related to the MT inference i s 
equally susceptible to response bias, although MT i s 
l o g i c a l l y v a l i d on a l l known interpretations. 
As Evcins has pointed out (e.g. Evans, 1980b), subjects 
appear to i n t e r p r e t the conditional as implying equivalence 
more often on inference, than on t r u t h table, tasks. 
This i s inconsistent with an 'interpretational* view, 
but i s not inconsistent with the view that factors other 
than in t e r p r e t a t i o n determine responses. 
5) On the selection task, the s i g n i f i c a n t positive correlation 
between P and Q selections, on a l l four rules (see 
Table 8.5), would be impossible to explain as based i n 
d i f f e r e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the rules, and may be 
regarded as f i r m evidence that the matching status of 
the cards has psychological relevance. 
F i n a l l y , ' . i t i s worth noting that, although i n 'real l i f e ' 
the NA rule may be more often used to imply equivalence, there i s 
no need fo r the subject to learn d i f f e r e n t i a l interpretations of 
d i f f e r e n t syntactic structures. In 'real l i f e * , the extent to 
which a conditional statement implies equivalence i s wholly 
determined by i t s semantic content. 
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SECTION 12,5 INTROSI^CTION AND THE STOCHASTIC NATURE OF RESPONSES 
Certain errors i n the f i t to the model obtained by Evans 
(1977b) have been pointed out and corrected i n Section 12.2 and 
other possible problems f o r the model have been discussed in 12.3 
and 12.4. In general, the model has stood up reasonably well to 
detailed analysis, ajid the more general tenets of the Evans position 
may now be evaluated. 
His position regarding introspection, and the p r o b a b i l i s t i c 
nature of responses, w i l l be discussed i n one section p a r t l y 
because they are, i n one sense, related. I t i s more natural to 
view a response as deterministic i f i t i s introspectable, i f only 
because subjects report what appears to be a deterministic process. 
I t i s only when introspection i s not regarded as revealing the 
causes of behaviour that the p o s s i b i l i t y that behaviour i s stochastic 
may be considered. That i s , as subjects report a deterministic 
process, then behaviour can only be stochastic i f i t i s not 
introspectable, (This i s not to suggest that, i f behaviour i s not 
stochastic, i t i s introspectable). 
There i s no evidence that reasoning responses are i n t r o -
spectable and, f u r t h e r , f o r introspection to be of any use i n 
i n t e r p r e t i n g reasoning data, responses would have to be introspectable 
on a l l occasions. I f not, then the experimenter w i l l never know 
whether any pa r t i c u l a r response i s introspectable or not. As Evans 
(1980b) has pointed out, "we can only assess the v a l i d i t y of a 
subjective report i n a si t u a t i o n where we have an independent 
objective method of determining the cause of the subject's action. 
In such a s i t u a t i o n , however, we do not need his introspective 
report". 
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That at least some introspective reports are not v a l i d 
i s clearly indicated by the data of Wason & Evans (1975)i and the 
'ra t i o n a l i s a t i o n ' hypothesis adequately accounts f o r the content 
of the subjects* protocols. The subject i s apparently unaware ^  
of the causes of his behaviour and, when asked f o r an explanation, 
generates the best explanation evailable. This e f f e c t i s p a r t i c -
u l a r l y noticeable i n the data of Experiment 3 and of the Van Duyne 
(1976) study (see Chapter 6) . In the Van Duyne study, s i g n i f i c a n t 
differences were observed An the protocol data, across conditions 
which produced no s i g n i f i c a n t differences i n selection behaviour. 
That explanations of selections can be manipulated (by the 
experimental conditions) independently of the selections themselves, 
i s d e f i n i t i v e evidence that those explanations do not mirror the 
causes of behaviour. 
Fellows (1976) has argued that " i f Evans dismisses the 
subjects' reports as ra t i o n a l i s a t i o n s , then l o g i c a l l y he must also 
dismiss his own explanations i n the same way" and claims that an 
a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s drawn '*between 'the experimenter' who i s 
a l l wise ajfid 'the subject' who i s a f o o l " . This i s a v a l i d point 
as any int e r p r e t a t i o n of data, must be, at least to some extent, 
a personal r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . I f t h i s were not the case, there 
would be no theo r e t i c a l controversy within the psychological 
l i t e r a t u r e . V/hen selection task data from AA rules only was 
considered, responses were explained i n the same way by experimeters 
and subjects (as due to a v e r i f i c a t i o n bias). -This suggests that 
subjects' r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s should be interpreted i n terms of the 
theories of Bem (I965) rather than those of Festinger (1957). That 
i s , the subject observes his own behaviour and attempts to construct 
the best available explanation of i t , as does the experimenter. 
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However, the experimenter has the advantage of a broader 
perspective i n cases where, either he i s i n possession of data 
from a wide range of studies or, i n cases of a single study, he 
manipulates a variable of which the subject i s apparently unaware 
and which he predicts w i l l have an e f f e c t upon responses. Thus, 
for instance, i n the case of the Evans & Lynch (1973) study, the 
experimenters may be said to have been 'wiser' than the subjects. 
The question of whether behaviour i s stochastic or 
deterministic extends across the whole of experimental psychology, 
which essentially i n f e r s aspects of human behaviour from group 
data. I t i s a question of whether results are interpreted as showing 
that ( a l l ) subjects are most l i k e l y to behave i n a pctrticular way, 
or as showing that most subjects w i l l behave i n a pa r t i c u l a r way. 
A preference mast be admitted f o r the former alternative and there 
i s no apparent reason why data from reasoning tasks should not be 
interpreted i n the sajne way as data from other areas of experimental 
psychology. However, certain findings reported i n Part 2 indicate 
that a simple stochastic approach i s unsatisfactory. 
The selection differences between 'fast' and 'slow' 
learners show that there i s greater v a r i a b i l i t y within an homogeneous 
group of subjects than might have been expected. This does not 
invalidate a stochastic approach but i t does indicate that, even 
i n an homogeneous sample, the group average p r o b a b i l i t y of making 
a response i s a poor indicator of in d i v i d u a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s of making 
a response. Further, the Dickstein r e s u l t s concerning the 
independence of responses between, but not w i t h i n , category 1 and 
2 premiss pairs, indicate that individual differences between 
subjects may apply to some, but not other, problems. Thus 
indi v i d u a l parameter values within a stochastic model may vary with 
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regard both to in d i v i d u a l differences and the type of problem. 
However, the Dickstein f i n d i n g , that some subjects behave more i n 
accordance with v a l i d i t y on some problems, whereas other subjects 
behave more i n accordance with v a l i d i t y on other problems, would 
presumably be as much of a problem f o r a deterministic, as f o r a 
stochastic, approach. 
The associations-bbseirved ( i n Chapter 8) between card 
selections on the selection task also suggest that a more complex 
stochastic approach i s required. Given that certain selections 
appear to be made p r i o r to other selections or rejections, i t i s 
possible that the pro b a b i l i t y of subsequent selections i s contingent 
upon p r i o r selections. I t i s possible, f o r instance, that, on the 
AA r u l e , p r i o r selection of TA increases the tendency to r e j e c t 
FA (as these selections are negatively associated) and that t h i s 
r e j e c t i o n of FA increases the tendency to subsequently r e j e c t FC 
(as these selections are p o s i t i v e l y associated on t h i s r u l e ) . 
However, no causal r e l a t i o n need be postulated. The point i s that, 
given the associations between the selections, certain of the 
pr o b a b i l i t i e s involved must be conditional p r o b a b i l i t i e s . 
Thus, although no objections are made to a stochastic 
approach, i t i s suggested that any sophisticated stochastic approach 
would need to take account of the following two factors: 
1) The role of ind i v i d u a l differences (such as probability 
learning speed) even within an appairently * homogeneous' 
group of subjects. 
2) The.contingent relationship between various responses. 
For instance, subjects who select P are more l i k e l y to 
select Q. Similarly, i t was reported i n Chapter 5, that 
subjects have d i f f e r e n t i a l tendencies to a f f i r m inferences. 
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and thus that subjects who a f f i r m one inference are more 
l i k e l y to a f f i r m another. 
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SECTION 12.6 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DJIERFRETATIONAL AND 
OPERATIONAL FACTORS 
The central theme of t h i s thesis has been that there 
are preferred responses that accord with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , and 
other preferred responses that do not, and consistent support has 
been advanced f o r the Evans viewpoint that the l a t t e r are not the 
r e s u l t of error i n a process of 'logic a l reasoning', but are 
separate behaviours to be explained i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Thus the 
position adopted i n previous chapters must be regarded as, at least, 
similar to that adopted by Evans, Certainly, the points made i n 
previous sections of t h i s chapter have been e n t i r e l y consistent 
with the Evans position regarding introspection and have, with 
certain modifications, supported a mathematical approach. However, 
when the core feature of the Evans posit i o n , his conception of the 
nature of in t e r p r e t a t i o n a l and operational factors, i s evaluated, 
important differences emerge between h i s position and that adopted 
here. 
Before discussing these differences, i t i s importajit to 
be quite clear about Evans' d e f i n i t i o n of in t e r p r e t a t i o n a l and 
operational factors. Evans (l977b) states that "generally 
speaking, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l influences take the form of l o g i c a l 
tendencies r e s u l t i n g from the subjects' comprehension of the sentence, 
while operational influences consist of nonlogical response tendencies 
such as matching bias." Operational tendencies have been described 
as (due to the f a c t that) "subjects ignore the l o g i c a l 
structure of the problems" (Evans, 1972a) and simply as "a nonlogical 
response bias" throughout Evans (1978). 
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EvsLHS has thus tended to describe, rather than explain, 
nonlogical e f f e c t s . However, there i s no wish to imply here that 
such accounts of observed responses are i n any way i n v a l i d . One 
does not have to explain an ef f e c t to argue that i t exists. Thus 
Evans* arguments that nonlogical effects e x i s t , and must be taken 
account of, have constituted a valuable contribution to the under-
standing of reasoning task behaviour. However, i t i s clearly an 
extension of his position that i s advanced i n Chapters 10 and 11.1, 
i n which some attempt was made to investigate the substrate of 
apparent response biases, and to explain them as possibly learned 
behaviours that have u t i l i t y i n *real l i f e * , but that are 
inappropriate to a r t i f i c i a l experimental situations. In f a c t , as 
long ago as 1972, Evans (1972a) has suggested that operational 
effects may be products of the experimental s i t u a t i o n , but has not 
attempted to explain why t h i s may be the case. 
The Evans position regarding i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l factors 
i s that they relate to the l o g i c a l stinicture of the problem, 
dependant upon the subject*s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the sentence. Although 
t h i s position appears to assume that subjects are capable of a 
va l i d l o g i c a l analysis i n certain situations, i t i s not inconsistent 
with the arguments developed i n Chapter 11.2, Evans has himself 
suggested that p r i o r use of the language may influence subjects* 
responses on formally structured tasks. Specifically, Evans (1977a) 
has suggested that, i n *real l i f e * , subjects use conditionals of 
the form 'P only i f Q' i n situations where Q precedes P i n time, 
whereas the usual form of the conditional i s used more often i n 
situations where P precedes Q i n time. On the basis of t h i s 
suggestion, he predicted that t h i s p r i o r usage would influence 
responses on a formal reasoning task, and Evans & Newstead (1977) 
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have presented some empirical support f o r t h i s prediction. Thus, 
i n t h i s case, behaviour i n accordance with an 'int e r p r e t a t i o n a l ' 
influence i s not necessarily seen as leading to behaviour i n 
accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . This i s similar to arguments 
about the learned use of the word 'or' advanced i n Chapter 11.2.3 
and, more generally, i s consistent with the point of view that 
'logical* behaviours may r e s u l t from a learned use of the language. 
However, i t i s not, of course, suggested that Evans himself has 
argued that a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l effects r e s u l t from such,' learned 
usage. 
The view that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l e f f e c t s do not necessarily 
lead to v a l i d behaviour i s supported by the data of Experiment 6 
(see Chapter 8 ) . I n t h i s experiment, t r u t h status affected 
responses with regard to t h e i r l o g i c a l , rather than matching, 
status. As was seen i n section 12.2, i t was the I values of the 
Evans model that varied with t r u t h status. However, t h i s cannot 
be regarded as a consistent e f f e c t of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , as behaviour 
i n accordsince with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y was f a c i l i t a t e d on antecedent 
selections i n the 'true' condition and on consequent selections i n 
the 'false' condition. Thus t h i s appears to be an e f f e c t that i s 
related to the l o g i c a l structure of the problem but can not be 
held to be related to the subject's appreciation of the logic of 
the problem. 
However, i f the ef f e c t of t r u t h status i s taken as being 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l influence, then other findings of Experiment 6 
pose a problem f o r the Evans position. Evans assumes that 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l and operational factors are independent (although 
Evans, 1977» has accepted that there must be some interaction between 
nonlogical influences and rule form as, f o r instance, matching bias 
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i s not observed on disjunctive tasks). In Experiment 6, those 
subjects ('fast learners') who were 'immune* to the (interpretational) 
effects of t r u t h status on antecedent selections were also 
'immune' to the (operational) effects of matching bias on antecedent 
selections. As these subjects also selected more TA, and less 
FA, than slow learners, the following associations were observed 
i n the data; 
1) An association between the (operational) e f f e c t of matching 
bias and the ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l ) e f f e c t of behaviour i n 
accordance with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y on antecedent selections. 
2) An association between the above i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l e f f e c t 
ajid the e f f e c t of t r u t h status. 
3) An association between t r u t h status and matching bias. 
Thus, the e f f e c t of t r u t h status was associated with both 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l tendency (to select TA and r e j e c t FA), and an 
operational (matching) tendency, and these two tendencies were 
associated with each other. These associations are d i f f i c u l t to 
account f o r from the Evans point of view, but they are e n t i r e l y 
consistent with the position developed i n t h i s discussion. I f a l l 
preferred responses are a r e s u l t of behaviour acquired i n the 
solution of 'real l i f e ' problems, then there i s no essential 
difference between the influence of t r u t h status and the influence 
of matching (both being 'available* influences), even though one 
happens to relate to the l o g i c a l structure and the other does not. 
Similarly, there i s no essential difference between the influence 
that leads subjects to test conditional rules by evaluating TA, 
and the influence of t r u t h status, even though one happens to 
correlate with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y and the other does not. The subject 
w i l l behave i n accordance with these influences, dependent upon 
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t h e i r strength. I f f a s t learners have had greater experience of 
use of conditional relationships, as t h e i r faster learning of such 
relationships implies, then they w i l l have a stronger tendency, 
than other subjects, to evaluate TA. Clearly, a strong dominant 
response w i l l be less susceptible to other influences. 
In conclusion, although there are t y p i c a l l y observed 
responses that may be categorised as r e l a t i n g , or not r e l a t i n g , 
to the l o g i c a l structure of the problem, and responses that may be 
categorised as according, or not according, with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , 
there i s no reason to believe that these behaviours are fundamentally 
d i f f e r e n t from one another. 
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SECTION 12.7 OONCLUSIONS 
At the end of Part 1, i t was concluded that data from 
reasoning tasks could not be explained without taking account of 
'nonlogical' factors, unrelated to the l o g i c a l structure of the 
problem, i n addition to l o g i c a l l y v a l i d behaviour. However, the 
tr u t h status findings, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of Experiment 6, 
demonstrate that responses cannot simply be categorised in t o those 
depending on an appreciation of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , which relate to 
structure, and those that r e s u l t from a response bias, independent 
of structure. The e f f e c t of t r u t h status i n Experiment 6 related 
to the l o g i c a l structure of the task, but did not have a consistent 
e f f e c t i n terms of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y . This r e s u l t appears to 'blur' 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between ' l o g i c a l ' and 'nonlogical' factors. 
In Chapters 10 and 11, i t has been argued that there i s , 
i n f a c t , no essential difference between behaviours that accord 
with l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y and those that do not. I t was pointed out 
that l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i s not the salient dimension i n 'real l i f e ' 
problem solving (which requires correct, rather than v a l i d , 
decisions) and that behaviours th a t have been learned to solve 'real 
l i f e ' problems would be expected to produce l o g i c a l l y v a l i d responses 
on some, but not necessarily a l l , occasions. From t h i s point of 
view, the designation of responses as 'in t e r p r e t a t i o n a l ' or 
'operational' (or as 'related, or not related, to l o g i c a l structure') 
i s seen as an essentially i r r e l e v a n t categorisation imposed by the 
experimenter. 
I f t y p i c a l l y observed responses are held to have u t i l i t y 
i n r e a l l i f e , then i t i s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to consider the 
apparent response biases observed on reasoning tasks, as i t may at f i r s t 
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be thought that such responses could have no 'real l i f e * u t i l i t y . 
However, deeper analysis of these apparent response biases does 
indicate that they may serve a useful function i n 'real l i f e ' 
decision maiking. The functional u t i l i t y of behaviours that lead 
to v a l i d conclusions i s , presumably not i n question. The more 
controversial suggestion, advanced i n t h i s discussion, i s that 
subjects have acquired responses to specific aspects of problems 
and that, although such responses may sometimes accord with l o g i c a l 
v a l i d i t y , there i s no reason to assume ttiet an appreciation of that 
v a l i d i t y i s acquired with the response. 
Whether or not the reader i s convinced, from the points 
raised i n Chapters 10 and 1 1 , that there i s , at least, a case f o r 
arguing that such responses are acquired, i t cannot seriously be 
denied that subjects more frequently make v a l i d responses on 
problems of which they have some experience. The decision process 
i s f a c i l i t a t e d i f the subject is f a m i l i a r with the problem. For 
instance, subjects are experienced at using the word 'or' with 
r e l a t i o n to AA disjunctions. 
Another important variable i s the semantic content of 
the problem. Subjects' experience of the content of 'real l i f e ' 
problems w i l l have an important influence upon behaviour. For 
instance, many 'real l i f e ' inferences may be 'pragmatic', rather 
o 
than l o g i c a l , (Harris & Monaco, 1978) and d i r e c t evaluation of the 
conclusion has u t i l i t y when i t i s as easy to evaluate the conclusion 
as i t i s to evaluate the premisses, of an argument. Experiments 
5 and 6 indicate that even a small amount of p r i o r experience w i l l 
influence responses. 
I t has been the contention of t h i s discussion that 
subjects w i l l learn useful responses to problems that .they encounter 
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i n 'real l i f e ' , but that, when they encounter experimental problems 
i n which neither the content nor the structure relates to t h e i r 
p r i o r experience, i t i s not surprising i f t h e i r previously learned 
responses are inappropriate. On the basis of t h i s argument, if* 
i t i s required to investigate how subjects actually do solve 
problems i n 'real l i f e ' , then they must be given 'real l i f e ' problems 
to solve. . 
I t was intended to conclude t h i s discussion with some 
reference to early work on memory, but t h i s has been succinctly 
referred to by Evans (1978) who points out: " i t i s now generally 
acknowledged that the attempt . to investigate human memory v i a 
meaningless nonsense syllables was misguided ajid largely unproductive: 
the study of meaning or semantics i s central to the understanding 
of memory," In the same way, 'reasoning' cannot be investigated 
by the use of problems devoid of relevance to the subjects' 
experience, as the a b i l i t y to 'reason' i s an inseparable function 
of that experience. 
•385-
FOOTOOTES 
1. In f a c t , t h i s i s a very reasonable assumption as, i f (RM - RM) 
were not invariant across antecedent and consequent selections, 
i t would have to int e r a c t with a values i n a highly coincidental 
manner to produce the equality between (1 - aa) (RM - RM) and 
(1 - ac) (RM - RM). 
2. Surprisingly, there i s no difference between conditions i n 
the best estimates of each expression. Subjects i n the 'true* 
condition selected exactly as many more P, than P, cards and 
exactly as many more Q, than Q cards, as did subjects i n the 'false* 
condition. 
3. I t i s , of course, possible that the subject i ^ aware of matching, 
but supresses t h i s information i n his verbal report. 
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